Reservation – Persons with Disabilities – The Supreme Court held that the appellants, being locomotor disabled, cannot claim appointment to the post of Safai-Karmis, which was not reserved for locomotor disabled candidates under the Government Order dated 07.05.1999. The reservation is to be made for posts identified by the appropriate government as suitable for disabled persons under Section 32 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 [Paras 1-88].

Identification of Posts – Judicial Review – The identification of posts suitable for different categories of disabled persons is a policy decision of the appropriate government. Such identification, as carried out in the Government Order dated 07.05.1999, cannot be set aside unless shown to be arbitrary, irrational, or against the objectives of the Act [Paras 62-70].

High Court's Error – Misinterpretation – The High Court erred in striking down the Government Order dated 07.05.1999, which identified specific posts for reservation for disabled persons. The High Court misread Sections 32 and 33 of the Act and incorrectly held that 3% reservation must be applied uniformly across all cadres irrespective of the nature of the posts [Paras 57-61].

Vacancies – Specific Disabilities – The Court reiterated that the 3% reservation mandated by Section 33 of the Act applies to each establishment, with 1% reserved for each category of disability (blindness or low vision, hearing impairment, locomotor disability or cerebral palsy). The identification of suitable posts for each category is essential to implementing this reservation [Paras 34-48].

Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order striking down the Government Order dated 07.05.1999 and upheld the validity of the Government's identification of posts suitable for different categories of disabled persons. The appellants were not eligible for appointment as Safai-Karmis as the posts were reserved for hearing impaired candidates [Para 88].

Limitation Act – Applicability to Carriage by Air Act – Rule 30 – Section 3 of the Limitation Act bars the remedy but does not extinguish the right unless expressly provided. Rule 30 of the Carriage by Air Act specifies a two-year limitation for bringing an action for damages, which the appellant argued should include exclusions under the Limitation Act. The court held that Rule 30 expressly excludes the Limitation Act’s provisions as per Section 29, confirming that the two-year period is absolute and not subject to suspension, interruption, or extension [Paras 2.2-2.4, 10-13].

Extinguishment of Right – Discusses how the Limitation Act provisions apply when the right itself is extinguished, referencing Sections 11 and 27 of the Limitation Act. This principle was upheld, ensuring that the right to claim damages under the Carriage by Air Act is extinguished after two years, emphasizing uniform interpretation in line with international conventions [Paras 12-13, 29-31].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Held that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation under Rule 30 of the Second Schedule of the Carriage by Air Act 1972, as it was filed after the two-year period had expired. The High Court's judgment was upheld [Paras 7.1, 7.2, 9, 20-21].

Guardians and Wards Act 1890 - Section 9 - Custody of Child - The court emphasized that the question of the child's wishes is distinct from what would be in the best interest of the child - The best interest must be determined by the court considering all relevant circumstances - In custody disputes, the child's welfare should be the paramount consideration - The case involves custody disputes with serious allegations between parents, highlighting the need to focus on the child's welfare rather than parental disputes [Paras 8-18].

International Custody Disputes - The child, a naturalized American citizen, was taken to India without the consent of the father, leading to custody disputes in both US and Indian courts - US courts issued orders for the child's return, which were partially vacated and later reinstated - The High Court of Karnataka rejected the father's habeas corpus petition but granted visitation rights, without adequately considering the best interests of the child as determined by the US courts [Paras 4-6, 12-16].

Best Interest of the Child - Paramount Consideration - The child had lived nearly a decade in the USA, where he was born and had established roots - The Supreme Court of India held that the child's return to the USA would be in his best interest, considering his naturalized citizenship, social and cultural environment, and future prospects - The court directed the child's return to the USA, with provisions for the mother to accompany and stay with the child if desired [Paras 16-18].

Decision: Appeal allowed - High Court's order set aside - Directions issued for the child's return to the USA - Provisions made for the mother to accompany the child and necessary legal formalities to be expedited.

Caste Verification – Authenticity of Report – Mere fact that the Caste Verification Committee provided a report within a few days cannot alone be a reason to doubt its correctness. The committee's report, when made in accordance with statutory provisions, holds validity unless contradicted by substantial evidence [Paras 34-36].

Reservation Policy – Caste Classification – Discussion on the categorization under Karnataka's Reservation Policy for Other Backward Classes, examining the distinction and overlap between the 'Ganiga' and 'Lingayat-Ganiga' castes. The court clarified that the inclusion of sub-castes within broader categories must be scrutinized in light of historical and legislative context [Paras 3-6, 26-33].

Judicial Review – Findings of Lower Courts – The Division Bench's finding that the caste verification process was consistent with legal requirements and that the Single Judge's differentiation between 'Hindu-Ganiga' and 'Lingayat-Ganiga' was not supported by sufficient evidence, upholding the respondent's caste certificate and reservation benefits [Paras 25-38].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Karnataka High Court (Dharwad Bench), which allowed the writ appeal filed by the respondent, set aside the Single Judge's order, and confirmed the validity of the caste certificate and the subsequent reservation benefits [Paras 38-39].

Penal Code 1860 (IPC) - Section 306 - Abetment of suicide - An FIR under Section 306 of IPC cannot be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, caregivers, or anyone else - Heinous or serious crimes with a serious impact on society cannot be compromised - High Court's quashing of FIR based on settlement between accused and informant was erroneous [Paras 25-50].

Abetment of Suicide - Seriousness of Offence - Crimes like abetment of suicide are against society and cannot be settled privately - High Court should have considered the gravity of the offence and the broader implications on societal interests - Emphasis on the state's role in prosecuting serious offences regardless of private settlements [Paras 37-50].

