Facts:

The case involved a clash between supporters of CPI (M) and BJP at Ottappilavu junction on 10.03.1993, resulting in the death of Suresh Babu. The prosecution's case was consolidated with a private complaint filed by the deceased's father. Witnesses included PW3, PW4, PW5, and PW6. The Trial Court convicted some accused under Section 302/149 IPC, while others were acquitted. The High Court upheld some convictions and acquittals.

Issues:

Evaluation of witness testimony, particularly PW4's evidence.

Determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly.

Liability of accused participating in an unlawful assembly.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in not considering PW4's evidence properly, limiting its use only for corroboration of PW3's evidence. The Court emphasized the importance of PW4's testimony and found that the Trial Court was correct in relying on it.

Additionally, the Court disagreed with the High Court's finding that the common object of the accused was not proved. It held that the members of the unlawful assembly had a common object to attack any BJP supporter, based on the nature of the assembly, weapons used, and behavior.

Regarding the liability of accused participating in an unlawful assembly, the Court stated that mere presence in the assembly could suggest participation, and the conduct of the accused would determine their liability. Without evidence showing lack of knowledge of the unlawful object of the assembly or attempts to prevent it, mere participation could be incriminating.

Based on these findings, the Supreme Court modified the convictions and sentences of some accused, holding them liable under Section 326/149 IPC. The appeals against acquittals and convictions were accordingly allowed or dismissed, as appropriate.

Facts: The appellant, Maharashtra State Cooperative Housing Finance Corporation Ltd., dismissed the respondent, Prabhakar Sitaram Bhadange, from service. This led to a dispute over the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Court to decide on the matter. The dispute centered on whether the Cooperative Court had jurisdiction to entertain service disputes between the employer and the employee under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960.

Issues:

Whether disputes between a cooperative society and its employees fall within the jurisdiction of the Cooperative Court under Section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960.

Whether the Cooperative Court has the authority to grant reinstatement as a remedy in service disputes.

Held and Decision: The court held that the Cooperative Court's jurisdiction is limited to disputes concerning the constitution, management, or business of the society, as outlined in Section 91(1) of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960. The dispute between the employee and the management of the cooperative society does not fall within the ambit of this provision. The court also clarified that the Cooperative Court cannot grant reinstatement as a remedy, as it is not empowered to enforce contracts of personal services. The jurisdiction to grant such relief lies with bodies such as the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and ruled that the dispute filed by the respondent before the Cooperative Court was not maintainable. It suggested that the respondent could pursue his claim through a civil suit, with the option to file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to save the limitation period.

Referred cases in the above judgment:

Facts:

The appellant-husband appealed against the order of the High Court of Delhi, which granted interim maintenance to the respondent-wife under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The appellant challenged the amount of maintenance awarded, arguing it to be excessive.

Issues:

The appropriateness of the amount of interim maintenance awarded to the wife by the High Court.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the entitlement of the wife to maintenance pendente lite but reduced the amount awarded by the High Court from Rs. 60,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per month, in addition to the Rs. 10,000/- already being paid under the DV Act.

The Court clarified that its decision was guided by the principles of matrimonial law and within the provisions of the Act. The reduction was deemed necessary as the High Court's award was considered excessive. The husband was directed to pay the arrears within four weeks and continue paying Rs. 25,000/- per month until the disposal of the divorce petition.

The Court emphasized that it did not express any opinion on the merits of the case and warned the husband of consequences, including contempt of court, if he failed to comply with the order.

Facts:

Mr. Satish Chander Aggarwal, the original landlord, filed for eviction in 1975, citing the need to expand the family business under the name M/s. Roop Krishna Traders.

The Rent Controller initially dismissed the eviction petition, but the First Appellate Authority granted eviction after conducting a spot inspection.

Mr. Satish Chander Aggarwal passed away on 04.07.2005.

The tenant appealed to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution after Mr. Aggarwal's death, and the High Court declined to rule on the bona fide requirement.

Issues:

Whether the bona fide requirement established by Mr. Satish Chander Aggarwal would satisfy the needs of the surviving legal heirs under Section 21(a) of the U.P. Urban Building Act?

Whether the High Court's refusal to rule on the bona fide requirement was justified?

Held:

The Supreme Court examined whether the bona fide requirement established by Mr. Satish Chander Aggarwal would satisfy the needs of the surviving legal heirs under Section 21(a) of the U.P. Urban Building Act. The Court found that since the family business continued with the legal heirs, and the requirement for the premises was established and upheld by the Appellate Authority, there was no need for further litigation. Therefore, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and reinstated the eviction order passed by the First Appellate Authority.

The legal principle established in this judgment is that the bona fide requirement established by the original landlord for the family business, which is continued by the legal heirs, is sufficient grounds for eviction, and there is no need to relegate the legal heirs for another round of litigation. This principle ensures continuity and stability in family business matters, preventing unnecessary legal battles.

Facts:

The appellants, which included Nationalised Banks and the Association of Banks, revised the pay scale with effect from July 1, 1993. However, they stipulated that the benefit of the revised pay for calculating gratuity would only apply to those who retired after October 31, 1994. Those who retired before this date would have their gratuity calculated based on the pre-revised pay scale. This led to a dispute regarding the justification of the fixation of the cut-off date.

Issues:

Whether the fixation of a cut-off date for the payment of gratuity was justified.

