Conviction Can Stand, But Sentence Must Serve Justice: Supreme Court Reduces Imprisonment in Grievous Hurt Case After Compromise Between Parties

“Once Parties Have Compounded Their Dispute and Substantial Sentence is Undergone, Continued Incarceration Serves No Purpose”, Supreme Court of India, in the case of Venkatesh & Another vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, delivered a significant ruling on sentencing discretion in criminal law. While refusing to interfere with the conviction of the appellants under Section 326 IPC and Section 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992, the Court invoked its equitable jurisdiction to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, considering the amicable compromise between the parties and the fact that the appellants had already spent over two years in custody.

A bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Prasanna B. Varale held: “We reduce the sentence to the period already undergone. The appellants shall be released forthwith if they are otherwise not required in any other case.”

This case represents a rare judicial instance where the Apex Court, while upholding the rule of law, simultaneously applied the principles of restorative justice and proportionality in sentencing, reiterating that punishment must be tailored to the facts, fairness, and future prospects—not merely the statute book.

Supreme Court Confines Appeal to Quantum of Sentence—"Notice was issued only on the question of sentence"

The appellants had been convicted by the Trial Court on November 3, 2020, in Sessions Case No. 460/2016 for offences under Section 326 IPC, relating to voluntarily causing grievous hurt with dangerous weapons, and under Section 3(1) of the TNPPDL Act for damage to property. They were sentenced to five years and two years of rigorous imprisonment respectively, with the sentences running concurrently.

The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Madras High Court on February 7, 2023. However, the Supreme Court, after granting special leave, made it clear at the outset that the scope of the appeal would be restricted.
“This Court had issued notice to the respondents only on the question of sentence,” the Bench recorded, clarifying that the Court would not reopen findings of guilt but would examine only whether continued imprisonment was necessary.

“Out of five years, two years and three months already undergone”—Court finds sentence reduction justified in view of compromise

What made the case unusual was that during the pendency of the SLP, a compromise was reached between the appellants and the de facto complainant, who was subsequently impleaded by the Court on record. The appellants argued that given the amicable settlement, their time already served in custody should be treated as sufficient punishment.

The Court accepted the plea, observing:
“We take note of the facts and circumstances of the case. We find that out of five years of sentence imposed on the appellants, they have already completed two years and three months. Therefore, while upholding the conviction… we reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.”

“Court’s power to do complete justice extends to sentencing, where equity and law must align”

The Court’s decision rests on a larger jurisprudential principle—that even in cases where compounding the offence may not be legally permissible under Section 320 CrPC, a post-conviction compromise and conduct of the parties can guide sentencing discretion, especially where the conviction is not under challenge.

While the Court did not refer to earlier judgments explicitly, its approach is consistent with precedents such as Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) and Ram Pujan v. State of U.P., where the Supreme Court had held that “compromise can be a relevant consideration in determining the quantum of sentence.”

Here too, the Court emphasized judicial pragmatism, choosing not to enforce the sentence rigidly where the purpose of punishment had already been served, especially in light of the reconciliation and the absence of continuing threat to public order or interest.

“Sentence is not a vengeance mechanism—it must reflect justice, not retaliation”

Through this judgment, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed a core tenet of criminal jurisprudence: sentence must serve justice, not vengeance. The Bench was clearly conscious of the balance between the gravity of the offence and the need for rehabilitation, noting that the appellants had already undergone substantial imprisonment, and further incarceration would amount to unjust enrichment of punishment without additional benefit to society.

The Court concluded: “The appellants shall be released forthwith from the jail in which they are incarcerated, if they are otherwise not required in any other case.”

The appeal was accordingly allowed, but the conviction remained undisturbed, signalling a judicial message that leniency in sentence is not an erasure of guilt, but a measured response to evolving circumstances.

Date of Decision: December 2, 2025