Facts:

The respondent, ABB Ltd., a Public Limited Company, was engaged in the manufacture and sale of engineering goods.

The Delhi Metro Railway Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) invited tenders for the supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of various electrical equipment for a specific project.

The respondent entered into a contract with DMRC to provide transformers, switch-gears, High Voltage Cables, SCADA system, and other electrical solutions.

The dispute arose when the respondent was asked to pay Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) on the deemed sales made to DMRC.

Issues:

Whether the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract between the respondent and DMRC.

Held:

The High Court held that the inter-State movement of goods was in pursuance of and incidental to the contract for the supply of goods used in the execution of the works contract with DMRC.

The transactions constituting inter-State trade and those constituting sale or purchase in the course of import were deemed exempt from taxation under the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004, based on Section 3(a) and Section 5(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

The High Court's decision was based on a detailed examination of the relevant contract terms, specifications, and conditions, concluding that the movement of goods was integral to fulfilling the terms of the contract with DMRC.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking partition, challenging sale deeds, and claiming possession and mesne profits.

Allegations included improper alienation of ancestral property by the guardian without legal necessity.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed in 1989 for setting aside the sale deed dated 20.01.1982 is within limitation.

Applicability of Articles under the Limitation Act, particularly Article 60 and Article 109.

Held:

The court held that the suit is governed by Article 60 of the Limitation Act, applicable to a quondam minor challenging a transfer made by a guardian in violation of Section 8(1)(2) of the 1956 Act.

Articles 109, 110, and 113 were deemed not applicable to the facts of the case.

The court emphasized that the limitation is three years from the date of attaining majority.

Section 7 of the Limitation Act was discussed, stating that time runs against all plaintiffs when a discharge can be given without the concurrence of all.

The interpretation of statutes emphasized a literal approach, and inconvenience and hardship were not deemed decisive factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The original lease of a mining operation had expired.

The appellant, Common Cause and Others, sought renewal under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.

Issues:

Validity of a mining lease after the original lease has expired but has been renewed.

Entitlement to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act based on lease renewal application timing.

Determination of leaseholder status for those who did not apply for renewal at least twelve months before the lease expiration.

Conditions for considering a leaseholder as valid with a first renewal application.

Held:

A leaseholder with a renewed lease, still within the renewal period on January 12, 2015, is considered to have a subsisting lease, entitling them to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders failing to apply for renewal at least twelve months before the original lease's expiration before January 12, 2015, are not considered valid or subsisting leaseholders post-expiration, excluding them from the benefits of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders who applied for the first renewal of the original mining lease at least twelve months before the lease's expiration, and whose application was not rejected, are considered valid leaseholders with the right to conduct mining operations until two years after July 18, 2014.

Unless the State Government issues an order declaring a mining lease as lapsed, the lease is deemed subsisting until the specified expiration date in the lease document. A leaseholder facing lapse is disentitled to benefits under the amended MMDR Act as per Section 8A(9).

Decision: The Court, after thorough consideration, ruled that leaseholders meeting the conditions outlined in Paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 are entitled to the respective benefits or limitations stated in each paragraph.

Facts:

The original lease of a mining operation had expired.

The appellant, Common Cause and Others, sought renewal under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960.

Issues:

Validity of a mining lease after the original lease has expired but has been renewed.

Entitlement to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act based on lease renewal application timing.

Determination of leaseholder status for those who did not apply for renewal at least twelve months before the lease expiration.

Conditions for considering a leaseholder as valid with a first renewal application.

Held:

A leaseholder with a renewed lease, still within the renewal period on January 12, 2015, is considered to have a subsisting lease, entitling them to benefits under Section 8A of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders failing to apply for renewal at least twelve months before the original lease's expiration before January 12, 2015, are not considered valid or subsisting leaseholders post-expiration, excluding them from the benefits of the amended MMDR Act.

Leaseholders who applied for the first renewal of the original mining lease at least twelve months before the lease's expiration, and whose application was not rejected, are considered valid leaseholders with the right to conduct mining operations until two years after July 18, 2014.

