Criminal Law – Bail – Custody of Elected Representative – Regular Bail Granted – The petitioner, a sitting MLA, was in custody for over one and a half years for using mobile phones to allegedly threaten witnesses and extort money while in jail – His bail was initially denied by the Special Judge and the High Court, citing his criminal history and the potential misuse of his position – Held: Given that the investigation is complete, charges have been framed, and the trial will take time, the petitioner was granted bail on the condition of cooperation with the trial and regular attendance in court [Paras 1-5].

Conditions for Bail – Misuse of Position – Despite concerns raised about the petitioner’s potential influence over witnesses due to his position as an MLA, the Court directed his release on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial court regarding bail bonds, and imposed conditions to ensure his cooperation with the trial process [Para 5].

Decision: Special Leave Petition disposed of – Bail granted to the petitioner subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court – Petitioner to cooperate with the trial and attend all hearings [Paras 5-6].

Constitutional Law – Habeas Corpus Petition – Voluntary Stay in Ashram – The petitioner, Isha Foundation, challenged the High Court's order directing an inquiry into the detention allegations concerning two individuals staying at the Foundation's ashram – The individuals in question, Geeta Kamaraj and Lata Kamaraj, affirmed during proceedings that they were residing in the ashram voluntarily and without coercion – Held: Since both individuals had attained the age of majority when they joined the ashram and repeatedly confirmed their voluntary stay, the habeas corpus petition lost relevance – No further action needed by the police based on the inquiry initiated by the High Court [Paras 5-9].

Jurisdiction Under Article 226 – Habeas Corpus Scope – The Court reiterated that the scope of habeas corpus under Article 226 is limited to cases involving unlawful detention – As the individuals were residing voluntarily in the Ashram and had interacted freely with the Court, there was no ground to extend the inquiry further – The petition was disposed of as the purpose of the habeas corpus was fulfilled [Paras 6, 9].

Status Report and Regulatory Compliance – A status report submitted by the Superintendent of Police confirmed that both individuals were in good health and freely residing at the ashram – The Court clarified that the closure of these proceedings does not affect the regulatory compliance obligations of Isha Foundation, which the Foundation agreed to comply with as required by law [Paras 8, 10].

Decision: Special Leave Petition disposed of – Habeas Corpus Petition transferred from the Madras High Court is also disposed of – No further police action required regarding the inquiry into detention – Regulatory compliances by Isha Foundation to continue in accordance with the law [Paras 9-11].

Grant of Citizenship – Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 5(1)(b) – Application Rejected – Pranav Srinivasan, born in Singapore to parents who had renounced Indian citizenship, applied for resumption of Indian citizenship under Section 5(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1955. The Court held that since neither Pranav nor his parents were born in undivided India or in a territory that became part of India after 15th August 1947, he could not be considered a person of Indian origin under the relevant section – Appeal allowed, application for resumption of citizenship dismissed [Paras 18, 19, 23].

Constitutional Citizenship – Article 8 of the Constitution – Interpretation – The Court clarified that Article 8 applies only to those persons ordinarily residing outside India as defined in the Government of India Act, 1935, and does not extend to foreign nationals born after the commencement of the Constitution – Held: Article 8 has no application to Pranav's case [Paras 14-16].

Termination of Citizenship – Section 9(1) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Automatic Cessation – The Court held that Pranav’s parents ceased to be Indian citizens upon voluntarily acquiring Singapore citizenship. As such, Pranav's parents were not eligible to renounce Indian citizenship under Section 8(1) as they had already lost it by operation of law under Section 9(1) – Section 8(2) is therefore not applicable to Pranav [Paras 19-21].

Exercise of Extraordinary Powers – Article 142 of the Constitution – Citizenship – The Court declined to exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 to grant citizenship, stating that such powers must be exercised judiciously, especially in cases involving foreign nationals seeking Indian citizenship [Paras 24, 25].

Decision – The appeal by Union of India was allowed, and the writ petition filed by Pranav was dismissed. However, Pranav is not precluded from applying for Indian citizenship under Section 5(1)(f) of the Citizenship Act, 1955, and may seek a relaxation of the residential requirements under Section 5(1A) [Paras 25].

