Contract Law – Specific Performance – Agreement to Sell – Appeal against rejection of specific performance on ground of illegality – Plaintiff-bank entered into agreement to purchase 8 flats to be constructed on a 300 sq. yd. plot for ₹32.07 lakhs – Plaintiff paid ₹28.86 lakhs (about 90%) – Construction not completed – Plaintiff filed suit for specific performance – Trial Court decreed the suit, allowing performance to the extent possible under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act – Division Bench reversed, holding the agreement to be void for being contrary to building laws – Supreme Court upheld Division Bench’s view – Held: Construction of 8 flats was the essential object of the agreement – Since such construction was impermissible under prevailing building bye-laws, agreement was illegal and void – Courts cannot reframe or rewrite contracts to make them lawful – Specific performance rightly denied [Paras 1, 3.1, 5.2, 7.2, 11–13, 14–18, 19–25].

Illegality of Contract – Violation of Building Bye-laws – Agreement contemplated construction of 8–10 flats on 300 sq. yd. plot where only 2.5 units were permissible under 1983 Building Bye-laws – Both Trial Court and High Court found such construction illegal – Trial Court erroneously attempted to enforce the agreement by allowing construction of only 3 flats – Supreme Court held that courts cannot enforce a contract whose object is prohibited by law – Such agreement is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act – Held: Trial Court erred in modifying agreement and granting partial performance – Division Bench rightly reversed [Paras 5.2, 8.1, 8.2, 15–18, 23–25].

Specific Relief – Section 12 of Specific Relief Act – Partial performance – Applicability – Plaintiff invoked Section 12 and expressed willingness to accept modified performance (lesser number of flats) – Trial Court accepted and decreed partial performance – Supreme Court held that Section 12 does not permit enforcement when essential terms (construction of 8 flats) are removed – Construction was central to the contract – Courts cannot enforce only the lawful part if it involves removing core obligations – Such re-writing of contract is impermissible [Paras 6, 7.2, 19–22, 24–25].

Public Authority Conduct – Public Sector Bank – Due Diligence and Legality – Plaintiff being a nationalised bank was expected to act lawfully – Agreement entered into was contrary to law and in contravention of building bye-laws – Court observed that state instrumentalities are expected to avoid camouflage agreements and uphold legality – No equitable relief can be granted to a party engaged in illegal contractual arrangement, even if it is a public authority [Paras 8.2, 27].

Contract Interpretation – Essential Terms – Construction of Flats – Supreme Court emphasized that the core object of the agreement was construction and delivery of 8 flats – Clause 6 of agreement explicitly stated that Plaintiff was interested in acquiring the flats, not merely rights over land – Such construction being legally impermissible, the contract could not subsist – Held: Essential terms cannot be severed or ignored – Agreement not enforceable without its primary object [Paras 11–13, 24].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment of Delhi High Court Division Bench affirmed – Specific performance rightly denied – Plaintiff not entitled to relief under Section 12 – Agreement declared unenforceable – Plaintiff entitled only to refund with interest as per contract – Each party to bear its own costs [Paras 26, 28].

Service Law – Termination – Eligibility Criteria – Vocational Subject Marks – Rules 4 and 21 of Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012 – Termination of teachers on the ground of not securing 40% in Intermediate Examination and invalidity of graduation certificates – Held: Rule 21 governs merit list preparation and not eligibility – Rule 4 prescribes eligibility to appear in Teacher Eligibility Test and contains no bar on inclusion of vocational marks – Marks in vocational subjects, as per marksheet guidelines, are to be added to aggregate for determining overall percentage – Exclusion of such marks erroneous – Appellants were eligible and termination unsustainable [Paras 25–29, 36–37].

Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Termination Without Fresh Notice – Show-cause notices alleged candidates failed to secure 45% marks, but termination based on exclusion of vocational marks reducing percentage below 40% – Held: Finding of guilt on a charge not contained in notice violates natural justice – Department’s action arbitrary and illegal – Termination vitiated [Paras 31–35].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation – Rule 4 v. Rule 21 – Distinct Fields – Rule 4 (Eligibility) applies for determining who may appear in TET – Rule 21 (Merit List) applies post-TET for ranking – Both operate in separate spheres – Department and High Court erred in applying Rule 21 for eligibility determination [Paras 26–28].

