Courts Are Not Meant to Endorse Bureaucratic Stubbornness – Punjab & Haryana High Court Slams Authorities for Denying Police Job Despite Innocence and Discharge

"When Police Declare a Candidate Innocent and Court Discharges Him, Denying Appointment is Abuse of Power" – In a strongly worded judgment Punjab and Haryana High Court, per Justice Jagmohan Bansal, came down heavily on the State of Haryana for denying appointment to a constable applicant despite his full disclosure of a pending FIR, being found innocent by police, and being discharged by the Trial Court. Allowing Civil Writ , the Court held that the rejection of Surender’s appointment was arbitrary, mechanical, and a clear violation of Rule 12.18 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 as well as binding precedent laid down by the Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P.

"This is a classical case of misuse of power and abuse of process of law. Officers dealing with the matter... have shown reprehensible attitude just to stick to their opinion. It shows that they have scant regard for the orders of Constitutional Courts." — Justice Jagmohan Bansal [Para 3]

The petitioner, Surender, applied for the post of Constable in response to an advertisement dated 30.12.2020 and completed all stages of the selection process. However, during the pendency of selection, an FIR No. 170 dated 23.08.2021 was registered against him under various provisions of the IPC and the IT Act.

Surender truthfully disclosed the FIR in his verification form. Crucially, the investigating officer filed a supplementary challan on 27.12.2022, placing Surender in Column No. 2, thereby declaring him innocent, and the Trial Court discharged him on 26.02.2024.

Despite these facts and repeated High Court directions, the respondents denied him appointment thrice, forcing him into three rounds of litigation.

Rule 12.18 of Punjab Police Rules: Court’s Interpretation

The central issue revolved around Rule 12.18(3) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, which categorises the treatment of candidates with criminal cases. The State wrongly applied Clause (d) to Surender’s case, ignoring Clause (c) which clearly applied.

Clause (c) applies where the case is "withdrawn, cancelled, sent untraced, or acquitted" — such candidates are to be appointed.
Clause (d) applies where a "cancellation report or untraced report" is pending approval by a Court.

The Court noted:

“The respondent has intentionally and mischievously skipped Clause (c)... The police had already filed supplementary challan disclosing him innocent... he was not an accused in any FIR on the date of verification.” [Para 15]

Violation of Judicial Directions and Mechanical Decision-Making

Justice Bansal observed that the respondent authority relied blindly on the opinion of the Assistant District Attorney, even though the High Court had specifically directed consideration of Surender’s case in light of Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., (2024) 5 SCC 264.

“There was no direction to Assistant District Attorney to adjudicate the matter. By relying upon opinion of ADA, the Commandant has grossly violated orders of this Court and attempted to deflect from his duty.” [Para 9]

The Court also criticized reliance on instructions dated 27.09.2024, issued after the date of verification, calling it a deliberate misapplication:

“It is surprising that respondent has considered instructions of September 2024 whereas verification was conducted in October 2023... The respondent was duty bound to consider applicable Rules instead.” [Para 10]

Disregard of Supreme Court Judgment in Ravindra Kumar

Despite the petitioner’s case falling squarely within the protective umbrella of the Ravindra Kumar ruling, the State mechanically distinguished it on facts, ignoring its core ratio.

“The respondent has tried to apply facts of Ravindra Kumar to instant case and miserably discarded the ratio... It is ratio of a judgment which is considered precedent... not its facts.” [Para 18]

The Supreme Court in Ravindra Kumar had laid down that acquitted or discharged candidates who made full disclosure cannot be denied appointment unless the offence was serious or disclosure was deliberately suppressed.

The High Court reiterated:

“The respondent has not examined even a single aspect as mandated by the Supreme Court whereas has attempted to distinguish facts... because of narrow and limited appreciation of judgment.” [Para 19]

Holding the rejection of appointment as manifestly arbitrary, non-application of mind, and an abuse of authority, the Court allowed the writ petition:

“The respondent unnecessarily dragged the petitioner to multiple rounds of litigation. This is a fit case for imposing costs upon the respondent.” [Para 21]

Accordingly, the High Court:

• Quashed the rejection order dated 16.04.2025;

• Directed the respondents to appoint the petitioner within two weeks;

• Granted all notional benefits, including seniority and continuity of service, from the date similarly placed candidates joined;

• Imposed ₹50,000 costs on the respondent authorities, payable within two weeks.

This judgment stands as a resounding reaffirmation of the constitutional duty of public authorities to act fairly, reasonably, and in compliance with judicial directions. The High Court not only condemned the mechanical conduct of the authorities but also ensured justice to the petitioner, who had done everything the law required.

“Courts are not meant to endorse bureaucratic stubbornness or shield administrative injustice behind procedural smokescreens. When police find a candidate innocent and the court discharges him, denying employment is not administration—it's harassment.” — Justice Jagmohan Bansal

Date of Decision: 18 July 2025