High Court's Inherent Powers - Section 482 Cr.P.C. - Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIRs must be done with caution, especially in cases involving serious non-compoundable offences - Settlements in such cases cannot override public interest and the necessity of legal prosecution [Paras 26-30].

Decision: Appeals allowed - High Court's orders quashing the FIR and subsequent applications set aside - Reaffirmed that heinous crimes impacting society should not be compromised through settlements.

Land Acquisition – Requirement of Scheme Sanction – Appellants challenged the acquisition of land by KHB without prior sanction of housing schemes under Section 24(2) of the KHB Act – High Court held that sanction of a housing scheme by the State Government is a condition precedent to land acquisition – Supreme Court examined the provisions of the KHB Act and L.A. Act to determine if acquisition could precede scheme sanction [Paras 1-50].

Public Purpose – Acquisition for Housing Board – Acquisition for KHB deemed to be for a public purpose under Section 33(2) of KHB Act – The term "public purpose" in the context of acquisition by KHB does not necessitate prior scheme sanction – Emphasis on the statutory mandate that execution of the scheme requires prior sanction but initiation of acquisition proceedings does not [Paras 30-41].

Procedural Validity – Acquisition Notification – Notification under Section 4 of L.A. Act – High Court’s decision based on procedural deficiencies in acquisition notification overturned – Supreme Court highlighted that prior sanction is required only for scheme execution, not for acquisition initiation – Acquisition for housing schemes by KHB can be initiated under L.A. Act provisions as modified by KHB Act [Paras 42-50].

Decision: Appeals allowed – High Court's orders set aside – Validity of land acquisition proceedings upheld – No requirement for prior sanction of housing schemes for initiating acquisition under Section 33(2) of KHB Act.

Delhi School Education Rules 1973 - Rule 121 - Disciplinary Proceedings - The Tribunal's power to award back wages upon reinstatement of an employee was contested - High Court held that Rule 121 does not confer express power on the Tribunal to award back wages, limiting such power to the managing committee - Supreme Court analyzed the statutory provisions and concluded that the Tribunal does not have express power under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act to award back wages, which is within the purview of the managing committee under Rule 121 [Paras 1-34].

Express Power - Interpretation - Section 11(6) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, was scrutinized to determine if it confers express power on the Tribunal to decide on back wages - The Supreme Court found that while the Tribunal has the power to stay operation of the order appealed against, it lacks express authority to grant back wages, which is explicitly conferred on the managing committee under Rule 121 [Paras 10-24].

Judicial Review - Ultra Vires - The argument that Rule 121 is ultra vires Section 11 of the Act was examined - Supreme Court held that Rule 121 is not ultra vires, as it aligns with the legislative scheme and provides a coherent framework for addressing reinstatement and back wages, requiring the managing committee to decide on these matters post-reinstatement [Paras 25-36].

Decision: Appeal dismissed - High Court's interpretation upheld - Rule 121 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, was found to be intra vires, and the authority to award back wages remains with the managing committee, not the Tribunal - Tribunal's role limited to adjudicating the legality of termination orders, not deciding on pay and allowances during the period of absence [Paras 37-40].

Constitutional Law – Article 31C Protection – The State of Karnataka contended that Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, enjoys immunity under Article 31C of the Constitution – The High Court ruled that Article 31C protection was unavailable as the Act was enacted before the 44th Amendment – The Supreme Court emphasized the need to consider whether the Act’s provisions align with the objectives in Article 39(b) and are therefore protected by Article 31C [Paras 7-16].

Compensation – Determination Method – The method of calculating compensation as 300 times the property tax under Section 20 of the Act was challenged as being arbitrary and providing illusory compensation – The High Court declared Section 20 unconstitutional, requiring a market value-based compensation approach similar to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Supreme Court remanded the case to the High Court for detailed consideration of the constitutionality of Section 20 and the compensation method [Paras 7-25].

Procedural Aspects – Lapsing of Acquisition – Respondents argued the acquisition under the Act had lapsed due to the time elapsed since the initial notification – High Court ruled there was no provision for lapsing under the Act unlike the L.A. Act – Supreme Court directed the High Court to examine the procedural adequacy of the acquisition under Section 17 [Paras 2-6, 20-21].

Decision: Appeals disposed of – High Court's judgments set aside – Cases remanded to the High Court for reconsideration of constitutional validity of Section 20 and procedural compliance under Section 17 – Liberty granted to parties to amend pleadings and file further affidavits – High Court directed to expedite the hearing and decide expeditiously [Paras 21-25].

Family Law – Right of Natural Guardian – Mother, as the only natural guardian after the father's death, has the right to decide the surname of her child and give the child in adoption – High Court's direction to restore the child's original surname was overturned – Mother's decision to change the surname to that of her new husband is valid and aligns with the child's best interests and social identity [Paras 6-11, 19].

Adoption and Surname – Legal Implications – Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, stipulates that an adopted child assumes the surname of the adoptive family – Adoption legally severs ties with the biological family, making the adoptive family the child's new family for all purposes – Judicial intervention in changing the surname without a specific prayer is improper [Paras 12-14].

Judicial Propriety – Relief Beyond Pleadings – Relief not sought in the pleadings should not be granted – High Court's direction to change the child's surname without a specific plea from the respondents is contrary to established legal principles and constitutes a miscarriage of justice [Paras 15-18].

Decision: Appeals allowed in part – High Court's directions to change the surname of the child set aside – Mother recognized as the sole natural guardian with the right to decide the surname and adoption of the child – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 20-21].