Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Dishonour of Cheque – Individual vs. Corporate Liability – Accused acquitted for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act as the cheque was drawn on an account maintained by the company (Shilabati Hospital Pvt. Ltd.), and the company was not impleaded as an accused – Held: A director or authorized signatory cannot be held liable in their personal capacity under Section 138 unless the company, as the principal offender, is also prosecuted – Appeal dismissed – Opportunity granted to lodge an FIR for potential cheating by the accused under general criminal law [Paras 69–78].

Criminal Law – Section 138 NI Act – Key Requirements for Liability – Compliance with Section 138 demands that the dishonoured cheque must be drawn on an account maintained by the accused – Strict interpretation of penal statutes mandates that the liability under Section 138 is limited to the drawer of the cheque – Merely signing a cheque as an authorized signatory does not constitute personal liability unless the principal account-holder is prosecuted [Paras 33–42, 69–73].

Vicarious Liability – Section 141 NI Act – Corporate Offences – Liability under Section 141 arises only when the company is prosecuted and held guilty – Doctrine of strict construction requires prosecution of the principal offender (the company) as a condition precedent to affixing vicarious liability on directors or officers responsible for the conduct of its business – Absence of the company as an accused precludes vicarious liability for directors [Paras 59–63].

Doctrine of Strict Interpretation – Penal Statutes – Section 138 NI Act – Held: Interpretation of penal provisions must be strict and in conformity with legislative intent – Extending the scope of Section 138 to authorize prosecution of individuals who act as agents or signatories on behalf of corporate entities would result in unintended and unjust liability [Paras 44–48, 66–68].

Judicial Precedents – Individual vs. Corporate Liability – Several Supreme Court rulings reaffirm that the liability under Section 138 rests on the entity maintaining the account from which the cheque is drawn – Directors or authorized signatories may only be held liable when the company is prosecuted as per Section 141 of the NI Act [Paras 50, 55–62].

Cheating Allegations – Alternative Remedy – Dishonoured Cheque Issued for Personal Debt – Held: Accused's conduct of encashing Rs. 7,00,000/- from the complainant and later issuing a dishonoured cheque raises prima facie suspicion of cheating under general criminal law – Complainant is at liberty to file an FIR for further investigation [Paras 75–77].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Accused acquitted of offence under Section 138 NI Act – Complainant granted liberty to pursue alternative criminal remedies under general law [Paras 78–79].

Service Law - Termination of Service – Applicability of Article 311(2)(b) – Invalid Termination – The appellants terminated the services of doctors under Article 311(2)(b) citing impracticability of conducting a disciplinary enquiry due to large-scale absenteeism – The High Court quashed the termination orders, holding the provision inapplicable and ordered reinstatement with benefits – Held: The termination under Article 311(2)(b) was unsustainable as no evidence showed it was impracticable to conduct an enquiry; however, reinstatement was also inappropriate considering the respondents' absenteeism [Paras 2-5, 8-10].

Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) – Unreasonable Delay in Decision – The respondents' applications for VRS were kept pending for an extended period, and the appellants failed to provide reasons for the delay – Held: The applications for VRS were deemed accepted from the termination date, ensuring justice while precluding back salary or pre-pension benefits due to the respondents' prolonged absence [Paras 6-7, 10].

Judicial Powers under Article 142 – Complete Justice – In the unique facts of the case, the Court exercised its powers under Article 142 to quash the termination orders and substitute them with orders granting VRS – Directed pension fixation based on VRS with effect from the termination date but payable only prospectively from the date of the judgment [Paras 10-11].

Decision: The appeals were partly allowed. The termination orders were quashed and substituted with VRS orders dated 03/05/2010. Respondents were not entitled to back salary or arrears but directed to receive prospective pension benefits, ensuring equity and justice.

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheques – Essential Ingredients – Complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act lacked specific averments that the appellant, as the authorized signatory of the company, was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of its business – Held: Such averments are statutorily mandatory to maintain a complaint under Section 138 – Absence of such averments renders the complaint unsustainable – Complaint and all proceedings emanating therefrom quashed [Paras 6-8, 9].

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing of Summoning Orders – High Court declined to quash summoning orders despite the absence of mandatory averments in the complaints – Held: Compelling the appellant to stand trial in the absence of foundational statutory requirements would amount to abuse of the court process – Summoning orders and all related proceedings set aside [Paras 8-9].

Legal Principle – Liability of Authorized Signatory – It is settled law that to maintain a charge under Section 138 NI Act against an individual associated with a company, the complaint must specifically state that the individual was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company’s business – Failure to make such averments is fatal to the complaint – Reliance placed on Ashok Shewakramani v. State of Andhra Pradesh [Paras 7, 8].

