Admission to Medical Courses – Article 371D – Definition of Local Candidate – High Court Expanded Definition – Orders Set Aside – The High Court widened “local candidate” beyond the Presidential Order and Rules of 2017/2024 by accepting residence certificates as eligibility – Held: Legislative and executive wisdom in framing rules consistent with the Presidential Order cannot be substituted by judicial expansion – Definition of “local candidate” in Rules of 2017 and 2024 is valid; High Court erred in reading down the rule – Appeals by State allowed; Student Writ Petitions dismissed – Admissions already granted under interim orders not to be disturbed – Relief carved out for children of Telangana employees posted outside the State (as per new proviso to Rule 3) [Paras 2-7, 19, 31-36].

Legislative Competence – Rules of 2017 – Source of Power – The 2017 Rules derive authority from the 1983 Admission Act which in turn traces its power to Entry 25 List III read with Articles 245, 246 and 371D – Rules consistent with the Presidential Order; Division Bench erred in holding otherwise [Paras 10-16, 19].

Judicial Review – Limits – Article 226 – Courts cannot expand statutory definitions framed under Presidential Orders – Policy choices in admission rules lie within legislative/executive domain unless manifestly arbitrary, discriminatory or unconstitutional – Hardship alone cannot invalidate rules [Paras 19, 23-25, 30-33].

Residence/Nativity – Validity of Requirement – Longstanding Precedent – Requirement of residence or study within State for local quota upheld in D.P. Joshi, Kumari Vasundara, Pradeep Jain, Anand Madaan, Rajdeep Ghosh – Rules of 2017/2024 fall within same framework – No arbitrariness or Article 14 violation [Paras 20, 24-29].

Relief – Mitigation Clause – Proviso to Rule 3 – State introduced proviso covering children of Telangana employees in Government, All-India Services, Defence, CAPF, and State PSUs posted outside Telangana – Such candidates eligible despite part of studies outside – Appeals allowed subject to this proviso [Paras 34-36].

Promissory Note – Proof of Debt – Presumption under Negotiable Instruments Act – Decretal Amount Restored – The Trial Court decreed the suit for ₹35,29,680 based on a promissory note acknowledging receipt of ₹30,80,000 – The High Court reduced the recoverable amount to ₹22,00,000 on the ground that only this portion was evidenced by bank transactions – Held: Once the execution and contents of the promissory note are not disputed, and the document is upheld, the entire amount therein must be presumed valid under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act – The presumption includes both bank and cash payments – Rejection of the cash component solely due to lack of documentary evidence, in absence of rebuttal by the respondent, was erroneous – Onus to disprove the debt lay on the respondent, who neither appeared nor contested – Trial Court’s decree restored [Paras 3-7].

Maintainability of Second SLP – Dismissal of Earlier SLP Without Leave – Abuse of Process – A second SLP was filed challenging the same High Court judgment after the earlier SLP had been dismissed without granting leave – The petitioner argued that the non-speaking dismissal did not bar a second SLP relying on S. Narahari v. S.R. Kumar – Held: The earlier dismissal constituted finality under Article 136 and re-litigating the same issue through a second SLP was impermissible – The attempt was viewed as an abuse of process and contrary to the principle of finality in litigation – Reference to larger bench in Narahari held not applicable as facts not pari materia – Present SLP dismissed [Paras 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10].

Review Jurisdiction – Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC – No Appeal from Order in Review – Petitioner challenged the High Court’s dismissal of the review petition, but Supreme Court held that under Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC, no appeal lies from such order – Any attempt to challenge the main judgment through this route is an indirect method to re-agitate concluded issues – No relief can be granted where the main order has attained finality – SLP dismissed [Paras 5, 8].

Constitutional Law – Article 141 and Judicial Discipline – Reference to Larger Bench Does Not Stay Binding Precedent – Just because a legal issue has been referred to a larger bench does not permit departure from binding law under Article 141 – Courts must continue to apply prevailing precedents unless overturned – SLP rightly dismissed in line with established precedents [Para 10].

