Facts:
The case involves Judicial Officers who were promoted on an ad-hoc basis to serve as Additional District and Sessions Judges in Fast Track Courts. The question arose regarding their seniority in relation to officers promoted on a substantive basis to the Cadre of District Judge and those selected through Direct Recruitment and Limited Competitive Examination (LCE).

Issues:

• Whether officers promoted on ad-hoc basis as Additional District and Sessions Judges for Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their initial ad-hoc promotion.
• Whether the selection process initiated under a certain notification can be considered a continuation of an earlier process.
• Whether the promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge can be treated as part of the same selection process as the candidates selected through LCE.
• How the inter se seniority of candidates selected through LCE should be determined.
• Whether the Report dated 15.03.2019 requires any modification or correction.

Held:

Judicial officers promoted on ad-hoc basis to Fast Track Courts are entitled to seniority from the date of their substantive appointment, not from the date of initial ad-hoc appointment.

The selection process initiated under a specific notification is not in continuation of an earlier selection process.

The promotion of 47 Judicial Officers to the Cadre of District Judge is not part of the same selection process as candidates selected through LCE. Cyclic Order rules do not apply, and the 47 Officers were rightly placed senior to the candidates from the later selection process.

The inter se placement of candidates selected through LCE should be based on merit, not their seniority in the erstwhile cadre.

The Report dated 15.03.2019 does not require significant modification, except regarding the placement of LCE candidates based on merit.

The seniority list issued in line with the Report stands modified only to the extent mentioned above.

This case primarily deals with issues related to the seniority and promotion of Judicial Officers in the Cadre of District Judges in Rajasthan and provides clarifications on various aspects of the selection process and the application of relevant rules and regulations.

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the notifications issued by the Medical Council of India (MCI) and Dental Council of India (DCI) introducing NEET for admissions to MBBS, BDS, and other medical courses. The initial quashing of the notifications was later recalled. During the pendency of the case, Section 10D of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, providing for a uniform entrance examination, was introduced.

Issues:

• Whether the notifications and amendments violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions under Articles 19(1)(g), 25, 26, 29(1), and 30. The case also examines whether the introduction of NEET for admissions in medical and dental courses is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The notifications, amendments to Section 10D, and the regulations introduced by MCI and DCI do not violate the rights of unaided/aided minority institutions. The court emphasizes the need for regulatory mechanisms at the national level, even in prestigious institutions like All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS). The decision aligns with T.M.A. Pai Foundation, allowing regulatory mechanisms and maintaining academic standards.

The notifications and amendments do not infringe upon minority institutions' rights. Regulatory measures apply uniformly to all institutions, and conditions of recognition must be followed. The court emphasizes that regulations do not impede minority institutions' rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 25, and 30.

The court justifies the introduction of NEET in the larger public interest and the improvement of medical education. NEET is a reasonable condition of recognition/affiliation and aims to prevent malpractices and commercialization of education. The court cites constitutional articles, including Article 47, Article 51A(j), and Article 30, to support the constitutionality of NEET.

NEET is seen as a means to standardize qualifications and combat malpractices in admissions. The court emphasizes that minority institutions must comply with reasonable regulatory measures for the overall welfare of students and the nation's interest.

The court concludes that NEET and regulatory measures do not violate Articles 19(1)(g) and 30, as they are intended to maintain educational standards, prevent malpractices, and ensure transparency. The court underscores the importance of balancing rights in the interest of the nation.

Accordingly, the transferred cases, appeal, and writ petitions are disposed of.

Facts:

Pradeep Mehra, the respondent, resigned from his position as Chief Operating Officer after 12 years of service.

He claimed gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn monthly wage.

The appellant-employer argued that the respondent was entitled to a maximum of Rs.10 lacs as gratuity, in line with Section 4(3) of the Act.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent is entitled to receive gratuity of Rs.1.83 crores based on his last drawn wage, or if the ceiling under Section 4(3) of the Act applies.

Held:

The court analyzed Section 4(3) and Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Section 4(3) places a cap on the amount of gratuity payable to an employee, while Section 4(5) preserves an employee's right to receive better terms of gratuity under any award, agreement, or contract.

For Section 4(5) to be invoked, better terms of gratuity must be available under an arrangement with the employer compared to what the Act provides.

The Trust Deed and Scheme of the appellant-Company clearly stipulate that gratuity calculations for employees covered by the Act should be in accordance with the Act itself. No alternative is offered under the Scheme for such employees.

Rule 6(b) of the Scheme explicitly states that if an employee is covered by the Act, the gratuity amount must be calculated as per the Act's provisions.

