Facts:

The Appellant-bank filed a suit on the original side of the Calcutta High Court against the Respondent-debtor.

The suit was disposed of on March 29, 1994, by a single judge.

An appeal was filed and was disposed of by a Division Bench on August 11, 1998, resulting in the suit being restored before a single judge.

During this period, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came into force in West Bengal on April 27, 1994.

The Respondent-debtor company filed an application requesting that the suit filed by the Bank should remain on the original side of the Calcutta High Court and not be transferred to the Tribunal under the Act.

Issues:

Whether the suit filed by the bank should remain in the original side of the Calcutta High Court or be transferred to the Tribunal under the 1993 Act.

The applicability of the 1993 Act to suits pending on the crucial date of April 27, 1994, when it came into force.

Held:

The Court held that both the suits filed by the bank and the debtor company were interconnected and fell under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

The suit filed by the bank in 1985, although disposed of in 1994, was revived by the remand order passed by the Division Bench in 1998. It could not be treated as freshly instituted in 1998.

The court emphasized that the principle of purposive construction should be applied to the Act, ensuring that no suit by the bank is decided by the Civil Court after the Act's commencement.

Even if the suit was not pending immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal but came before the single judge on remand after April 27, 1994, it would need to be transferred to the Tribunal.

The court held that it is the duty of a court to take notice of changes in the law affecting pending actions and give effect to them.

The pendency of the company's suit in the High Court was not a ground for retaining the bank's suit in the Calcutta High Court. Both suits should be tried by the Tribunal. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, as the owner of certain premises, filed an eviction petition against the respondent, who was a tenant.

The eviction petition was initially granted ex parte in favor of the appellant.

During the execution proceedings, the parties entered into a compromise outside of court, which allowed the respondent to continue renting a portion of the premises while surrendering another portion.

The compromise included a provision that if the respondent did not vacate the remaining portion after a specified period, the appellant could execute the eviction order.

The compromise was not recorded by the court as required by Rule 2 of Order 21 of the CPC.

Subsequently, the appellant sought to execute the eviction order after the agreed-upon period had passed, but the respondent resisted it, claiming that the compromise had extinguished the original eviction decree.

Issues:

Whether the compromise between the parties extinguished the original eviction decree or merely postponed its execution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the effect of the compromise on the executability of the decree depends on the intention of the parties, which must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

If the intention was to extinguish the decree, the execution could not proceed. However, if the intention was to keep the decree alive and enforce it as agreed upon in the compromise, the execution could proceed.

In this case, since the compromise was not recorded by the court as required by Rule 2 of Order 21 of the CPC, the court could not recognize it under Rule 3 of Order 21. Therefore, the original decree was not extinguished, and the execution could proceed.

The court also noted that the execution of a decree depends on whether the compromise was recorded by the court and whether it had the effect of extinguishing the decree.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's order, and directed the executing court to give effect to its earlier order of possession.

Facts:

The petitioner, Laxman Laskar, was a life convict sentenced under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 34 of the IPC. He sought premature release from life imprisonment, claiming that he had served a certain period of actual sentence and had earned remissions. Laxman Laskar based his claim on the West Bengal Correctional Services Act XXXII of 1992, which equated life imprisonment with a definite period of 20 years and provided provisions for remission.

Issues:

Whether a life convict is automatically entitled to release after serving a certain period, as per the West Bengal Correctional Services Act?

What factors should be considered by the appropriate government when deciding on the premature release of a life convict?

Held:

The judgment clarified that a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the entire remaining natural life of the convict unless the appropriate government exercises its discretion to remit a part or the whole of the sentence. The court emphasized that the relevant rules equating life imprisonment with a definite period of 20 years are meant for working out remissions and not for granting an automatic release.

The court cited precedents, including the cases of Naib Singh vs. State of Punjab and Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra, which highlighted that there is no automatic release for life convicts after a certain period.

The judgment noted that the petitioner's release depended on whether the appropriate government chose to remit the unexpired portion of his sentence.

