Arbitration – Appointment of Arbitrator – Limitation Period – Appeal against High Court's decision to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Demand for arbitration was made on 07.11.2006 and reiterated on 13.01.2007 – Time began running from 12.02.2007 after no arbitrator was appointed – Subsequent final rejection by appellant on 10.11.2010 did not reset limitation period – Applications under Section 11 filed on 06.11.2013 were time-barred – High Court erred in finding applications within limitation – Appeals allowed; High Court's appointment of arbitrator set aside [Paras 1-22].

Final Payment and Demand – Contractual Obligations – Final payments for road repair works were received by March 2003 – Respondent's demand for price variation reimbursement made on 08.09.2003 – Further demands and letters did not extend limitation – Claims were time-barred by February 2013 – Applications for arbitration appointment were ex facie time-barred [Paras 21-22].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court's judgment dated 20.08.2019 set aside – Applications for appointment of arbitrator under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act dismissed as time-barred [Para 22].

Default Bail – Fundamental Right – Appeal regarding default bail under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. – Supreme Court holds default bail as a fundamental right under Article 21 – The State cannot extend the period for filing charge sheets through supplementary charge sheets beyond the period specified under Section 167 – Appeals allowed; appellant entitled to default bail [Paras 1-17].

Criminal Procedure – Investigation Period – The charge sheet for offenses under IPC and Arms Act filed within 180 days, but not for UAPA – Application for default bail filed after 180 days, with charge sheet under UAPA filed 211 days post-arrest – The appellant’s right to default bail upheld due to failure to file charge sheet within the statutory period [Paras 13-14].

Court Jurisdiction – Special Courts for UAPA – Argument on jurisdiction for granting 180 days extension by Chief Judicial Magistrate instead of special courts – Different situation in Uttar Pradesh as special courts were not notified – The extension granted by CJM found permissible in this context [Para 11].

Decision – Appeals allowed – Impugned orders set aside – Appellant entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. – Conditions to be set by trial court [Paras 16-17].

Criminal Law – Bail Cancellation – Tampering of Court Records – The appellant challenged the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent, accused of serious offenses including forgery and manipulation of court records. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court failed to consider the seriousness of the allegations and the gravity of the matter. The bail order was set aside due to inadequate reasoning and lack of consideration of relevant factors [Paras 1-10].

Seriousness of Offense – Consideration in Bail Matters – The Supreme Court highlighted that tampering with court records is a grave offense that can significantly undermine the administration of justice. The court stressed that such allegations require cautious consideration while granting bail [Paras 8.2-8.3].

Beneficiary of Forged Documents – Implications for Bail – The court noted that the respondent benefited from the forged and manipulated court order, which was used to secure an acquittal in a separate case. This fact alone warranted a more stringent approach in considering the bail application [Paras 8.3-8.4].

Locus Standi – Right to Challenge Bail – The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the appellant lacked the locus to challenge the bail order, noting the appellant's role in bringing the tampering allegations to light and the serious nature of the offense involved [Para 8.4].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The High Court's order granting bail was quashed and set aside. The respondent was directed to surrender forthwith. The court clarified that observations in the order were confined to the bail issue and should not influence the trial's merits [Para 9].

Insolvency Law – Professional Fees – Jurisdiction of NCLT – The appellant, a registered valuer, was appointed during the CIRP of the corporate debtor, which was subsequently set aside by the NCLAT. The appellant's claim for professional fees was dismissed by the NCLT, which held it was functus officio. The Supreme Court held that the NCLT has the jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to determine the fees payable to professionals engaged during the CIRP, emphasizing the need for a forum to address such claims within the insolvency framework [Paras 1-21].

IBC – Section 60(5)(c) – Scope and Application – The Supreme Court clarified that Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC grants the NCLT jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes arising out of or related to the insolvency resolution process. This includes determining the claims of professionals like registered valuers whose services were utilized during the CIRP [Para 18].

Costs and Expenses – CIRP – The court highlighted the definitions and provisions under Regulations 31 and 34 of the IRP Regulations, which encompass fees for professionals as part of the insolvency resolution process costs. The NCLT is thus empowered to assess and adjudicate the professional charges claimed by the appellant [Paras 12-15, 19].

Redressal Mechanism under IBC – Jurisdiction of NCLT and IBBI – The Supreme Court distinguished between the grievance redressal mechanism available under the IBC for addressing misconduct by resolution professionals and the jurisdiction of the NCLT to determine professional fees as part of CIRP costs. It stated that the NCLT's jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) is not ousted by the availability of other grievance mechanisms [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The impugned judgment of the NCLAT was set aside, and the matter was remitted back to the NCLT to determine the appellant's claim for professional fees afresh. The earlier order of the NCLT was also set aside to facilitate this determination [Para 21].

Criminal Law – Murder Conviction – Bail Cancellation – The appellant challenged the High Court's order granting bail to the second respondent, accused of murdering the appellant's son. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court's order lacked sufficient reasoning and failed to consider the seriousness of the offense and the prima facie evidence against the accused. The High Court's decision was deemed to not meet the required judicial standards, thus the bail order was set aside [Paras 1-10].

