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by Admin
28 December 2025 10:17 AM
“An FIR cannot be a substitute for a complaint by a court when the alleged offences directly arise from judicial proceedings – Section 195 CrPC is not a mere formality, it is a jurisdictional bar.” – Madras High Court
In a significant reaffirmation of judicial sanctity and procedural law, the Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court quashed the FIR (RC0502024S0013 dated 08.08.2024) and subsequent charge sheet filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) against Mr. A.G. Ponmanickavel, a retired Inspector General of Police and Special Officer of the Tamil Nadu Idol Wing – CID. The Court held that the initiation and continuation of criminal proceedings by the CBI were in direct violation of the express bar under Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and amounted to a misuse of process.
Justice Dr. R.N. Manjula categorically found that the entire criminal process initiated against the petitioner was vitiated, both procedurally and legally, and thus deserved to be struck down in toto.
“Once the Court Has Appointed an Officer and Barred Enquiry Without Its Leave, No Agency Can Circumvent That by Filing an FIR”
The case is embedded in a chain of judicial directions and findings that stemmed from the writ proceedings in W.P. Nos. 20392 and 20963 of 2018, where a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, after noting the commendable and impartial work of Mr. A.G. Ponmanickavel in recovering over 1000 stolen idols, had appointed him as Special Officer to head the Idol Wing even after his retirement, and explicitly directed that:
“No action or enquiry against the Special Officer or any member of his team shall be initiated except with the concurrence of this Court. If any materials are there to rely upon for necessary action, the same shall be placed before this Court for further directions.”
Despite this, the CBI registered an FIR and filed a chargesheet against him without seeking or obtaining such concurrence, acting on the complaint of Mr. Kadar Batcha, a police officer who had himself been implicated in one of the idol theft cases being investigated by Ponmanickavel.
The Court noted that the entire trajectory of events was legally untenable, observing: “The FIR itself is non-est and redundant, as it has been registered not only in excess of the authority... but also in direct breach of binding judicial directions.”
“When the Allegation is of Fabricating Evidence in Court Proceedings, Only the Court Can Set the Law in Motion – Not the Police”
The High Court gave detailed reasoning on why the FIR and charge sheet could not be sustained in law. It reiterated that allegations related to the fabrication or use of false evidence in judicial proceedings fall squarely within the domain of Section 195(1)(b) CrPC, which provides that no court shall take cognizance of such offences except on a complaint made by the very court before which the offence is said to have been committed.
The Court said: “In view of the bar created under Section 195(1)(b)(i) of Cr.P.C., if the alleged offence has been committed in relation to a proceeding in any Court, the FIR registered for the said offences, which are exclusively triable by the Magistrate, is a clear abuse of process of law.”
“Such a course is impermissible in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah vs. Meenakshi Marwah, 2005 (4) SCC 370, wherein it has been clearly held that only the Court before which the offence is committed can file a complaint under Section 340 CrPC.”
The offences alleged against Ponmanickavel – Sections 193, 195A, 196, 211 IPC, among others – are precisely those which fall within the prohibition laid down in Section 195, and the court unequivocally held that CBI had no jurisdiction to register an FIR or investigate without a complaint from the concerned court.
“Approver’s Confession Admitted by Court Cannot Later Become Basis to Prosecute the Investigating Officer Who Relied on It”
One of the core allegations in the CBI’s FIR was that Mr. Ponmanickavel fabricated evidence by using confessional statements of a now-deceased accused, Deenadayalan, who had turned approver.
The Court found this argument legally absurd and factually baseless: “When the confessional statement has been accepted by the court and recorded after complying with statutory requirements, it cannot be presumed to be a manipulated one merely because it implicates certain persons.”
“It is not open for the prosecution to turn around later and allege that the very confession that was relied upon by the prosecution itself is a fabrication.”
The Court warned that if such logic were to be accepted, no investigation would be safe from retaliatory prosecution, and added: “If such baseless reports are allowed to be given undue importance... then in every case involving police officials, an opposite syndicate will start acting against the investigating team and try to sabotage the material gathered and filed in the court.”
“Complaint by an Accused in a Case Investigated by the Officer Cannot Be the Basis to Prosecute That Officer in a Retaliatory FIR”
The Court also took strong exception to the motivations and origin of the FIR. It emphasized that the entire criminal proceedings against Ponmanickavel originated from the representations of a person who was an accused in the very idol theft case being investigated by the officer.
“The complainant in the present FIR is a person who was already shown as an accused in the idol theft case. A person who had been the subject of investigation by the team is now allowed to retaliate through criminal proceedings. This flips the very concept of impartial investigation on its head.”
The Court likened the situation to a role reversal engineered through misuse of the criminal process, observing: “A person who was considered as a hero has been reversed to a villain now. And that too, on the complaint of someone who was investigated by him for a serious cultural crime.”
“The Preliminary Report Cannot Be Hidden – Natural Justice and Article 21 Demand Its Disclosure”
In Crl.O.P.(MD) No.2263 of 2025, the petitioner had also challenged the order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai, refusing to provide a copy of the preliminary enquiry report filed by the CBI. The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in S.P. Velumani v. Arappor Iyakkam, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 507, which held that denial of such a document amounts to a violation of natural justice and the right to fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The High Court observed: “The prosecution by the State ought to be carried out in a manner consistent with the right to fair trial, as enshrined under Article 21... The accused is entitled to know the material based on which he is being investigated and prosecuted.”
However, since the entire FIR and proceedings were quashed, the Court held that the petition seeking the preliminary report had become infructuous, and accordingly closed it.
FIR Quashed, Chargesheet Quashed, Prosecution Barred
Concluding the 86-page judgment, Justice Dr. R.N. Manjula delivered a categorical ruling, noting that: “This Court is constrained to hold that the entire process followed by the first respondent is in gross violation of the earlier orders passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench... The very registration of the FIR and filing of chargesheet are vitiated by jurisdictional error, legal bar, and procedural impropriety.”
The FIR RC0502024S0013 and entire prosecution launched by the CBI against Mr. A.G. Ponmanickavel were quashed in entirety.
The case is now a landmark reaffirmation of the procedural safeguards under Section 195 and 340 CrPC, the boundaries of executive power, and the court’s exclusive domain in protecting the integrity of its own proceedings.
Date of Decision: 26.09.2025