Child Marriage – Constitutional Guarantees – Writ Petition filed under Article 32 – Petitioners approached the Supreme Court seeking stronger enforcement of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) – Court noted that child marriage violates fundamental rights to life, liberty, health, education, and autonomy – Directed the Union Government and States to implement effective measures to prevent child marriages, ensure education, and protect children at risk – Held: Guidelines issued to enhance enforcement and protect children from child marriages [Paras 1, 4, 171, 173, 181].

International Law – Compliance with International Standards – Court traced India’s international obligations under treaties such as CEDAW and CRC, emphasizing their relevance in preventing child marriages – Noted that international law recognizes child marriage as forced marriage, violating human rights, particularly those of girls – Directed that Indian laws and policies should align with these international commitments to combat the practice [Paras 123, 146, 150].

Child Marriage Prevention Officers (CMPO) – Legal Enforcement – Directed States and UTs to appoint dedicated CMPOs at the district level and ensure they are not burdened with additional duties – Quarterly performance reviews to assess their effectiveness – Specialized police units to handle child marriage cases to be considered – Legal accountability for public officials failing to act on child marriages emphasized [Paras 210, 211, 212].

Judicial Measures – Fast-Track Courts and Suo Moto Actions – Directed the Union to assess the feasibility of establishing special fast-track courts for child marriage cases – Empowered Magistrates to take suo motu action to prevent child marriages, particularly on auspicious days known for mass weddings [Paras 210, 211].

Community Involvement – Child Marriage Free Villages – Encouraged the launch of a “Child Marriage Free Village” initiative to mobilize local communities and Panchayats – Emphasized awareness campaigns in schools and religious institutions to educate communities about the consequences of child marriages – Directed regular capacity-building programs for local leaders, teachers, and health workers [Paras 209, 210].

Right to Education – Mandatory Reporting – Stressed the importance of education in preventing child marriages – Directed schools in high-risk regions to report potential cases such as sudden dropouts of girls to authorities – Schools must also integrate sexuality education and raise awareness about the legal and health impacts of child marriages [Paras 189, 190, 192].

Social Support and Financial Incentives – Directed States to consider educational incentives and scholarships for at-risk girls to keep them in school – Suggested conditional cash transfers and vocational training for families to reduce reliance on child marriages for economic reasons [Paras 191, 210].

Technological Interventions – Centralized Reporting Portal – Directed the creation of an online portal for reporting child marriages, ensuring anonymity and swift interventions by authorities – Recommended leveraging data analytics to identify high-risk areas and monitor school attendance [Paras 210, 211].

Constitutional Interpretation – Right to Life and Liberty – Child marriage violates Article 21 of the Constitution, depriving minors of autonomy, health, and education – Court reiterated that child marriage infringes on the right to self-determination, reproductive rights, and dignity – Emphasized the State’s duty to protect children from such practices [Paras 171, 179, 180].

Suggestions for Legislative Amendments – Court suggested that Parliament consider amending the PCMA to outlaw child betrothals and clarify its precedence over personal laws – Suggested introducing measures to prevent child marriages from being legitimized through customary practices like betrothal [Paras 213, 215].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of – Directions issued to Union and States as follows:

Appointment of CMPOs: States and Union Territories (UTs) must appoint dedicated Child Marriage Prohibition Officers (CMPOs) at the district level, without additional duties – Quarterly performance reviews of CMPOs to be conducted – CMPOs to submit quarterly reports detailing child marriage prevention efforts [Paras 210, 211].

Specialized Police Units: The Union Government and State Governments to assess the feasibility of integrating the Special Juvenile Police Units (SJPU) into the child marriage prevention framework – Reports on actions taken against perpetrators and community engagement efforts to be submitted biannually [Paras 211, 212].

Fast-Track Courts: Union Government, in consultation with States, to assess the viability of setting up special fast-track courts for child marriage cases – Status report to be submitted within one year [Paras 210, 211].