Unless the State Government issues an order declaring a mining lease as lapsed, the lease is deemed subsisting until the specified expiration date in the lease document. A leaseholder facing lapse is disentitled to benefits under the amended MMDR Act as per Section 8A(9).

Decision: The Court, after thorough consideration, ruled that leaseholders meeting the conditions outlined in Paras 1, 2, 3, and 4 are entitled to the respective benefits or limitations stated in each paragraph.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Solatium, a form of compensation for compulsory acquisition, was provided at 15% of the market value of the land before the amendment. The dispute arises from the applicability of enhanced solatium at 30%, even in cases initiated before the amendment, if the award by the Collector or the Court was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 30(2) and whether the enhanced solatium is applicable to awards made by the Collector or the Court during the specified period.

Held:

The Court, after considering previous judgments and the legislative intent, concluded that the enhanced solatium at 30% should be made available for acquisition proceedings initiated before the amendment if the award was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984. The term "any such award" refers to awards made by the Collector or the Court during this specific period. The appellants were held entitled to the benefits as per this interpretation, and the appeal was allowed.

The Court also emphasized the applicability of interest on the compensation amount, including solatium, as per the proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. In case of non-compliance by the respondent, execution could be levied, and the matter could be addressed at that stage.

Facts:

The case involves the interpretation of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act of 1984. Solatium, a form of compensation for compulsory acquisition, was provided at 15% of the market value of the land before the amendment. The dispute arises from the applicability of enhanced solatium at 30%, even in cases initiated before the amendment, if the award by the Collector or the Court was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984.

Issues:

The correct interpretation of Section 30(2) and whether the enhanced solatium is applicable to awards made by the Collector or the Court during the specified period.

Held:

The Court, after considering previous judgments and the legislative intent, concluded that the enhanced solatium at 30% should be made available for acquisition proceedings initiated before the amendment if the award was made between April 30, 1982, and September 24, 1984. The term "any such award" refers to awards made by the Collector or the Court during this specific period. The appellants were held entitled to the benefits as per this interpretation, and the appeal was allowed.

The Court also emphasized the applicability of interest on the compensation amount, including solatium, as per the proviso to Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. In case of non-compliance by the respondent, execution could be levied, and the matter could be addressed at that stage.

Facts:

The case involves a resolution passed by the Board of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) for amending the LIC of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995. The resolution aimed at upgrading the basic pension for individuals who retired before August 1, 1997. Despite the resolution, the Corporation failed to execute the amendment.

Issues:

The authority of the Corporation to make amendments to pension rules, the applicability of the resolution, and the criteria for granting dearness allowance to existing pensioners based on a cut-off date.

Held:

In the absence of a specific rule, benefits cannot be granted solely on the basis of a resolution passed by the Corporation. The legal position, as clarified by Section 48 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, requires rules to be tabled before the Parliament for conferring benefits.[Para 15]

Two categories of employees are identified: those who retired before August 1, 1997, and those who retired after that date but are not receiving the benefit of dearness relief. The quantum of pension is affected for these individuals.[Para 22]

Orders passed by the High Courts of Rajasthan, Delhi, and Punjab & Haryana are set aside. Writ petitions are transferred to the High Court of Delhi to determine the constitutional validity of Para 3A of the Appendix to the Rules and address cases of individuals who retired after the cut-off date.[Para 23]

The matter is remanded back due to inadequate pleadings challenging the constitutional validity of Para 3A. Respondents are directed to receive a certain amount as an interim measure, and the Corporation is instructed to pay 40% as per Para 3A of the Appendix to each employee within six weeks.[Para 26, 27]

An interim order for the Corporation to pay 20% to individual employees is maintained, applicable to similarly placed persons until a final verdict.[Para 28]

The appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Referred Cases:

All India Reserve Bank retired Officers Association Vs. Union of India, (1992) Sup 1 SCC 664

B.S. Bajwa Vs. State of Punjab, (1998) 2 SCC 523

D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 130

K.J.S. Buttar Vs. Union of India, (2011) 11 SCC 429

Kallakkurichi Taluk Retired Officials Association, Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 2 SCC 772

