Facts:

The case involves parties Bijay Kumar Singh and others (Appellants) versus Amit Kumar Chamariya and another (Respondents). The dispute centers around the eviction proceedings initiated under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, based on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent.

Issues:

Interpretation of the mandatory nature of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

Determination of the outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent as per the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7.

Examination of the consequences arising from the non-deposit of admitted arrears of rent, as contemplated under sub-section (3) of Section 7.

Held:

The Court held that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed by tenants to avoid eviction under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. The outer limit for the extension of time to deposit arrears of rent is determined by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 7. Failure to deposit admitted arrears of rent within the specified timeframe, along with the absence of an application for dispute determination, will lead to eviction. The deposit of rent, coupled with an application for dispute determination, is a pre-condition for avoiding eviction on the grounds of non-payment of arrears of rent. The appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai seeking arrears of water tax and water benefit tax from the respondent, who refused payment, contending that water supply had been disconnected.

Issues:

Whether Water Tax and Water Benefit Tax are integral components of Property Tax?

Does the liability to pay such taxes persist irrespective of water supply or meter disconnection?

How does Section 169 empower the standing committee regarding water supply and charges?

Is the demand for arrears barred by limitation?

Held:

Qualitative Distinction: The judgment establishes the qualitative distinction between water tax, water benefit tax, and water charges. Water tax and water benefit tax are deemed components of Property Tax as per Sections 139, 140, and 141 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.

Empowerment under Section 169: Section 169 is identified as an enabling provision, conferring authority upon the standing committee to formulate rules for water supply and associated charges. The extent of charges leviable is delineated within Section 169.

Compulsory Imposition: The judgment emphasizes that the levy of property tax in the form of water benefit tax is compulsory, contingent upon fulfilling conditions stipulated in Sections 139, 140, and 141 of the Act. The liability arises regardless of water supply or meter disconnection.

Disconnection Impact on Water Charges: In case of water supply or meter disconnection, the corporation cannot recover water charges under Section 169. Water charges can only be recuperated commensurate with the quantity of water actually supplied and consumed.

Nature of Demand Notices: Analysis of the demand notices reveals that they are explicitly for property tax in the form of water benefit tax and sewerage benefit tax, not for water charges under Section 169.

High Court Misinterpretation: The High Court's misinterpretation is highlighted. The demand notices were for property tax, and the liability persists even with water supply or meter disconnection.

Challenge on Limitation: The challenge asserting limitation is restricted to the period preceding January 10, 1994. The demand notices were issued on January 10, 1997, well within the three-year limitation period, thus rejecting the limitation challenge.

Relief from Statutory Interest: Respondents are granted relief from the liability to pay statutory interest for the period spent pursuing the proceedings in good faith, especially during interim orders in their favor.

Quantification of Interest: Interest is quantified at 18% per annum on the outstanding principal tax amount or the prescribed statutory interest, whichever is less, for the period during the pendency of the case.

Commencement of Interest: Interest at the statutory rate commences from the date of the impugned demand notice(s). Specific periods during legal proceedings have different interest calculations.

Facts:

Appellant's father, a resident of Sindh, claimed ownership of 83.11 acres of land, which was verified by the settlement claim officer.

The appellant, after his father's death, sought allotment of the remaining land balance, which was allotted by the Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (CCLA).

Issues:

Whether the Central Government, after transferring land to the State Government, could make allotments to displaced persons post May 24, 1980.

Whether the CCLA, as a delegate of the Central Government, had the authority to make allotments despite the power of allotment being vested with the Managing Officer under Section 17 of the Act.

Held:

The Court examined the authority of the Central Government to make allotments after transferring land to the State Government and whether the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could exercise allotment powers.( Para 22)

The transfer of land to the State Government was completed on May 24, 1980, through a circular specifying the administration, management, and disposal of remaining evacuee property. The land transfer was effective from June 1, 1980, subject to certain conditions.( Para 23)

The Court affirmed that the Circular dated May 23, 1980, related to the administration, management, and disposal of compensation pool in accordance with Section 16 of the Act. The Central Government was empowered to constitute authorities or corporations for these purposes.( Para 24)

The argument suggesting that the Central Government retained control and administration of evacuee property was dismissed. The CCLA, as per the Act's scheme, had no power to make allotments as he exercised appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Allotment powers were vested in Managing Officers.( Para 28)