Suo Moto Actions by Magistrates: Magistrates are empowered to take suo motu action to prevent child marriages, especially during mass weddings or auspicious days [Paras 211].

Community Involvement: States to launch the "Child Marriage Free Village" initiative – Panchayats and local leaders must report suspected child marriages within 48 hours and actively participate in awareness campaigns [Paras 210, 211].

Educational Incentives: States directed to provide scholarships and stipends to girls at risk of child marriage to encourage continued education – Conditional cash transfer programs for families delaying marriages until legal adulthood to be considered [Paras 210, 211].

Sexuality and Rights Education: Comprehensive sexuality education to be integrated into school curricula – Awareness campaigns in schools, religious institutions, and Panchayats to highlight the legal and health impacts of child marriages [Paras 210, 211].

Centralized Reporting Portal: Union Government to establish an online portal for anonymous reporting of child marriages – Use of technology and data analytics to identify high-risk areas for child marriage prevention [Paras 210, 211].

Support Programs for Victims: States to develop Individual Care Plans (ICPs) for at-risk girls, including access to education, psychological support, and regular monitoring – Juvenile Justice Fund to be institutionalized for financial assistance to girls opting out of child marriages [Paras 210, 211].

Legal Amendments: Parliament may consider amending the PCMA to outlaw child betrothals and explicitly state its overriding effect over personal laws – Issue of interface with personal laws kept open for future determination [Paras 212, 213, 215].

Compliance: Ministry of Women and Child Development to circulate this judgment to Chief Secretaries of all States and UTs, NALSA, and NCPCR within four weeks for strict compliance with the above directions [Paras 216, 217].

Power under Section 319 CrPC – The scope and timing for the Trial Court to exercise discretion on summoning additional accused based on Examination-in-Chief without waiting for cross-examination – Held: The High Court misinterpreted the mandate under Section 319 CrPC – It is for the Trial Court to decide whether or not to proceed solely based on Examination-in-Chief or wait for cross-examination – The discretion remains with the Trial Court [Paras 13-17].

Case of No Evidence – Application of Section 232 CrPC – Acquittal restored by Supreme Court – Prosecution failed to present witnesses for cross-examination despite repeated opportunities, leading to inadmissible evidence – Held: The Trial Court was justified in closing the evidence and acquitting the appellant – High Court's order set aside, acquittal order by Trial Court restored [Paras 18-20].

Decision – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned High Court order, and restored the Trial Court's order acquitting the appellant. The decision to dismiss the Section 319 CrPC application was upheld due to lack of admissible evidence [Paras 19-20].

Auction Sale – Setting Aside of Auction – Equitable Relief Granted – The auction sale in favor of the appellant was set aside on equitable grounds after the borrowers repaid the amount due to the bank. The High Court’s decision was not based on any illegality of the auction but on the equitable consideration that the debt had been repaid shortly after filing of the writ petition – Held: The cancellation of the auction was appropriate due to the full deposit of the due amount by the borrowers [Paras 12-13].

Compensation for Auction Purchaser – Rule 38(4)(b) of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Rules – Compensation Enhanced – The appellant, originally compensated with 5% of the deposited auction amount under Rule 38(4)(b), was found to have been inadequately compensated. The Court ordered additional compensation in the form of interest – Held: The appellant is entitled to simple interest at 6% per annum on the amount of Rs. 81,20,000 from the date of its deposit (21st July 2019) until the date of refund, ensuring fair compensation for the loss of use of his funds [Paras 13-14].

Interest Liability – Respondent Bank Held Responsible – The 4th respondent, the co-operative bank which initiated the auction, was held liable for the payment of interest to the appellant. The fact that the money was with the 3rd respondent (Recovery Officer) does not absolve the 4th respondent, who did not challenge the High Court’s findings – Held: The 4th respondent must pay the appellant the calculated interest within six weeks from the date of the judgment [Paras 14-15].

Decision: The appeal is partly allowed. The High Court’s judgments are modified, directing the 4th respondent bank to pay simple interest at 6% per annum on the sum of Rs. 81,20,000 from 21st July 2019 until the actual refund. The entire interest amount is to be paid within six weeks from the date of this judgment [Paras 15-16].

