FACTS:

The appellant was accused of forging and fabricating a Power of Attorney in 2011, and an FIR was lodged against him in 2014. However, he was arrested only in 2020. The High Court granted him conditional interim bail for eight weeks but refused to allow him to travel to the US, where he has been a resident since 1985. The appellant is an Indian citizen and holds an Indian passport. He has regularly traveled between the US and India on multiple occasions between 2015 and 2020, indicating that he has maintained contact with India contrary to the High Court's view.

ISSUES:

Whether the conditions imposed for granting bail are proportionate to the purpose of imposing them?

Whether the appellant should be permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks?

HELD:

The Court observed that while the competent court has the discretion to impose conditions for granting bail, the conditions must be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the accused's presence, and prevent the misuse of liberty to obstruct justice. (Para 14)

The Court emphasized that the issue before it is limited to whether the appellant should be permitted to travel to the US for eight weeks. In making this determination, the nature of the allegations, the appellant's conduct, and the risk of evading prosecution must be considered. (Para 21)

The Court found that the appellant had frequently traveled between the US and India even after the FIR was lodged. The conditions for granting bail must balance public interest and the accused's rights. (Para 23)

There was no reason to deny the appellant permission to travel to the US for eight weeks. He is an Indian citizen and a US resident since 1985. The lodging of an FIR should not prevent him from traveling to the US, especially when it could result in the invalidation of his Green Card. The appellant was allowed to travel, subject to an undertaking to return to India after eight weeks and be available for all court hearings unless exempted from personal appearance. (Para 24)

REFERRED CASES:

Dataram Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2018) 3 SCC 22

Kunal Kumar Tiwari v The State of Bihar, (2018) 16 SCC 74

Sumit Mehta vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 15 SCC 570

Facts:

During the COVID-19 lockdown, the government banned all domestic and international flights from 25th March to 24th May 2020. Consequently, passengers sought refunds for their airfare. In response, the Ministry of Civil Aviation issued an advisory on 16th April 2020 to address the issue of airfare refunds during this period.

Issues:

The primary issue was whether passengers were entitled to a full refund for tickets booked during the lockdown period (25th March to 24th May 2020) for travel during that same period.

Another concern was the immediate full refund for tickets booked through travel agents during the lockdown period for travel within the lockdown period.

The Court also considered how to handle refund requests for tickets booked before 24th May 2020, but intended for travel after that date.

Additionally, the Court addressed the provision of incentives to compensate passengers for the delayed refund process.

Held:

The Court held that for tickets booked during the lockdown period for travel during the same period, airlines must refund the full amount collected without any cancellation charges. The refund must be processed within three weeks from the date of cancellation.

In cases where tickets were booked through travel agents during the lockdown period for travel within that same period, airlines must provide immediate full refunds. The agents are required to pass on the refunded amount to the passengers without delay.

For tickets booked at any time but intended for travel after 24th May 2020, the refund process shall be governed by the provisions of Civil Aviation Requirements (CAR).

The Court decided to provide incentives to compensate passengers for the delayed refund process. The incentive would be 0.5% of the face value (fare collected) for every month or part thereof between the date of cancellation and 30th June 2020. After 30th June 2020 until 31st March 2021, the incentive would increase to 0.75% of the face value per month.

Facts:

The case involves the petitioners seeking premature release from imprisonment under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. The respondents, representing the State of Uttar Pradesh, have refused their release without giving proper reasons based on the three-factor evaluation mandated by the Act.

Issues:

The need to strike a balance between public safety and individual liberty while considering premature release.

The importance of reformative principles in sentencing, especially for first-time offenders.

The evaluation criteria for granting premature release under the Uttar Pradesh Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938.

Held:

The court upholds the principles of reformative theory, emphasizing that a civilized society cannot be achieved through punitive attitudes alone. First-time offenders should be granted a chance to reform and rebuild their lives. The court reaffirms the constitutional provisions and statutory laws that provide for the suspension, remission, or commutation of sentences.

The court criticizes the State's refusal of premature release solely based on the length of the sentence or gravity of the original crime. It stresses that the assessment of the likelihood of committing future crimes after release should be based on antecedents and conduct during incarceration, not on age or apprehensions of victims and witnesses.

The court orders the release of the petitioners on probation under Section 2 of the UP Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938. However, the release is subject to the imposition of conditions by the State to balance public safety with individual liberty. The court cautions that the order of premature release can be recalled in the event of any future misconduct or breach by the petitioners.

Facts:

The prosecution's case was that the appellants, along with others, assaulted two individuals who were returning from the market on bicycles. One of the victims died on the spot, and the other passed away in the hospital. Originally, five accused persons were named, but accused nos. 3 and 5 were acquitted on the benefit of doubt. There was no appeal against their acquittals. The appellants contended that since two accused were acquitted based on the same evidence, their own convictions were unjustified.