Decision – Second SLP dismissed as not maintainable – Held to be an abuse of process – Dismissal of review petition by High Court upheld – No tagging or reference to larger bench warranted [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Criminal Law – Murder – Acquittal – Sole conviction based on dying declaration – Deceased allegedly assaulted by accused Tarun Sharma and others – Trial court convicted appellant under Section 302 IPC relying upon alleged dying declaration (Exh. P-34) and recovery of knife based on disclosure (Exh. P-24) – High Court affirmed conviction without providing effective hearing to the accused or his counsel – Supreme Court held that the alleged dying declaration was riddled with infirmities and lacked procedural safeguards – Recovery of weapon uncorroborated by forensic evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction set aside – Appellant acquitted [Paras 4, 27, 28, 30, 41, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67].

Fair Trial – Right to Legal Representation – Accused’s counsel absent at hearing before High Court – Appeal decided same day by appointing amicus curiae without granting time to prepare – Supreme Court held this deprived appellant of effective opportunity of hearing – Cited Chaluvegowda v. State, Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam, and Anokhilal v. State of M.P. – Held: Right to legal representation under Article 21 not an empty formality – Amicus must be given sufficient time to prepare – High Court erred in proceeding with hearing without fairness [Paras 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39].

Evidence Law – Hostile Witness – Prosecution’s star witness Amit Bakshi (PW-1), brother of the deceased, turned hostile – Stated he could not identify assailants due to darkness – Testified that deceased Munish Kumar fell unconscious immediately and was never in a position to speak – Supreme Court held testimony of hostile witness cannot be discarded in toto – Corroborated by medical evidence – Court relied on portions of testimony contradicting prosecution’s dying declaration theory [Paras 14, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48].

Dying Declaration – Admissibility – Statement (Exh. P-34) allegedly made by deceased Munish Kumar while undergoing treatment – No doctor who issued fitness certificate (Exh. P-33) was examined – Time of recording not mentioned – Investigating Officer (PW-17) failed to record his own satisfaction as to victim’s fitness – Other medical witnesses (PW-9, PW-10) confirmed deceased was unconscious and not in condition to speak – Held: Dying declaration unreliable and cannot be sole basis for conviction [Paras 21, 24, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63(iv)].

Criminal Procedure – Failure to Examine Material Witness – Doctor who allegedly certified injured’s fitness (Exh. P-33) not identified or examined – No medical records from hospitals (GMCH/PGI) filed – Trial court failed to summon doctor under Section 311 CrPC – Held: Omission fatal to prosecution – Court must act proactively to ensure fair trial [Paras 51, 52, 54].

Circumstantial Evidence – Recovery of Weapon – Knife allegedly recovered based on disclosure by appellant (Exh. P-24) – No blood group detected – No FSL/serological match with deceased – Held: Recovery inconsequential – Cannot establish guilt absent corroboration – Mere recovery not sufficient where main evidence (dying declaration) is discredited [Paras 20, 65].

Infirmities in Prosecution Case – Presence of contradictions – Dying declaration implicates Sanjay and Bittoo – Sanjay not charge-sheeted, Bittoo acquitted – Medical evidence contradicts dying declaration – Witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 to PW-5) turned hostile – Deceased stated to be unconscious throughout – Held: Infirmities grave enough to negate prosecution’s case – Conviction unsustainable [Paras 14, 15, 41, 49, 61, 63, 64, 66].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC set aside – Appellant acquitted – To be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case [Para 67, 68].

Right to Education – Applicability of RTE Act to Minority Institutions – Reconsideration of Pramati – Court records serious doubts about Pramati which exempted all minority institutions (aided/unaided) from the “entirety” of the RTE Act without analysing provisions beyond Section 12(1)(c) – Finds blanket exclusion disproportionate and potentially sub-serviating Article 21A; notes data-based consequences post-Pramati including increased claims to minority status and low representation of disadvantaged children – Reference framed to larger Bench on correctness of Pramati, scope of Article 29(2), and possibility of reading down Section 12(1)(c) rather than wholesale exclusion – Outcome: Questions referred; interim application of RTE preserved for non-minority schools [Paras 70-71, 115-132, 171, 174-177, 184-186, 188-190, 207-210].

Article 21A vs Article 30(1) – Harmonious Construction – No Inherent Conflict – Article 30(1) is not a blanket immunity from regulation; rights must be harmonised with Article 21A which operationalises the foundational right to elementary education through minimum standards – Core RTE norms (infrastructure, teacher qualifications, child safety, curriculum) are regulatory and child-centric and do not “annihilate” minority character – Outcome: Court affirms coexistence and rejects reading Article 30(1) as a trump over Article 21A [Paras 85-92, 133-143, 145-151, 171-174].

