Facts:

The petitioner, R. Balakrishna Pillai, was a former Minister for Electricity in the Government of Kerala and an elected member of the Legislative Assembly or Parliament for over 30 years.

He was convicted under various sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

The charges against the petitioner related to the sale of electricity from Kerala to Karnataka, benefiting a private company in Karnataka.

The petitioner initially filed an application requesting that the appeal be heard by a different bench in the High Court of Kerala due to concerns about a judge's previous involvement in a commission of inquiry.

Later, the petitioner changed his request and sought to transfer the appeal to the High Court of Karnataka, alleging that a fair trial was not possible in Kerala due to adverse publicity and political influence.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's request for transferring the appeal to the High Court of Karnataka is justified.

Whether there exists a reasonable apprehension that the petitioner would not receive fair justice in the High Court of Kerala.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's request for transfer, stating that it was based on belated claims and lacked justification. The Court emphasized that the judiciary in India is independent and unaffected by publicity or political influence.

The Court also rejected the argument that a judge's prior involvement as an advocate in a commission of inquiry would lead to bias, noting that such a connection does not necessarily imply bias.

The Chief Justice's failure to pass an order on the petitioner's representation was considered irrelevant in a criminal appeal.

The Court criticized the practice of advocates withdrawing their appearances on the date of a hearing to secure adjournments and emphasized that issuing a bailable warrant in such cases was justified.

The Court concluded that there was no reasonable apprehension that the petitioner would not receive fair justice in the High Court of Kerala and, therefore, dismissed the transfer petition.

Facts:

This case involves three appeals against the judgment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh, dated July 17, 1995. The appellants, including the Electricity Employment Union, had filed applications before the Tribunal, which were disposed of jointly as they raised similar questions of fact and law. The Tribunal had dismissed all three applications, leading to these appeals.

Issues:

The allocation of employees of the former Punjab State Electricity Board among the successor states and Union Territories as per the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966.

Held:

The court held that the allocation of the services of the employees of the erstwhile Punjab State Electricity Board should be governed by Section 67(3) of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. It affirmed the decisions of the committee regarding the allocation of staff and the continuation of the appellants' services on deputation to the Punjab State Electricity Board and under the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The court rejected the arguments that the allocation should be done under Section 82 or that the employees should be treated as persons serving in connection with the affairs of the erstwhile State of Punjab under Section 82.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, and each party was directed to bear its own costs.

Facts:

The case dealt with industrial pollution in Delhi and the categorization of industries under the Master Plan of 1990. Industries in category - H were required to close down or relocate within three years of the Master Plan coming into effect. Brick-kilns were initially not categorized as category - H industries.

Issues:

Whether the owners of the land on which brick-kilns were situated had been provided with an opportunity to be heard before the order of closure and relocation was passed.

Whether agricultural land, on which brick-kilns were situated, could be treated the same way as industrial land for the purpose of surrendering land and providing extra F.A.R.

Held:

These applications were filed by the erstwhile brick-kiln owners seeking the modification of earlier orders. The applicants wanted the direction to surrender land without compensation to be deleted.

The Court had earlier dealt with industrial pollution in Delhi and categorization under the Master Plan of 1990. Category - H industries were required to close or relocate. An order dated 10th May 1996 dealt with hazardous industries and required surrender of land with compensation and extra F.A.R.

Brick-kilns were initially not categorized as category - H industries but were later classified as such after a report from the Delhi Pollution Control Committee.

Landowners on whose land brick-kilns were situated were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard, violating principles of natural justice.

Brick-kilns were on agricultural land with different construction rules compared to industrial land. The situation of brick-kilns was not identical to other category - H industries.

Applications were allowed, and it was clarified that landowners would not be obliged to surrender land, especially as agricultural land had different restrictions on construction. The order of 26th November 1996 was modified.

This order did not apply to brick-kiln owners who had already benefited from the earlier order of 26th November 1996. Land would revert to the original owner.

Facts:

The case involves the abduction and murder of Mahesh Kumar Aggarwal in Calcutta. Mahesh was abducted twice by the accused, initially from his sister's apartment and later from another location. Witnesses testified to the threats made by the accused during the abductions. Mahesh's body was found with multiple injuries, and a post-mortem examination confirmed murder.

Issues:

Did the accused abduct Mahesh with the intent to murder him?

Is there sufficient evidence to establish the identity of the deceased and the cause of death?

Should the accused be convicted of murder under Section 364/34 IPC?

Held:

The court found that the accused had abducted Mahesh with the intent to murder him based on witness testimony and the circumstances of the case.

The court rejected the defense's arguments regarding the identity of the deceased and the cause of death, concluding that there was overwhelming evidence to establish both.

The court convicted the accused of murder under Section 364/34 IPC and imposed life sentences, running concurrently with their existing sentences for abduction.

Facts:

The case involved two appeals by Aligarh Muslim University against Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan and Mr. Murshad Hussain Khan. The university terminated their services due to alleged unauthorized absence. The individuals had sought extensions of their leave, but the university had limitations on further extensions. Mr. Khan had entered into a contract in Libya while on leave, and the university warned him that no further extensions would be granted.

Issues:

Determination of the applicable rules for unauthorized absence.

Interpretation of specific sections and rules regarding leave and service.