Issues:

whether the convictions of the appellants under Section 302/34 were justified given the acquittal of two other accused based on the same evidence.

Held:

The depositions of witnesses P.W. 5, 6, 7, and 9 established that appellant no. 1 stopped the deceased, appellant no. 2 assaulted one of them resulting in his immediate death, and appellant no. 3 assaulted the other victim causing injuries. When the second victim tried to flee, he was chased, caught, and brutally assaulted. He later succumbed to his injuries in the hospital. The court found no reason to doubt the presence and assault on the two deceased by appellant nos. 2 & 3 and refused to grant them acquittal based on the benefit of doubt or parity with the acquitted accused. (Para 11)

The court reiterated that the acquittal of accused nos. 3 and 5 does not raise any doubts about the guilt of the appellants, as the evidence against the appellants was independent and sufficient. (Para 12)

The court explained the concept of common intention, which involves several persons acting in unison to achieve a common purpose, irrespective of their individual roles. The presence of the mental element or intention to commit the act, if cogently established, is sufficient for conviction, without requiring actual participation in the assault. Common intention can be inferred from the cumulative assessment of evidence, and there may not be direct evidence to establish it. (Para 13)

As for appellant no. 1, the court found that he lay in wait with the other appellants, stopped the two deceased, and the assault followed. Since there was evidence of a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert, appellant no. 1's conviction was justified, and there was no need to prove his active participation in the assault. (Para 18)

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants.

Constitutional Law – Contempt of Court – Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution – The Supreme Court has inherent powers as a Court of Record to punish for contempt – These powers cannot be abridged or taken away even by legislative enactment – Comparison of Articles 129 and 142 shows no restriction on the Supreme Court's powers to punish for contempt, unlike clause (2) of Article 142 which can be subject to any law made by Parliament [Paras 9-10, 31].

Contempt Proceedings – Scandalising the Court – The raison d'être of contempt jurisdiction is to maintain the dignity of judicial institutions – Not a vindictive exercise but necessary when persistent and unwarranted attacks are made against the judiciary – Repeated unjustified allegations and attempts to scandalise the court amount to contempt – Apologies, if not genuine, do not mitigate the offense [Paras 1, 20, 33].

Judicial Precedent – Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re – The Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in previous cases like Roshan Lal Ahuja In Re and others where motivated attempts to malign judiciary's reputation warranted strict action – Apologies must be sincere and demonstrate remorse, not serve as a tactic to avoid consequences [Paras 27-33].

Decision: Contemnor is found guilty of contempt – Conduct aimed at scandalising the court cannot be countenanced – Sentencing deferred to allow the contemnor a chance to be heard on the issue of final sentence [Paras 33-34].

Facts:

The case revolves around a claim for compassionate appointment made by the family of a deceased government employee, who was working as a work-charged employee and had attained the status of a permanent employee after completing 15 years of service. The claim for compassionate appointment was rejected by the government on the ground that there was no provision for compassionate appointment for employees receiving salary from work-charge or contingency funds. However, a policy existed that provided for the grant of Rs. One Lakh as compassionate relief to the wife of the deceased employee.

Issues:

Whether the deceased employee, who was a permanent employee, was entitled to compassionate appointment?

Whether the subsequent circular increasing the compassionate grant amount to Rs. Two Lakhs should be applied retrospectively?

Held:

The Court held that compassionate appointment is not an inherent right, but a right based on specific criteria and policies in place at the time of the employee's demise. The primary purpose is to provide succor to a needy family. However, in this case, 11 years had passed since the demise, and the aspect of immediate succor to the family no longer existed. (Para 14,15)

The Court clarified that there is a distinction between a work-charged employee, a permanent employee, and a regular employee. The late father of the respondent attained the status of a permanent employee after completing 15 years of service, but this did not automatically make him a regular employee. The classification of "permanent" does not amount to regularization under the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1963. (Para 16-18)

The Court emphasized that an employee does not acquire the status of a regular employee merely by becoming a permanent employee. The distinction between "permanent" status and "regular" status must be recognized.

Para 24-25: The Court noted the subsequent circular that increased the compassionate grant amount from Rs. One Lakh to Rs. Two Lakhs. However, the circular clarified that pending cases would be decided only in terms of the amended policy dated 29.9.2014, and the present case was pending before the Court and not before the authority. (Para 20-21)

In exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court enhanced the compassionate grant amount from Rs. One Lakh to Rs. Two Lakhs to provide complete justice between the parties. (Para 27-28)

Facts:

The accused was prosecuted for allegedly raping the prosecutrix at knifepoint when she was 14 years old. The prosecution claimed that the accused continued to establish physical relations with her under the pretext of marriage. The lower courts had convicted the accused, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Variation in evidence regarding the age of the prosecutrix.