Whether the fixation of the cut-off date was arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The Court held that the fixation of a cut-off date for extending the benefit of gratuity from a different date than the revision of the pay scale was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court referred to previous judgments, including State Government Pensioners' Association and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, State of A.P. v. A.P. Pensioners' Association, and State of Bihar v. Bihar Petitioners' Samaj, to support its decision.

However, considering the prolonged litigation and the interests of the retired employees, the Court invoked its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. It directed the appellants Banks to pay a settlement amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) to the retired employees in full and final settlement of all their claims, including litigation expenses. This amount was to be paid within eight weeks from the date of the judgment.

The Court clarified that this settlement would only apply to those retired employees who were parties to the case before the High Court and whose names were furnished to the High Court during the consideration of the writ petition(s). With these observations and directions, the appeals were disposed of.

Facts:

The appellant, M/s Meena Devi Jindal Medical Institute and Research Centre, challenged the land acquisition proceedings initiated under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the construction of Yamuna Expressway. The acquisition included land for various purposes complementary to the expressway's development. The appellant argued that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition, the notification lacked specificity, and the enquiry under Section 5A was improperly conducted.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition served a public purpose, whether the notification was specific enough, and whether the enquiry under Section 5A was conducted properly.

Held:

The Court held that the acquisition for planned development of Delhi, as per the zonal plan, served a public purpose, as defined under Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Court cited previous decisions, including Aflatoon vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, to support its reasoning.

The Court rejected the argument that the notification lacked specificity, stating that once planned development of Delhi was specified, it was to be read in conjunction with the applicable zonal plan. The Court referred to previous cases to highlight the importance of adherence to legal procedures and the significance of public purpose in land acquisition proceedings.

Therefore, the Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the validity of the land acquisition proceedings.

Facts:

The case pertains to the sale and registration of vehicles not meeting the Bharat Stage-IV (BS-IV) emission standards, scheduled to take effect from April 1, 2017. Manufacturers argued for the continuation of sale and registration of vehicles compliant with Bharat Stage III (BS-III) emission standards until March 31, 2017, citing their entitlement to produce such vehicles until the aforementioned date.

Issues:

Whether commercial interests of manufacturers and dealers of non-BS-IV compliant vehicles outweighed the health hazards posed by increased air pollution to millions of people in India.

Held:

The Court, after considering the arguments presented, upheld the concerns regarding public health highlighted by the learned Amicus Curiae. It acknowledged that while the number of BS-III vehicles might be relatively small compared to the total vehicle population, the health of the public was of paramount importance and outweighed the commercial interests of manufacturers and dealers. The Court emphasized that manufacturers had adequate time to transition to BS-IV compliant vehicles but failed to do so, despite having the necessary technology and awareness since 2010.

Consequently, the Court directed that:

From April 1, 2017, vehicles not meeting BS-IV emission standards would not be sold in India by any manufacturer or dealer.

Vehicle registering authorities were prohibited from registering vehicles not meeting BS-IV emission standards, except those sold before March 31, 2017.

Facts:

The appellants-landlords sought eviction of the respondents-tenants under Sections 11(4)(iii) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965.

The Rent Control Court allowed eviction under Section 11(4)(iv) on the ground of demolition and reconstruction.

The landlords pursued eviction on the ground of Section 11(4)(iii) before the First Appellate Authority, which was granted.

The landlords took possession of the premises during execution proceedings before the decision of the First Appellate Authority.

The tenants appealed to the High Court, arguing that further proceedings for eviction on other grounds could not be pursued after possession had been taken.

The High Court set aside the First Appellate Authority's decision on Section 11(4)(iii) and restored the Rent Control Court's decision solely on the ground of demolition and reconstruction under Section 11(4)(iv).

Issues:

Whether possession taken on one ground for eviction renders surviving grounds non-est.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that possession taken on one ground for eviction does not render surviving grounds non-est. The Court set aside the High Court's decision and remitted the matter back to the High Court for consideration on merits. The surviving grounds for eviction should still be considered despite possession being taken on one ground.

The Court directed the High Court to consider the revision petitions filed by the tenants on merits, and urged for expeditious disposal of the matter within six months.

Facts:

The appellant, Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation, sought recovery of loans granted to the respondent, Anil Garg, for the purchase of a truck and the establishment of a steel trunk manufacturing industry. The respondent failed to repay the loans, leading to legal proceedings. A suit was filed, but later withdrawn, with the intention to pursue more expedient remedies under the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973. However, the High Court set aside the auction notice issued by the appellant, prompting the present appeal.

Issues:

The withdrawal of the suit, its impact on subsequent proceedings under the Act, and whether the appellant's right to recover the loans was preserved despite the withdrawal.

Held:

The Court held that the withdrawal of the suit did not constitute an abandonment of the claim by the appellant. The court emphasized that the withdrawal was intended to pursue remedies under the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973, which provided a more expedient route for recovery. The court clarified that the bar under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code applied only to fresh suits and not to proceedings under the Act. Additionally, the court rejected the respondent's argument regarding the loans being time-barred, noting that the appellant had taken steps for recovery within the statutory limitations.

The court further emphasized the importance of timely repayment of loans, as they are disbursed from public funds and serve the larger societal interest. It stated that the doctrine of public policy cannot be invoked to prevent a loanee from repaying a loan unjustifiably abusing the law.

Therefore, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and directed that the auction notice under Section 85 of the Act proceed in accordance with the law and be concluded expeditiously.