Land Acquisition – Market Value – Section 4(1) Notification dated 17.11.1980 – Collector fixed Rs. 8,500/- per bigha; Reference Court enhanced to Rs. 76,550/- per bigha; High Court further enhanced to Rs. 345/- per sq. yd. (Rs. 3,45,000/- per bigha) relying on post-notification sales and Government schedule of rates – Held: Impermissible to base valuation on post-notification transactions and schedule of rates when earlier Supreme Court judgment (Karan Singh v. Union of India, (1997) 8 SCC 186) concerning same notification fixed Rs. 76,550/- per bigha – Evidence in present case identical to Karan Singh; High Court erred – Market value reduced to Rs. 76,550/- per bigha [Paras 2–5].

Precedent – Binding Effect – Once Supreme Court had adjudicated valuation under same Section 4(1) Notification in Karan Singh, High Court bound to follow – Reappraisal of identical evidence unwarranted – Judicial discipline requires consistency in compensation for similarly situated lands under same notification [Paras 3–5].

Land Acquisition – Subsequent Notifications – Escalation of Compensation – Lands acquired under notifications dated 25.2.1981 and 24.11.1981 for same purpose – Held: Reasonable escalation permissible – 5% increase over Rs. 76,550/- per bigha for 25.2.1981 notification; 10% increase for 24.11.1981 notification – Respondents entitled to statutory benefits under Act on modified compensation [Paras 6–7].

Decision – Appeals allowed – High Court’s enhancement set aside – Market value fixed at Rs. 76,550/- per bigha for 17.11.1980 notification lands; Rs. 76,550/- + 5% for 25.2.1981 notification lands; Rs. 76,550/- + 10% for 24.11.1981 notification lands – Respondents entitled to statutory benefits on modified amounts – No order as to costs [Paras 5–7].

Civil Procedure – Clarification/Modification vs. Review – Application filed by Respondents seeking clarification/modification of Supreme Court judgment dated 09.10.2003 – Claimed factual errors: incorrect date of consent decree (22.5.1988 instead of 22.5.1998) and wrong attribution of decree to Division Bench instead of Single Judge – Other claims raised were on merits of the case, including party impleadment and effect of consent decree – Held: Only typographical errors can be corrected under inherent powers – Application in substance is a review petition, and not maintainable unless proper procedure under Order XI Rules 3 & 5 of Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and Article 137 of Constitution followed [Paras 1–4, 10–14, 18–19, 24].

Review Jurisdiction – Limits under Supreme Court Rules – Application for “clarification/modification” cannot be used as disguise to seek review and bypass rules requiring in-chambers circulation without oral hearing – Such disguised review attempts are not maintainable – Court reiterates principles from Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Common Cause v. Union of India – What cannot be done directly cannot be permitted indirectly [Paras 13, 15–17].

Inherent Powers – Scope of Correction – Court’s inherent power can be exercised only for correcting accidental clerical/arithmetical errors – Not for revisiting merits or making substantive changes – Typographical corrections made: (1) Date of consent decree corrected to 22.5.1998 (from 22.5.1988); (2) Judge attributed correctly as Single Judge, not Division Bench – No other changes warranted [Paras 19–23].

Decision: Applications dismissed except to correct two typographical errors – No other relief granted – No costs [Paras 24–25].

Murder – Conviction Set Aside – Acquittal – Deceased allegedly strangulated with ‘pharna’ and stabbed near primary school at Ranguwal – FIR recorded at 11:20 p.m.; trial court convicted under Section 302/34 IPC; High Court affirmed – Held: Ocular version of PWs 3 & 4 (father and associate) unsafe – they are chance witnesses; major contradictions on timing (7:00 p.m. vs 9–10 p.m.) apparently to cover delay; non-examination of chowkidar and servant present at the spot; doubtful capacity to observe details in moonlight given distance and PW-3’s weak eyesight; “last seen” evidence by PW-6 recorded after ~3 months and lacks corroboration – Benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside; appellant to be released [Paras 1–4, 6–13, 15].

Chance Witnesses – Cautious Scrutiny Required – Court reiterates that testimony of chance witnesses must be evaluated with greater care; mechanical acceptance improper – Applied to discard uncorroborated, inconsistent ocular account (relying on Satbir v. Surat Singh) [Paras 6, 14].

Contradictory Timelines & Delay – Material inconsistency between versions (before/after sunset; 7:00 p.m. vs ~10:00 p.m.) – Explanation untenable; timing significant given FIR at 11:20 p.m.; variations not attributable to mere rustic imprecision [Paras 7–10].