Administrative Law – Procedural Fairness – Where an employee successfully rebuts charges in a show-cause notice, authorities cannot alter the basis of termination without issuing a fresh notice – Violation renders order void [Paras 32–34].

Relief – Reinstatement – Continuity of Service – Arrears – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) deemed in continuous service from initial appointment (December 2015) – Entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority benefits – However, period out of service not to count for experience-based promotion – Deceased appellant Surendra Munda’s termination quashed; heirs entitled to full arrears till date of death and eligible for compassionate appointment under scheme, if applicable [Paras 37–42].

Administrative Fairness – Government Conduct – State acted arbitrarily and without due process in terminating teachers despite clear eligibility and valid degrees—Court strongly deprecated such action [Para 38].

Decision: Appeals allowed – Impugned judgments of the Jharkhand High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 83/2019, 332/2021, and 331/2021 set aside – Termination orders dated 07.10.2016 quashed – Appellants (Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom) reinstated with continuity and arrears – Legal heirs of deceased appellant (Surendra Munda) entitled to arrears till date of death and consideration for compassionate appointment – Compliance directed within three months.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Dishonour of Cheque – Complaint Against Trustee Without Trust as Party – Maintainability – Sections 138, 141, NI Act – Question whether complaint under NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/Trustee of a Trust without arraying the Trust as an accused – Held: A Trust is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued – It is an obligation, not an entity – Trustees alone are owners of trust property and must maintain and defend suits – Complaint maintainable directly against the Trustee who issued the cheque – No requirement to implead the Trust [Paras 23–29, 40–41].

Trusts Act – Legal Status of a Trust – Sections 3 and 13 – Trust lacks independent legal personality – Operates only through Trustees – Obligation to maintain and defend suits lies on Trustees, not the Trust – Trust cannot be equated with a “company” or “association of individuals” within the meaning of Section 141 NI Act – Trustees are answerable for acts done on behalf of Trust [Paras 22–27].

Vicarious Liability – Signatory of Dishonoured Cheque – Section 141 NI Act – Signatory of dishonoured cheque is directly responsible for the act and covered under Section 141(2) – No specific averment necessary regarding responsibility where accused is signatory or holds position analogous to Managing Director – Principle affirmed per SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 [Paras 17–20].

Juristic Person – Trust v. Company – Distinction – A Trust cannot be treated as equivalent to a company or corporate body for the purposes of NI Act – Trustees are liable in their individual capacities – Contrary High Court rulings equating Trusts with companies are erroneous and overruled [Paras 34–38].

Precedent – Co-equal Benches – Judicial Discipline – Later coordinate Benches cannot disregard earlier decisions of equal strength – If disagreement exists, reference must be made to larger Bench – Later Kerala HC ruling in Prana Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Kerala (2023) held incorrect for ignoring binding coordinate decision in K.P. Shibu v. State of Kerala (2019) – Restatement of law from National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680; Union Territory of Ladakh v. J&K National Conference, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1140 [Paras 32–33, 42–44].

Pending Reference – Effect of Larger Bench Referral – Though Pratibha Pratisthan v. Canara Bank, (2017) 3 SCC 712 is under reference to a Larger Bench (Tara Bai Desai Charitable Ophthalmic Trust Hospital v. Supreme Elevators India (P) Ltd., (2025) 3 SCC 80), it continues to hold the field till the Larger Bench decides otherwise – High Courts must follow prevailing law unless directed to await reference outcome [Paras 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – High Court’s order quashing complaint under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside – Complaint restored against Trustee who issued cheque – Held: A Trust has no separate juristic existence; proceedings under NI Act maintainable directly against the Trustee/Chairman who signed the cheque. Directions issued for expeditious trial.

