Common Intention Cannot Be Presumed from Vague Allegations: Allahabad High Court Affirms Acquittal in 1984 Attempt to Murder Case After 37 Years

“Where evidence falls far short of showing that the accused ever entered into a pre-meditated concert… care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention.” - Allahabad High Court upholding the acquittal of three men accused of attempted murder and assault in a 1984 village land dispute. The Bench of Justice Rajiv Gupta and Justice Subhash Chandra Sharma dismissed the State’s appeal, observing that the trial court’s view was plausible and did not suffer from any perversity or illegality. Reaffirming long-settled principles on the burden in appeals against acquittal, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish common intention under Section 34 IPC or connect the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

“The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets further strengthened by acquittal — unless the findings are manifestly erroneous, appellate interference is not warranted.”

The State had appealed against the 1988 judgment of acquittal passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia, in Sessions Trial No. 232 of 1985. The FIR, lodged on 24th December 1984, alleged that Sudama Singh fired a gun and three co-accused — Parshu Ram, Uday Singh and Shyama Singh — assaulted the complainant Suresh Ram and his family with lathis over a land dispute. Several injuries were recorded in medical reports, but most were caused by firearm pellets. The prosecution claimed a coordinated attack, but the trial court acquitted all accused, finding the evidence insufficient to prove common intention or individual liability for grievous hurt.

“No prosecution witness attributed the injury to any specific accused — and the only blunt injury reported was superficial in nature.”

Justice Rajiv Gupta, speaking for the Bench, examined the injuries and testimonies in detail and noted that none of the witnesses were able to identify who among the lathi-wielding accused inflicted injuries. The Court remarked: “There is only one lacerated wound shown to be caused to the victim Lakshminiya, which too is superficial in nature… no internal damage has been noted… and during testimony, the author of the single injury was not identified.”

The first informant Suresh Ram claimed he was assaulted, but he bore no injury and was not even medically examined, which the Court found critical in assessing credibility: “From careful perusal of the record and the injury reports, we find that he has not received any lathi injury… his testimony to this extent becomes unreliable.”

On the application of Section 34 IPC, the Court quoted the Privy Council in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, stating: “To invoke the aid of Section 34 IPC successfully, it must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all… common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan… Where evidence falls far short of showing such concert, care must be taken not to confuse same or similar intention with common intention.”

The Court concluded that no such pre-arranged plan or concerted action was established in the prosecution’s evidence. It added: “In view thereof, it cannot be said that the offence has been committed in furtherance of the common intention, and the prosecution story becomes doubtful… The possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out.”

“The view taken by the trial court is plausible, reasonable and free from perversity — the appellate court need not disturb it merely because another view is possible.”

The High Court declined to overturn the acquittal, emphasizing that the trial court had given a well-reasoned decision based on the evidence. It held: “The reasoning adopted by the learned Trial Judge is based upon proper application of judicial mind. No illegality or infirmity is found in the impugned judgment… it needs no interference by this Court.”

Dismissing the appeal after nearly four decades, the judgment underscores the strict standard required to reverse acquittals and the judicial discipline expected in distinguishing between mere presence and active participation with common intention.

Date of Decision: 10th April 2025