An Excuse Is Not An Explanation: Supreme Court Redefines The Contours Of “Sufficient Cause” Under Section 5 of Limitation Act

“Condonation Of Delay Must Remain An Exception, Not The Rule” - Supreme Court of India in Karnataka Housing Board v. Basavaraj delivered a significant ruling on the scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, clarifying what is to be understood by the term “sufficient cause.” A Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan drew a sharp line between genuine explanations that justify condonation and excuses that merely mask negligence or bureaucratic lethargy.

The Court made it clear that the power to condone delay is not meant to rescue careless litigants. “Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant,” the Bench observed.

From Explanation To Excuse: The Fine Distinction

The judgment highlights that “sufficient cause” cannot be allowed to degenerate into a ritualistic phrase. The Court drew a conceptual distinction that may well guide future litigation: “An ‘excuse’ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. An ‘explanation’, on the other hand, demonstrates genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, devoid of negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides.”

With these words, the Court dismantled the habitual reliance of State agencies on bureaucratic red-tapism as a ground for delay. Such explanations, it said, more often than not fall into the category of excuses, and courts must be “loathe in accepting such explanations as sufficient cause.”

Length Of Delay And Irrelevance Of Merits

In the case at hand, the Karnataka Housing Board had delayed its second appeal by almost eleven years, a staggering 3966 days. The High Court had condoned the delay on the ground of official negligence. The Supreme Court, however, struck down that indulgence, emphasising that “the length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration.”

The Court also sent a strong message to the lower judiciary: “While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation.”

Public Interest Cannot Shelter Negligence

The judgment further clarified that public interest does not lie in excusing the lapses of State instrumentalities. “Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that functions with diligence and accountability.”

The Court therefore rejected the long-standing practice of granting leniency to government bodies under the cover of “institutional delay,” noting that such indulgence only fosters inefficiency and betrays the very purpose of limitation statutes.

In setting aside the High Court’s condonation of delay, the Supreme Court has given fresh teeth to the principle that limitation laws are rooted in public policy. They exist not to punish but to ensure finality, discipline, and certainty in litigation. By warning that “sufficient cause” is an explanation and not an excuse, the Court has reinforced that judicial discretion must be exercised cautiously and never as a routine indulgence.

The ruling places both private and governmental litigants on equal footing and signals to the High Courts that laxity, indifference, and bureaucratic apathy can no longer pass as sufficient grounds for condoning delay.

Date of Decision: 12th September 2025