Non-Examination of Material Witnesses – Chowkidar and servant present at scene not examined without explanation – Failure undermines prosecution and deprives corroboration of alleged cries/sequence [Para 11].

Medical Evidence – Cause of death (strangulation) not decisive to outcome – Absence of ligature mark vs hyoid fracture noted – Court finds it unnecessary to resolve medical doubt in view of unreliable ocular evidence [Para 5].

“Last Seen” Evidence – PW-6’s statement recorded after three months; expected inquiries from accused not shown – Version held doubtful [Para 13].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 IPC set aside – Appellant to be released forthwith [Para 15].

Environmental Protection – Taj Trapezium Zone – Brick Kilns – Committee Mechanism – Pursuant to Court’s order dated 11.09.2003, a Special Committee comprising representatives of CPCB, ASI, MoEF and UPPCB was constituted to decide applications for restarting kilns – Applications pending before Court dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to approach Committee – Committee to dispose of applications within 4 weeks [Paras 1–3].

Interpretation of Orders – “Significant Monuments” – Clarification – Court’s order dated 10.05.1996 directing closure of brick kilns within 20 km radius of Taj Mahal and “other significant monuments” – ASI list filed pursuant to order dated 04.09.1996 – Court clarified on 03.10.1996 that “significant monuments” refers to centrally protected monuments listed in ASI’s Annexure 1 – No further clarification necessary – Submissions to reopen issue rejected [Paras 5–9].

Monument Classification – Budhiya Ka Taal – Inclusion Valid – Objection raised that Budhiya Ka Taal was not notified by MoEF in Annexure IV – Court held that since it was included in ASI list affirmed on 03.10.1996, it must be treated as significant for purpose of earlier orders – Applications raising contrary contention rejected – Liberty given to approach Committee for operational permissions [Para 10].

Decision – No modification of earlier orders – Pending IAs disposed of with liberty to move Special Committee – Clarification already settled by 03.10.1996 order stands final [Paras 3, 9–10].

Civil Law – Order 2 Rule 2 CPC – Bar Not Attracted – Appeal Dismissed – Agreement to sell dated 25.05.1987 for 69 kanals 10 marlas; injunction suit first filed then withdrawn after filing suit for specific performance; during pendency, defendant sold to R-2 to R-4 – Trial court found agreement proved, plaintiff ready and willing, transferees not bona fide (lis pendens), yet dismissed as barred by O.2 R.2 though not pleaded and with no issue – First appellate court set aside O.2 R.2 bar and decreed specific performance; High Court affirmed – Held: O.2 R.2 is a technical bar and must be strictly pleaded and proved; in absence of plea and framed issue, and without proof of identity of cause of action between the two suits, bar cannot apply; on merits also suits not on same cause – Decree for specific performance upheld [Paras 1–11, 12–13].

Order 23 Rule 1 CPC – Withdrawal of Earlier Suit – New Suit Not Barred – Plea under O.23 R.1 not taken in written statement, negatived by first appellate court, and not urged before High Court – Cannot be raised before Supreme Court for the first time; objection rejected [Para 12].

Pleading & Issues – Necessity for Plea/Issue to Invoke O.2 R.2 – To sustain an O.2 R.2 objection, defendant must plead the bar; court must frame an issue; and prior suit’s cause of action must be proved to be identical – Absent these, defendant cannot spring the bar at appellate stages; technical pleas cannot defeat substantive rights [Para 12].

Decision – Appeal dismissed – Findings of readiness and willingness and non-bona fide purchase left undisturbed – Specific performance of agreement dated 25.05.1987 on payment of balance consideration confirmed – No order as to costs [Paras 11–13].

SYL Canal Decree – Article 131 suit to discharge/modify decree – Order 23 Rule 6 (SC Rules) – Res judicata – Execution under Article 142 – Applications allowed; Punjab’s suit rejected – Haryana’s I.A. for enforcement allowed; directions issued to Union of India to implement decree – No change of circumstances; decree not a “continuing” preventive injunction – Construction of canal not a “water dispute” under Article 262 – Section 51 CPC (residuary mode) applied for execution [Paras 35–37, 52–57, 59–63, 65–67, 94–99].

Maintainability – “Cause of action” in Article 131 – Order 23 Rule 6(a), SC Rules – Phrase “cause of action” in O.23 R.6 to be read contextually as “ground to sue” under Article 131 – Plaint must disclose a dispute on which existence/extent of a legal right depends – Punjab’s plaint disclosed none; aimed to impeach prior final decree; hence rejection proper – Challenge to validity of O.23 R.6(a) unsustainable [Paras 23–31, 37, 63–64, 84–86].

