Facts:

In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 190 of 2018, Arun Kumar Gupta, a judicial officer, challenged his compulsory retirement by the High Court of Jharkhand. The petitioner faced allegations of using sexist language during lectures and causing physical harm to a washerman. In Writ Petition (Civil) No. 391 of 2018, another judicial officer's record was being examined, including allegations of integrity issues and questionable knowledge of law.

Issues:

The nature of compulsory retirement of judicial officers and its consequences.

Whether the allegations against Arun Kumar Gupta were sufficient to justify his compulsory retirement.

The significance of adverse entries related to integrity in the context of judicial officers.

The role of the Screening Committee and the Standing Committee in making decisions about compulsory retirement.

The extent and limits of the power of judicial review in such cases.

Held:

The court established that an order for compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is not punitive and lacks civil consequences. The entire record of the judicial officer must be considered, giving more weight to the more recent records. The court clarified that subsequent promotions do not nullify earlier adverse records, especially concerning integrity. [(Para 16)]

In the case of Arun Kumar Gupta, allegations of using sexist language and causing physical harm to a washerman were deemed serious. The court noted that these allegations were sufficient to justify the decision for his compulsory retirement. The subsequent exoneration was considered questionable due to a lack of thorough investigation. [(Para 18-19)]

Emphasizing the importance of integrity for judicial officers, the court held that even a single lapse in integrity is not acceptable. Adverse entries related to integrity retain their significance at all stages of the officer's career. [(Para 22)]

The court highlighted that decisions regarding compulsory retirement involve collective judgment, first by the Screening Committee and then by the Standing Committee. The decisions are made by senior judges of the High Court, and the power of judicial review should be exercised cautiously, unless mala fides or glaringly unsupportable facts are present. [(Para 22-23)]

Facts:

The Government of Maharashtra had established the Maharashtra Finance and Accounts Service, including various posts, in the Finance Department. Different resolutions were issued over the years, outlining procedures for recruitment, promotions, and pay scale adjustments. A crucial resolution of October 24, 2004, granted the pay scale of Deputy Accountant to Junior Clerks under specific conditions. However, this resolution was later withdrawn by a resolution dated September 11, 2008, causing a dispute among the employees.

Issues:

The validity of the withdrawal of the Government Resolution dated 24.10.2004 by the subsequent Government Resolution dated 11.09.2008.

The entitlement of Junior Clerks to the pay scale of Deputy Accountant based on the Government Resolution dated 08.06.1995, despite the withdrawal of the resolution dated 24.10.2004.

The possibility of recovering excess payments made to the employees and the impact of the undertaking given by the employees.

Held:

The Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal did not err in upholding the withdrawal of the Government Resolution dated 24.10.2004 by the subsequent Resolution dated 11.09.2008. The resolutions were issued by the State Government in the exercise of its executive powers, and such service conditions can be modified by the Government.

The Government Resolution dated 08.06.1995 only entitled Junior Clerks to the pay scale of the next promotional post, which was that of Senior Clerks. It did not entitle them to the pay scale of Deputy Accountant, which was the promotional post for Senior Clerks.

The High Court's judgment permitted the respondents to recover excess payments made to the petitioners after 11.09.2008 by way of monthly instalments. However, recovery of benefits received prior to 11.09.2008 was restrained. The undertaking given by the employees obligated them to refund the amount if the High Court upheld the Government Resolution dated 11.09.2008. The appellants were entitled to retain benefits until the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal rejected their application on 04.12.2014, after which recovery could be initiated for excess payments received thereafter.

Facts:

The respondent, a Chief Manager at a bank branch, reported irregularities and corruption in the branch, along with allegations of sexual harassment by a Zonal Manager. Subsequently, she was transferred to a different branch.

Issues:

Whether the transfer of the respondent was valid and in accordance with administrative and service exigencies?

Whether the allegations of irregularities and sexual harassment were adequately addressed by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) of the bank?

Whether the constitution of the ICC was fair and in line with the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013?

Held:

Transfer is an exigency of service and is generally not interfered with by courts unless malafides, statutory violations, or incompetency is proven. Administrative circulars guide the implementation of the transfer policy, but they may not always create a vested right.

The respondent made multiple complaints about irregularities and corruption in the bank branch, as well as allegations of sexual harassment. These were not addressed adequately by the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) due to issues with its composition.