Article 21 – Personal Liberty vs. Public Interest – While the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 is paramount, it must be balanced with the public interest in ensuring that those accused of serious crimes are held accountable. The Supreme Court highlighted that in cases of serious offenses like murder, the liberty of the accused must be weighed against the need for justice and public safety [Paras 8-9].

Judicial Reasoning – Necessity of Detailed Justification – The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for its cursory reasoning in granting bail, which merely referenced the "larger mandate of Article 21" without addressing the gravity of the crime or the evidence on record. The Court reiterated the necessity for reasoned judicial orders to uphold the principles of open justice and ensure transparency in judicial decision-making [Paras 7-8].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The order of the High Court granting bail was set aside. The second respondent was directed to surrender forthwith [Para 9].

Criminal Procedure – Summoning Additional Accused – Examination-in-Chief – Appeal against High Court's quashing of the Trial Court’s order summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC – Supreme Court holds that accused can be summoned on the basis of examination-in-chief of the witness and need not wait till cross-examination – Prima facie case against the proposed accused suffices – Appeal allowed; Trial Court's order restored [Paras 1-8].

Application of Section 319 CrPC – Broad Interpretation of Evidence – Evidence in Section 319 CrPC includes examination-in-chief – Court can summon additional accused if prima facie evidence is available – No need to await cross-examination or further evidence testing – The aim is to ensure the real perpetrators face trial – High Court erred in appreciating evidence on merits at the summoning stage [Paras 6-8].

Summoning Based on Witness Testimony – Injured eyewitness testimony named additional accused, initially not charge-sheeted due to DSP’s enquiry report – Trial Court’s reliance on witness’s examination-in-chief justified – High Court’s reasons for quashing summoning order found unsustainable [Paras 7-8].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s order quashing Trial Court's summoning of additional accused set aside – Trial Court’s summoning order restored – Additional accused to face trial as summoned [Paras 8-8.2].

Criminal Law – Fabrication of False Evidence – Applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC – The Supreme Court examined whether the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC applies to prosecution by the investigating agency for offenses under Section 193 IPC committed during the investigation stage. It held that Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC does not bar such prosecution, provided the complaint is lodged before the commencement of proceedings and production of evidence before the trial court [Paras 1-24].

Interpretation of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC – The Court clarified that the term "in relation to any proceeding in any Court" should not be construed to include offenses committed during the investigative stage that do not have a direct nexus with the court proceedings. The bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is intended to prevent private parties from initiating frivolous or vexatious prosecutions [Paras 6-24].

Judicial Proceeding – Investigation Stage – The Court noted that while an investigation is deemed to be a stage of a judicial proceeding under Explanation 2 to Section 193 IPC, it does not equate to a proceeding in any court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC. The investigating agency is best positioned to verify and act upon fabricated evidence detected during the investigation [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – The Court upheld the convictions and sentences imposed by the Trial Court and the High Court, emphasizing the gravity of the offenses and rejecting the application of Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC as a bar to prosecution by the investigating agency [Para 24].

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act – Nomination of Responsible Person – Section 17 – The appellant contested the criminal proceedings initiated against him, asserting that he was not the nominated person responsible for the company, as per Section 17 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the nomination in Form VIII, duly submitted to the Local Health Authority and received, could not be rejected on technical grounds such as it being sent on the company's letterhead. The complaint's averments indicated that Devendra Singh Bhadauria was the nominated person, not the appellant [Paras 1-11].

Cognizance of Offense – Validity of Nomination – The Court found that the lower courts erred in taking cognizance of the offense against the appellant, as there were no specific allegations against him apart from being incorrectly impleaded as the nominee. The valid nomination of Devendra Singh Bhadauria was substantiated by the documents submitted, negating the claims against the appellant [Paras 7-11].

Decision: Appeal allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and the Special Judge taking cognizance against the appellant. The appellant was found not responsible under Sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, due to the valid nomination of another individual [Paras 11-12].

Limitation Act – Period of Limitation – Article 137 – The Supreme Court clarified that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, would be governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is a failure to appoint the arbitrator. The court emphasized the need for Parliament to consider amending Section 11 to prescribe a specific period of limitation to align with the objective of expeditious arbitration proceedings [Paras 1-40].

Arbitration and Conciliation Act – Appointment of Arbitrator – Section 11 – The Court held that Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act mandates the appointment of an arbitrator by the court upon failure of the parties to appoint one within the stipulated period. However, in rare and exceptional cases where the claims are ex facie time-barred and there is no subsisting dispute, the court may refuse to make the reference [Paras 40-41].

Judicial Intervention – Commercial Disputes – Expeditious Disposal – The judgment highlights that the Arbitration Act, amended in 2015 and 2019, aims to minimize judicial intervention and promote the expeditious resolution of disputes. The court's role at the pre-reference stage should be limited to examining the existence of an arbitration agreement, leaving other issues to the arbitral tribunal [Paras 17-31, 40-41].

Decision: Appeals allowed – The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the High Court and dismissed the application filed under Section 11 by the respondent. The court reiterated that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 is three years from the date of failure to appoint the arbitrator, as governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 [Paras 40-41].