The Court held that the CCLA, as a delegatee of the Central Government, could not deal with land that had been transferred to the State Government. Therefore, the allotment made in favor of the appellant on February 26, 2003, was unsustainable.( Para 29)

Based on the Division Bench judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Chander, as approved by the Supreme Court in Pala Singh, the Central Government or its delegatee could not allot land after its transfer to the State.( Para 30)

While disagreeing with the High Court's opinion that transferred land was excluded from the compensation pool, the Court clarified that the land transferred to the State remained part of the compensation pool and could be utilized by the State Government after settling displaced persons.( Para 31)

Facts:

The case involves a complaint filed by the sister of accused No. 1, alleging forgery in claiming ownership of a property.

The complaint accuses accused No. 1 of creating forged documents, including a will and a deed of confirmation.

Accused No. 4 is implicated for entering into a lease agreement based on the allegedly forged documents.

The property ownership is disputed among legal heirs, leading to civil suits and other legal proceedings.

Issues:

The primary issues include allegations of forgery, fabrication of documents, and the execution of a lease deed based on purportedly fraudulent documents.

Inheritance disputes among legal heirs further complicate the matter.

The complainant alleges a conspiracy involving accused No. 1 and accuses accused No. 4 of colluding in the fraudulent lease agreement.

Held:

The judgment refers to the principles laid down in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335.

It is emphasized that the High Court, while considering the quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC, should examine whether the allegations prima facie constitute an offense.

The Court observes that the complaint mainly revolves around a civil dispute regarding inheritance and property rights.

Accused No. 4's role is limited to entering into a lease agreement, and there is no indication of his awareness of the alleged forgery by accused No. 1.

The judgment highlights that the issues raised in the complaint are better suited for resolution in civil proceedings already initiated by various parties.

The Court concludes that continuing criminal proceedings against accused No. 4 would amount to an abuse of the legal process.

Accordingly, the appeal of accused No. 4 is allowed, and the criminal proceedings against him are quashed and set aside.

The appeals filed by the original complainant against accused Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 are dismissed.

Facts:

Wellman Smith Owen Engineering Corporation, a UK-based company, leased industrial properties in West Bengal.

The assets were later taken over by Wellman Incandescent India Ltd. (Wellman).

Wellman, in financial distress, borrowed funds from IDBI and mortgaged the leased properties.

The company went into liquidation, and WBSIDC, to whom the lease rights were assigned, determined the lease due to non-compliance with lease conditions.

The Official Liquidator appointed during the liquidation proceedings took charge of the assets.

Issues:

Whether WBSIDC had the right to determine the lease due to non-compliance with lease conditions.

Whether SASF, as a mortgagee, could challenge the forfeiture of the lease.

Held:

The Supreme Court, upholding the Calcutta High Court's decision, held:

The lessor's exercise of the right to determine the lease had attained finality.

A mortgagee (SASF) could not claim rights superior to those of the lessee.

The forfeiture of the lease by WBSIDC was in line with the law.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision, and upheld the principle that a mortgagee cannot possess rights superior to the mortgagor, and the lessor's right to determine the lease had legal sanctity.

Facts:

The respondent filed an income tax return for A.Y. 2006-07.

Notices under Section 143(2) were sent to the address in the PAN database.

Assessee claimed a change of name and address, communicated via an alleged letter dated 06.12.2005.

The alleged letter was not produced, and the assessee failed to prove its existence.

Assessing Officer completed the assessment under Section 143(3).

The assessee challenged the assessment on the grounds of invalid notice and delay.

Issues:

Validity of the notice under Section 143(2) within the prescribed time.

Sufficiency of communication for change of address.

Held:

The notice under Section 143(2) was sent within the prescribed time. The alleged communication about the address change was not proven, and the assessee failed to provide evidence. Filing Form 18 with the Registrar of Companies was deemed insufficient to notify the Assessing Officer of the address change.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's view that merely filing the return with the new address is enough.

The Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and set aside the CIT (Appeals) and ITAT orders. The matter was remanded to the CIT (Appeals) to consider the appeal on merits, addressing other grounds.

Facts:

The victim, a painter and artist, had a relationship with the first respondent, her English teacher.

