Facts:

Mrs. Ritika Sharan and Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, a married couple, have been living apart since 2016, with divorce proceedings pending before the Family Court, Bengaluru. Their minor child has been residing with Mrs. Ritika Sharan in Bengaluru under the care of maternal grandparents. The Family Court restrained Mrs. Ritika Sharan from taking the child out of Bengaluru and granted visitation rights to Mr. Sujoy Ghosh.

Issues:

Whether the custody of the child should remain with the maternal grandparents or be transferred to the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan, who is working in Singapore?

Whether the child's expressed desire to reside with the mother should be considered while determining custody?

Whether the court can use its jurisdiction under Art.142 of the Constitution to modify arrangements in the best interests of the child?

Held:

Ever since the couple started living apart in 2016, the child has been in the care and custody of the mother, Mrs. Ritika Sharan. The fact that the maternal grandparents have moved to Bengaluru to help Mrs. Ritika Sharan does not transfer the child's custody to them.

The paramount consideration is the welfare of the child. Mr. Sujoy Ghosh's insistence on the continued presence of the child under the care of the maternal grandparents, who have moved to Bengaluru, is not fair. There is insufficient material to indicate that Mr. Sujoy Ghosh can look after the child on his own.

During a video conferencing interaction, the child expressed his desire to reside with his mother in Singapore. The child is attached to the father, but his preference is clear.

In matters concerning the welfare of the child, Article 142 of the Constitution is a facilitative constitutional instrument to advance substantive justice. The court has the power to modify arrangements in the child's best interests.

Technicalities regarding the challenge to the Family Court's order cannot overshadow the core issue – the welfare of the child. Delaying the decision could lead to the child staying in Bengaluru with the grandparents while the mother is in Singapore, causing the child to lose a year of education.

The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Mrs. Ritika Sharan is permitted to take the child with her to Singapore, where she is employed and resides. Directions are issued to facilitate visitation rights for Mr. Sujoy Ghosh, which will supersede all previous orders.

Facts:

The petitioners sought fair investigation in a case of gangrape and murder in Uttar Pradesh. They raised concerns about the legality of the victim's cremation. The State Government entrusted the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 10.10.2020, and the CBI began its investigation on 11.10.2020.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should monitor the investigation or leave it to the High Court's jurisdiction.

Protection of the victim's family and witnesses.

Appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor.

Whether the trial of the case should be transferred to Delhi from Uttar Pradesh.

Violation of Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code.

Held:

The investigation was entrusted to the CBI by the State, thereby addressing the petitioners' apprehensions about proper investigation by the Uttar Pradesh Police. The grievance stands redressed. The High Court of Allahabad has adequately delved into the aspects of the case related to fair investigation, securing the presence of the victim's family members, and other appropriate orders. The Supreme Court will not monitor the proceedings but leaves it to the High Court's jurisdiction. The petitioners may seek to intervene in the High Court's proceedings if necessary. (Para 10)

All aspects of the matter, including the CBI investigation and alleged illegal cremation, are left open to be considered by the High Court in PIL(C) No.16150/2020. The CBI shall report to the High Court as directed by it. (Paras 13 and 14)

The security provided by the State Government to the victim's family and witnesses is deemed sufficient. However, to allay apprehensions, the Supreme Court directs that the security shall be provided by the CRPF. (Paras 11 and 12)

The issue of appointing a Special Public Prosecutor shall be considered by the High Court in light of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. (Para 13)

The transfer of the case to Delhi is not necessary at this stage since the CBI is conducting the investigation. However, the question of transferring the trial remains open for consideration if needed in the future. (Para 15)

The High Court is requested to delete the names and relationship of the victim's family members from the order and digital records to comply with the law. (Para 16)

Facts:

The appellant was acquitted under Section 20, NDPS Act based on the finding that the case was not one of 'chance recovery.'

Trial Court relied on certain averments made in a written reply submitted by the prosecution in opposition to the appellant's bail application.