The court emphasized that the intent of the Scheme was to provide a similar benefit to employees not covered by the Act and not to offer a better package to employees covered by the Act.

The court concluded that Section 4(5) does not apply in this case, and the appellant-employer was correct in applying the provisions of the Act and the prescribed ceiling under Section 4(3).

Any errors in making extra payments to some other employees would not create a right in favor of the respondent in light of the stipulations in the Trust Deed and the Scheme.

We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order and dismiss the Claim Petition preferred by the respondent.

Facts:

The case pertains to the interpretation of Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appellant, Vodafone Idea Ltd., filed a return of income for Assessment Year (AY) 2017-18. Subsequently, a notice was issued under Section 143(2) of the Act, initiating proceedings for scrutiny assessment.

Issues:

• The distinction between the exercise of power under Section 143(1) and Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
• Whether an intimation is required to be given to the assessee regarding the deferral of processing the return under Section 143(1) once proceedings are initiated under Section 143(2).
• Applicability of Section 241-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in withholding refunds.

Held:

The power under Section 143(1) is summary in nature and is designed to make adjustments that are apparent from the return. On the other hand, the power under Section 143(2) involves deeper scrutiny to ensure no understatement of income, overstatement of loss, or underpayment of tax. The processing under Section 143(1) should await the outcome of scrutiny assessment under Section 143(2).

For AYs ending on or before March 31, 2017, if a notice is issued under Section 143(2), it is not necessary to process the return under Section 143(1). The requirement to process the return stands overridden in such cases.

In AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017, Section 241-A requires a separate recording of satisfaction by the Assessing Officer to withhold refunds when a notice is issued under Section 143(2) and it is likely to adversely affect revenue.

The intimation under Section 143(1) does not require a separate notice of deferral due to initiation of proceedings under Section 143(2). The issuance of notice under Section 143(2) is sufficient indication, and no separate intimation is contemplated by the statute.

This judgment clarifies the distinction between Sections 143(1) and 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and establishes that processing under Section 143(1) must be deferred if proceedings under Section 143(2) are initiated. It also addresses the requirement for intimation and the withholding of refunds under Section 241-A for AYs commencing on or after April 1, 2017.

The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Facts:                                                   

The appellant and respondent companies entered into various agreements for renting construction equipment for infrastructure development projects. The agreements contained arbitration clauses referring to the Construction Industry Arbitration Association (CIAA) Rules and Regulations. The agreements also specified different venues for arbitration, including New Delhi and Kolkata.

Issues:

• Whether the respondent's objections regarding the venue of arbitration were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.
• Whether the venue specified in the agreements was crucial to the validity of the arbitration awards.

Held:

The respondent's failure to participate in the arbitration proceedings and its failure to raise objections regarding the venue amounted to a waiver of its right to object to the venue.

The Court held that the specification of the place of arbitration did not have a critical bearing on the validity of the arbitration awards in the present case. The respondent's objections on this ground were rejected.

Decision: The Court upheld the dismissal of the respondent's application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the arbitration awards. The Court held that the venue of arbitration did not invalidate the awards, and the respondent's objections were waived due to its non-participation in the arbitration proceedings.

Facts:

PILCOM, a committee formed by Cricket Control Boards/Associations of Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka for conducting the World Cup tournament in 1996, made payments to ICC and various Cricket Control Boards/Associations of member countries from its London Bank Accounts. The Income Tax Officer issued a show cause notice under Section 194E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, questioning whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India and whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source.

Issues:

• Whether income accrued to Non-Resident Sports Associations in India?
• Whether PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E?

Held:

The payments made by PILCOM were intricately connected with the World Cup event, where cricket teams of Non-Resident Sports Associations played matches in India. The source of income was the playing of matches in India. Therefore, income accrued to the Non-Resident Sports Associations in India.

Section 115BBA(1)(b) mandates that if the total income of a Non-Resident Sports Association includes guaranteed payments for games played in India, income tax becomes payable. The connection between the game played in India and the Guarantee Money establishes liability. Thus, PILCOM was liable to deduct Tax at Source under Section 194E.

Conclusion: The appeal and special leave petitions were dismissed, confirming PILCOM's liability to deduct Tax at Source for payments made to Non-Resident Sports Associations participating in the World Cup event held in India.

Facts:

Aishwarya Atul Pusalkar, the appellant, sought to enforce her right to reside in her matrimonial home, which was comprised of two flats in a redeveloped building. The building's reconstruction was undertaken under the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, with provisions for rehabilitation of displaced occupants.

