151 CPC | Police Cannot Be Used As An Instrument To Circumvent Adjudication: Calcutta High Court Quashes Illegal Possession Restoration Order

“Ex-Parte Injunction Does Not Confer Possession Rights; Courts Must Exercise Section 151 CPC With Caution”: Calcutta High Court delivered a resounding judgment reasserting judicial discipline in civil disputes over possession. Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya decisively held that “police help cannot be granted merely on the asking of a party, especially in matters where possession is disputed and unsettled.” The judgment decisively quashed the Trial Court’s order that had, without any inquiry or adjudication, allowed the police to forcibly oust a party based solely on an interim injunction. By restoring possession to the petitioner, the High Court reaffirmed that the principles of natural justice and proper adjudication cannot be bypassed in civil proceedings under the garb of inherent powers.

The conflict arose around a shop room trading as ‘M/s Tul Tul Bhandar.’ Mohibul Molla, the respondent, filed a civil suit claiming himself to be the sole owner and occupant of the shop room, seeking protection against alleged interference by Halim Molla, the petitioner. Relying on these claims, the Trial Court granted an ad-interim injunction on 18th December 2024, directing that “the defendant and his agents are restrained from disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiff till January 16, 2025.”

However, by mid-January 2025, the respondent claimed that the petitioner forcibly locked the shop in violation of the injunction. The respondent then secured a police help order under Section 151 CPC on 15th May 2025, allowing possession to be restored with police assistance. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court stating that he had been running the business since 1984 with a valid trade license, and had been forcibly dispossessed without any due adjudication of his possession rights.

Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharyya framed the central issue with remarkable clarity: “The question before this Court is not whether the Court can grant mandatory injunction restoring possession, but whether the Court can pass an order for police help on the mere asking of a party in the absence of any adjudication.” The High Court delved into the limits of inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court categorically held that “ad-interim orders passed ex parte, based solely on the plaintiff's version, do not conclusively determine possession rights,” pointing out that such orders are inherently interlocutory and subject to final determination after hearing both sides.

Highlighting a glaring oversight by the Trial Court, the High Court noted: “The Trial Court proceeded to grant police help without considering the written objections, without conducting any inquiry, and without returning any finding that the petitioner had violated the injunction.” This, according to the High Court, was a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

The Court reinforced its conclusion by relying on the binding precedent in Joydeb Das vs. Khandubala Das (2012), observing that “in cases where allegations of possession disputes are denied, courts must conduct an inquiry before directing police action. Without this, granting police help is impermissible.”

Justice Bhattacharyya also referred to the decision in Gouri Das vs. Nani Bhattacharjee (2020), stating, “It is well settled that orders for police help should not be passed casually or routinely. Courts must exercise utmost caution, especially where possession itself is in dispute.”

The High Court took critical note of the Trial Court’s silence on the petitioner’s claim of long-standing possession: “The Trial Court neither acknowledged nor adjudicated the petitioner’s assertion that he has been running the shop since 1984 under a valid trade license. Such oversight strikes at the root of judicial fairness.”

Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling in P.R. Murlidharan vs. Swami Dharmananda (2006), the Court underlined that “police protection can only be granted when rights are established by a decree or a definitive interlocutory order. No such determination existed here.”

Justice Bhattacharyya delivered a powerful reminder on judicial restraint: “Inherent powers cannot be exercised in disregard of specific provisions in the Code, such as Order 39 Rule 2A, which provides a structured mechanism to deal with violation of injunctions.”

The Court scrutinised the timeline, observing that “the respondent admitted in his complaint that he was dispossessed by 14th January 2025, before the injunction was even extended. This undisputed fact demolished the basis of his claim to police help in May 2025.”

Slamming the manner in which possession was restored by police action, the Court remarked, “The very purpose of civil adjudication stands frustrated when courts allow one party to secure police assistance without determining who was in possession.”

In a significant conclusion, the High Court ruled that “without a clear finding of wrongful dispossession or violation of injunction, no order for restoration of possession could have been made against the petitioner.”

Directing restoration of possession to the petitioner, Justice Bhattacharyya stated, “The police are directed to hand over the keys of the padlocked shop to the petitioner. The Trial Court shall adjudicate the injunction application afresh, uninfluenced by the interim orders.”

Summarising the decision, the Calcutta High Court categorically set aside the Trial Court’s order, directed the police to return the shop to the petitioner, and instructed the Trial Court to hear both sides and decide the matter in accordance with law. Justice Bhattacharyya aptly concluded, “Courts must resist the temptation to allow police machinery to be used in civil disputes where the facts are contested and possession unsettled. Judicial orders cannot become instruments of oppression without the test of adjudication.”

This decision stands as a stern reminder against the misuse of interim injunctions and inherent powers, reaffirming the fundamental tenets of procedural fairness and judicial caution.

Date of Decision: 18th July 2025