Facts:

The case revolved around an organization formed to achieve separate statehood for Tamil Nadu. The appellant and other accused allegedly conspired to bomb the State Government building. The bomb was defused before detonation. The prosecution's case relied on confessions, both from the appellant and co-accused, as well as evidence related to the conspiracy and bomb-making materials.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's confession was obtained voluntarily and adhered to the guidelines set by the court.
• Whether the confession of co-accused is admissible in the absence of a joint trial.

Held:

The court examined the appellant's confession (Ex. P-57) and observed that the requirements for recording confessions under Section 15 of the TADA Act were not followed. The appellant alleged torture and claimed that his statement was not voluntary. The court found discrepancies in the warning given, and the appellant's petitions (Ex. D-1 and D-2) raised doubts. The court held that the confession was not proven to be voluntary and rejected it.

The court considered the admissibility of co-accused confessions (Ex. P-26 and P-27). Since the appellant was absconding and a separate trial was conducted against him, the joint trial requirement of Section 30 of the Evidence Act was not met. The court upheld that for a co-accused confession to be admissible, a joint trial is necessary. Therefore, the co-accused confessions were not admissible against the appellant.

Conclusion : As the appellant's confession was rejected and co-accused confessions were not admissible, the Designated Court's conviction was unsustainable. The appellant was acquitted and his bail bond was canceled.

Facts:

Pawan Kumar Gupta challenged the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. He contended that settled principles of considering mercy petitions were not followed. He raised concerns about the determination of his juvenility, alleging that he was a juvenile at the time of the incident. Additionally, he claimed to have suffered injuries due to torture in prison.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition could be subjected to judicial review and if so, on what grounds.

Whether the petitioner's claim of juvenility had been adequately determined.

Whether allegations of torture in prison could be a basis for judicial review of the mercy petition rejection.

Held:

The court held that the power of judicial review over the President's decision in a mercy petition was limited. Such decisions could be challenged on the grounds of lack of application of mind, mala fide intent, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, or arbitrariness. [Para 10]

The petitioner's claim of juvenility was rejected as the plea had been previously considered and rejected by the Juvenile Justice Board, the District & Sessions Judge, and the Delhi High Court. The plea had been conclusively determined by the courts. [Para 12-15]

Allegations of torture in prison were deemed insufficient to warrant judicial review of the executive order rejecting the mercy petition. [Para 16]

The court emphasized that when high constitutional authorities like the President of India have the power to grant mercy, it is presumed they have considered all aspects carefully. The court found no evidence that the President had not considered the mercy petition with an open mind. [Para 20-21]

The writ petition challenging the rejection of the mercy petition was dismissed, applying the principles from previous cases on the limited scope of judicial review over such decisions. [Para 22]

Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that he, his mother, and sisters had equal shares in a land, which defendant No. 5 obtained through a Will. The Will was contested as fraudulent and misrepresented. The trial and the first appellate court rejected the suit, citing existing property partition and valid Will proof. However, the High Court, in a second appeal, decreed in favor of the plaintiff, alleging suspicious circumstances around the Will's execution.

Issues:

Whether the Will's execution was duly proved?

Whether secondary evidence of the lost original Will was admissible?

Whether the High Court's interference with the concurrent findings of lower courts was justified?

Held:

The Will's attesting witness and the scribe's statements confirmed its proper execution. The Will's exclusion of natural heirs didn't render it suspicious. The High Court's intervention was improper as it disregarded the consistent findings of the lower courts. (Para 11, 23, 30, 33)

Section 65 of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence when the original document is lost. In this case, evidence showed the original Will was lost, and secondary evidence was appropriately admitted. There was no requirement to file an application for permission to lead secondary evidence under Section 65(c). (Para 15, 17, 20)

The High Court, under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, lacked jurisdiction to overturn findings of fact. The findings of fact could not be interfered with even in the absence of framing substantial questions of law. (Para 11)

Facts:

The Government of Bombay had acquired land for the Government of India before 1964, upon which it constructed godowns and silos for storing food grains. These structures were transferred to the Food Corporation of India (FCI) in 1965 after its establishment. The Brihanmumbai Mahanagar Palika (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai) demanded property tax from the FCI for these godowns. The FCI claimed exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution, asserting that the properties were owned by the Central Government.

