“A Child May Be Tried with Adults, But Cannot Be Punished Like One” – Allahabad High Court Modifies Life Sentence of Juvenile Convicts in 1982 Murder Case

“Trial Court Ignored That the Accused Were 13 and 15 – Law Mandated Reform, Not Incarceration” – High Court Declares Sentence Illegal Under U.P. Children Act, 1951. In a judgment Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice Siddharth and Justice Avnish Saxena, delivered a significant ruling in Criminal Appeal, revisiting the conviction and sentencing of two juveniles in a 1982 murder case. While affirming their conviction under Sections 302/149 and 147 IPC, the Court modified their life sentence to the period already undergone, citing gross illegality by the trial court in sentencing minors as adults, in violation of the U.P. Children Act, 1951.

The Court observed, “The trial court was aware that the accused were below 16 years but still sentenced them to life imprisonment without any certification as required under Section 27 of the U.P. Children Act. Such a sentence is impermissible in law.”

“Juvenility Was Ignored Though Recorded” – Trial Court Failed to Apply Protective Provisions

The two appellants, Chhedi and Madan, were 13 and 15 years old, respectively, at the time of the incident on 8 April 1982. Their school leaving certificate and municipal birth records—filed along with affidavits—remained uncontroverted. Moreover, the trial court itself recorded their ages as below 16 while examining them under Section 313 CrPC.

Despite this, the trial court concluded: “Any person of 12 or more than 12 years of age could be held responsible for committing the crime.”

The High Court rejected this reasoning outright: “The trial judge merely observed that both accused were over 12 but failed to consider that, under the 1951 Act, a ‘child’ is anyone under 16, and a ‘youthful offender’ means a child convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment.”

Mandatory Legal Procedure for Juveniles Was Omitted

Section 27 of the U.P. Children Act, 1951 prohibits imprisonment of children unless the court specifically certifies that the child is “so unruly or depraved a character that he is not fit to be sent to an approved school.” No such finding or certificate was made by the trial court.

The High Court held: “There is no observation, much less a certification, by the trial judge that either of the two children was unruly or depraved. In the absence of this, the sentence to prison is contrary to law.”

Furthermore, under Section 33 of the Act, the court was bound to consider alternate methods of dealing with convicted children—such as probation, custody with a guardian, or placement in an approved school—none of which were even discussed in the trial court's judgment.

Joint Trial with Adults Permissible, But Sentencing Must Be Separate

Though the 1951 Act under Section 63 allowed juveniles to be tried jointly with adults, it explicitly required that any sentence awarded must conform to the special provisions for children. The High Court clarified:

“Joint trial does not empower a court to sentence a child like an adult. The sentence must be awarded strictly in accordance with the Children Act.”

Evidence Clearly Proved Guilt – Conviction Stands

While modifying the sentence, the Court firmly upheld the conviction of both appellants under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, as members of an unlawful assembly that murdered one Lakhan over a neighborhood drain dispute.

Eyewitnesses, including the deceased's mother (PW-1) and sister (PW-3), consistently testified that Madan delivered a fatal brick blow to the head, while Chhedi struck with a lathi. This was corroborated by hostile but partly reliable witness Vishnu (PW-2), who confirmed Madan's role and presence.

The Court found: “The role of Chhedi and Madan was clearly established by direct ocular testimony. Their active participation in the fatal assault leaves no room for doubt. The conviction is therefore affirmed.”

It also dismissed the defence arguments about faulty identification due to night-time, citing the moonlight and lantern, and the fact that the assailants were known neighbours:

“The visibility of villagers attuned to country lamps is not to be judged by urban standards. Identification was natural and convincing.”

Delay in Appeal Did Not Weaken Rights of Juveniles

This 41-year-old appeal had remained pending while three of the five original appellants passed away. But the Court held that juvenile rights survive the passage of time, and applications to determine juvenility can be moved even at the appellate stage, relying on Ashok Kumar Mehra v. State of Punjab.

The High Court further cited its own earlier ruling in Mohd. Gufran v. State of U.P., clarifying that the U.P. Children Act, 1951 governed this case, as the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 came into effect only after the date of offence.

The Court ultimately ruled: “The two appellants were children under the U.P. Children Act at the time of incident. Their conviction under Section 302/149 and 147 IPC is upheld. However, their sentence to life imprisonment is illegal and is modified to the period already undergone.”

This judgment reinforces a critical constitutional and statutory safeguard: that children, even if tried with adults, must be sentenced as children. Reform, not retribution, remains the core of juvenile justice.

Date of Decision: 23 July 2025