Facts:

The appellant and respondent no. 2 entered into an agreement to develop a portion of the appellant's land. Later, respondent no. 2 assigned the execution of the agreement to respondent no. 1, which contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, a deed of confirmation was executed. The appellant filed a suit alleging fraud by respondent no. 3, representing himself as an authorized partner of respondent no. 1, seeking the cancellation of the agreements as null and void. Respondent no. 1 relied on the arbitration clause and filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking referral to arbitration.

Issues:

Whether the subject matter of the agreements is arbitrable, considering Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, and the fraud exception?

Whether Section 31(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allows actions in rem or in personam?

Whether the judgment of the District Court and the High Court requires interference?

Held:

The court observed that if the subject matter of the agreement falls within Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872, or involves fraud amounting to deceit in the performance of the contract, it would be arbitrable. The presence of criminal overtones does not make the matter non-arbitrable. In the present case, a valid arbitration agreement exists as the agreements sought to be cancelled were not stated to be non-existent. The suit being inter parties with no public overtones, the fraud exception does not apply. Post-amendment, Section 8 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, mandates referral to arbitration unless no valid arbitration agreement is prima facie found. The court found a valid arbitration agreement in this case. [Para 4, 6]

Section 26(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, allows rectification of a contract through fraud or mutual mistake, and such rectification can be the subject matter of a suit for specific performance, making it arbitrable. Section 27(1) allows a party interested in a contract to sue for its rescission, and the relief granted is in personam. Section 31(1) of the Act pertains to actions inter parties or by persons with derivative title from the parties, making it an in personam action. [Para 11-13]

Section 31(2) does not change the in personam nature of actions under Section 31(1). The reasoning in certain cases to the contrary is overruled. The judgments of the District Court and the High Court do not require interference. This appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. [Para 17-18, 20-22, 25-26]

Facts:

The cases revolve around multiple assesses who allegedly undervalued the goods they manufactured and cleared, leading to evasion of excise duty. The Customs, Excise, and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) upheld the finding of undervaluation and evasion of excise duty in all the cases but remanded the matters for re-quantification of duty.

Issues:

Adjudication was to determine the value of the goods removed by the assesses for sale to or through dealers. The cases involved two different methods of valuation, one before and one after the amendment to Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which took place on July 1, 2000.

Held:

The Court confirmed the finding of undervaluation and evasion of excise duty recorded by CESTAT in all the cases, as it had attained finality, and was not challenged by the assesses. The Court then explained the changes brought about by the amendment to Section 4. Before the amendment, the method of valuation focused on normal price for an ordinary sale in the course of wholesale trade. After the amendment, the emphasis shifted to "transaction value" for sales covered by Section 4(1)(a). For cases not covered by Section 4(1)(a), the Central Government issued the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000, in supersession of the 1975 Valuation Rules. The valuation as per the Rules is permissible only in cases covered by Section 4(1)(b) and not by Section 4(1)(a).

The Court disposed of the appeals and confirmed the impugned orders of CESTAT setting aside the Orders-in-Original passed by the Adjudicating Authorities and remanded the matters back for re-adjudication. However, the Court pointed out the failure of the Adjudicating Authorities and CESTAT to determine specific factors related to the method of valuation before and after the amendment. The Court provided principles for adjudicating authorities to keep in mind while re-adjudicating the matters, depending on whether the period of assessment was prior to or after July 1, 2000.

Facts:

A Share Subscription Agreement (SSA) and Shareholders' Agreement (SHA) were entered into between the claimant and the appellants, both containing an identical arbitration clause. The appellants allegedly made false representations about a contract with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to induce the claimant to invest USD 60 million in their equity capital. The claimant later found that the BBC contract was non-existent, and the investment proceeds were siphoned off to companies in which the appellants had a stake. Disputes arose, and the claimant initiated arbitral proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded USD 60 million plus interest and costs in favor of the claimant.

Issues:

Whether the fraud alleged in the SSA would vitiate the arbitration clause?