Regulatory Law – Maintainability of Appeal – Statutory Authority – Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India (AERA) filed appeals under Section 31 of the AERA Act against the decisions of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT) – Respondents objected to the maintainability of the appeals, arguing that AERA, being a quasi-judicial body, cannot challenge its own decisions before TDSAT and subsequently appeal them in the Supreme Court – Supreme Court held that AERA’s appeals are maintainable since it functions as a regulator with a vested public interest, making it a necessary party to such proceedings [Paras 1, 13-15, 63-64, 66-67].

Quasi-Judicial Functions – Judicial or quasi-judicial authorities typically cannot defend their orders in appeals, as reiterated in precedents like Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur – However, the distinction between judicial and regulatory functions is crucial in the case of AERA – Tariff determination under Section 13(1)(a) of the AERA Act is a regulatory function, not an adjudicatory one – AERA’s role as a regulator, with policy considerations in mind, makes it an interested party, unlike traditional adjudicatory bodies [Paras 16-24, 33, 53-58].

Proper and Necessary Parties – Regulatory Authority – AERA must be impleaded as a respondent in appeals concerning its tariff determinations as it is a necessary party – Its regulatory role ensures it has a public interest in the outcome of such appeals – Supreme Court observed that even though Section 18(5) of the AERA Act requires a copy of TDSAT orders to be sent to AERA, it does not exclude AERA from being a party in appeals – Provisions under Section 18 are not intended to imply AERA's exclusion from the appellate process but rather to ensure its involvement in regulatory decisions [Paras 26-29, 62-65].

Nature of Tariff Determination – Tariff determination by AERA under Section 13(1)(a) is primarily regulatory, not adjudicatory – It involves broader policy concerns and discretionary decision-making, as AERA considers various factors such as public interest, economic viability, and airport efficiency – The statutory provisions confer AERA with the role of a regulator concerned with public and economic interests, distinguishing its function from traditional adjudication – The requirement to follow principles of natural justice under Section 13(4) does not render the process adjudicatory [Paras 53-60].

Decision – The appeals filed by AERA against TDSAT’s orders are maintainable as AERA’s role is regulatory, not quasi-judicial – AERA is a necessary party in appeals concerning its tariff orders – Matters remanded to be listed before the regular bench for adjudication on merits [Paras 66-67].

Citizenship Law – Constitutionality of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which provides for citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, was challenged for violating various constitutional provisions – It was argued that Parliament lacked legislative competence to modify the citizenship provisions for a specific region like Assam without amending the Constitution – The Supreme Court upheld Parliament’s authority under Article 11 of the Constitution to legislate on matters of citizenship, noting that Articles 6 and 7 govern citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, while Section 6A addresses later migrants – No conflict was found between Section 6A and Articles 6 and 7 [Paras 29-42].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The court upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 387-391].

Citizenship Law – Validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 – Petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6A, arguing it violated the legislative competence of Parliament under Article 11 of the Constitution, and Articles 14, 29, and 355 – Section 6A provides special provisions for granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh to Assam, based on specific cut-off dates – The majority upheld the validity of Section 6A, holding that the provision fell within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 11 and did not violate any constitutional provisions, including Article 14, as the classification of Assam and the cut-off date were rational and justified – However, Justice J.B. Pardiwala dissented, arguing that Section 6A has become unconstitutional due to its "manifest arbitrariness" and temporal unreasonableness [Paras 12, 42-45, 72-75, 207-219].

Legislative Competence – Article 11 of the Constitution – Parliament's power to legislate on matters related to citizenship – Petitioners argued that Section 6A of the Citizenship Act altered the cut-off dates prescribed by Articles 6 and 7, thus requiring a constitutional amendment rather than parliamentary legislation – The majority held that Section 6A does not amend Articles 6 and 7, as those provisions only pertain to citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution, whereas Section 6A deals with post-Partition migration – Article 11 empowers Parliament to enact laws on citizenship beyond the scope of Articles 6 and 7, as Section 6A addresses a different time frame and context – In dissent, Justice Pardiwala argued that Section 6A's framework is flawed for lacking a clear temporal limit for its application [Paras 13, 29-31, 32-42, 208].