Issues:

• Whether the appellant's claim for the right to reside in her matrimonial home falls within the purview of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.
• Whether the appellant's claim to reside in her matrimonial home is valid under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Held:

The court observed that the appellant's right to reside in her matrimonial home is grounded in her status as a wife, as recognized under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. However, the court emphasized that her claim to residence does not directly arise from the provisions of the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976.

The court ruled that the appellant's claim must be adjudicated by the appropriate legal forum, such as the Civil Court or the Family Court, as her right to reside in her matrimonial home is distinct from the statutory rehabilitation provisions. The court also directed the appellant and the respondent to take certain actions, including verifying the availability of a specific flat for the appellant's residence.

The court held that the appellant's claim cannot be enforced through a writ jurisdiction and that she should pursue her claim through the appropriate legal channels.

All connected applications are disposed of.

Facts:

Two letters dated 20.3.2019 and 19.3.2019 signed by alleged contemnor nos. 1 and 2 were circulated. The letters contained disrespectful, scandalous, and scurrilous allegations against two Judges of the Supreme Court. A Bench issued notice to the contemnors and directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate bench to hear and decide the contempt case.

Issues:

• Whether the Supreme Court's suo motu contempt proceedings were validly initiated.
• Whether the Bench acted as a judge in their own cause.
• The freedom to criticize court judgments while respecting judicial decorum.

Held:

Powers of the Supreme Court (Para 7): Article 129 of the Constitution confers the Supreme Court with the powers of a Court of Record, including the power to punish for contempt. This constitutional power cannot be abridged by statute. Article 142 allows the Court to punish for contempt, subject to parliamentary law. Article 129, being the primary source of the Court's power, is not subject to the same restriction as Article 142. The Supreme Court's powers extend to framing rules, such as The Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975.

Notice for Contempt (Para 32): The Rules require that the brief nature of the contempt be stated in the notice. The notice in question met this requirement, and the order initiating contempt proceedings reflected the grounds for contempt. Thus, the notice was legally valid.

Suo Motu Proceedings (Para 34-35): The Court, based on information received, took suo motu note of the contempt. This procedure is valid as the matter was placed before the Chief Justice for listing before the appropriate bench, maintaining the suo motu nature of the proceedings.

Judge in their Own Cause (Para 40): The Bench's actions were justifiable in issuing notice and subsequently referring the matter to the Chief Justice for assignment to an appropriate bench. This procedure did not amount to the Bench acting as a judge in their own cause.

Freedom to Criticize (Para 48): Citizens have the right to criticize court judgments, but they cannot attribute motives to judges or question their bona fides. Slanderous and scandalous allegations, particularly when circulated widely, undermine the justice delivery system's integrity.

While the truth can serve as a defense in contempt cases, the provided arguments and pleadings lack substantial evidence to support such a defense. The allegations, which are both scandalous and offensive, are unfitting for Judges of the highest Court.

Facts:

The dispute revolves around the valuation of imports involving plant and equipment, as well as spares. The revenue included the price paid for design and technical documents in the transaction value of the imported goods. The assessee contended that these documents were related to post-importation activities for assembly, construction, erection, operation, and maintenance of the plant. The revenue argued that, since it was a turnkey project, the entire contract value should be treated as the transaction value for customs duty calculation.

Issues:

• Whether the design and technical documents related to post-importation activities should be included in the valuation of imported goods?
• Whether the provisions of Rule 9(1)(e) of the Customs Valuation Rules apply automatically to the import of turnkey projects?

Held:

Issue 1: Valuation of Design and Technical Documents (Paras 22 and 26): The Court held that the revenue failed to demonstrate that the disputed items of the contract did not relate to post-importation activities. The expression "condition" in Rule 9(1)(e) suggests a mutual dependence between actions. The revenue's argument that the turnkey project's importation and post-importation activities were mutually dependent was not supported by evidence. Imposing such an implied condition without substantiating evidence was impermissible. The contract did not contain any part from which such a condition could be inferred. Thus, the design and technical documents for post-importation activities should not be automatically included in the valuation.

Issue 2: Application of Rule 9(1)(e) to Turnkey Projects (Paras 27 and 28): The Court explained that if a single agreement involves both imported dutiable equipment and services for post-importation activities, and these items can be segregated, the importer can claim duty exclusion for items directly related to post-importation activities under Rule 9. In this case, the authorities considered the imported items and post-importation activities as interdependent due to the same contract. However, the Court emphasized that such interdependence must be explicitly demonstrated in the contract terms. The appellant's argument that the import of equipment was supplemented by post-importation work was not supported by the contract's terms.

All connected applications shall stand disposed of.