Whether the issues raised and answered in the Foreign Final award are civil or criminal in nature?

Whether the claimant made a strong prima facie case in the section 9 proceedings?

Whether the division bench's reduction of USD 60 million to USD 30 million was justified?

Held:

The Court referred to the Foreign Final Award dated September 27, 2014, and found that the siphoning off of USD 60 million into companies controlled by the appellants was established. As a result, the claimant was entitled to damages in the total amount of USD 60 million plus interest and costs as awarded.

The Court held that the issues raised and answered in the Foreign Final Award were of a civil nature, and the fraud alleged in the SSA did not vitiate the arbitration clause, which was an independent clause.

The Court also found that the claimant made a strong prima facie case in the section 9 proceedings. The USD 60 million awarded to the claimant should be kept apart for enforcement purposes, as irreparable loss would be caused if the award was not enforced.

The Court dismissed Civil Appeal No. 5145 of 2016 and allowed Civil Appeal No. 5158 of 2016, Civil Appeal no. 9820 of 2016.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the victim-complainant was accosted by three boys armed with weapons, who extorted Rs. 30,000/- from him.

The police apprehended all three accused, and they confessed to committing the robbery.

The Trial Court found all three accused guilty of robbery with an attempt to cause grievous hurt and sentenced them accordingly.

The High Court dismissed the charge under Section 397 of IPC and instead convicted the appellant under Section 394 of IPC with a reduced sentence.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's claim of being a juvenile at the time of the incident and undergoing treatment for a mental disorder is valid.

Whether the testimonies of the witnesses and the evidence establish the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held:

The testimonies of the witnesses are credible and consistent with each other, establishing the crime of robbery with hurt. The complainant had no motive to falsely implicate the appellant.

The appellant's refusal to participate in the Test Identification Parade (TIP) indicates his guilty conscience and should be given substantial weight.

Claims of unsoundness of mind or mitigating circumstances like juvenility of age should be raised during the trial, and the appellant's belated claims are not genuine.

The appellant failed to provide evidence to support his claim of being a juvenile at the time of the incident, and the statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) indicates he was above 18 years of age.

The plea of mental disorder remains unsubstantiated, as no witness testified to it, and the appellant's conduct shows an elevated level of mental intellect.

The High Court's reasons for disbelieving the appellant's defences are well-reasoned and valid.

The appeal is dismissed, the appellant's bail bonds are cancelled, and the respondent-State is directed to take the appellant into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.

Facts:

The petitioners filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Union of India to prepare, notify, and implement a separate National Disaster Management Plan specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic. They also sought guidelines for minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by COVID-19, and questioned the utilization of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the PM CARES Fund.

Issues:

• Whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was required despite the existence of the National Plan, 2019?
• Whether fresh guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19 were necessary in addition to the existing guidelines under Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005?
• Whether the NDRF could be used for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19, and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund?
• Whether all funds collected in the PM CARES Fund should be transferred to the NDRF?

Held:

The court examined whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was necessary. It held that the National Plan, 2019, which was framed and notified in November 2019, already covered Biological and Public Health Emergencies, including epidemics like COVID-19. The court observed that the Disaster Management Act, 2005, contained sufficient powers and measures to address such emergencies, and thus, there was no need for a separate plan for COVID-19. (Para 36, 38, 39, 42)

The court addressed the issue of guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19. It held that the guidelines issued under Section 12 of the Act, which were in place before the COVID-19 pandemic, already covered the minimum standards of relief for all disasters, including COVID-19. There was no requirement to issue fresh guidelines specifically for the pandemic. (Para 45, 46)

The court examined whether the NDRF could be utilized for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19 and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund. The court ruled that the NDRF could indeed be utilized for providing assistance for COVID-19. It clarified that any person or institution could still make contributions to the NDRF as per Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. The court also noted that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF served different purposes, and contributions to the PM CARES Fund were voluntary. (Para 61, 64, 65)

The court addressed the issue of transferring funds collected in the PM CARES Fund to the NDRF. It held that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF were separate funds with different objectives. The funds collected in the PM CARES Fund were meant for a public charitable trust and need not be transferred to the NDRF. (Para 72)

Facts:

The petitioners filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) seeking directions to the Union of India to prepare, notify, and implement a separate National Disaster Management Plan specifically for the COVID-19 pandemic. They also sought guidelines for minimum standards of relief to be provided to persons affected by COVID-19, and questioned the utilization of the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and the PM CARES Fund.

