A Writ Petition Cannot Be Used to Challenge a Judicial Order or Assert Ownership Disputes: Supreme Court Dismisses Article 32 Petition in  Fraud Case

“No writ lies against a judicial order—and certainly not to assert a private ownership dispute disguised as a fundamental rights violation.” —  Supreme Court Clarifies Limits of Article 32 Jurisdiction, Dismisses Writ Petition Despite Acknowledging Fraud in Compensation Proceedings. In its significant judgment Supreme Court not only unraveled a fraud committed in land compensation proceedings but also delivered a categorical ruling on the boundaries of Article 32 of the Constitution.

While allowing the civil appeal and declaring its own earlier decision in Reddy Veerana (2022) a nullity due to fraud, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 32, holding that no fundamental right had been violated, and more importantly, that a writ petition cannot lie against a judicial order.

“Article 32 Is Not a Catch-All Remedy”: Court Emphasises That Private Civil Disputes Cannot Be Masqueraded as Constitutional Claims

Vishnu Vardhan had filed a writ petition invoking Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21, and 300A, claiming that his fundamental rights were violated because the High Court had awarded the entire land acquisition compensation to Reddy Veerana without hearing him.

However, the Supreme Court was unsparing in its analysis of the writ's deficiencies:

“Merely stating that Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 have been violated is not enough. A petition under Article 32 must clearly establish how a fundamental right is infringed and the consequence thereof.”

Citing D.A.V. College v. State of Punjab, the Court reiterated that mere apprehension or a general assertion of violation is not a ground for maintainability under Article 32. The judgment stressed that the writ petition “reads more like a challenge to a property dispute” than a genuine constitutional grievance.

“Writ Jurisdiction Under Article 32 Is Not Available Against Judicial Orders”: Court Reaffirms the Principle Laid Down in Naresh Mirajkar

The Court further held that even if Vishnu had alleged a fundamental right violation, the challenge was fundamentally flawed because it was directed against a judicial order of the High Court, which is impermissible under Article 32.

Quoting from the nine-judge Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court stated:

“It is singularly inappropriate to assume that a judicial decision of a competent court can be said to affect fundamental rights under Article 19(1).”

The Court noted that Vishnu’s petition effectively sought to overturn a High Court judgment by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32—an approach that was procedurally and constitutionally unsustainable.

“Violation of Article 300A Does Not Confer Jurisdiction Under Article 32”: Court Distinguishes Between Legal and Fundamental Rights

Vishnu had also relied on Article 300A (right to property), arguing that denial of compensation violated his constitutional rights. But the Court pointed out:

“Article 300A is not part of the fundamental rights chapter. Though it guarantees protection of property, it is enforceable under Article 226, not Article 32.”

The Court relied on its Constitution Bench ruling in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab to underline that remedy for property rights must be sought before High Courts, and not through direct writs to the Supreme Court under Article 32.

“Let There Be No Confusion: A Poorly Drafted Writ Petition Cannot Open Constitutional Doors” — Supreme Court Urges Caution in Invoking Article 32

Reflecting on the broader trend of litigants misusing constitutional remedies, the Bench remarked:

“It has become customary to vaguely allege arbitrariness or violation of natural justice under Article 32. But this Court will not entertain such petitions without clear pleadings.”

Reiterating that Article 32 is not an appellate forum for every grievance, the Court warned against “camouflaging statutory violations as constitutional injuries.”

Decision Reflects Judicial Discipline: Despite Fraud, the Court Refused to Stretch Article 32 Beyond Constitutional Bounds

The dismissal of the writ petition is notable because it demonstrates that even in compelling cases involving fraud, the Supreme Court will maintain the integrity of its constitutional jurisdiction.

While it offered Vishnu relief via civil appeal and recall of its own earlier judgment, it held firmly:

“In the absence of specific and justiciable violation of a fundamental right, Article 32 cannot be invoked.”

Thus, the Court reinforced that the route to constitutional remedies must not be paved with procedural shortcuts or vague pleadings, no matter how sympathetic the underlying grievance.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Vishnu Vardhan v. State of U.P. is a clarion call for constitutional clarity. Even as it exposed and rectified a grave fraud, the Court stood by the procedural discipline and legal limits of Article 32, refusing to dilute its constitutional character.

“Justice cannot be achieved by bypassing constitutional structure. Article 32 is a shield for fundamental rights, not a weapon for private disputes.”

Date of Decision: July 23, 2025