Section 12(1)(c), RTE Act – 25% Entry-Level Admissions – Minority Institutions – Reading Down – Section 12(1)(c) furthers social inclusion and common schooling; minority character is not necessarily diluted since admissions under the quota can include disadvantaged/weaker-section children from within the same minority community; reimbursement preserves financial neutrality – Outcome: Instead of blanket inapplicability, Court moots reading down as a reconciliation tool; issue sent to larger Bench [Paras 100-107, 178-183, 185].

Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Mandatory Nature – Statutory Architecture and Rationale – NCTE designated as academic authority under Section 23; 2010 Notification introduced TET as a mandatory component of “minimum qualifications” for Classes I–VIII; 2011 amendment retained TET; 2014 Regulations continued the scheme; NCTE Guidelines (11.02.2011) justify TET for national standards and signalling teacher quality; MHRD clarified no relaxation and fixed 01.04.2019 as last date for in-service compliance – Outcome: TET held a binding minimum qualification, not a mere procedural eligibility [Paras 60-69, 64-66, 167-170, 202-206].

Minimum Qualifications vs Eligibility – TET is a Qualification under Section 23 – Court rejects semantic distinction; TET forms part of minimum qualifications, the acquisition of which renders a candidate eligible; without TET, a teacher is unqualified for appointment/promotion – Outcome: Challenge to TET’s status as “qualification” rejected [Paras 202-206].

In-Service Teachers (Pre-RTE Appointees) – Continuation and Promotion – Transitional Relief under Article 142 – Statutory scheme (first and second provisos to Section 23(2)) envisages time-bound acquisition of minimum qualifications by in-service teachers; failure leads to ineligibility to continue – Outcome: (i) Teachers with <5 years left in service may continue without TET till superannuation but are ineligible for promotion; (ii) Teachers with ≥5 years left must clear TET within 2 years from the judgment date or face separation with terminal benefits as per rules; (iii) For all future appointments/promotions, TET is mandatory [Paras 167-170, 198-201, 214-218].

High Court Judgments Impugned – Divergent Approaches – Supreme Court’s Resolution – Bombay HC (12.12.2017) upheld Maharashtra G.R. mandating TET even for minority schools relying on St. Xavier’s; Madras HC (02.06.2023) mandated TET for non-minority institutions and for promotions but treated minority institutions as exempt per Pramati; Bombay HC (01.04.2019) granted interim protection to minority-school teachers against TET-based termination; Madras HC (08.01.2019) directed approval of appointment in aided minority school without TET relying on Pramati – Outcome: SC doubts Pramati, refers questions; meanwhile, applies RTE/TET to non-minority schools; modifies impugned orders accordingly for in-service teachers; minority-institution appeals governed by reference [Paras 5-13, 14-23, 24-27, 28 (table), 207-215, 219].

Article 29(2) – Relevance to Aided Minority Institutions – Court notes Pramati did not engage with Article 29(2) while declaring RTE inapplicable to aided minority schools; admission non-discrimination mandate bears on Section 12(1)(b) – Outcome: Article 29(2) explicitly flagged as a reference question affecting the Pramati ratio [Paras 141-142, 210(c)].

Regulatory Power and Reasonable Restrictions – Articles 19(6) & 21A – RTE-driven quality norms are reasonable restrictions in public interest; T.M.A. Pai and St. Xavier’s affirm regulations for standards, efficiency, welfare; “right to administer is not a right to maladminister” – Outcome: Regulatory floor under RTE/NCTE is constitutionally legitimate and applies generally, subject to minority identity preservation [Paras 144-151, 176 (extracts), 150].

Procedural Bar – New Grounds in Supreme Court – Tamil Nadu Surplus Staff vs TET – In CA Nos. 6365-6367/2025, State raised TET for first time in SC; ordinarily impermissible; however, since the school is a minority institution, appeals brought within ambit of reference – Outcome: Appeals to be governed by reference order under Para 211 [Paras 9-13, 212-213].