Issues:

Whether the FCI is eligible for exemption from property tax under Article 285 of the Constitution of India?

Whether the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act is valid?

Held:

The court analyzed the conditions for exemption under Article 285. Exemption from taxes on Central Government properties can only be denied if the property was subject to municipal tax prior to the Constitution's commencement or if a parliamentary law allows property taxation. In this case, the properties in question were constructed after 1964 and were not previously subject to property tax. Therefore, the conditions for exemption denial under Article 285(2) were not satisfied. The Municipal Corporation is not authorized to impose property tax, thus upholding the FCI's exemption claim under Article 285(1). [Para 27-31]

The court rejected the Municipal Corporation's argument based on Section 146 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act. It emphasized that such arguments could not undermine a constitutional provision. The court stated that the claim of primary or secondary responsibility loses relevance when there is an exemption claim based on property owned by the Government of India. Section 146 cannot be interpreted in a way that contradicts the Constitution. [Para 34-36]

The court emphasized that if the Municipal Corporation's claim to levy property tax is not covered by Article 285(2), it cannot use statutory provisions to bypass the exemption granted by Article 285(1). [Para 37]

Additionally, the court clarified that while the FCI is exempt from property tax under Article 285, it may still be liable to pay service charges for services rendered by the Corporation. [Para 45, 47]

Facts:

Akshay Kumar Singh, the appellant, filed a writ petition (criminal) under Article 32 challenging the rejection of his mercy petition by the President of India. The petitioner raised various grounds for review, including issues related to the consideration of the petition, alleged miscarriage of justice, solitary confinement, torture in prison, and influence of media interviews on the decision.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the mercy petition suffered from any procedural or substantive irregularities that warranted judicial review.

Whether subsequent events like the filing of divorce petitions were relevant grounds for reviewing the rejection.

Held:

The court began by stating that the exercise of judicial review over decisions made by the President of India in mercy petitions is limited. The scope of judicial review can be invoked based on specific grounds, such as lack of application of mind, mala fide, consideration of irrelevant factors, exclusion of relevant materials, and arbitrariness. The court referred to the importance of indicating reasons in pardon/remission orders and the power to withdraw such orders if relevant materials are not considered (Para 5).

The court rejected the petitioner's arguments that there was a miscarriage of justice, torture in prison, and that media interviews influenced the rejection of the mercy petition. The court held that the President's decision was based on the case records and no evidence indicated non-application of mind. Allegations of prison torture were not valid grounds for reviewing the rejection (Para 6-7).

Regarding subsequent events, such as the filing of divorce petitions by the petitioner's wife, the court ruled that these could not be considered grounds for judicial review of the President's decision. The court emphasized that the President had already gone through the case records and evidence in making the decision (Para 9).

The court concluded that the petitioner's grounds did not meet the criteria for judicial review, and there was no valid reason to warrant a review of the rejection of the mercy petition by the President (Para 10-11).

Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

In two separate civil appeals, candidates contested elections for seats reserved for backward class citizens in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act required candidates to submit caste validity certificates, failing which, the election would be deemed retrospectively terminated and the candidate disqualified.

Issues:

Whether the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is ousted by the statutory scheme of Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act?

Whether the High Court has the authority to pass orders affecting the statutory fiction under Section 5B leading to disqualification?

Whether the interim orders issued by the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226?

Whether the High Court's interim orders allowing candidates to continue were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B?

Held:

The Court held that the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts under Article 226 overrides any contrary provision in a statute, and this power cannot be taken away or abridged by any statutory provision.