The composition of the ICC was flawed as it did not have an independent member, as required by law. One of the ICC members was a panel lawyer of the bank, which compromised its impartiality.

Facts:

The property in question was originally owned by a Portuguese national and was subsequently declared as evacuee property. The appellants claimed tenancy rights over the property, asserting their possession under the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The respondents contested this claim, seeking tenancy recognition under the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964, which was extended to evacuee properties through the Amending Act 19 of 1989.

Issues:

Whether the 2nd respondent's claim of tenancy was supported by valid evidence.

Whether the 2nd respondent's claim falls within the purview of the Amending Act 19 of 1989.

Whether the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act and the Tenancy Act are applicable to the present case.

Held:

The court held that the claim made by the 2nd respondent lacked sufficient valid evidence to establish tenancy. The court emphasized that the Amending Act 19 of 1989 only applied tenancy provisions to relationships between tenants and the Custodian, which the 2nd respondent had not claimed. Additionally, the court referred to Section 32 of the Evacuee Property Act, stating that any transfer or transaction involving evacuee property requires prior approval from the Custodian.

The court further explained that for the 2nd respondent to establish deemed tenancy under Section 4 of the Tenancy Act, they needed to prove possession during a specific time frame, which they failed to do. Moreover, even if the 2nd respondent claimed sub-tenancy or transfer from the appellants' predecessors, who were tenants from the Custodian, it required prior Custodian approval as per Section 32.

The primary authority's decision was criticized for granting tenancy based on an alleged oral settlement, which the appellants disputed. The appellate and revisional authorities also failed to consider relevant aspects, and the High Court upheld the decision without proper examination.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and dismissed the 2nd respondent's application for tenancy rights.

Facts:

The plaintiffs assigned telecasting rights of 16 films to certain parties for a period of 9 years through assignment deeds dated 23.12.1994. In 1995, they learned about a dispute involving the films. Legal actions were taken by various parties. The plaintiffs issued a public notice in 2003 asserting their rights, and defendant No. 1 claimed to have acquired the rights from defendant No. 2 through an assignment deed dated 21.03.1997. The plaintiffs then filed a suit for declaration and injunction in 2003.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation due to the timing of the filing of the suit.

Held:

The trial court held that the cause of action for the suit arose in 1995 when the plaintiffs became aware of the dispute, and they waited for eight years before filing the suit. The High Court, on the other hand, reversed this decision, stating that the suit was not barred by limitation. The High Court considered the fact that the plaintiffs' cause of action arose only after their assignment period ended. Therefore, the suit was filed within a reasonable time.

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that the cause of action to file a suit accrues when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe a right. Since the plaintiffs had assigned their rights for a specific period, they could not claim those rights during that time. The Court held that the suit was filed within a reasonable time and dismissed the appeal.

Facts:

The respondent, Mukesh Poonamchand Shah, an employee of LIC, was convicted of various criminal offenses, including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code. He was initially penalized through a disciplinary inquiry by LIC and later was convicted in a criminal case.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's issuance of a notice to show cause under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations, based on the respondent's criminal conviction, is valid despite an earlier disciplinary penalty.

Whether the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision on the notice pending the criminal appeal is legally justified.

Held:

The Court upheld that the notice to show cause issued by LIC based on the respondent's criminal conviction was valid under Regulation 39(4) of the 1960 Regulations.

The Court reasoned that a prior disciplinary penalty for misconduct does not prevent LIC from issuing a separate notice under Regulation 39(4) based on the criminal conviction.

The Court cited precedents like Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, K C Sareen vs. CBI, and State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh to support the view that disciplinary action can be taken based on criminal conviction even if the sentence is suspended during an appeal.

The Court clarified that the conviction itself was not stayed pending the appeal; only the sentence was suspended.

The Court concluded that the appellant's issuance of the notice was within its jurisdiction, and the High Court's direction to withhold a final decision during the criminal appeal lacked a valid legal basis.

REFERRED CASES:

Dy Director of Collegiate Education (Admn) vs. S Nagoor Meera, (1995) 3 SCC 377

K.C. Sareen vs. CBI. (2001) 6 SCC 584

Lt Governor, Delhi vs. HC Narinder Singh, (2004) 13 SCC 342

State of Haryana vs. Balwant Singh, (2003) 3 SCC 362

FACTS:

Sadhusharan Yadav defaulted on a loan and his mortgaged land was sold in an auction.