The prosecution was not given an opportunity to controvert the reply document, and no confrontation was made with Prosecution Witness 5 (PW5).

The statement of PW1, the sole independent witness (declared hostile by the prosecution), corroborates the seizure of contraband substance (charas) from the appellant's possession.

Issues:

Whether the acquittal based on the reply document without giving an opportunity to the prosecution and without confronting PW5 was valid?

Whether the lack of independent witnesses affects the prosecution case?

Whether the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 awarded by the High Court is appropriate?

Held:

The appellate court has the power to re-consider questions of both law and fact and re-appreciate the evidence on record in appeals against judgments of conviction or acquittal. However, self-restraint is exercised to consider the presumption of innocence and the interests of justice. [Para 11]

2.1 The appellant's acquittal was primarily based on the finding that it was not a 'chance recovery.' The trial court relied on a written reply submitted by the prosecution in opposition to the appellant's bail application. Court records cannot be presumed to be veracious, and the prosecution must be confronted with such documents during cross-examination. [Paras 15, 16]

2.2 Since the prosecution was not given an opportunity to controvert the reply document, and irrelevant material was impermissibly relied upon by the trial court, the High Court was justified in reversing the findings and interfering with the acquittal. [Paras 17, 18]

Lack of independent witnesses does not necessarily weaken the prosecution case, but it demands a greater degree of care in scrutinizing police officers' testimonies. The observations of the trial court that the testimonies of PW2 and PW5 (police witnesses) were contradictory and lacked independent witness support were unsubstantiated by the evidence. PW1's statement corroborated the seizure of contraband substance from the appellant. [Paras 19-21]

Considering the appellant's age, circumstances, and the delay in trial and appeal, the High Court's sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 is upheld. However, the law mandates a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years for possession of 'commercial quantity' of cannabis. As clarified in Hira Singh v. Union of India, the total quantity of the mixture, including the neutral substance, is relevant for sentencing. In this case, the total quantity exceeded the 'commercial quantity,' making the sentence too charitable. [Paras 23-25]

Decision: The appeals are dismissed, and the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 awarded by the High Court is upheld.

Facts:

The appellant had applied for default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC after the completion of 180 days from the remand date. The trial court granted bail to the accused. However, the High Court set aside the bail order, stating that since an additional complaint was filed before the disposal of the bail application, bail could not have been granted.

Issues:

Whether an accused has the right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC upon the expiry of 180 days from the remand date.

Whether the subsequent filing of an additional complaint can defeat the enforcement of the accused's right to default bail.

Held:

The Court held that Section 167(2) of the CrPC was enacted with the objectives of ensuring fair trial, expedited investigation and trial, and reasonable procedure before depriving any person of his personal liberty, which is intrinsically linked to Article 21 of the Constitution. The accused, upon applying for bail under Section 167(2) r/w Section 36A (4) of the NDPS Act, after the expiry of 180 days or the extended period, is entitled to be released on bail forthwith.

The prosecution cannot defeat the enforcement of the accused's right to bail by subsequently filing a final report, additional complaint, or report seeking an extension of time. The accused's right to be released on bail arises the moment he files the bail application and offers to abide by the bail order's terms and conditions.

In cases where there is any ambiguity in the interpretation of a penal statute, the Court must favor an interpretation that protects the rights of the accused, given the power disparity between the individual accused and the State machinery.

Decision: The Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the accused, considering that he had applied for default bail within the stipulated period.

Facts:

The U.P. State Warehousing Corporation issued an e-tender for handling and transport of foodgrains and fertilizers. The tender was canceled multiple times due to complaints of financial irregularities.

Respondent No.1, Sudhir Kumar Singh, was declared the successful bidder for one of the centers, and an agreement was entered into between him and the Corporation.

Sudhir Kumar Singh filed a writ petition challenging the tender's cancellation, and the High Court allowed his petition, setting aside the cancellation and certain disciplinary actions recommended against the Corporation's officers.

The State of U.P. appealed against this judgment.

Issues:

Whether the principles of natural justice, particularly audi alteram partem, were violated during the cancellation of the tender.