Decision – Reference to larger Bench on Pramati and interrelated questions (scope of RTE vis-à-vis minority institutions, Article 29(2) effect, possibility of reading down Section 12(1)(c)) – Interim: RTE/TET regime applies to all non-minority schools; minority schools’ position subject to reference outcome – TET mandatory for appointments and promotions; Article 142 relief carved out for in-service teachers as specified – Impugned judgments/orders modified/disposed accordingly [Paras 207-211, 214-219].

Property Law – Transfer of Immovable Property – Title Dispute – Appeal against concurrent findings of Trial Court and High Court decreeing plaintiff’s suit for possession, mesne profits, declaration, and injunction – Plaintiff relied upon Agreement to Sell, GPA, Affidavit, Receipt, and Registered Will to claim title – Supreme Court held that such documents do not confer valid title under Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act – Sale of immovable property can only be by registered sale deed – Held: Plaintiff not entitled to relief as no valid conveyance executed – Appeal allowed – Suit dismissed [Paras 11-19, 27-28, 35]

General Power of Attorney – Scope and Legal Effect – GPA relied upon by Plaintiff only authorised management of property, not transfer of ownership – GPA, even if valid, does not transfer title – Held: GPA is an instrument of agency, not a conveyance – No title conferred on Plaintiff through GPA – Power of Attorney is revocable and cannot be used to create proprietary rights [Paras 18-22]

Will – Validity and Proof – Registered Will dated 16.05.1996 propounded by Plaintiff found unproven – Plaintiff failed to examine attesting witnesses as mandated under Section 68 of Evidence Act and Section 63 of Indian Succession Act – Will surrounded by suspicious circumstances, including complete exclusion of three other children without justification – Held: Will not proved in accordance with law – No valid title derived by Plaintiff [Paras 23-27]

Doctrine of Part Performance – Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act – Plaintiff sought protection under doctrine of part performance – Supreme Court held that actual possession is precondition to invoke Section 53A – Plaintiff not in possession at the time of filing suit – Relief under Section 53A not available [Paras 29-31]

Succession – Absence of Valid Transfer or Will – On demise of original owner (father), property devolves upon all Class-I legal heirs – Plaintiff’s claim based on unproven Will and invalid sale documents rejected – Held: Property to be treated as intestate succession among legal heirs [Para 32]

Rights of Bona Fide Purchaser – Defendant No.2 purchased 50% share from Defendant No.1 – Supreme Court protected such share to the extent of Defendant No.1’s right – Held: Rights of Defendant No.2 preserved to the extent of seller’s share – Parties free to assert claims through appropriate legal proceedings [Paras 33-34]

Decision – Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree of High Court and Trial Court set aside – Plaintiff’s suit dismissed – No costs – Rights of Defendant No.2 protected to extent of seller’s share [Para 35]

Criminal Law - Rape of Minor – Conviction under Section 376(2) IPC & Sections 4, 6 POCSO – Trial Court’s Conviction Restored – High Court erred in acquitting accused on grounds of procedural irregularities and alleged inconsistencies – Held: Evidence of victim consistent and corroborated by medical records (pregnancy, abortion); procedural lapses (Section 223/defective charge) did not cause prejudice or failure of justice – High Court judgment unsustainable – Conviction and life sentence restored [Paras 13-23, 25-36, 38].

Age of Victim – Proof – Minor Status Established – Transfer Certificate, testimony of parents, statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and medical report showed victim aged 12-15 years – Defence did not rebut or challenge minority – High Court erred in doubting age determination – Victim entitled to protection under POCSO [Paras 16-18].

Evidence – Testimony of Victim – Sole Basis for Conviction – Consistency of statements before Magistrate, police, and court; corroborated by medical reports of pregnancy and abortion – Absence of DNA test not fatal where identity and acts proved – Victim’s testimony reliable and trustworthy [Paras 14-15, 19-24].

Procedural Irregularity – Section 223 Cr.P.C. – Joint Trial of Two Accused – Even if joinder was technically improper, no prejudice or failure of justice shown – High Court wrongly treated misjoinder as fatal without proof of prejudice – Mere irregularity does not vitiate trial [Paras 29-35].

Defective Charge – Section 215 & 464 Cr.P.C. – Error in mentioning date of offence (02.07.2016 instead of March 2016) – Did not mislead accused or affect fair trial – Accused aware of allegations and time frame – Conviction not invalidated [Paras 25-27].