Respondent-writ petitioners, claiming to be bona fide purchasers of the land, filed an application to set aside the sale under Section 28 of the Act.

The application was filed within the stipulated time but without the required deposit.

The Certificate Officer allowed the deposit to be made after the specified time.

ISSUES:

Whether an application under Section 28 of the Act can be entertained without the required deposit?

Can the Certificate Officer extend the time for deposit?

HELD:

The interpretation of Section 28 of the Act is crucial. The section requires that the application for setting aside a sale, made within thirty days from the sale date, must be accompanied by the specified deposit. The word "deposit" implies that the deposit is to be made before or simultaneously with the application, within the thirty-day period. There's no authority to extend this time limit.( Para 6)

Section 28 is a concession for the defaulter, and strict compliance is necessary. The sale cannot be set aside unless the entire specified amount is deposited within thirty days. Allowing deposits after the thirty-day period would defeat the purpose of the provision.( Para 7)

The High Court allowed the writ petition on the premise of the Certificate Officer's discretion, which we find invalid. The authority lacks power to extend the deposit time. The judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is erroneous.( Para 8)

The appeal is allowed, and the impugned order is set aside. The application under Section 28 stands rejected. The respondent-writ petitioners are entitled to a refund of their deposit.( Para 9)

 Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as inserted by the Finance Act, 2001. The provision pertains to the deduction for liability under the leave encashment scheme.

Issues:

• Whether the newly inserted Clause (f) to Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid?
• Whether the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid?

Held:

The Court held that Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is constitutionally valid. The provision is not an embargo upon the autonomy of the assessee in adopting a particular method of accounting, nor does it deprive the assessee of any lawful deduction. It only operates as an additional condition for the availment of deduction concerning specified heads. The insertion of Clause (f) was to regulate deductions by putting them under a special provision. The Court emphasized that the presumption in favor of constitutionality applies while testing the validity of a provision.

The Court rejected the argument that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of Clause (f) renders it invalid. The presence or absence of objects and reasons does not impact the constitutional validity of a provision, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and clarified that the absence of objects and reasons behind the enactment of a provision does not impact its validity, as long as the literal features of the provision enable the Court to comprehend its true meaning with sufficient clarity. 

Facts:

The Kerala State Electricity Board issued a tariff notification that segregated Self-Financing Educational Institutions (SFEIs) from State-run and State-aided private educational institutions, subjecting SFEIs to a higher category of tariff. The validity of this tariff order was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the tariff order gave undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions?

Whether the tariff notification breached the principles of natural justice due to the absence of reasons?

Whether SFEIs were correctly categorized under the "commercial" heading for tariff purposes?

The meaning of the term "purpose" in the context of the Electricity Act, 2003.

Held:

Issue 1: Undue Preference The court held that the tariff notification did not show undue preference to State-run and State-aided institutions. The differentiation in tariff rates was based on factors like load factor, power factor, voltage, consumption, geographical position, nature of supply, and purpose for which supply is required. (Para 7)

Issue 2: Principles of Natural Justice The court ruled that the absence of reasons in the tariff notification did not breach principles of natural justice. Since SFEIs did not raise objections during the tariff proposal stage, the Commission's role was quasi-legislative. The requirement for disclosing reasons arises only when a dispute is generated, and there was no dispute in this case. (Para 10-11)

Issue 3: Categorization under "Commercial" Heading The court explained that while educational institutions might not perform functions similar to traditional commercial entities, for tariff purposes, entities from diverse fields can be grouped under a common umbrella. The heading "commercial" does not solely depend on the nature of activities. (Para 14)

Issue 4: Meaning of "Purpose" The court interpreted the term "purpose" as the reason for which something is done or exists. SFEIs were included under the "commercial" heading based on the purpose they served, which distinguished them from State-run institutions. The distinction in purpose justifies different tariff rates. (Para 16-18)

The court concluded that the tariff order was valid, and SFEIs being categorized as commercial entities for tariff purposes was not erroneous. The differentiation in tariff rates was justified based on the distinction in purpose and nature of the institutions. The judgment of the Single Judge was restored. (Para 19)