Juvenile Justice – Claim of Juvenility – Retrospective Application – Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000 – Petitioner convicted for murder committed in 1981 when he was aged 12 years and 5 months – Sessions Court had extended benefit under the Children’s Act, 1960 and sent him to a children’s home – His conviction restored by Supreme Court in 2009 after High Court acquittal – Petitioner re-arrested in 2022 and in custody for more than 3 years and 10 months – Held: By virtue of Section 7-A JJ Act, 2000, the claim of juvenility can be raised at any stage even after final disposal – Petitioner entitled to benefit of the 2000 Act as per Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan – Detention beyond 3 years is contrary to Section 15(1)(g) and violative of Article 21 [Paras 3, 9–13].

Children’s Act, 1960 – Section 24 – Joint Trial of Child and Adult Accused – No justification shown by the State for breach of Section 24 which prohibits joint trial of a child with non-children – Court notes that legislative safeguards under the Children’s Act were ignored by the trial court [Para 8].

Juvenile Justice – Period of Detention – Illegal Custody – Once the petitioner is found to have been a juvenile on the date of offence, continued incarceration beyond three years amounts to deprivation of liberty not in accordance with procedure established by law – Detention beyond permissible period illegal [Paras 8, 13].

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Protection of Personal Liberty – Continued custody of a person entitled to juvenile justice protection is unconstitutional – Breach of fundamental right to life and liberty warrants immediate release [Para 13].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Petitioner directed to be released immediately if not required in any other case – Jail authorities to act on downloaded copy of judgment without insisting on certified copy [Paras 14–16].

Constitution of India – Article 233 – Appointment of District Judges – Eligibility – In-service Judicial Officers – Direct Recruitment – Interpretation of Clause (1) and (2) – Held: Both clauses form a complete code – Article 233(1) covers appointments, postings and promotions – Article 233(2) lays down qualification only for advocates/pleaders not in service – Judicial officers already in service are governed by Article 233(1) – No constitutional bar against their participation in direct recruitment – Textual and contextual reading must give effect to both clauses without rendering any part redundant [Paras 118–126].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Appointments – Article 233 – Eligibility of In-service Judicial Officers – Held: No constitutional bar against judicial officers competing in direct recruitment process for District Judges – Judicial officers having combined experience of seven years as advocate and judicial officer entitled to apply – Level playing field to be maintained between advocates and in-service candidates – Minimum age 35 years for both categories – Appointment to be based on merit through written examination and viva voce – No weightage to in-service candidates – Recruitment to Higher Judicial Service to continue in 50:25:25 ratio as per All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2010) 15 SCC 170 [Paras 155–161, 157–159, 172(i)–(v)].

Constitutional Law – Article 233(2) – Bar Quota – Reservation – Interpretation – The 25% direct recruitment under Article 233(2) is not an exclusive quota for advocates – Clause (2) only prescribes qualification for advocates/pleaders not in service – Reading it as a reservation for advocates would violate Article 14 and constitutional equality – Both advocates and judicial officers with requisite experience entitled to compete [Paras 164, 19–23 per Sundresh, J.].

Judicial Service – Independence of Judiciary – Article 50 – Separation of Powers – Held: Judicial officers are not “employees” of the State – They discharge sovereign judicial functions – To debar them from open competition would offend the constitutional principle of independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers – Recruitment and control over the judiciary is insulated from legislative and executive interference – Reliance placed on State of Bihar v. Bal Mukund Sah, (2000) 4 SCC 640, and Registrar (Admn.), Orissa High Court v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy, (1999) 7 SCC 725 [Paras 8–13, 33–35 per Sundresh, J.].

Constitutional Law – Interpretation – Constitutional Silence – Doctrine Explained – Absence of express qualification for in-service candidates under Article 233(2) is a deliberate constitutional silence – Framers left it to the discretion of High Courts and Governors under Articles 233–235 – Such silence is not a gap but an intentional flexibility to preserve the independence and adaptability of the judiciary – Principle discussed in Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 [Paras 14–16 per Sundresh, J.].

Interpretation of Constitution – Textual and Contextual Reading – Harmonious construction required – Interpretation must give meaning to every word – Article 233(2) must be read so as not to render the words “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” redundant – Applying Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273, and RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co., (1987) 1 SCC 424 [Paras 114–125].

