Facts:

Late Smt. Shyal Devi purchased land in 1958.

Title Suit filed in 1992 due to alleged interference by Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

Previous litigation established possession but not title.

Electricity Sub-station construction initiated in 2015 on disputed land.

Smt. Shyal Devi passed away in 2014, and her sons (Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) filed Title Suit No. 45/2015 seeking an injunction.

Issues:

Validity of Writ Petition challenging orders of Civil Courts.

Prima facie case for granting interim injunction.

Ownership and possession of disputed suit property.

Public interest vs. Private interest in constructing Electricity Sub-station.

Held:

The court does not unsettle the judgement of the High Court on the ground of maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 227 due to procedural reasons.

Respondents failed to establish a prima facie case justifying the grant of an interim injunction. The previous finding of possession did not confer title, and the Plaintiffs did not specify the area under dispute.

The court emphasized that the findings of previous litigation were against the Plaintiffs, and the refusal to grant a Temporary Injunction was justified. The Electricity Sub-station construction was on land registered in the name of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation.

The balance of convenience favored the Electricity Board due to the completion of the Sub-station, ready to benefit around 1 lakh people. Respondents could be compensated if entitled under Section 67 of the Electricity Act, 2003.

The judgement of the High Court directing status quo was set aside. The court stated that these findings were prima facie in nature and would not influence the trial of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Satishchandra Ratanlal Shah, a retired bank employee, sought a loan from the respondent's money lending company.

The loan was granted, but the appellant failed to repay within the agreed timeframe.

The respondent filed a complaint, leading to the framing of charges under various sections of the IPC.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's inability to repay the loan automatically gives rise to criminal prosecution for cheating.

Whether there was fraudulent or dishonest intent by the appellant at the beginning of the transaction.

Validity of charges under Section 406 and Section 415 of the IPC.

Held:

The court emphasizes that at the stage of framing charges, the court must ensure a prima facie case against the accused. A cautious approach is necessary to prevent irreparable harm to the accused's liberty.( Para 10)

Analyzing charges under Section 405 read with 406 of the IPC, the court notes that there was no clear case of entrustment, and the magistrate erred in issuing process for criminal breach of trust. The High Court failed to correct this error.( Para 12)

Regarding charges under Section 415 punishable under Section 420 of the IPC, the court stresses that the mere inability to repay a loan does not warrant criminal prosecution unless fraudulent or dishonest intent is proven from the beginning of the transaction.( Para 14)

The High Court's unnecessary moral observations are criticized, and the court expunges certain remarks that could be seen as casting aspersions on the appellant, maintaining that such suggestions need to be restricted.( Para 16)

The court sets aside the High Court's order, allowing the appellant's application under Section 482 of the CrPC and quashing the proceedings initiated based on the FIR.( Para 18)

Facts:

The petitioner, Ravi Agrawal, filed a writ petition under Article 32 as a Public Interest Litigation, raising concerns about the denial of benefits to handicapped individuals under the Jeevan Aadhar Policy. The petitioner, a differently-abled person, challenged Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008, issued by the Income Tax Department, which restricted the payment of annuity to the disabled dependant only after the death of the parent or guardian.

Issues:

Whether the provision in Section 80DD, restricting the payment of annuity or lump sum amount to handicapped individuals to the period after the death of the parent or guardian, violates the fundamental right of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The judgment outlines Section 80DD of the Income Tax Act, which provides for deductions related to the medical treatment, training, and rehabilitation of a dependant with a disability. The focus is on sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 80DD.

The grievance of the petitioner revolves around Circular No. CO/CRM/PS/622/23 dated January 24, 2008, which restricts the benefit under the Jeevan Aadhar Policy to the period after the death of the parent or guardian. The petitioner argues that this denies handicapped individuals the opportunity to receive annuity during the lifetime of their parent or guardian.

The Jeevan Aadhar plan is detailed, highlighting that the policy does not have a maturity claim, and the amount is payable to the dependant only upon the demise of the proposer/life assured.

The petitioner contends that the denial of benefits during the lifetime of the parent or guardian violates the fundamental right of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.

The petitioner had lodged complaints before the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDA) and approached the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities. The Chief Commissioner directed the CBDT to reexamine the matter, but no action was taken.

The petitioner, dissatisfied with the responses, files the writ petition seeking specific amendments and reliefs.

FACTS:

The appellant, Barara Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., terminated the services of the respondent, a peon, on 01.07.1985.

A reference was made to the Labour Court by the State, at the respondent's instance, to decide the legality of the termination.

The Labour Court, by award dated 03.02.1988, found the termination illegal and awarded compensation to the respondent.

Both parties challenged the award in writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is entitled to claim re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The applicability of Section 25(H) in the context of the respondent's case.

HELD:

The respondent filed a representation in 1993, claiming re-employment based on the regularization of other peons' services. The Labour Court held against the respondent, stating Section 25(H) did not apply.

The court, after considering the facts and legal provisions, found that the respondent had accepted compensation for the termination, concluding the matter.

Section 25(H) applies when an employer proposes to fill vacancies, giving preference to retrenched employees. The court clarified that regularization of an already employed person doesn't constitute filling a vacancy.

The Labour Court's decision was deemed justified, setting aside the High Court's order directing re-employment. Section 25(H) did not apply to the respondent's case.

FACTS:

The appellant, Barara Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Society Ltd., terminated the services of the respondent, a peon, on 01.07.1985.