The court addressed the government's role in deciding premature release and outlined certain guidelines, including considering the nature of the offense, the possibility of further crimes, and the socio-economic condition of the convict's family.

The government had initially constituted a review committee to consider the petitioner's case for premature release, but the committee recommended against it, citing concerns about potential disturbances in the locality and the petitioner's age.

The court found the government's reasons for rejecting the petitioner's release claim to be irrelevant and without substance. It emphasized that the views of witnesses or people in the locality should not solely determine the risk of releasing the convict, and age alone should not be a determining factor. The government was also criticized for not considering whether the convict's political views had changed.

The judgment quashed the government's order and remitted the matter back to the government for reevaluation, taking into account the court's comments and the changes in the law introduced by the West Bengal Correctional Services Act of 1992.

Facts:

The educational institution in question had a maximum intake of 60 students, with 30 students allowed per section, and two sections in total.

However, a total of 75 students were admitted, including 15 students beyond the permitted quota.

The 15 extra students who were admitted beyond the quota challenged the department's orders that prevented them from taking the examination.

Issues:

Whether the admission of the 15 extra students beyond the permitted quota was valid.

Whether the students should be allowed to take the examination despite their admission being in violation of the quota.

Held:

The Court was not inclined to support the students' challenge to the department's orders preventing them from taking the examination. If their admission was not valid and exceeded the permitted quota of 60, the Court could not assist the petitioners.

The Court agreed with the decisions in the cases of State of Punjab vs. Renuka Singla (AIR 1994 SC 59) and State of Maharashtra vs. Vikas Sahebrao Roundale and Others. These decisions emphasized the importance of not directing authorities to violate their own statutory rules and regulations regarding admissions, especially in the field of education.

The Court, in conclusion, agreed with the views expressed in the cited judgments and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions, upholding the decision that the admission of the 15 extra students was illegal.

Facts:

The appellant entered into an agreement to sell shares with the respondent and received earnest money.

The respondent failed to make the balance payment, resulting in a breach of the agreement.

The appellant terminated the agreement, and the earnest money was forfeited as stipulated in the agreement.

The respondent filed a criminal complaint against the appellant in Shillong, Meghalaya.

Issues:

Whether the High Court correctly determined the maintainability of the writ petition based on territorial jurisdiction.

Whether the complaint was filed with malicious intent and whether it should be quashed.

Whether the investigation should be transferred from Shillong to the Mumbai Police.

Held:

The High Court failed to consider all relevant facts necessary to decide the maintainability of the writ petition based on territorial jurisdiction.

The Court noted that the complaint had been filed to harass and pressurize the petitioner and to reverse a share transfer transaction that had occurred in Mumbai.

The Supreme Court ordered the transfer of the investigation from Shillong to the Mumbai Police, specifically the Economic Offences Wing, General Branch, CID, or any other competent branch of the Mumbai Police.

The Court emphasized that the power of High Courts under Article 226 could be exercised by any High Court within the territories where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The petitioners, who are officers of the Indian Police Service (IPS) in the Arunachal, Goa, Mizoram, and Union Territories cadre, were promoted to the IPS from the Delhi and Andaman Nicobar Police Services. They filed a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of a notification dated 31st December 1997, alleging that it was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 16. The petitioners also sought directions for granting them benefits from a specific date.

Issues:

The validity of the notification dated 31st December 1997.

Whether the petitioners were entitled to benefits from a specific retrospective date.

Held:

The court acknowledged that a similar direction had been issued in a previous case filed by the Tamil Nadu Administrative Services Officers Association against the Union of India. The petitioners in this case sought a similar direction, which was accepted.

The court directed that the petitioners had the right to file a detailed representation to the Central Government, specifying the posts they believed should be encadred (included in the cadre). They were also allowed to provide special reasons for requesting encadrement with a retrospective date. The Central Government, in consultation with the relevant State Government, was instructed to consider these representations and make appropriate decisions within six months from the receipt of such representations.