Whether the breach of natural justice can lead to a conclusion of arbitrary state action under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Held:

The prayer in the writ petition was confined to the cancellation of the tender, but the High Court went beyond that and set aside the Managing Director's report and the Special Secretary's order, which recommended disciplinary action and recovery of financial loss from the responsible parties. The impugned judgment is set aside to that extent. (Para 18)

Whenever a plea of breach of natural justice is made against the State, the said plea, if found sustainable, sounds in constitutional law as arbitrary State action, which attracts the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23)

Non-observance of natural justice was earlier considered to be prejudice in itself, but the Court clarified that the existence of prejudice must be determined by the Court or Tribunal and not the authority that denies natural justice. (Para 28)

Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to remedy injustice. Breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot lead to a conclusion of prejudice by itself. Prejudice must be a matter of fact or a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice. (Para 39)

In the present case, respondent No.1 was completely in the dark regarding the cancellation of the tender, and prejudice was caused to him. The impugned judgment is upheld on this ground. (Para 40)

The appeals arising out of SLP (C) 5136 of 2020 and SLP (C) 7351 of 2020 are partially allowed. The earnest money deposit and security deposit made by respondent No.1 are ordered to be returned within eight weeks. (Para 42)

The State Corporation may also pay any amount that remained unpaid for work actually done by respondent No.1, subject to a hearing and reasons to be stated. (Para 43)

Facts:

The appellants were working as Professors in various disciplines at Kumaun University. They challenged an office order dated 21.12.2019 that specified their respective dates of retirement, which were the last dates of the months they attained the age of superannuation. The appellants argued that Statute No. 16.24 of the University entitled them to continue their service beyond the last date of the month in which they attained superannuation until the "30th of June following" their retirement.

Issues:

Whether Statute No. 16.24 grants the appellants the right to continue their service beyond the last date of the month they attain superannuation.

Whether the proviso to Statute No. 16.24 (2) permits the appellants to be treated as on re-employment until the end of the following June, despite reaching the age of superannuation.

Held:

On a plain interpretation of Statute No. 16.24, including the proviso, the Court observed the following:

Each teacher attains the age of superannuation on completing 65 years, as per Statute No. 16.24 (1).

No teacher who attains the age of superannuation has a right or entitlement to re-employment, as per Statute No. 16.24 (2). The opening expression "No teacher" seems to rule out re-employment of superannuated teachers.

The proviso to Statute No. 16.24 (2) carves out an exception to the main provision. It provides that a teacher whose "date of superannuation does not fall on June 30 shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, i.e., June 30 following, and will be treated as on re-employment from the date immediately following his superannuation till June 30 following."

The Court opined that the very object and intent of the proviso to Statute No. 16.24 is to avoid the disruption caused by discontinuity of service of a teaching staff employee or official mid-session. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to continue until the end of the following June on re-employment basis.

Decision: The Court ruled in favor of the appellants, holding that they are entitled to continue their employment till the end of the following June on re-employment basis. If any of them has been superannuated, they shall be reinstated with full salary for the period they were out of employment and allowed to continue until the following June on a re-employment basis.

REFERRED CASES:

Brownsea Haven Properties vs. Poole Corpn.(1958 [Ch] 574)

Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 673

Dr. Indu Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand, 2017 SCC Online 1527

Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd. vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (2009) 8 SCC 646

Raj Narain Pandey vs. Sant Prasad Tewari & Ors., 1973 (2) SCR 835

S. Kasi v State through Inspector of Police 2020 SCC Online 529

S.K. Rathi vs. Prem Hari Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 377

State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Chandra Tiwari, (2015 (6) ADJ 579)

Facts:

The appellant, Saravanan, had applied for default bail or statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) as he had been in jail for more than the required 60 or 90 days (depending on the offense), and the investigation was not completed, and no chargesheet was filed. The High Court granted the default bail but imposed a condition that the appellant must deposit a sum of Rs. 8,00,000/- before the Magistrate, taking into consideration an earlier undertaking given by the appellant's wife during the hearing of a regular bail application under Section 437 Cr.P.C.

