Facts:

The appellant, M/S. Jay Bharat Credit and Investment Co. Ltd., was engaged in hire-purchase agreements, primarily related to vehicles. These agreements involved an initial premium payment and subsequent installments, with an option for the hirer to purchase the vehicle at a nominal amount upon completion of payments. The sales tax authorities concluded that these transactions were subject to sales tax on the consolidated proceeds.

Issues:

Whether hire-purchase transactions were liable to sales tax on the consolidated proceeds.

Held:

The appellants contended that after the 1959 amendment to the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, sales tax could only be levied on the price of the vehicle when the hirer exercised the option to purchase, excluding hire charges from the taxable amount. They argued that hire-purchase agreements were not strictly sales as defined in the Sale of Goods Act.

The court noted that hire-purchase agreements had characteristics of both a contract of bailment and an element of sale, specifically the option to purchase. The court referred to its earlier decision in Instalment Supply (P.) Ltd. vs. The Union of India, where it upheld the validity of Explanation I and stated that a legal fiction had been introduced into the concept of sale. Thus, hire-purchase transactions could be considered sales for the purpose of sales tax.

The court rejected the argument that such taxation was discriminatory, citing the Central Sales Tax Act's similar definition, ensuring consistent taxation across India.

The court clarified that after the 1959 amendment, sales tax could be levied on the sale price of the vehicle when the hirer exercised the option to purchase, excluding the hire charges from the taxable amount.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The appellants filed a suit for partition, claiming a share of the property and disputing the execution of a Gift Deed (Exhibit B-1) and a Settlement Deed (Exhibit B-2). The trial court initially dismissed the suit, which was subsequently remanded by the Appellate Court for further determination. After remand, the trial court decreed the suit, but the Appellate Court allowed the appeal. The High Court held that the issue of custom became irrelevant under the Indian Succession Act, granting daughters the right to succeed. The central issue was the admissibility of Exhibit B-1 under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was correct in admitting Exhibit B-1 as evidence in light of the proviso to Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Whether there was a specific denial of the execution of Exhibit B-1?

Held:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's interpretation. It held that:

The denial of execution of Exhibit B-1 by the plaintiff was clear and specific in the pleadings, as it alleged that the defendants had forged their father's signature.

The proviso to Section 68 did not apply since there was a specific denial by the plaintiff.

Compliance with Section 68 was necessary, and since none of the two attesting witnesses had been produced, Exhibit B-1 could not be admitted as evidence.

Consequently, the execution of the Gift Deed (Exhibit B-1) was not proved.

The appellant's claim to a 2/5th share of Schedule A property succeeded, and the High Court's order was set aside. Costs were imposed on the parties.

Facts:

The appellant, Sarabjit Singh, appealed against the High Court's decision.

The High Court had applied guidelines adopted by the State which were not in effect at the time of the original DPC meeting.

There were changes in eligibility criteria for promotion.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly applied the guidelines.

Which guidelines were applicable for the DPC's decision.

Held:

The Central guidelines adopted by the State did not apply to the DPC meeting held on 16.4.99, as the circular adopting these guidelines came into effect later.

The guidelines dated 28.6.61 were applicable, specifying that for three posts, five names should be considered.

The DPC's decision to select three candidates from the first five names was consistent with the guidelines.

The writ petitioner, Ex. Major B.D. Gupta, was not considered for promotion because he was the sixth candidate, and there was no obligation to consider his case.

The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the promotions of the respondents were upheld.

Facts:

The case involved the rape of a five-year-old girl by the respondent on January 4, 1985.

The trial court convicted the respondent under Section 376 IPC and sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment (RI) and imposed a fine of Rs. 10.

The respondent appealed the conviction and sentence to the High Court, which upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to 5 years RI, while maintaining the fine.

The State filed an appeal against the reduction of the sentence by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in reducing the sentence from 10 years RI to 5 years RI, given that the victim was a child below 12 years of age, and the law mandated a minimum sentence of not less than 10 years RI for such cases.

Whether there were "adequate and special reasons" provided by the High Court for reducing the sentence.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the respondent for the offense under Section 376 IPC.

The Court emphasized that it is the duty of the sentencing court to consider all relevant facts and circumstances when determining the sentence and impose a punishment commensurate with the gravity of the offense.

The Court highlighted the sensitivity required when dealing with cases involving crimes against women and children.

The High Court reduced the sentence without providing "special or adequate reasons" for doing so, and the Court found no extenuating or mitigating circumstances to justify a lesser sentence.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order reducing the sentence and reinstated the original sentence of 10 years RI imposed by the trial court.

The Court rejected the argument that the time elapsed since the offense and the possibility of the victim and the respondent getting married and settling in life justified imposing a fine instead of a sentence, emphasizing that these factors could be considered by executive or constitutional authorities but should not override the legislative mandate for the minimum sentence.

Facts:

The appellant, A.P. State Financial Corporation, provided loans to two companies in liquidation, M/S Nagarjuna Paper Mills and M/S Chandra Pharmaceuticals Limited.

The appellant invoked Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, to recover its dues from these companies.

The High Court granted permission to the appellant to stay outside the liquidation proceedings but imposed specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the conditions imposed by the High Court on the appellant were lawful, considering the conflicting provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, and the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951?

Held:

The conflicting provisions are Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, and Section 529A of the Companies Act, both containing non-obstante clauses.

The proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 529 and Section 529A were inserted by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1985, making them subsequent enactments.