Article 14 – Equality before Law – Petitioners argued that Section 6A violates Article 14 by adopting arbitrary cut-off dates and singling out Assam – The majority held that the classification of Assam as a separate entity is based on the unique impact of migration in the region and the significant cultural, economic, and political challenges faced by the state due to the influx of migrants from Bangladesh – The cut-off date of March 25, 1971, was rational, linked to historical events, and had a reasonable nexus with the objective of regulating migration – However, Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, held that Section 6A has become arbitrary over time, especially due to the burden of detection being placed solely on the state, and the provision has led to continued illegal immigration [Paras 43-75, 207-215].

Cultural Identity – Article 29(1) – Petitioners argued that Section 6A infringes on the cultural identity of Assamese people by granting citizenship to migrants from Bangladesh – The majority found no violation of Article 29(1), stating that the provision balances the protection of Assamese cultural identity with humanitarian considerations for migrants – Justice Pardiwala also disagreed with the majority's stance, stating that Section 6A, lacking procedural safeguards like those in Articles 6 and 7, undermines Assamese identity through unchecked migration [Paras 387, 212].

External Aggression – Article 355 – Petitioners contended that undocumented immigration constitutes 'external aggression' under Article 355 and that Section 6A fails to curb such immigration – The majority rejected this argument, stating that the provision is in line with the legislative intent to regularize certain classes of migrants and is not in conflict with the State's duty under Article 355 to protect against external aggression – Justice Pardiwala, in dissent, emphasized that Section 6A's failure to stop illegal immigration into Assam is evidence of its ineffectiveness in addressing the concerns of external aggression [Paras 12(c), 387, 211].

Decision: Section 6A of the Citizenship Act upheld by the majority, but declared unconstitutional by dissenting opinion – The majority held that Section 6A is constitutionally valid and does not violate any provisions of the Constitution, including Articles 6, 7, 14, 29, or 355 – However, Justice Pardiwala's dissenting opinion argued that Section 6A suffers from temporal unreasonableness and has become unconstitutional due to its failure to curb illegal immigration effectively – The dissent also emphasized that Section 6A's flawed framework places an undue burden on the state and undermines Assamese cultural identity – Directions were issued for improved enforcement and monitoring of immigration laws post-1971 [Paras 387-393, 217-219].

Motor Accident Claim – Motor Accident – Involvement of Car – Appeal against the dismissal of a claim for compensation – Appellants, the widow, minor child, and parents of the deceased, sought compensation after Ikhbal died in a road accident – Accident allegedly caused by the respondent's car when the deceased was overtaking a bus on his motorcycle – Trial court and High Court dismissed the claim on grounds that the car was not involved in the accident – Supreme Court, after examining evidence including witness testimonies and a Mahazar report showing damage to the car, held that the car was involved in the accident based on the preponderance of probability – Held: Appellants entitled to compensation of ₹46,31,496 with 9% interest [Paras 1-17].

Witness Testimony – Credibility of Witnesses – P.W. 2, the driver of the bus, testified that the accident involved the car hitting the motorcycle – P.W. 3, a nearby shopkeeper, also confirmed damage to the car – P.W. 6, an eyewitness, firmly stated the car hit the motorcycle and took the injured to the hospital – Courts below disbelieved P.W. 6 only because his statement was not recorded during the police investigation – Supreme Court found P.W. 6 trustworthy, holding that police oversight does not render credible testimony unreliable in motor accident cases [Paras 10-16].

Circumstantial Evidence – Damage to Car – Mahazar report noted damage to the front bumper, parking light, and grill of the car, indicating its involvement in the accident – Respondent's claim that the motorcycle skid independently was dismissed – The Supreme Court ruled that the damage corroborated the appellants' version of events, overturning the lower courts' findings [Paras 12-17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Award of ₹46,31,496 with 9% interest granted to the appellants – Payment to be made within three months, failing which interest will increase to 12% – Respondents to bear their own costs [Paras 17-18].