Issues:

Whether the High Court could have imposed a condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- while granting default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.?

Whether the condition directing the appellant to report to the police station daily at 10:00 a.m., until further orders, for interrogation was valid?

Held:

The Supreme Court considered the short question before it - whether the High Court could have imposed the condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- while granting default bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C.( Para 8)

The Court emphasized that the only requirement for obtaining default bail/statutory bail under Section 167(2), Cr.P.C. is that the accused should have been in jail for more than 60 or 90 days (depending on the offense), and within that period, the investigation must not have been completed, and no chargesheet should have been filed. The Court held that no other condition, such as depositing a sum of money, could be imposed while granting default bail, as doing so would frustrate the purpose of the provision.( Para 9)

The Court found that the condition of depositing Rs. 8,00,000/- imposed by the High Court was unsustainable and quashed it. (Para 9.2)

Regarding the condition of reporting to the police station daily for interrogation, the Court deemed it too harsh. Instead, it directed the appellant to cooperate with the investigating officer in completing the investigation and to be present at the concerned police station for investigation/interrogation as and when required. The investigating officer could approach the court for the cancellation of bail in case of any breach of this condition. (Para 10)

REFERRED CASES:

Rakesh Kumar Paul vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67

Facts:

The respondent, Gayatri Prasad Prajapati, was a former minister accused of offenses under Sections 376D, 376, 511, 504, 506 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act. He sought interim bail on medical grounds and had received treatment at King George's Medical University (K.G.M.U.) and Sanjay Gandhi Postgraduate Institute of Medical Sciences (S.G.P.G.I.M.S.).

Issues:

The adequacy of medical treatment received by the respondent in K.G.M.U. and S.G.P.G.I.M.S.

Whether the High Court properly considered all relevant medical reports before granting interim bail.

The justification for the respondent's release on bail despite receiving treatment in a specialized medical facility.

Held:

The Supreme Court observed that the respondent was admitted to K.G.M.U. and discharged after more than seven months, with the medical board concluding that there was no significant difference in the treatment provided by both hospitals. The court further noted that the report of the medical board had not been adequately considered by the High Court while granting interim bail on medical grounds. Moreover, the respondent had been receiving treatment at S.G.P.G.I.M.S., as recommended by K.G.M.U., with no indication of inadequate medical attention.

The High Court's order granting interim bail lacked sufficient evidence to support the claim that the treatment offered to the respondent was insufficient and necessitated his release on medical grounds. The court emphasized that no satisfaction had been recorded by the High Court to warrant such an order.

The Supreme Court found that the High Court's contemplation that the respondent would reside far from the prosecutrix's residence was not substantiated by evidence or the entire material on record. Consequently, the order passed by the High Court granting interim bail on medical grounds was unsustainable.

Facts:

The appellant was tried for offenses punishable under Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act. Based on the deposition of PW-3, the 13-year-old victim, the accused was convicted under Section 7 and sentenced to 3 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 8. The trial court also ordered the accused to pay one lakh rupees as compensation to the victim, in accordance with Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules.

Issues:

The reliability and credibility of the sole testimony of PW-3, the victim.

The legality and enforceability of the compensation order under Rule 7(2) of the POCSO Rules.

Held:

The court found that there was no evidence to suggest that the legal aid counsel did not have access to the necessary papers to defend the accused. The deposition of PW-3 was thoroughly cross-examined, and the court deemed it reliable and trustworthy. The trial court had not erred in convicting the accused based on PW-3's testimony.

The High Court modified the compensation order, directing that the amount be paid by the State to the victim girl. If the State finds the accused to have sufficient means, the amount can be recovered from the accused under the Revenue Recovery Act.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. The trial court's conviction of the accused under Section 7 of the POCSO Act and the sentence imposed under Section 8 were upheld. The High Court's modification of the compensation order, making the State liable for payment, was also upheld.