A reference was made to the Labour Court by the State, at the respondent's instance, to decide the legality of the termination.

The Labour Court, by award dated 03.02.1988, found the termination illegal and awarded compensation to the respondent.

Both parties challenged the award in writ petitions, which were dismissed by the High Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is entitled to claim re-employment under Section 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The applicability of Section 25(H) in the context of the respondent's case.

HELD:

The respondent filed a representation in 1993, claiming re-employment based on the regularization of other peons' services. The Labour Court held against the respondent, stating Section 25(H) did not apply.

The court, after considering the facts and legal provisions, found that the respondent had accepted compensation for the termination, concluding the matter.

Section 25(H) applies when an employer proposes to fill vacancies, giving preference to retrenched employees. The court clarified that regularization of an already employed person doesn't constitute filling a vacancy.

The Labour Court's decision was deemed justified, setting aside the High Court's order directing re-employment. Section 25(H) did not apply to the respondent's case.

Facts:

H.K. Singla, the appellant, was the Secretary of the Chandigarh State Bank of Patiala Employees Co-operative USE Thrift & Credit Society.

Avtar Singh Saini & Ors, the respondents, filed a complaint alleging non-payment of maturity amount along with interest by the society.

The District Forum directed the society to pay the amount along with additional compensation, but the society failed to comply.

Singla was sentenced to imprisonment and fined by the District Forum under Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Issues:

Whether Singla, as Secretary of the society, could be held personally liable for the society's default.

Interpretation of Section 27 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 regarding penalties.

Held:

The Court suspended the order of imprisonment against Singla during the pendency of the appeal before the State Commission. The Court expressed doubt about the legality of imprisoning Singla for the default committed by the society, especially in the absence of any order directly implicating him.

Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to suspend the imprisonment order until the State Commission determines whether Singla could be imprisoned without any personal liability imposed by the District Forum. The Court urged the State Commission to expedite the appeal process.

Additionally, the first respondent was allowed to take necessary legal steps to recover the amount owed by the society, considering it was in liquidation.

Facts:

The appellant, Hukum Chandra, was a tenant in a shop located in Madhya Pradesh.

The respondent, Nemi Chand Jain, filed a suit for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, claiming a bona fide requirement of the shop for his son, Rajendra Kumar Jain, to start or continue his business.

The trial court initially dismissed the suit for eviction, but the first appellate court overturned this decision, finding that the requirement of the shop for Rajendra Kumar's business was genuine.

Issues:

Whether the requirement for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act was bona fide and genuine.

Whether subsequent events, such as the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop, affected the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Held:

Outlines the requirements for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act, emphasizing the need for a bona fide requirement by the landlord or his family member and the absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation.

Discusses the evidence presented regarding the tenant's son, Rajendra Kumar's, involvement in a utensils business at the time of filing the eviction petition. The trial court had initially found that Rajendra Kumar was already engaged in business, questioning the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Address the contention regarding subsequent events, particularly the landlord obtaining possession of an adjacent shop. The Court found that this adjacent shop was meant for another son of the landlord, not Rajendra Kumar, thus not affecting the bona fide requirement for eviction.

Confirms the decision of the High Court to uphold the eviction, noting that the landlord's other son, Rajesh Kumar Jain, occupied the adjacent shop. Therefore, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the lower courts.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was granted three months to vacate the premises.

Facts:

The case involved an incident where the deceased, Raghumani, was found lying in a pool of blood after being attacked on November 15, 1995.

The prosecution alleged involvement of six accused, including the appellant, Gupteswar Behera, who were charged with offenses under Sections 148, 149, and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

Various witnesses, including PW1 Pradeep and PW15, the Investigating Officer, provided testimony, along with medical evidence presented through PW13 and PW14 regarding the injuries sustained by the deceased.

Issues:

The credibility of the eye-witness accounts and the reliance on dying declarations made by the deceased were the main issues in question.

Whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements was a crucial point of contention.

Held:

The Court found doubt regarding whether the deceased survived long enough for the witnesses to hear his statements. Considering the time it would take for witnesses to reach the scene and the severity of the injuries, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments and orders of both the Sessions Court and the High Court. Gupteswar Behera was acquitted of all charges and ordered to be set at liberty unless required in connection with any other case.

Facts:

The appellants entered into agreements to sell with the respondent, which were found to be insufficiently stamped. The trial court directed the payment of deficit duty and penalty. The High Court directed the trial court to levy the penalty at 10 times the deficit duty, relying on a previous judgment.

Issues:

Whether the trial court had discretion in imposing the penalty for deficit stamp duty, and whether the High Court's reliance on the previous judgment was correct.

Held:

The court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, particularly Sections 33, 34, 38, and 39. It found that while Section 34 mandates a penalty of 10 times the deficit duty, Section 39 provides discretion to the Deputy Commissioner to impose a penalty not exceeding 10 times the duty. The court upheld the High Court's interpretation but noted that Section 38 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to refund any portion of the penalty in excess of five rupees, indicating legislative intent for discretion in penalty imposition.

The court considered the circumstances of the case and the time it would take to seek a refund of penalty from the Deputy Commissioner. It decided to uphold the trial court's direction of payment of deficit duty with double the penalty, aiming to serve the ends of justice efficiently without prolonging the legal proceedings.

Therefore, the appeal was disposed of by approving the trial court's direction for payment of deficit duty with double the penalty instead of requiring the appellant to deposit 10 times the penalty and then seek a refund under Section 38.