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by sayum
01 July 2026 6:11 AM
"Quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiate desertion from wilful separation; for the offence of desertion, the factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end must coexist," Jharkhand High Court, in a significant ruling, held that mere physical separation between spouses does not automatically constitute 'desertion' under the Hindu Marriage Act unless accompanied by a clear intention to permanently end the matrimonial relationship.
A bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Pradeep Kumar Srivastava observed that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passion like anger or disgust without the intent to cease cohabitation permanently, it does not amount to legal desertion.
The court made these observations while dismissing a First Appeal filed by a husband challenging a Family Court order that refused to grant him a decree of divorce. The appellant-husband had sought dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty and desertion under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging that his wife had been living separately since 2005 and had subjected him to legal harassment.
The parties were married in 2001 and a daughter was born out of the wedlock in 2002. The husband alleged that the wife pressured him to live separately from his parents and eventually deserted him in 2005. Conversely, the wife contended that she was ousted from the matrimonial home following dowry demands of ₹3 lakhs and 25 bighas of land, leading to the husband's conviction under Section 498A of the IPC.
The primary question before the court was whether the husband had successfully established the grounds of 'cruelty' and 'desertion' for the purpose of dissolving the marriage. The court was specifically called upon to determine if the long-term separate living of the parties, by itself, entitled the husband to a decree of divorce under the statutory framework.
Court Explains Distinction Between Separation And Desertion
The High Court emphasized that 'desertion' is not merely the withdrawal from a place but from a "state of things" that defines a matrimonial home. Referring to the explanation of Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, the bench noted that desertion signifies the abandonment of one spouse by the other without reasonable cause and without consent.
The court observed that for the offence of desertion to be complete, two essential conditions must be met by the deserting spouse: the factum of separation and the animus deserendi, which is the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end. It noted that the quality of permanence is what distinguishes desertion from a temporary wilful separation.
Animus Deserendi Is Essential To Prove Desertion
Drawing from established precedents and legal treatises like Rayden on Divorce, the bench clarified that the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party. The court noted that desertion is an inchoate offence that remains a continuing wrong until the matrimonial suit is constituted.
"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse."
No Desertion If Separation Is Forced By Cruelty
The court found that in the present case, the wife had been ousted from the matrimonial home due to the husband's conduct and dowry demands. Since the wife expressed a keen desire to live with her husband and perform her "wifely duties," the bench held that the element of animus deserendi was conspicuously absent on her part.
The judges observed that the husband failed to produce concrete evidence to show that the wife had willfully abandoned him. On the contrary, the record suggested that the wife was compelled to take shelter at her parents' house due to the cruelty inflicted upon her, for which the husband and his relatives were even convicted by a criminal court.
Allegations Of Cruelty Must Be Specific And Cogent
Regarding the ground of cruelty, the High Court noted that the husband’s allegations were "too vague and general in nature." The court pointed out that the appellant failed to disclose specific dates, times, or the manner in which he was allegedly subjected to harassment or mental torture by the respondent-wife.
"The allegations made by the petitioner regarding cruelty upon him by the respondent are too vague and general in nature and neither in pleading nor in his evidence petitioner has disclosed the date, time or the manner of such cruelty."
Perversity In Family Court Findings Not Established
The appellant had argued that the Family Court's findings were "perverse." However, the High Court, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State, held that a finding is only perverse if it ignores relevant material or takes into account irrelevant material. In this case, the bench found that the Family Court had correctly appreciated the evidence on record.
The court concluded that the husband could not take advantage of a situation he helped create. Since the separation was a result of his own actions and the wife remained willing to reconcile, the grounds for divorce were not made out. The High Court affirmed the Family Court's decision, holding that the husband was not entitled to any relief.
The High Court dismissed the appeal, reiterating that a decree of divorce cannot be granted merely because parties have lived separately for a long duration if the statutory requirements of desertion and cruelty remain unproven. The court held that the husband's failure to establish a permanent intention on the part of the wife to end the marriage was fatal to his claim for divorce.
Date of Decision: 25 June 2026