Facts:

The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits, claiming the defendant was a trespasser, never legally inducted as a tenant. The plaintiff alleged the defendant unlawfully occupied the property, intended for use by the National Cadet Corps (NCC).

Issues:

Validity of the defendant's tenancy.

Existence of a power of attorney permitting letting out of the premises.

Plaintiff's entitlement to possession and mesne profits.

Held:

The court considered the defendant's claim of tenancy based on a receipt and the power of attorney held by D.K. Chadha. The court observed that the letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, dated 28.10.1977, negated the existence of a power of attorney for letting out the premises. The court held that the defendant trespassed without a proper lease agreement and noted the plaintiff's denial of granting any such power to D.K. Chadha. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiff withheld the power of attorney, stating it was not proven to be in her possession. The court reinstated the decision of the Single Judge, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises. (Para 7-12)

Facts:

The appellant, whose marriage was dissolved, sought enhanced maintenance for two minor children. Both parents were employed, and the appellant claimed maintenance from the date of application under Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The salaries of both parents increased over time.

Issues:

Whether both parents are obligated to contribute to the maintenance of minor children?

How should the maintenance amount be determined, considering the financial status of both parents?

Held:

The court examined the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, particularly Sections 18, 20, and 3(b). It emphasized that maintenance includes provisions for food, clothing, residence, education, and medical attendance for minor children. Section 20 establishes the obligation of both parents to maintain a minor child. The court determined that, regardless of the mother's financial status, both parents are responsible for the maintenance of their children.

The court, considering the salaries of both parents, established a proportional contribution for maintenance. If the husband's salary is approximately twice that of the wife, they are obligated to contribute to the children's maintenance in that proportion. The court directed the respondent to pay a specified amount for each child from different dates.

Facts:

The respondent had booked consignments with the appellant for transportation. The goods were destroyed in a fire at the appellant's godown, leading to a complaint before the National Consumer Forum.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies in cases of loss or damage to goods entrusted for transportation.

Liability of the common carrier for the loss of goods, with a focus on the applicability of Section 9 of the Carriers Act.

The burden of proving negligence and its relevance in consumer complaints.

Held:

The Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies have jurisdiction over complaints related to loss or damage to goods entrusted for transportation.

The liability of a common carrier is that of an insurer, and negligence need not be established by the complainant. The absolute liability is subject to exceptions like acts of God, but accidental fire is not considered an act of God.

Section 9 of the Carriers Act is applicable to proceedings before consumer dispute redressal agencies. The term 'suit' in the Carriers Act includes proceedings before these forums.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the deficiency in the performance of service by the common carrier, making them liable for the loss of goods.

Facts:

During the pendency of the appeal, all parties entered into an arbitration agreement.

Issues:

Whether the court has the authority to refer parties to arbitration under the new Act.

The conditions under Section 8 that need to be satisfied before referring parties to arbitration.

The interpretation of the phrase "which is the subject of an arbitration agreement."

Held:

The court can refer parties to arbitration under the new Act.

Conditions under Section 8 include the existence of an arbitration agreement, the subject matter of the action being the same as the arbitration agreement, and the timing of the application.

The phrase "which is the subject of an arbitration agreement" does not necessarily require the agreement to be in existence before the court action is brought.

Decision: The application is allowed, and the parties are referred to arbitration. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

Controversy over the admission of 19 and 14 candidates to Post Graduate Degree and Diploma courses in Medicine during the academic year 1997 for HCMS candidates.

Petitioners claimed admission should be based solely on marks obtained in the entrance examination, while respondents argued for the Selection Committee's role in final selection based on various criteria.

High Court favored the petitioners, citing the force of law in the Prospectus and challenging the government's right to issue conflicting instructions.

Issues:

Dispute over the criteria for admission of HCMS candidates to Post Graduate courses.

Validity of government orders modifying admission criteria.

Interpretation of the Prospectus as the sole governing document for admissions.

Held:

High Court erred in asserting the Prospectus as the exclusive criterion and disregarding the modifying government orders.

Government orders, including those dated 20.3.96 and 21.2.97, continued to hold significance and were not overridden by the later orders dated 21.5.97.

The merit of HCMS candidates must be assessed based on both the Prospectus and government orders, ensuring a fair evaluation of their service credentials.

Decision: The judgment of the High Court is set aside. The merit of HCMS candidates is to be adjudged in terms of the criteria contained in the government orders and the selections made for admission against reserved seats are to be determined by the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose.