On 05.03.2004, the victim visited the first respondent's house to finalize their marriage proposal.

The parents of the first respondent, respondent Nos. 2 and 3, allegedly shouted at the victim, calling her a call-girl.

Disturbed, the victim returned home and committed suicide on 06.03.2004.

Charge under Section 306/34 IPC was framed against the accused-respondents based on suicide notes and statements recorded during the investigation.

Issues:

Whether the accused-respondents' conduct and utterances constituted abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC.

Held:

The court held that the case did not present a picture of abetment by the respondents.

The suicide committed by the victim could not be attributed to the actions of the respondents.

No goading, solicitation, or insinuation by the respondents to induce the victim to commit suicide was found.

The court emphasized that insulting and abusive conduct, without a reasonable connection to the intention of causing suicide, does not constitute abetment.

Referring to legal precedents, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to discharge the accused-respondents from the charge under Section 306/34 IPC.

Facts:

The original partnership deed involved two partners, namely late Smt. Hashmatunnisa Begum and late Sri Jai Narayan Misra.

Late Sri Jai Narayan Misra filed Original Suit No. 580 of 1988, claiming reliefs related to the partnership property.

The suit was decreed on 14.07.1993, after which the original plaintiff passed away.

The legal heirs of the original plaintiff sought execution of the decree against the legal representatives of the deceased partner.

Issues:

Whether the decree obtained against the predecessor of the appellants is executable against the legal representatives (respondents) who were not parties to the partnership deed.

Considering the dissolution of the partnership due to the death of one of the partners, whether the respondents can be held liable under the decree.

Held:

The court, after considering the provisions of Section 42(c) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and the specific clauses in the partnership deed, held that the partnership itself stands dissolved by operation of law due to the death of one of the partners. The legal representatives (respondents) were not parties to the partnership firm, and they had not derived any benefit from the assets of the partnership. Therefore, the decree obtained by the original plaintiff was not executable against the respondents. The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the Trial Court and the High Court.

Facts:

The case involves Barasat Eye Hospital and Kaustabh Mondal under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The respondent (pre-emptor) sought pre-emption rights, and the dispute centered around the deposit requirement and procedural aspects under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act.

Issues:

Activation of the right of pre-emption: Whether the right is triggered only upon the deposit of the specified amounts?

Inquiry into consideration amount: What is the process and prerequisite for investigating the stated consideration?

Deposit requirement for pre-emption: Is the pre-emptor allowed discretion in depositing amounts, or must the full amount be deposited?

Strict construction of pre-emption right: How should the weak right of pre-emption be construed in legal terms?

Refund of deposit: Under what circumstances can the pre-emptor claim a refund, and what does the phrase "remainder" signify?

Extension of time: Can the respondent be granted an extension of time for depositing the full amount?

Held:

The pre-emptor has two rights: the inherent or primary right for the offer of a thing about to be sold, and the secondary or remedial right to follow the thing sold. The secondary right is a right of substitution, and the pre-emptor must show the superiority of their right over that of the vendee.

Under Section 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, the right of pre-emption is activated on the deposit of the consideration money and an additional 10%. No deposit means the right is not triggered. Section 8 is clear and explicit.

Section 9(1) comes into play only after the deposit mentioned in Section 8(1) is made. The inquiry into the consideration amount, as envisaged in Section 9, is based on the deposit under Section 8.

The nature of inquiry by the Munsif involves first depositing the amount mentioned in the sale transaction. The phrase "the remainder, if any, being refunded to the applicant" pertains to the refund of any excess amount deposited.

The pre-requisite for exercising the weak right of pre-emption is the deposit of the sale consideration amount and the 10% levy. Full amount deposition is mandatory, and no discretion is given to the pre-emptor.

The respondent did not provide material to substantiate a plea questioning the stated consideration's market value. Allowing a pre-emptor to deposit smaller amounts could lead to speculative litigation.

The requirement to exercise the right within the stipulated time is sacrosanct. No extension of time is permitted, even through Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Once the time period is sacrosanct, the deposit of the full amount within that time is equally crucial. No extension can be granted to the respondent to exercise the right.

The respondent is entitled to the refund of the deposited amount, together with any interest earned, if applicable, as the speculative exercise has continued for fourteen years.