As per the general rule of interpretation, when non-obstante clauses in different statutes conflict, the subsequent enactment prevails.

Therefore, the non-obstante clause in Section 529A of the Companies Act prevails over the one in Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951.

The statutory right of the Financial Corporation to sell the property of a defaulting concern under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, must be exercised with the rights of pari passu charge in favor of the workmen created by the proviso to Section 529 of the Companies Act.

Decision: The imposition of conditions by the High Court was lawful and necessary to protect the rights of workmen in accordance with the amended provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The appeals were dismissed, and costs were imposed on the parties.

Facts:

The case involved multiple appeals related to the taxation of hotel businesses and their ancillary operations. The primary issue was whether the ancillary operations, such as food preparation, in a hotel could be considered industrial undertakings and qualify for tax benefits.

Issues:

Whether activities like food preparation in a hotel could be classified as industrial undertakings.

Whether the hotel business should be treated as a trading activity or an industrial activity for tax purposes.

Whether the specific provisions of Section 80J and Section 32A of the Income Tax Act applied to the hotel industry.

Held:

The Court held that the hotel business, such as running a hotel, is primarily a trading activity and not an industrial undertaking. The term "manufacture" in the context of the tax provisions referred to the production of new articles or creating commercially distinct items. Processing of raw food materials for consumption did not qualify as manufacturing or production.

The Court emphasized that different provisions of the tax law apply to trading activities and industrial activities. It pointed out that specific provisions exist for granting tax benefits to industrial undertakings, and these should not be extended to trading activities like running a hotel.

Facts:

The criminal complaint was filed under Section 5(4) read with Sections 5(2) & (3) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923, against the petitioner in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, by the Union of India through the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, Anti-Corruption Unit, New Delhi. The appellant filed an application under Section 245 of the CrPC for discharge on the grounds that the prosecution order lacked appropriate authority, and the complaint was time-barred.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the complaint should entitle the accused to seek discharge under Section 245 of the CrPC?

Whether the Official Secrets Act, 1923, requires prior consent or sanction from the government for filing a complaint, and whether the period spent in obtaining orders for filing the complaint can be excluded?

Held:

The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry of the limitation period did not entitle the accused to seek discharge under Section 245 of the CrPC. The complainant had the right to seek an extension of time under Section 473 of the CrPC, provided the delay was explainable due to bona fide belief.

The Court held that no consent or sanction from the government was required to file a complaint under the Official Secrets Act, 1923. The period spent in obtaining orders for filing the complaint could not be excluded, as it did not fall under the category of consent or sanction as contemplated by the Explanation to Section 470(3) of the CrPC.

Facts:

The Quarry Owners Association challenged the State of Bihar's authority to fix royalty rates on minor minerals. The state had issued notifications increasing royalty rates on these minerals.

Issues:

Whether the State Government had the authority to make rules and fix royalty rates for minor minerals?

Were there sufficient guidelines and checks in place for the fixation of royalty rates?

How did constitutional provisions impact the regulation of mines and minerals development?

Held:

The State Government had the power to make rules in respect of minor minerals under the Mines and Minerals Act.

Ample guidelines were available in various provisions of the Act, the Preamble, and the Statement of Objects and Reasons. Fixing royalty rates was considered an inherent part of mineral development, and the state had to consider various factors, including that it was parting with its own wealth.

The maximum prescribed percentage in Schedule II of the Act did not apply to minor minerals but served as a guideline. Major minerals and minor minerals were distinguished.

While Sections 4 to 12 of the Act provided general restrictions on rule-making power, they were not applicable to minor minerals. However, they served as guidelines to the State Government when framing rules.

Sections 15(2) and (3) of the Act required approval of rules and royalty rates by Parliament, serving as a check on the enhancement of royalty rates.

The regulation of mines and minerals development fell under the control of the Union (central government) according to Entry 54, List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The central government had the power to partially or fully withdraw control from the states if needed.

Royalty on minerals was a distinct form of tax, including consideration for parting with the rights and privileges of mineral ownership.

The State Government's actions came under scrutiny by the state legislature when notifications or rules were laid before it, serving as a check on the state's exercise of power.

Decision: The court upheld the impugned notifications by the State Government, stating that they were valid as they were within the ambit of delegated power, and there were sufficient guidelines and checks in place. However, it emphasized that the second notification, which had not been placed before the state legislature, should be done so at the earliest, but its non-placement would not invalidate it as the requirement was only directory.

Facts:

The appellants were involved in the manufacturing of turbo alternators, consisting of steam turbines and complete alternators. Disputes arose regarding the excisability of turbo alternators. The appellants contended that they should not be subject to excise duty for various reasons.

Issues:

Whether the process of combining steam turbines and alternators constituted a manufacturing process and whether turbo alternators could be considered "excisable goods" as per the Central Excise Act.

Held:

The Court held that the process of combining steam turbines and alternators amounted to a manufacturing process since it resulted in the creation of a new commodity with a distinctive name and use.

Turbo alternators could only be classified as "excisable goods" if they satisfied the criteria of mobility and marketability.

An article that is permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth does not qualify as "excisable goods" as per the Transfer of Property Act and the General Clauses Act.

The Explanatory Note issued by the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) clarified that installation or erection of turbo alternators on a platform constructed on the land should not be considered a common base, making it immovable property.

As a result, the Court concluded that when turbo alternators were permanently fixed to a platform at the customer's site, they became immovable property and were not considered "excisable goods" for excise duty purposes.