Modification of Decree – Final mandatory vs continuing preventive injunction – No inherent power to reopen/“reverse under guise of readjusting” a final mandatory decree – No factual/legal change shown; decree founded on (i) binding 31.12.1981 Agreement recorded by SC on withdrawal of earlier suits and (ii) massive public expenditure; not on quantum of water – Swift & Co. principle inapplicable – Suit to modify rejected [Paras 51–57, 58–61, 62–63].

Article 262 Bar – Construction of canal not a “water dispute” within Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act – Prior Constitution Bench (State of Karnataka v. State of A.P.) applied; Article 145(3) not attracted as no fresh substantial constitutional interpretation was required – Objection overruled [Paras 65–67].

Res Judicata & Withdrawal Bar – Re-agitation of Article 145(3)/Article 262 objections barred inter partes (Daryao; Cauvery Reference) – Challenge to Section 78, Punjab Reorganisation Act, foreclosed: (a) expressly raised in O.S. 6/1996 W.S.; (b) barred by Order 32 Rule 2 (SC Rules) due to unconditional withdrawal of O.S. 2/1979 without liberty – Challenge to Section 14, ISWDA, barred and in any case unsupported by pleadings; made “without prejudice” while pursuing review before Tribunal – Plaint rejected under O.23 R.6(b) [Paras 68–79, 80–84].

Execution & Enforcement – Article 142(1) & Supreme Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order, 1954, para 2(b) – Court may specify enforcement “in accordance with” law of any court/tribunal; residuary power under Section 51(e) CPC to craft effective mode – Haryana’s application maintainable; directions issued: mobilise Central agency; Punjab to hand over works; set up empowered committee incl. State reps; complete remaining works per committee timelines; provide security – Haryana’s I.A. allowed; no order as to costs on I.A. [Paras 95–99].

Constitutional Duty to Aid Execution – Article 144 – Resistance on political grounds deprecated; refusal to comply invites anarchy and undermines federal structure; observations in Cauvery Reference applied – Punjab’s conduct criticised; execution cannot be deferred owing to pending filings without stay [Paras 91–94].

Decision – I.A. No. 1 in O.S. 1/2003 allowed; plaint rejected and O.S. 1/2003 (Punjab v. Haryana) dismissed with costs – I.A. No. 4 in O.S. 6/1996 (Haryana) allowed; Union of India directed to implement decree per specified timeline; no order as to costs on I.A. [Paras 86, 99].

Medical Education – Post-Graduate Admissions – All-India Quota – Prospective Application of Judgment – Clarification Allowed – Following the Constitution Bench judgment in Saurabh Chaudhary (2003), which increased the All-India PG quota from 25% to 50%, applications were filed seeking clarity on its applicability to ongoing admissions – Held: The judgment shall apply prospectively – Admissions that had already commenced based on 25% quota will not be disturbed – Directions issued accordingly [Paras 1-6].

Reservation in Education – Institutional Preference vs. All-India Merit – Constitutional Validity – Reaffirmed – The Constitution Bench reaffirmed the validity of institutional preference in PG medical admissions up to 50% but emphasized the primacy of merit and need for a unified national entrance test – Dr. Pradeep Jain’s principle was preferred over Dr. Dinesh Kumar – Held: Institutional preference beyond 50% not permissible – One common entrance test should determine merit [Paras 2, 11-14, 23-24].

Prospective Overruling – Judicial Declaration of Law – Principle Reiterated – Held: A judicial declaration of law ordinarily applies retrospectively unless explicitly stated otherwise – Since no such statement was made in Saurabh Chaudhary, clarification was necessary – Court held judgment would apply prospectively from subsequent academic year [Paras 5, 20, 34].

Merit vs. Reservation – Right to PG Medical Education – Fundamental and Human Right – Court emphasized the importance of merit in PG admissions – Held: Allowing less meritorious students to gain admission through State quota after failing in All-India test would violate Article 14 – Merit must be assessed uniformly through a common test [Paras 24, 28].

Clarification vs. Review – Jurisdiction of Court – Limitations Recognised – Applications seeking to delay the implementation of a binding judgment were viewed as attempts to indirectly seek review – Held: Modification of a Constitution Bench judgment not permissible through clarification – Such powers can only be exercised in review jurisdiction [Paras 36, 38-39].

Obligation of State – Duty to Implement Article 141 – Non-compliance by UOI Criticized – Union of India, being party to the main writ petition, was bound by Article 141 to implement the judgment – Delay in seeking clarification was deprecated – Held: Government acted at its own peril by not making timely representation [Paras 19, 37].