State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. K. Jayaraman, (1974) 2 SCC 738

State of Haryana Vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 12 SCC 673

State of Rajasthan Vs. Surendra Mohnot, (2014) 14 SCC 77

State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1135

Union of India Vs. SPS Vains (Retd.), (2008) 9 SCC 125

Union of India Vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd., (2000) 2 SCC 223

Union of India Vs. Hira Lal, (1996) 10 SCC 574

V. Kasturi Vs. Managing Director, State Bank of India, (1998) 8 SCC 30

Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet Vs. Noor Ahmed Shariff, (2011) 12 SCC 658

Facts:

The appeal challenges an order summoning the appellant, Hardei, to face trial in a case related to embezzlement of funds from the MNREGA Scheme.

The FIR was filed based on a complaint by R.D. Sharma, alleging embezzlement by Rahul Yadav and Omkar Singh.

The trial progressed, and an application under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. was filed to summon additional accused, including the appellant, based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant's defense highlighted her absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's summoning order under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. based on evidence recorded during the trial is justified.

The relevance of the appellant's absence in the FIR and the lack of a charge sheet against her.

Held:

The court, after giving due consideration to the rival submissions, found no good reason to interfere with the order under appeal. The key points include:

An FIR is not expected to contain all details, especially in complex cases involving conspiracy, economic offenses, or those without eyewitness accounts.

The fact that the police chose not to send a suspect to face trial does not affect the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person based on evidence recorded during the trial.

The appellant, being a cosignatory, was found accountable for jointly withdrawing money from the MNREGA account, supporting the prima facie evidence against her.

The court dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, and the appellant is free to present her defense during the trial.

Relevant Paragraphs in the Judgment:

Paragraph 9: Acknowledges complexities in investigating crimes and emphasizes the trial court's power under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon based on recorded evidence.

Paragraph 10: Dismisses the appeal and clarifies that observations made in the orders should not adversely affect either party, granting the appellant the liberty to present her defense during the trial.

Referred Cases:

Decided on : 30-03-2016

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) - Section 161, Section 319

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 409, Section 420, Section 467, Section 468, Section 471

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 319 — Summoning of additional accused to face trial — Fact that Police chose not to send up a suspect to face trial does not affect power of trial Court under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. to summon such a person on account of evidence recorded during trial — F.I.R. may not contain all details of occurrence or even names of all accused — It is not expected to be an encyclopedia even of facts already known — There are varieties of crimes and by their very nature, details of some crimes can be unfolded only by a detailed and expert investigation — This is more true in crimes involving conspiracy, economic offences or cases not founded on eye witness accounts — Appeal dismissed.

Facts:

The Respondent, Uttaradi Mutt, filed a suit for perpetual injunction against the Appellant, Raghavendra Swamy Mutt.

The trial court dismissed the suit, but the first appellate court partially allowed the appeal, imposing certain conditions.

The Appellant filed a second appeal, and during the pendency, sought an interim order through IA No. 1/2015.

The High Court observed procedural irregularities in the grant of the interim order and vacated it without admitting the second appeal.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in vacating the order of stay and interim orders without admitting the second appeal.

Whether the High Court had the authority to entertain IA No. 1/2015 without formulating substantial questions of law.

Held:

The High Court must formulate substantial questions of law before admitting a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.

The Court clarified that an ex parte order under Order XLI Rule 5(4) can be passed during the pendency of an appeal, but it does not exempt the High Court from formulating substantial questions of law for the purpose of admission.

The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to the procedural requirements and not passing an interim order without first formulating substantial questions of law.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision to vacate the interim order.

Referred Cases:

A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu Vs. S. Chellappan, AIR 2000 SC 3032

Ishwar Dass Jain Vs. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434

Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB, (2010) 13 SCC 216

Ram Phal Vs. Banarasi, (2003) 11 SCC 762

Roop Singh Vs. Ram Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 708

Umerkhan Vs. Bismillabi alias Babulal Shaikh, (2011) 9 SCC 684