Issues:

Whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was required despite the existence of the National Plan, 2019?

Whether fresh guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19 were necessary in addition to the existing guidelines under Section 12 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005?

Whether the NDRF could be used for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19, and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund?

Whether all funds collected in the PM CARES Fund should be transferred to the NDRF?

Held:

The court examined whether a separate National Disaster Management Plan for COVID-19 was necessary. It held that the National Plan, 2019, which was framed and notified in November 2019, already covered Biological and Public Health Emergencies, including epidemics like COVID-19. The court observed that the Disaster Management Act, 2005, contained sufficient powers and measures to address such emergencies, and thus, there was no need for a separate plan for COVID-19. (Para 36, 38, 39, 42)

The court addressed the issue of guidelines for minimum standards of relief for COVID-19. It held that the guidelines issued under Section 12 of the Act, which were in place before the COVID-19 pandemic, already covered the minimum standards of relief for all disasters, including COVID-19. There was no requirement to issue fresh guidelines specifically for the pandemic. (Para 45, 46)

The court examined whether the NDRF could be utilized for providing assistance in the fight against COVID-19 and whether contributions should be credited to the NDRF or the PM CARES Fund. The court ruled that the NDRF could indeed be utilized for providing assistance for COVID-19. It clarified that any person or institution could still make contributions to the NDRF as per Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. The court also noted that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF served different purposes, and contributions to the PM CARES Fund were voluntary. (Para 61, 64, 65)

The court addressed the issue of transferring funds collected in the PM CARES Fund to the NDRF. It held that the PM CARES Fund and the NDRF were separate funds with different objectives. The funds collected in the PM CARES Fund were meant for a public charitable trust and need not be transferred to the NDRF. (Para 72)

Facts:

On or about December 22, 2007, the Lender Banks sanctioned and extended various loans, advances, and facilities to the corporate debtor-respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 defaulted in payment, and its account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset on July 8, 2011. Recovery proceedings were initiated against the corporate debtor by the consortium of lenders before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institution Act, 1993.

On or about March 21, 2018, the respondent no.2, as the financial creditor and assignee of the loans and advances disbursed to the corporate debtor, filed an application under Section 7 of the Code before the Adjudicating Authority seeking initiation of CIRP against respondent no.1. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) admitted the application and initiated CIRP under Section 7 of the Code. The appellant, the director of the respondent no.1 company, contended before the Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) that the claim was barred by time. However, the appeal was dismissed by the NCLAT.

Issues:

• Whether the application under Section 7 of the Code is barred by limitation?
• Whether Section 18 of the Limitation Act can be applied to the present case?

Held:

The period of limitation for an application seeking initiation of CIRP under Section 7 of the Code is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, which is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. In this case, the application was filed in March 2018, much later than three years from the date of default (stated as July 8, 2011) in the application. Therefore, the application filed by the respondent no.2 is clearly barred by limitation. [Para 38]

The NCLT failed to examine the question of limitation, and the NCLAT decided the question of limitation on entirely irrelevant considerations. The NCLAT's assumption that the right to apply under Section 7 of the Code accrued on December 1, 2016 (when the Code came into force) and the application is within limitation, lacks any foundation or basis. There is nothing in the Code or the Limitation Act to support such an assumption. The reasoning of the NCLAT regarding the period of limitation for mortgaged property (12 years) is also erroneous and not in line with the Supreme Court's decision. [Para 36, 37]

In view of the above, this appeal is allowed to the extent indicated and with the observations foregoing.