Decision – Appeals Allowed – Complaints Quashed – High Court order dismissing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. set aside – Complaints filed under Section 138 NI Act and related summoning orders quashed – Proceedings before the Metropolitan Magistrate quashed as against the appellant [Paras 9-10].
 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. – Lack of Prima Facie Case – Appellant (Accused No.13) sought discharge under Section 227 Cr.P.C. from charges under Section 27(b) of the NDPS Act – Sole evidence against the appellant was the confession statement of a co-accused (Accused No.1) – Held: Confessional statement of a co-accused is inadmissible under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and cannot form the basis for framing charges – No other evidence linked the appellant to the offense – Dismissal of discharge application by the Trial Court and High Court was improper – Appellant discharged [Paras 7, 9-12, 14].
Confession of Co-Accused – Inadmissibility – No Prima Facie Case for Trial – The appellant was arraigned under Section 27(b) of the NDPS Act based solely on the confession of a co-accused – Held: Confession of a co-accused cannot form the sole basis for framing charges against another accused. In the absence of corroborative material or evidence, there was no prima facie case to proceed against the appellant [Paras 12-14, 23-24].

Scope of Section 227, Cr.P.C. – Discharge in Absence of Grave Suspicion – At the stage of discharge, the judge must sift evidence to assess if a grave suspicion exists against the accused – Mere suspicion, unsupported by admissible evidence, does not justify subjecting the accused to trial [Paras 11-15, 20-22].

NDPS Act – Proof Beyond Suspicion Required – In cases under the NDPS Act, strong and corroborated material evidence is necessary due to the stringent nature of penalties – Confession unsupported by medical examination or recovery of contraband is insufficient to frame charges [Paras 18-19].

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The orders of the High Court and the Additional District Judge-Special Court were set aside. The appellant (Accused No. 13) was discharged from CC No. 43 of 2020.
 

Civil Writ - PIL - Judicial Review – Public Contracts – Excessive Delegation Invalidated – Articles 13 and 14 of the Concession Agreement, allowing NOIDA Toll Bridge Company Ltd. to levy toll, were held invalid for violating public policy – Held: Power to levy fees or toll cannot be delegated to private entities as per the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976; only the collection of fees may be delegated [Paras 42-50].

Public Interest Litigation – Maintainability and Delay – Continuous Cause of Action – The PIL filed after 15 years of the Concession Agreement was held maintainable due to continuous public injury and absence of clear disclosure of toll recoveries – Held: Delay in filing a public interest matter does not preclude maintainability where public welfare is at stake [Paras 16-21].

Reasonableness of Toll Policy – Violation of Public Policy – Perpetual Recovery of Costs – Formula in the Concession Agreement led to perpetual recovery of escalating project costs, extending the concession period indefinitely – Held: The agreement imposed an undue burden on public commuters and failed to align with the principles of equity and public trust [Paras 53-65].

Role of the State – Responsibility in Public-Private Partnerships – Lack of Transparency – Selection of NTBCL without competitive bidding and delegation of financial oversight to private stakeholders highlighted misuse of power – Held: Actions violated Article 14, mandating fairness and equality in public governance [Paras 30-40].

Decision: The appeal was dismissed. The High Court's judgment prohibiting the collection of toll and severing Articles 13 and 14 from the Concession Agreement was upheld. NTBCL was directed to cease toll collection immediately.
 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Discharge under Section 239 Cr.P.C. – Prima Facie Case – High Court set aside the charges framed under Section 109 IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) punishable under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and discharged the respondent – Held: The Trial Court correctly found prima facie case against the respondent based on the investigation materials – High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under revision by meticulously analyzing evidence for "clinching material" instead of prima facie assessment – Such analysis was inappropriate at the discharge stage under Section 239 Cr.P.C. – High Court erred in setting aside the charge framed by the Trial Court [Paras 9, 13, 14].

Disproportionate Assets – Prima Facie Evidence – Framing of Charges Justified – Charges were framed against the respondent and her husband for the possession of disproportionate assets – High Court quashed the charges against the respondent, holding that there was no material evidence of abetment – Held: The Trial Court appropriately found a prima facie case, and the High Court’s meticulous examination for "clinching evidence" exceeded its jurisdiction at the discharge stage under Section 239, Cr.P.C. [Paras 5-9, 12].

Abetment and Relationship with Public Servant – Mere Association Not Sufficient for Liability – The respondent’s liability was alleged due to her relationship with her husband, a public servant accused of disproportionate assets – High Court erred by delving into the merits instead of evaluating prima facie suspicion, which is sufficient to frame charges at this stage [Paras 6-10, 15].

Presumption of Innocence – Scope of Section 239, Cr.P.C. – At the stage of discharge, the focus is on whether a prima facie case exists, not the sufficiency of evidence for conviction – The High Court misapplied principles of trial to the discharge stage [Paras 9-13].

Decision: The appeal was allowed. The High Court’s order discharging the respondent was set aside. The Trial Court was directed to proceed with the trial expeditiously, as the case dated back to 2013.

