Facts:

The incident on December 28, 2018, at the Shri Jagannath Temple is highlighted. A Bhitar Chhu Sevak, responsible for opening the Sanctum-Santorum for daily puja/nitis, delayed the process due to personal issues with the Police Administration of Puri Town.

Issues:

The delay in the performance of seva and puja due to the Sevak's refusal to open the temple doors raises concerns about antitemple activities. The court must address misbehavior/misconduct against Temple Administration employees and devotees.

Held:

The Court expresses deep concern about the unpardonable delay in opening the temple doors on December 28, 2018.

No one has the right to obstruct temple rituals, especially with approximately 60,000 daily visitors. The incident reflects total maladministration and chaos.

The Chief Administrator of the Temple is authorized to take immediate steps against servitors/incumbents causing obstructions in seva/puja/niti and involved in misbehavior. The nature of indiscipline will determine appropriate disciplinary actions.

Decision: The Court emphasizes the need for strict disciplinary control to maintain order in the temple. The Chief Administrator is granted authority to take necessary actions against those disrupting rituals and misbehaving with employees or devotees.

Facts:

Man Singh, the respondent, was prosecuted for offenses under Sections 468, 471, and 419 of the Indian Penal Code. The charges included the use of a forged transfer certificate to secure a job in the Veterinary Department.

Issues:

Whether a High Court judge can use Section 482 CrPC to alter a sentence previously imposed by the same High Court.

The legality of granting probation in this case, especially after the conviction and service of sentence.

Held:

The High Court had no jurisdiction to review its order under Section 362 or Section 482 of CrPC. The inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be utilized to reopen or alter an order disposed of on merits. The Court, once functus officio, cannot entertain a petition to alter a sentence. The manner in which probation was granted was deemed improper and not in accordance with the law.

The order granting probation was illegal as it violated the provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The Court should have obtained a report from the Probation Officer before releasing the offender on probation. The High Court's directive that the sentence already undergone would not affect the respondent's service career was beyond its authority.

Even if benefit of probation was given, it did not entitle the employee to retain the job obtained through forged documents. The employer has the discretion to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude.

The appeal is allowed

Facts:

The appellant, a resident of Jodhpur, filed a complaint against the 2nd respondent, alleging rape, blackmail, and interference. The High Court quashed the proceedings based on a settlement document, claiming consensual relations between the parties. The appellant contested this, asserting coercion in obtaining the settlement.

Issues:

Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the proceedings prematurely.

The validity of the settlement document and the allegations of coercion.

The applicability of Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and quashed the proceedings prematurely. It emphasized the need for a thorough investigation into the serious allegations. The court refrained from making findings on the merits at this stage, especially concerning the settlement document's validity and coercion allegations. The judgment highlighted Section 114-A of the Indian Evidence Act, emphasizing the presumption of absence of

FACTS:

The Applicant-Company changed its registered office address multiple times.

The Applicant claimed not receiving the notice for the judgment due to changes in the registered office.

The Applicant learned of the judgment through a news clipping in Economic Times.

The Affidavit of dasti service filed by the Revenue showed acknowledgment by the Applicant's Chartered Accountant.

The Chartered Accountant claimed he believed the documents were related to Income Tax Return and cited health issues.

ISSUES:

Whether the Applicant was duly served with the notice of the judgment.

Validity of the Applicant's claim regarding the change of registered office.

Credibility of the Chartered Accountant's claim regarding the nature of the documents and health issues.

HELD:

This Court is satisfied that the Applicant-Company was duly served through their authorized representative. The grounds for recall lack merit, and the Applicant chose to let the matter proceed ex-parte. The application for recall is dismissed with no order as to costs.( Paragraph 14)

REFERRED CASES:

State of Rajasthan vs. Basant Nehata, (2005) 12 SCC 77

FACTS:

Advertisement published on 18th June 2013 for various posts in Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services.

Corrigendum issued on 24th June 2013, increasing the number of posts to 990.

Online examination canceled on 10th July 2014 due to irregularities.

Press Note issued on 12th November 2014, allowing candidates to correct online application forms and change categories by paying Rs. 100.

ISSUES:

Whether the Press Note shifts the date of eligibility for candidates applying for Ex-servicemen category.

The eligibility of candidates who were in active service on the last date of application.