Whether the cases of Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan and Mr. Murshad Hussain Khan fall under Rule 5(8)(i) or Rule 5(8)(ii).

Whether the absence of a show cause notice under Rule 5(8)(i) violated the principles of natural justice.

Whether prejudice was caused by the absence of a notice and if it would have made any difference.

Application of exceptions to the rule that breach of natural justice must be accompanied by prejudice.

Held:

The Court decided as follows:

Rule 5(8)(i) applied to cases of absence for less than 5 years, while Rule 10(C)(ii) applied to absences exceeding 5 years.

In both cases, the total absence did not exceed 5 years, making Rule 5(8)(i) applicable.

In Mr. Murshad Hussain Khan's case, a notice had been issued, and his termination was upheld. However, the judgment in Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan's case, where no notice was given, was set aside on this ground.

The absence of a notice did not prejudice Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan as the university had clearly informed him that no further extension would be granted due to his job commitment in Libya.

In cases where only one conclusion is possible based on admitted or indisputable facts, no prejudice is caused even if no notice is issued.

Therefore, the absence of a notice did not affect Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan's case, and his appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The National Insurance Company Ltd. issued an insurance policy for a bus under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was valid from October 28, 1988, to October 27, 1989.

An accident involving the bus occurred on September 4, 1989, after the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 came into force on July 1, 1989.

The insurance company argued that its liability should be limited to the terms of the policy issued under the old act, which capped the liability at Rs. 15,000 per passenger.

Issues:

Whether the new Motor Vehicles Act of 1988, which came into force after the accident but during the policy period, would affect the insurance company's liability.

Held:

The proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 147 of the new Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 does not limit the liability of the insurance company to the amount mentioned in the old policy. It merely indicates the span of validity of the existing policy under the old act for a period of four months or until its expiry.

The liability of the insurance company would be governed by the new act for accidents occurring during the policy period that extended beyond the commencement of the new act.

In this specific case, since the accident occurred after the commencement of the new act but during the policy period, the insurance company's liability was not limited to the amount specified in the old policy but was determined under the new act.

The court upheld the High Court's decision that the insurance company was liable for the full amount of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

Facts:

The petitioner, who was a minor at the time of his mother's death, applied for compassionate appointment after her passing. However, his application was rejected on the grounds of being time-barred. Subsequently, he filed a fresh application, which was also rejected for the same reason. The petitioner appealed to the High Court, where his petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge, and this decision was affirmed by a Division Bench. The petitioner then filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the petitioner's application for compassionate appointment due to delay was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the purpose of compassionate appointment is to provide immediate relief to the family of a deceased employee facing a sudden crisis due to the loss of the breadwinner. The Court noted that when the petitioner initially applied in 1988, he was a minor and thus ineligible for appointment, a fact acknowledged by the petitioner. The Court emphasized that vacancies cannot be reserved until the petitioner becomes an adult after several years, unless specific provisions exist for such reservations. Consequently, the Court disagreed with the earlier judgment of the Patna High Court and upheld the rejection of the petitioner's application.

Decision: The Special Leave Petition (SLP) was dismissed, and the case was closed.

Facts:

Biennial elections for the Bihar Legislative Council were held in April 1996, and Nawal Kishore Yadav was declared elected. Shyamdeo Prasad Singh, the appellant, filed an election petition, alleging that the inclusion of ineligible persons as electors in the electoral roll and the improper reception of votes by such illegal electors had materially affected the election's result.

Issues:

Whether the inclusion of ineligible persons in the electoral roll could be a valid ground for setting aside an election.

Held:

Inclusion of persons in the electoral roll by the authorized authority, even if they were not qualified to be enrolled, cannot be a ground for setting aside an election of a returned candidate under s.100(1)(d)(iii) or (iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

A person enrolled in the electoral list has the entitlement to cast a vote unless disqualified under s.62(2) to (5) of the 1951 Act.

A person enrolled in the electoral roll cannot be excluded from exercising their right to cast a vote solely on the grounds that they did not meet the eligibility requirements specified in s.19 or s.27(5) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

Decision: The court held that the inclusion of individuals in the electoral roll, even if they did not meet the eligibility requirements, could not be considered valid grounds for setting aside an election. Such individuals could only be disqualified if they were specifically covered by the disqualifications outlined in the relevant provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Facts:

The Supreme Court had previously dismissed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) and held that landowners could seek exemptions under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, despite the issuance of a vesting order.

The question arose whether an owner could seek exemption if possession had not been taken pursuant to the vesting order, based on a Government Order (G.O.) issued by the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Issues:

The main issue before the court was whether, in cases where possession had not been taken following a vesting order, landowners had the right to seek exemption from the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, under Section 20 or Section 10, based on a G.O. issued by the Government.

Held :

The Division Bench of the High Court explained that the question of the retrospectivity of the exemption order does not arise, especially if proceedings under Chapter III of the Act are still pending. The exemption could be granted even after vesting, as previously upheld by the Supreme Court.

The Court fully endorsed the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court that exemptions granted under such circumstances would apply to any excess land for which the proceedings under Chapter III had not yet been concluded.

The Court clarified that it was not deciding a situation where possession of the land had already been taken over and where third-party rights were involved.

With the above clarification, the application for clarification was disposed of.