Constitutional Law – Equality Before Law – Article 14 – Exclusion of Judicial Officers from Direct Recruitment – Held: Such exclusion would amount to unconstitutional classification and deny equal opportunity – Would also amount to reservation in favour of advocates – Broader competition enhances merit and efficiency in judiciary [Paras 19–23, 153–155].

Judiciary – Efficiency and Merit – Object of Recruitment – Purpose of direct recruitment is to secure best talent for judicial service – Open competition between advocates and in-service judges fosters excellence and efficiency – Observations in Leela Dhar v. State of Rajasthan, (1981) 4 SCC 159, and Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, (2013) 4 SCC 540, relied upon [Paras 149–151].

Administrative Law – Shetty Commission Recommendations – Accepted – Commission found that allowing in-service judges to compete would promote efficiency, improve discipline and remove frustration – Recommended amendment to Article 233 to formalise such eligibility – Recommendations relied upon to interpret Article 233 in a progressive manner [Paras 128–134].

Professional Ethics – Rule 49, Bar Council of India Rules – Enrollment and Suspension – An advocate who joins judicial service only suspends right to practice; remains on Bar Roll – May resume practice after retirement – Such suspended status does not erase prior practice experience – Thus, judicial officers with pre-service Bar practice fulfil eligibility under Article 233(2) [Paras 140–145].

Advocates Act, 1961 – Section 29, 30, 33 read with BCI Rules – Continuous Experience – Candidate must have continuous seven years’ experience either as advocate or judicial officer, or combined, as on date of application – Discontinuous or interrupted practice not sufficient – Break in practice cannot be condoned [Paras 162–163].

Constitutional Law – Doctrine of Stare Decisis – Reconsideration of Long-standing View – Held: Doctrine not inflexible – Earlier rulings in Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Allahabad (1985) 1 SCC 225, and Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020) 7 SCC 401 misapplied Constitution Bench decisions in Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 123, and Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., 1966 SCC OnLine SC 35 – Earlier interpretation perpetuated injustice to judicial officers – Correct view restored – Satya Narain Singh and Dheeraj Mor expressly overruled [Paras 165–169, 172(vi)].

Constitutional Law – Judicial Review – Prospective Application – New interpretation to operate prospectively – Past appointments and completed selections not disturbed, except where protected by interim orders [Para 170].

Appointment Rules – Directions – All existing State rules inconsistent with present interpretation quashed – States directed to frame or amend recruitment rules in consultation with High Courts within three months – Uniform criteria to include combined seven-year experience, minimum age 35, and common competitive examination for advocates and judicial officers [Paras 174–175].

Separate Opinion – Per M.M. Sundresh, J. – Concurred with CJI – Emphasised that Article 233(1) itself covers both promotion and direct recruitment – Clause (2) provides qualification only for advocates – Constitutional silence permits High Court to fix eligibility for in-service candidates – Judicial independence and Article 14 mandate equal opportunity – Interpreting Article 233 to exclude in-service judges would violate basic structure and reduce judicial quality – Advocated open competition to secure excellence in judiciary [Paras 1–23].

Decision – Appeal allowed – Questions answered – In-service judicial officers with combined experience of seven years eligible to compete in direct recruitment for District Judges – Satya Narain Singh (1985) and Dheeraj Mor (2020) overruled – Directions issued to States and High Courts for rule amendment – Prospective application – No retrospective disturbance of existing appointments [Paras 172–175].

Criminal Law – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Anticipatory Bail – Bar under Section 18 – Applicability to Accused Added under Section 319 CrPC – Jurisdiction of High Court – Respondent added as accused under Section 319 CrPC in case involving offence punishable under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act – High Court granted anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC – Held: Once summoned under Section 319 CrPC, the respondent assumes status of an accused for all offences in the case, including those under the 1989 Act – Bar under Section 18 on consideration of anticipatory bail applies – High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain or grant anticipatory bail in absence of a finding that no prima facie case under the 1989 Act was made out – Order granting anticipatory bail unsustainable [Paras 4–10].