Facts:

Roop Singh (Appellant) claimed ownership of agricultural land, accusing Ram Singh (Respondent, now deceased) of illegal possession. Appellant sought possession through a civil suit, while the Respondent defended claiming ownership through an alleged sale agreement and adverse possession.

Issues:

Whether the defendant's possession was permissive or adverse.

Existence and proof of the alleged agreement to sale.

Adverse possession claim by the defendant.

Held:

High Court jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC is limited to substantial questions of law, not pure questions of fact. No substantial question of law found, and High Court should not have interfered with the factual findings of lower courts.( Para 7)

Defendant failed to prove the alleged agreement to sale, lacking documentation and witnesses. High Court erred in considering evidence that contradicted findings of lower courts.( Para 8)

High Court's reliance on defendant's possession for 15-16 years as adverse is contradicted by lower courts' findings that it was permissive, established by revenue records. Plea of adverse possession inconsistent with Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act.( Para 9)

Judgment and decree of High Court set aside, restoring the decision of the Appellate Court in favor of the plaintiff. Costs to be borne by respective parties.( Para 10)

FACTS:

Appellant No. 4 was notionally promoted to the post of Additional Director General (Works) on 22nd February 1995.

The respondent claimed eligibility for consideration for the post of Director General, asserting that he could have been appointed as Additional Director General in 1995-96.

The Departmental Promotion Committee considered only the appellant for the post of Director General.

ISSUES:

Whether notional promotion qualifies as 'regular service' for eligibility criteria.

Whether the respondent has the locus standi to challenge the promotion process.

HELD:

The notional promotion of the appellant No. 4 was granted in accordance with relevant rules and orders.

The respondent challenged the promotion process but clarified that he did not dispute the eligibility of the appellant for consideration.

The High Court erred in not dismissing the writ petition due to the lack of locus standi in the respondent.

The term 'regular service' does not necessarily mean 'actual service,' and the High Court misconstrued this aspect.

Reference to K. Madhavan case clarifies that 'on a regular basis' means an appointment on a regular basis, not ad hoc or temporary.

The appellant was entitled to count the period from his supersession as qualifying service for the purpose of further promotion.

The term 'service' in the eligibility criteria means 'qualifying service,' as clarified by relevant notes.

Denying consideration for promotion based on notional promotion perpetuates the wrong done to the appellant.

The appeal is allowed, setting aside the High Court's order regarding the appellant.

REFERRED CASES:

Union of India (UOI) and Another Vs. M. Bhaskar and Others, (1996) 73 FLR 1676 : (1996) 5 JT 500 : (1996) 4 SCALE 670 : (1996) 4 SCC 416 : (1996) 2 SCR 358 Supp : (1996) 2 SLJ 25

K. Madhavan and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, AIR 1987 SC 2291 : (1987) 4 JT 43 : (1987) 2 SCALE 727 : (1987) 4 SCC 566 : (1988) 1 SCR 421

Facts:

The assessee filed its income tax return for the assessment year 1989-90, not including the cash compensatory support received, which became taxable retrospectively under Section 28 due to the Finance Act of 1990.

Issues:

Whether the assessing officer was justified in adding the cash compensatory support to the income under Section 143(1)(a) and levying additional tax under Section 143(1A) in light of the retrospective amendment of Section 28.

Held:

The court held that the levy of additional tax was not warranted in these circumstances, considering the lack of fault on the part of the assessee and the retrospective nature of the amendment. It questioned the fairness of penalizing the assessee for not declaring income that wasn't taxable at the time of filing the return.

Decision: The question of law was answered in affirmative, i.e., in favor of the assessee and against the revenue. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Facts:

The appellant is a tenant of a shop, leased for the business of "Maniyari (General Merchant) Readymade & Cloth Merchant."

The landlord filed an eviction petition under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973, citing reasons including change of user of the shop.

The Rent Controller allowed eviction only on the ground of change of user.

The appellate authority and the High Court upheld the eviction decision.

Issues:

Whether the change in the appellant's business constituted a change in user justifying eviction.

The impact of the appellant's undertaking before the High Court on the maintainability of the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Held:

The Court ruled that a mere change in business does not amount to a change in user unless it violates the terms of the lease or the original purpose for which the property was let out.

The appellant's undertaking before the High Court does not affect the right to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Court has discretion in granting leave to appeal, considering circumstances surrounding the undertaking.