Facts:

Prashant Bhushan, an advocate, posted two tweets on Twitter, which were the subject of the contempt proceedings. The first tweet criticized the Chief Justice of India (CJI) as an individual, while the second tweet made an adverse statement against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices regarding the state of democracy in India. The Supreme Court initiated suo motu contempt proceedings based on these tweets.

Issues:

• Whether the tweets made by the advocate amount to fair criticism or criminal contempt of the judiciary and the CJI.
• Whether the Supreme Court's suo motu initiation of contempt proceedings without the Attorney General's consent is valid.

Held:

The power of the Supreme Court to initiate contempt proceedings is derived from Article 129 of the Constitution, and it is not limited by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Court can initiate suo motu proceedings based on information received and is not required to seek the consent of the Attorney General for such proceedings. The procedure must be just, fair, and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. (Para 18)

While citizens have the right to make fair criticism of judges, the judiciary, and its functioning under Article 19(1) of the Constitution, there are limits to this right. If the criticism exceeds those limits and tends to scandalize the judges, undermine the dignity and authority of the court, or shake public confidence in the judicial institutions, it may be considered 'criminal contempt.' (Para 57)

Criticism against an individual judge is not contempt, but when criticism is directed against a judge as a judge and adversely affects the administration of justice, the contempt jurisdiction can be invoked. (Para 58)

Constructive criticism for systemic correction in the system is permissible, but malicious, scurrilous, or calculated attacks on the judiciary's foundation cannot be condoned. (Para 59)

The first tweet, which criticized the CJI as an individual, could not be considered contempt. However, the second part of the tweet, which criticized the CJI as the head of the judiciary during the COVID-19 lockdown, was false, malicious, and scandalous. (Para 62-64)

The second tweet, which made adverse statements against the Supreme Court and the last four Chief Justices, created an impression that the judiciary played a substantial role in the destruction of democracy in the last six years. This attack on the Supreme Court and the CJIs cannot be overlooked and amounts to criminal contempt. (Para 67-68)

The Indian judiciary's trust, faith, and confidence are essential for a healthy democracy. Attacks on the judiciary's foundation must be dealt with firmly, and the Court's summary jurisdiction is required to protect the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. (Para 72-73)

Facts:

The present writ petition was filed in 1985 and raised various issues related to the environment in Delhi, misuse of premises for unauthorized/commercial purposes, and the shifting of heavy industries. In 2006, the Supreme Court appointed a Monitoring Committee to restrain the misuse of residential premises for commercial purposes in Delhi. Subsequently, the Monitoring Committee also addressed encroachments and unauthorized colonies on public land.

Issues:

• whether the Monitoring Committee had the authority to act against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land.

Held:

The Court clarified that the Monitoring Committee was appointed and empowered within the strict confines of the powers conferred on it by the Court. The Committee's powers were limited to checking the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and addressing encroachments on public land. The Court, through various orders, never authorized the Committee to act against purely residential premises on private land not used for commercial purposes.

The Court emphasized that the Monitoring Committee was not authorized to take action against residential premises not being used for commercial purposes on private land. If there was unauthorized construction or deviation, the requisite provisions were under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Committee's power to seal properties carried civil consequences, and a person could only be deprived of their property following the procedure prescribed by law.

Article 300A of the Constitution of India provides protection against deprivation of property and right of residence except as prescribed by law. The Court held that the Committee's actions were beyond its authorized scope and violated the due process protection provided by law. The Committee's action in sealing residential premises not misused for commercial purposes was deemed invalid.

The Court observed that the Monitoring Committee had never sealed any residential premises used solely for residential purposes on private land before and could not order their demolition. The Court reemphasized that the Committee's purpose was limited to specific issues, and its actions were confined to the misuse of residential properties for commercial purposes and encroachments on public land.

The Court quashed Report No.149 and other reports submitted subsequently, along with the entire action of sealing properties pursuant to the said report. The Court also quashed notices directing demolitions where the Monitoring Committee had no power to take action. The Court ordered the properties sealed as per Report No.149 to be de-sealed and possession restored to the owners.