Casual and perfunctory examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

Delay of 4 years in lodging the FIR raises doubts about the veracity of the allegations.

Consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact.

Whether the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations.

Held :

The Court noted the variation in evidence regarding the prosecutrix's age and found it difficult to determine her exact age at the time of the incident. The trial court had relied on the prosecutrix's deposition but failed to produce positive evidence of her age. Thus, the benefit of doubt was given to the accused, leading to an acquittal. (Para 7)

The Court observed that the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was casual and perfunctory, violating principles of natural justice. Circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him, and this supported the appellant's case. (Para 8 and 9)

The Court highlighted the delay of four years in filing the FIR and its proximity to the appellant's intended marriage with another girl. This raised doubts about the truthfulness of the allegations. Moreover, the prosecutrix admitted that no incident had occurred on a specific date, further weakening the prosecution's case. (Para 10)

The Court considered Section 90 IPC, which states that consent given under fear of injury or misconception of fact is not valid. However, the misconception should be in proximity to the occurrence, which was not the case here. The Court concluded that the consent of the prosecutrix was a conscious and deliberate choice made over a long period of time, and thus, the accused's conviction could not be sustained. (Paras 13 and 14)

The Court found no evidence to support the claim that the accused made false promises or intentional misrepresentations to establish physical relations with the prosecutrix. Instead, it appeared that the prosecutrix was aware of the societal obstacles in their relationship, and the consent was a result of her deep-seated love for the accused. (Paras 18 and 20)

Considering the acquittal of the accused on other charges and the absence of medical evidence for certain convictions, the Court held that the appellant's conviction was unsustainable and acquitted him. (Para 19 and 21)

Facts:

The prosecution charged the accused with multiple offenses, including murder, robbery, causing disappearance of evidence, and cheating. The trial court acquitted the accused due to contradictions in the prosecution's case. The High Court reversed the acquittal, considering the contradictions minor, and this decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal order?

Whether non-compliance with certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) could impact the case when recovery of evidence is seriously doubted?

The significance of motive in cases based on circumstantial evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court clarified that interference with an acquittal order should occur only in exceptional cases where there are compelling reasons, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse. [Para 5.2.1]

An order would be considered perverse if it is based on no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence that no reasonable person would act upon. [Para 5.2.3]

The findings recorded by the trial court were not perverse and were based on the appreciation of the entire evidence on record. [Para 10]

In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form a complete chain leading to the conclusion that the accused committed the crime and no one else. [Para 5.4]

The contradictions considered by the trial court were not minor and were material to the case. The High Court erred in reversing the trial court's findings solely on this basis. [Para 6.1]

Non-compliance with certain provisions of the CrPC may not be a ground for acquittal, but in cases where recovery of evidence is seriously doubted, non-compliance can play an important role. [Para 7]

The recovery of evidence, including the mobile phone and other items, raised serious doubts due to the lack of proper verification and procedure followed by the investigating officer. [Para 8]

Motive can be a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, but the absence of motive cannot be a ground to reject the prosecution's case. However, it can weigh in favor of the accused. [Para 9]

In light of the above findings, the trial court was justified in recording the acquittal, and the High Court's decision to reverse it was not justified. [Para 10]

Facts:

The appellant and the second respondent got married in India in 2012 and later moved to the US in April 2015. They had a son who was born in December 2016. In March 2019, the second respondent came to India with the child and decided to stay back. The appellant was granted legal and temporary custody of the minor child by the Superior Court of New Jersey in May 2019. Subsequently, the appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus before the High Court of Karnataka in August 2019, seeking the child's return to the US.

Issues:

Whether the arrangement envisaged by the High Court, allowing the child to return to the US, was in the interest of the welfare of the child.

Whether the conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return were appropriate.

Held:

The Court considered the sequence of events and found that the appellant acted promptly to secure custody of the child. Given that the child was born in the US, was a US citizen by birth, and the appellant had shown commitment to shared parenting, the court determined that the child's welfare would be best served by accompanying the appellant to the US. (Para 9, 13)

The court exercised parens patriae jurisdiction to determine the child's welfare and concluded that allowing the child to return to the US with the appellant was in the child's best interest. (Para 16)

The conditions imposed by the High Court for the child's return, namely obtaining certificates certifying India's Covid-19 safety and congeniality for the child's residence in New Jersey, were set aside. The appellant's undertaking to comply with prevailing regulations for international travel was recorded. (Para 17, 19, 20)