Criminal Procedure – Section 319 CrPC – Effect of Summoning Order – Scope – Where the order summoning the accused under Section 319 CrPC was not under challenge before the High Court, its validity could not be tested incidentally in anticipatory bail proceedings – High Court erred in overlooking the binding nature of the summoning order [Paras 5, 10].

Judicial Review – Scope under Section 438 CrPC – Limits in presence of Statutory Bar – In offences under the SC/ST Act, anticipatory bail is impermissible unless the Court first records a finding that no prima facie case under the Act exists – Mere allegations of false implication insufficient to dilute the statutory bar [Paras 7, 10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail set aside – Respondent at liberty to appear before Trial Court and seek regular bail, to be considered expeditiously in accordance with law [Paras 10–11].

Succession Law – Scheduled Tribes – Applicability of Hindu Succession Act – High Court's direction to extend inheritance rights under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to daughters in tribal areas of Himachal Pradesh – Held: Impermissible in law in absence of Central Government notification under Section 2(2) of the Act – Tribes remain governed by customary law unless notified – High Court's sweeping declaration lacked jurisdiction and was beyond scope of dispute – Direction expunged [Paras 3-6]

Tribal Custom – Judicial Overreach – Hindu Succession Act expressly excluded Scheduled Tribes unless notified otherwise – High Court's pronouncement was uncalled for as issue neither directly nor substantially involved in the appeal – Supreme Court reiterates settled position in Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 5 SCC 125, and State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 – Held: Law must evolve, but evolution must come via legislative process, not judicial fiat [Paras 4-5]

Article 342 – Constitutional Scheme – Notification Requirement – Scheduled Tribe status and de-notification must flow from Presidential notification – No such notification shown in present case – Courts cannot presume applicability of personal laws where exclusion is legislatively preserved [Paras 4]

Obiter Dicta – Binding Nature – High Court’s observations in paragraph 63 not founded on pleadings or issues framed – Held: Directions not sustainable – Supreme Court orders expunction of Paragraph 63 from the High Court judgment [Paras 5-6]

Decision: Appeal allowed in part – Direction in paragraph 63 of the impugned judgment dated 23.06.2015 expunged – No costs – Pending applications also disposed of.

Criminal Law – Rape and Murder of Minor – Conviction Set Aside – Appellant was convicted and sentenced to death for kidnapping, raping, and murdering a 7-year-old girl – Trial court’s conviction confirmed by the High Court – Supreme Court set aside conviction due to glaring lapses in investigation, procedural violations, and unreliability of circumstantial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Acquittal granted [Paras 1–85]

Fair Trial – Violation of Right to Counsel – Appellant was unrepresented when charges were framed – Legal aid counsel appointed only on 13.12.2017, four days before commencement of prosecution evidence – Trial completed within one and a half months – No real opportunity to prepare defence – Trial court ignored mandate under Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 207 CrPC – Held: Trial conducted in gross violation of fair trial rights [Paras 34–38]

Sentencing – Death Penalty – Procedure Violated – Trial court sentenced appellant to death on same day as conviction without proper sentencing hearing – No psychological assessment, no jail conduct report, no analysis of aggravating or mitigating circumstances – High Court mechanically affirmed death penalty – Held: Sentencing process legally flawed and cannot be sustained [Paras 39–40]

Circumstantial Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Sole witness Murugan (PW-3) claimed he saw appellant with victim before disappearance – Did not disclose this fact to victim’s parents or police – Only mentioned to second IO nearly three months later – Held: Witness’s conduct unnatural and testimony unreliable – Theory of last seen together appears concocted and planted [Paras 44–46, 73]

CCTV Evidence – Alleged Suspicious Movement – CCTV footage from nearby temple allegedly captured appellant carrying a bag on a bike – Footage never collected or exhibited – Contradictions between PW-1 and PW-6 regarding who saw it and when – IO (PW-29) silent on CCTV – Held: CCTV theory appears fictional – Adverse inference drawn against prosecution for withholding evidence [Paras 47–51, 66]