The Court clarified that the High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if the fiction had not yet come into operation. It emphasized the wide scope of Article 226 and its power to remedy injustice.

The Court concluded that the High Court's jurisdiction to issue interim orders is not limited to the one-year time frame mentioned in Section 5B. Interim orders can be granted to maintain the status quo and ensure that the relief sought in a writ petition does not become infructuous.

The deeming fiction of retrospective termination of election under Section 5B could not come into operation due to the interim orders passed by the High Court. The Court dismissed the argument that interim orders couldn't continue beyond the prescribed time frame.

The Court answered the formulated points as follows:

Section 5B of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act does not oust the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226.

The High Court can pass orders interdicting the statutory fiction under Section 5B if it hasn't come into operation.

The interim and final orders of the High Court were within its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The interim orders and final judgment of the High Court were valid in light of the statutory scheme of Section 5B.

There is no merit in the appeals. All the appeals are dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants filed MAs seeking directions pertaining to the implementation of the Reservation Act 2018. The respondents argued that these applications were not maintainable since they essentially challenged the subsequent actions of the State government in implementing the Act, rather than seeking clarification or modification of the original judgment.

Issues:

Whether the MAs filed by the appellants were maintainable, considering they appeared to challenge the actions of the State government under the Reservation Act 2018.

Held:

The court held that the MAs were, in substance, a substantive challenge to the State government's actions in implementing the Reservation Act 2018. As the court had already upheld the constitutional validity of the Act in a previous judgment, the present applications were deemed not maintainable. The court emphasized that if the applicants were aggrieved by the State government's actions, they should pursue independent remedies available under the law.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over land acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The defendant had been given a lease for 20 years with a clause that allowed the lessor to seek eviction if rent was in arrears for a year. The leased land was later acquired, and compensation apportionment became a point of contention. The lessee claimed a share in compensation due to being deprived of the unexpired lease period after six years. A dispute also arose after a part of the acquired land was de-notified, and the lessee continued possession.

Issues:

Whether the determination of the lease due to non-payment of rent was res judicata in the subsequent suit for possession?

Whether the suit for possession was barred by limitation?

What was the legal status of the lessee's possession after the lease had expired and rent was unpaid?

Held:

The issue before the Reference Court was limited to apportionment of compensation, not the title or eviction. The finding that the lease was determined due to non-payment of rent was specific to compensation claim, not binding for a suit for possession or title.

The suit for possession was within the 12-year limitation period as per Art.67 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Mere non-payment of rent did not lead to forfeiture of tenancy but gave lessor the right to seek possession. The notice produced in proceedings wasn't part of the evidence in the suit, making reliance on it for limitation erroneous.

After the lease period's expiry, the lessee's status was that of a tenant at sufferance. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act granted "tenant holding over" status only if lessor accepted lease money, which didn't apply here.

Facts:

The petitioner, Mukesh, has been convicted, and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. Various appeals and petitions challenging the conviction have been dismissed by the courts, including this Court. The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the rejection of the Mercy Petition.

Issues:

The writ petition include improper evidence consideration, the disability and subsequent suicide of Ram Singh, doubts about the petitioner's arrest, and other related matters.

Held:

The petitioner was given sufficient opportunity, and his conviction has been upheld by the High Court.

The petitioner's points were considered in detail in Crl. Appeal Nos. 607-608 of 2017 Mukesh & Anr. v. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. and were dismissed by this Court's judgment dated 05.05.2017.

Review Petition (Crl.) No.570 of 2017 and Curative Petition (R) No.6 of 2020 were also dismissed by this Court.

The Mercy Petition of Mukesh was rejected by the President of India, and the writ petition challenging the rejection was dismissed by this Court.

The petitioner's criminal revision petition and subsequent appeals were also dismissed by lower courts.

Considering the submissions of the petitioner's counsel and the series of dismissals by various courts, no grounds were found to entertain the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.