All Orders Means All Orders– Orissa High Court Holds Even Interlocutory Orders in Panchayat Election Disputes Are Appealable Under Section 38(4)

“Narrow Interpretation of Appeal Rights is Statutorily Unsustainable; ‘All Orders’ Cannot Be Read as ‘Some Orders….Where Legislature Says ‘All Orders’, Courts Cannot Read ‘Only Final Orders’”, In a significant ruling  the Orissa High Court emphatically held that interlocutory orders passed by the Civil Judge under the Orissa Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 are appealable under Section 38(4) of the Act.

Justice Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, dismissing the writ petition, reaffirmed the principle that where a statute confers a specific appellate remedy, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 must be exercised only sparingly.

The Court decisively ruled: “The word ‘all orders’ under Section 38(3) must be read as ‘any order’, including interlocutory ones. A restrictive interpretation contrary to the plain language of the statute would be judicial legislation.”

“Writ Petition is Not Maintainable Where a Statutory Appeal Exists”: High Court Declines to Interfere

The dispute arose when the petitioner, Sanjeeb Kumar Kar, who was elected Sarapanch of Tentulida Gram Panchayat on 28 January 2022, sought to challenge the condonation of delay granted to the election petitioner (Opposite Party No.1) by the Civil Judge, Balasore, in Election Misc. Case No. 20 of 2022.

The election petition had been filed beyond the 15-day limit prescribed under Section 31 of the Act. The condonation of delay was challenged on the ground that the medical certificate produced by the election petitioner was fabricated—an allegation supported by RTI data from Fakir Mohan Medical College.

Despite the substance of the challenge, the High Court refused to enter into the merits, holding that the proper forum for such grievance is an appeal before the District Judge, not a writ court.

Court Clarifies: “An Appeal Lies Against Any Order of the Civil Judge, Not Just Final Ones”

Justice Satapathy undertook a thorough examination of Section 38(3) and 38(4) of the Act, which state:

“All orders of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), be final and conclusive… Any person aggrieved by an order… may… prefer an appeal before the District Judge…”

The petitioner argued that only final orders under sub-sections (1) and (2)—either dismissing or allowing the election petition—were appealable, and cited the decisions in Niranjan Sahu v. Narasu Satpathy and Sasmita Pradhan v. District Collector in support.

The Court unequivocally rejected that reading: The word ‘all orders’ does not merely mean final orders. To restrict it only to orders under sub-sections (1) and (2) would defeat the clear language and intent of the legislature.
“The view expressed in Niranjan Sahu and Sasmita Pradhan is per incuriam and does not bind this Court.”

Earlier Rulings Termed Per Incuriam – “Not Binding Where Rendered in Ignorance of Statutory Text”

Declaring the earlier decisions as per incuriam, the Court observed:The decision in Niranjan Sahu was rendered without considering the statutory structure of Section 38 or binding precedents such as Digambar Pradhan v. Arjun Pradhan, 1972 (1) CWR 74. Such rulings cannot govern the field.

Quoting the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., the Court reminded:

“A decision once rendered must later bind like cases. But in exceptional instances where a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision, it may not have the sway of binding precedent.”

The High Court reaffirmed that judicial discipline requires deference to the statute, not perpetuation of past oversight:

“The principle of per incuriam denudes a decision of its precedential value. A coordinate bench can decline to follow such a ruling.” (Shah Faesal v. Union of India, (2020) 4 SCC 1)

“Interpretation Must Match Legislative Intent; Text and Context Both Matter”

The Court adopted a purposive interpretation of the statute, citing Allahabad University v. Gitanjali Tiwari (2024):

“Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. A statute is best understood when read through the lens of the statute-maker.”

Further relying on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021), it reiterated:

“Words of a statute must be given a sensible meaning which aligns with the statutory scheme and legislative intent.”

The Court also interpreted the word “any”—appearing in similar statutory contexts—as meaning “all or every”, citing K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan (2005) and Om Prakash Bhatia v. Commissioner of Customs (2003).

“Where the statute uses the phrase ‘any order’ or ‘all orders’, courts must resist the temptation to read them down to ‘some orders’. Legislative language must be respected.”

Appellate Forum is the Right Forum

Though the petition was dismissed on maintainability, the Court offered procedural relief:

“If an appeal is filed within two weeks from receipt of this order, the appellate Court shall entertain it and decide the issue on merits by condoning the delay.”

The High Court returned the certified copy of the impugned order to the petitioner and clarified:

“This Court has not gone into the merits. The appellate court is free to adjudicate the contentions raised.”

Date of Decision: 21 July 2025