Split Opinion – Partial Dissent – Prospective Application Ordered by Majority – Justice S.B. Sinha dissented, holding that no case had been made for postponing implementation and that the 2004 admission process should conform to the binding judgment – Held: Constitutional rights of meritorious students must not be diluted [Paras 40].

Taxation Law - Promissory Estoppel – State representation to abolish purchase tax on milk – Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 – Enforceability despite absence of notification – Held: Binding on the State – Highest executive authorities including Chief Minister and Finance Minister publicly announced abolition; circulars issued by Excise Commissioner directed field officers not to levy tax – Respondents altered their position by passing on benefit to farmers – In such circumstances, Government estopped from retrospectively levying purchase tax for 1996–97 – Equity requires enforcement of promise [Paras 3–13, 37, 47–48].

Promissory Estoppel – Scope and Limitations – Doctrine applicable against Government in contractual, administrative or statutory functions – Subject to two conditions: (i) clear and unequivocal promise, and (ii) alteration of position by promisee – Cannot compel act contrary to statute; but where statute confers power to exempt, Government bound to exercise it in equity – Discretion under “may” in Section 30 of the Act not absolute, must be exercised fairly [Paras 24–31, 36–38, 44–45].

Conflict in Case Law – Jit Ram Shiv Kumar’s restrictive view disapproved in Godfrey Philips – ITC Bhadrachalam Paperboards not followed as inconsistent with larger Bench rulings – Larger Bench authority in Godfrey Philips applied – Representation enforceable despite absence of statutory formality – Rule of law requires Government to stand on same footing as private individual [Paras 32–35, 42–46].

Public Interest Exception – Burden on Government to show overriding public interest to defeat estoppel – No such overriding equity shown – Representation made after considering financial implications and with intent to aid milk producers – Subsequent withdrawal not justified [Paras 30, 47].

Decision – Appeals dismissed – High Court order upholding respondents’ plea of promissory estoppel affirmed – No costs [Para 48].

Validity of Delhi notification dated 31.12.1999 – Motor Vehicles – Section 67 (State power to fix fares) vs. Section 72(2) (permit conditions) – Notification largely upheld, but Paragraph 3(b) quashed – State validly revised service charges payable by private operators for use of DTC bus shelters/terminals per permit Condition 17; however, compelling private operators to honour all DTC concessional passes is ultra vires Section 67 – High Court modified; partial relief granted with transition for student passes [Paras 18–26, 27–33, 35–36].

Section 67 Power – Scope and Limits – Directions may validly fix fares/freights and incidentally vary permit conditions only within statutory remit – Section 67(1)(d) read with (i) cannot be used to impose non-fare obligations like compulsory acceptance of another operator’s passes absent permit authorization by STA – Mandatory text must be followed (CIT v. Ghaswala; Dhananjaya Reddy) [Paras 18–19, 29–31].

Permit Conditions & User of Bus Stands – Condition 17 requiring use of DTC bus stops/terminals and payment of service charges “as determined by STA in consultation with DTC from time to time” is intra vires – Variation through Section 67 notification is permissible (B. Srikantiah; Sree Gajanana) – Enhanced charges (Rs. 2,500 p.m. for shelters; Rs. 5,000 p.m. for terminals) sustained [Paras 21–26].

Rules 75–76 & Section 72(2)(xx), (xxii), (xxiv) – Operators must halt only at notified stands; fees for use may be fixed; RTA/STA may vary/attach permit conditions after notice – Scheme history (1992/1995/2002) consistently contemplated service charges and constrained halting points [Paras 16–17, 21–24].

Concessional Passes – Paragraph 3(b) Ultra Vires – Permit Condition 13 requires honouring only those concessional passes “authorised for these buses” by STA; DTC’s own passes cannot be foisted on private operators via Section 67 – “Social obligations/uneconomic competition” rationale rejected; large classes of DTC passes are commercial instruments (advance tickets) not Article 38-driven subsidies; State cannot shift DTC burdens to private rivals (“rob Peter to pay Paul”) [Paras 27–33].

Fares for Passes – What Section 67 Permits – Government may prescribe fare levels for concessional passes generally (Paragraph 2 of notification) where operators issue such passes; this is within “fares and freights” power [Paras 32–33].

Decision – Appeal Allowed in Part – Notification dated 31.12.1999 upheld except Paragraph 3(b) which is quashed as ultra vires; operators to continue honouring concessional passes for disabled persons, freedom fighters, war widows and dependants; respondents to frame a lawful scheme for student passes within four months, failing which Paragraph 3(b) stands quashed w.e.f. 31.08.2004 [Paras 35–36].