Family Law - Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Grant of Divorce under Article 142(1) – The Court dissolved the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent, citing irretrievable breakdown of marriage – The marriage was marred by multiple litigations, allegations of cruelty, and false criminal complaints – Held: The marriage had become emotionally dead and unworkable – Divorce granted under Article 142(1), balancing equities, including permanent alimony to the petitioner [Paras 9.10, 9.15-9.16, 12].

Transfer Petition – Section 25 CPC – Adjudication of Alimony – The Court transferred the divorce petition from Bhopal to Pune for adjudication limited to determining alimony – Alimony fixed at ₹2 lakhs per month or ₹10 crores in lump sum, considering the respondent’s financial status, marriage duration, and circumstances [Para 3.10, 3.13].

Misuse of Criminal Law – Effect on Marital Relationship – The petitioner’s filing of false criminal cases under Sections 498A, 376, and 377 IPC, Look Out Circulars, and arrest of the respondent irreparably fractured the marriage – Such actions amounted to cruelty against the respondent [Paras 9.9, 10].

Exercise of Article 142(1) – Complete Justice Achieved – Broad powers under Article 142(1) were used to dissolve the marriage and provide equitable relief – Held: Prolonged litigation and acrimony necessitated this decision – Relief included permanent alimony balancing fairness for both parties [Paras 9.16, 10].

Decision: Petition partly allowed – Marriage dissolved under Article 142(1) – Alimony to be determined by the Family Court at Pune.

Scope of Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Applicability to Tribunals – Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. mandates that complaints for offences under Sections 193, 199, and 200 IPC, when committed before a Court, must be filed only by orders of the Court concerned – Tribunal not defined as "Court" under law – Held: Offences alleged to have been committed before a Tribunal may be addressed through private complaints rather than following the procedure under Section 195 Cr.P.C..

Private Complaints – Offences under Sections 193, 199, and 200 IPC – Where offences are committed outside a Court, private complaints are maintainable – Tribunal, being outside the definition of "Court," can entertain such complaints – Held: Private complaints are valid for offences committed before the Municipal Building Tribunal in this case.

Quashing of Complaint – High Court’s Jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – High Court quashed the private complaint on the ground that it contravened Section 195 Cr.P.C. – Supreme Court held this reasoning to be erroneous, as the Tribunal was not a Court – Held: High Court order set aside, and private complaint restored for adjudication on merits by the Tribunal.

Decision – Appeal allowed – Private complaint restored to the Tribunal – Supreme Court clarified that the decision is based solely on technical and legal grounds, and the merits of the case remain to be adjudicated by the Tribunal.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce - Mental Cruelty – Filing False Complaints – Section 13(1)(ia), HMA – Divorce Granted – The High Court held that the appellant-wife’s act of filing a false dowry harassment complaint against the respondent-husband and his family, later abandoned, amounted to mental cruelty – Prolonged separation of over 15 years demonstrated an irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Held: Filing false complaints with intent to harass constitutes cruelty, justifying dissolution of marriage – Decision: Decree of divorce granted; appeal dismissed; permanent alimony awarded to the appellant and daughter [Paras 8, 10, 14-16, 27-29, 41].

Desertion – Prolonged Separation – Section 13(1)(ib), HMA – Divorce Granted – The High Court concluded that the appellant’s prolonged separation without reasonable cause and lack of interest in reconciliation amounted to desertion – Held: Willful abandonment of matrimonial obligations constitutes desertion, justifying divorce – Decision: Marriage dissolved due to desertion; permanent alimony granted [Paras 11, 13, 30-33, 40].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Prolonged Separation – Article 142 of the Constitution – Relief Granted – The Court acknowledged the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage due to 20 years of separation, during which reconciliation efforts failed – Held: While not a statutory ground, irretrievable breakdown justifies dissolution of a marriage when continuation would only perpetuate distress – Decision: Marriage declared irretrievably broken; divorce decree upheld; permanent alimony granted [Paras 30-33, 41].

Jurisdiction of High Court – Section 100, CPC – Substantial Question of Law – High Court’s Interference Justified – The High Court reversed concurrent findings of the lower courts by addressing substantial questions of law related to the appellant’s conduct and the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage – Held: Such interference is permissible under Section 100, CPC – Decision: High Court’s jurisdiction upheld; divorce decree maintained [Paras 6-8, 17-18, 23].

Permanent Alimony – Financial Independence and Dignity – Alimony Awarded – The Court directed the respondent-husband to pay Rs. 50,00,000/- as permanent alimony to the appellant-wife and an additional Rs. 50,00,000/- for the education and future expenses of their daughter – Held: Alimony ensures financial stability and dignity, safeguarding the rights of dependents post-divorce – Decision: Permanent alimony of Rs. 1 crore awarded to appellant and daughter; payments to be made within four months [Paras 36-40, 41].