Standard of Proof – Beyond Reasonable Doubt – Misapplication – High Court erred in elevating minor inconsistencies to reasonable doubt – Principle must not be misused to acquit actual culprits – Doubts must be serious and rational; not trivial inconsistencies [Paras 22-23, 36].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court’s acquittal set aside – Trial Court’s judgment of conviction and concurrent life sentences restored – Respondents directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which Trial Court to secure custody [Paras 38-39].

Motor Vehicles – Motor Vehicle Tax – Scope of ‘Public Place’ – Section 3 of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 – Rule 12A of A.P. Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules, 1963 – Interpretation – Liability to pay tax arises only when motor vehicle is used or kept for use in a public place – Appellant’s vehicles used exclusively within the restricted premises of RINL – Area not accessible to public – Held: Not a ‘public place’ – No tax liability incurred – Appeal allowed.

Motor Vehicle Tax – Use in Restricted Industrial Premises – Section 3 of A.P. Act, 1963 – Exemption Allowed – The appellant operated heavy vehicles solely within the enclosed and access-controlled premises of Visakhapatnam Steel Plant (RINL), which is not a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act – Held: Section 3 imposes tax only on vehicles used or kept for use in a public place – Since the site was not accessible to the general public, tax under the Act was not leviable [Paras 8–10, 28, 45–46, 50].

Interpretation of Rule 12A – Presumption of Use Must Align with Section 3 – No Automatic Liability – Rule 12A creates a deeming fiction of vehicle use unless prior intimation is given – Held: As subordinate legislation, Rule 12A cannot override Section 3 – Where actual use was exclusively in a non-public place, absence of intimation under Rule 12A is irrelevant – The vehicles were not ‘kept for use in a public place’, hence no tax liability arose [Paras 29, 43, 47–48, 50].

Public Place – Meaning under Section 2(34) of Motor Vehicles Act – Premises of RINL Not a Public Place – Appellant’s vehicles operated within a compound guarded by CISF with no public access – Held: ‘Public place’ requires a right of public access – Presence of a government company does not convert private industrial premises into a public place – Reliance on Bolani Ores Ltd. upheld – Decision in Akhil Gujarat Pravasi distinguished as not dealing with ‘public place’ requirement [Paras 28, 31–34, 44–46].

Constitutional Principle – Article 265 – Tax Only by Authority of Law – Literal Interpretation – Held: Taxing statutes must be strictly construed – There can be no presumption or inference of tax liability – Since Section 3 clearly restricts tax to vehicles used or kept for use in a public place, the levy in this case was without authority of law [Paras 36–38, 50].

Decision – Civil Appeal Allowed – Division Bench Set Aside – Judgment of learned Single Judge restored – Appellant not liable to pay motor vehicle tax for the period when its vehicles were confined to non-public premises – Refund of Rs. 22,71,700 ordered – No order as to costs [Para 51].

Service Law – Dismissal from Police Force – Rule 16.2(1) of Punjab Police Rules – Repeated Absence Amounts to Gravest Misconduct – Dismissal Justified - Respondent constable remained repeatedly absent from duty during a short service period of less than seven years – Departmental inquiry initiated for fourth absence and due process followed – Held: Disciplinary authority acted under the first part of Rule 16.2(1), and length of service was not relevant in cases of gravest misconduct – High Court erred in applying second part of Rule 16.2(1) [Paras 25, 27-30, 32-33].

Disciplinary Proceedings – Past Misconduct – No Mandatory Requirement to Include in Show Cause When Not Basis of Punishment – Held: Disciplinary authority referred to past misconduct only to add weight to decision, not as the basis of dismissal – Hence, no violation of principles laid down in K. Manche Gowda’s case – High Court wrongly interfered with punishment [Paras 19, 31-33].

Judicial Review – Limited Scope – Interference with Dismissal in Disciplinary Matters – High Court's Interference Unwarranted – Held: When penalty is imposed for proven gravest misconduct following due process and natural justice, courts should refrain from interference under judicial review unless penalty is shockingly disproportionate – High Court failed to follow this principle [Paras 21-24, 33].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Dismissal Order Restored – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and restored the dismissal of the respondent from service – Held: Departmental action complied with rules and principles of natural justice – No reinstatement or relief due [Para 33].