Confessional Statement – Disclosure and Recovery – Confession made allegedly in public park in presence of officials – Witness (PW-7) admitted police told her contents of confession before it was recorded – Complainant (PW-1) knew exact details of the crime even before confession – Held: Confession appears scripted and fabricated – Recovery of body and articles not in consequence of voluntary disclosure – Not admissible under Section 27 of Evidence Act [Paras 52–60]

Evidence – Confession Illegally Recorded – IO allowed to narrate entire confession in court, including details of sexual assault and murder – Held: Grossly illegal – Only discovery-related portions are admissible – Complete reproduction of confession violates Section 25 of Evidence Act – Highly prejudicial to accused [Paras 61–63]

Recovery – Undergarments and Ornaments – Recovery of victim’s undergarments and jewellery allegedly at appellant’s instance – No mention of blue bag in initial mahazar – No sealing of recovered articles – No Test Identification Parade – Held: Recoveries appear planted – No evidentiary value [Paras 55–56, 65]

Forensic Evidence – Chain of Custody Broken – No record of sealing, safe custody or transmission of samples – Malkhana In-charge not examined – Forensic officer (PW-28) admitted semen survives only 48 hours, but samples collected much later – Held: DNA evidence unreliable due to compromised integrity of samples – Cannot be relied upon [Paras 69–71, 75–79]

Investigation – Serious Procedural Flaws – IO failed to search appellant’s flat promptly – No attempt to verify appellant’s office attendance records – No identification parade conducted – No call detail records procured – Contradictions in timing of arrest and confession – Held: Investigation not fair or impartial – Evidence tainted [Paras 54, 66, 72–74]

Presumption under Section 114 Evidence Act – Not Attracted – Jewellery allegedly belonging to victim recovered from appellant – No proper identification process – Recovery itself suspicious – Held: No presumption can arise under Section 114 due to doubtful recoveries [Paras 55, 56]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments of Trial Court and High Court set aside – Conviction and death sentence of appellant quashed – Appellant acquitted – Directed to be released from custody forthwith if not wanted in any other case [Paras 83–85]

Town Planning – OSR Charges – Sub-division prior to 1975 proved by registered gifts and separate pattas – Site area 2229 sq. m. squarely within Annexure XX “first 3000 sq. m. – Nil” slab – Demand set aside and refund with 8% interest upheld – No interference under Article 136 with concurrent, non-perverse findings [Paras 14–17, 20–21].

Open Space Reservation (OSR) – Basis of Computation – Parent Tract vs. Independent Parcel – CMDA’s attempt to club respondent’s parcel with erstwhile 21-ground estate rejected – Documentary chain (1949 partition; 1972 & 1973 gift deeds; separate pattas; 1984 gift) shows long-standing, identifiable holding prior to 05.08.1975 – Fresh sub-division plea in 2008 termed ipse dixit and unsupported [Paras 14–16].

Revenue Records & Registered Instruments – Evidentiary Value – Separate pattas, though not title per se, corroborate possession/demarcation—read with unimpeached registered deeds, they establish a separate holding; once produced, burden shifts to authority to dislodge pre-1975 recognition—no contrary material produced [Para 15–16].

Regulatory Exemption – Annexure XX – “For the first 3000 sq. m. — Nil” – Respondent’s plot being 2229 sq. m. entitled to full exemption—Notional recombination with parent estate impermissible—Text of regulation cannot be defeated by retrospective enlargement of liability [Para 17].

Layouts vs. Individual Development – No layout formation by respondent—Provisions aimed at layout promoters inapplicable—Hospital construction on individual site cannot trigger layout-based OSR levy [Para 18].

Appellate Review – Article 136 – Interference confined to manifest illegality/perversity—Concurrent findings of Single Judge and Division Bench, resting on public documents and proper appreciation of evidence, warrant no interference [Para 20].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – High Court’s direction to refund ₹1,64,50,000/– with 8% p.a. interest affirmed – Payment to be made within six weeks – No order as to costs – All pending applications disposed of [Para 21].