The petitions and appeal were disposed of without imposing any costs.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the promotion and seniority of employees within the Delhi Jal Board. The appellant, Delhi Jal Board, had granted the benefit of ad hoc service to one of its employees, resulting in his promotion and the determination of his seniority. However, the respondent, Mahinder Singh, who was in a similar situation, was denied the same benefit and promotion.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's promotion and seniority were based on incorrect grounds, as argued by the respondent.

Whether the sealed cover procedure should be applied to cases where disciplinary inquiries are pending.

Held:

The sealed cover procedure permits the postponement of an officer's promotion until the outcome of any pending disciplinary inquiry. However, if the disciplinary inquiry ultimately exonerates the officer, the benefit of the assessment by the first Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in his favor in the previous selection should be given effect. The mere fact that another disciplinary inquiry was initiated after the first one ended in favor of the officer does not prevent the officer from receiving the benefits of the earlier DPC assessment.

Decision: The Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the Delhi Jal Board against the High Court's decision is dismissed. The Division Bench found that there was no need to refer the matter to a larger bench. They upheld the High Court's judgment, emphasizing the importance of fairness and adherence to established procedures in promotions and seniority matters.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between the Church of God (Full Gospel) in India and the K.K.R. Majestic Colony Welfare Association and others.

The church used loudspeakers, drums, and other sound-producing instruments during prayers, causing noise pollution.

Complaints were made to various authorities about the noise disturbance.

The High Court directed authorities to follow noise pollution control guidelines established in a previous case (Appa Rao's case) and take action against the church to reduce noise levels.

Issues:

Whether religious practices can be exempt from noise pollution regulations.

Whether the High Court's directions to control noise pollution were justified.

Held:

The judgment begins by emphasizing that no religion prescribes disturbing the peace of others through loud noises and that citizens have a right to live in a peaceful environment.

The judgment highlights that noise pollution has serious health and social implications, including sleep disturbances, health issues, and law and order problems. It emphasizes that rights in an organized society cannot be absolute and must coexist harmoniously with the rights of others.

The court refers to relevant laws and rules related to noise pollution, including the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000.

The judgment upholds the High Court's direction to implement noise pollution control measures, including regulating the use of loudspeakers and other sound-producing instruments in religious practices.

Decision: The appeal is dismissed, affirming the importance of controlling noise pollution and upholding the High Court's directive to implement noise pollution control measures.

Facts:

The case concerned an interim order of the High Court that stayed a notification issued by the Election Commission regarding the manner of counting votes during an election. The Election Commission had issued this notification in response to apprehensions of intimidation and victimization of voters. The notification directed the mixing of ballot papers from all ballot boxes in a constituency before counting, instead of counting them polling station-wise. The High Court's stay was based on the argument that valuable evidence of booth capturing might be lost.

Issues:

The extent of the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 concerning election matters during the electoral process.

The interpretation and application of Article 329(b) of the Constitution of India in the context of challenging election-related actions or orders.

Held:

The court established that actions or orders of the Election Commission are open to judicial review, but such review is subject to well-established parameters, including the presence of malafide or arbitrary exercise of power or a breach of the law.

The court emphasized that judicial intervention during ongoing election proceedings should only occur in exceptional cases supported by clear and strong grounds, specific details, and evidence .

The court clarified that Article 329(b) applies when a petition directly challenges the election results, and it prohibits calling the election into question during the electoral process.

The court held that disputes with the potential to materially affect the election's outcome should be adjudicated upon after the completion of the election process to prevent interruptions or delays.

The court acknowledged that judicial intervention is permissible when aimed at preserving crucial evidence that may be lost or destroyed before the election results are declared.

The court stressed the need for a conscientious approach in dealing with election disputes, with a primary focus on the welfare of the constituency and the strengthening of democracy.

The court further emphasized the importance of ignoring controversies that do not materially affect the election's outcome and postponing the adjudication of disputes until after the election process is completed.