HELD:

The Court held that the Press Note was meant for correcting mistakes or changing categories in already submitted application forms, not for providing a fresh opportunity to ineligible candidates. The eligibility date cannot be shifted under the guise of correction. The Court rejected the argument that an amendment in 2019 supported the eligibility of candidates retiring within the next year, emphasizing that the amendment had no retrospective effect.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute under the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, wherein the High Court was approached for the revision of an order. The question at hand pertains to the condonation of delay in filing the revision, which exceeded the prescribed 90 days from the communication of the order.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable in cases of revision under Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Held:

The provisions of Section 29 of the Limitation Act, dealing with savings, were discussed. It clarified that if a special law does not expressly exclude Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, they are applicable. Section 5, addressing the extension of the prescribed period, was considered applicable unless expressly excluded. The Court emphasized the importance of Section 5 in cases where the appellant/applicant had sufficient cause for not adhering to the prescribed limitation period.

The court delved into the specific provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, particularly Section 45(4), which provides for an appeal period and allows for extension. It argued that the principles of Section 5 would apply to an appeal before the appellate authority due to Section 45(4). The court also highlighted the absence of express exclusion of Section 5 in Section 48.

In this paragraph, the court established that as the revision under the Act lies with the High Court, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable. The court reiterated the absence of express exclusion, making Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act applicable. The scheme of the Himachal Pradesh VAT Act, 2005, was analyzed, indicating that it does not oust the provisions of the Limitation Act.

The court concluded that the decision of the High Court, which held Section 5 inapplicable, is not sustainable. It explicitly stated that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are indeed applicable to the revisional provision under Section 48 of the Act of 2005. The impugned judgments and orders were set aside.

Facts:

The case involves candidates from states other than Delhi (OBC outsiders) who applied for Special Education Teacher vacancies in Delhi. They obtained CTET qualification with relaxed pass norms but were deemed ineligible by the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board. The matter reached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), where the applicants claimed their selection based on merit despite not meeting the CTET pass marks for the unreserved category.

Issues:

Whether candidates from outside Delhi, securing CTET qualification with relaxed norms, can be considered for General Category vacancies.

Whether candidates, after availing concession under the OBC category, can compete for unreserved category seats.

Held:

The Court held that candidates from outside Delhi, obtaining CTET qualification under relaxed norms for the OBC category, are ineligible for General Category vacancies. The judgment distinguishes the present case from Vikas Sankhala (2017) 1 SCC 350, stating that the principles applied in Vikas Sankhala do not align with the present scenario. The Court emphasizes that migration to the unreserved category is not permissible for candidates who obtained qualification with relaxation. The decision of the High Court in favor of the respondents is set aside, and the appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The prosecution's case involved an incident on 25.05.1994, where the appellants were accused of beating Gajraj Singh to death. Witnesses Lakhan Singh (PW-10) and Ram Singh (PW-11) claimed to have seen the incident. The accused appealed against the judgment of the High Court, which upheld the Sessions Judge's decision convicting them.

Issues:

The main contention raised by the defense was the untrustworthiness of the testimonies of key witnesses, Lakhan Singh (PW-10) and Ram Singh (PW-11).

The defense argued that the testimonies, when considered along with attending circumstances, could not be relied upon.

Held:

The Court observed significant contradictions in the statements of Lakhan Singh (PW-10) and Ram Singh (PW-11), particularly regarding the sequence of events after the incident. Lakhan Singh initially claimed to have immediately reported the incident to the police, but later admitted that the report was lodged only on the arrival of the SDOP. This inconsistency raised doubts about the credibility of the witnesses.

Furthermore, the Court noted discrepancies in the accounts of other witnesses, such as Somati (PW-6) and Raghubir (PW-7). The contradictions in who informed the villagers about Gajraj Singh's death and the timing of events cast doubt on the reliability of the entire prosecution story.

The Court also highlighted the non-examination of crucial witnesses, including the potter Bhagwan Dass and the villagers from Bharon Kalan, whose testimony could have supported the prosecution's version.

Considering these contradictions, the Court concluded that a doubt had been cast on the prosecution's case, and the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused. Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the convictions of both the Courts below were set aside. The accused were acquitted, and their bail bonds were discharged.

Facts:

The case involves land acquisition proceedings initiated for the Vasant Kunj residential scheme under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant, a Cooperative Housing Society, claimed ownership of the land and sought withdrawal of the acquisition notification. The High Court partially allowed the writ petition, maintaining the notification but quashing the invocation of section 17(4) of the Act.

Issues:

The primary issue was the appellant's plea for de-notification of the acquired land based on their housing needs. The appellant argued that the area was no longer required, and government policy supported de-notification.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeals, rejecting the plea for de-notification. It emphasized that the appropriate Government had already rejected such a request, and no new facts were presented. The Cooperative Society's status did not change the legality of the land acquisition, and there was no basis for quashing the proceedings.