Bail – Gangster Act – Second Bail Application – Rejection for Lack of New Grounds – Applicant sought bail under Section 2/3 of the Gangster Act after rejection of earlier application – Criminal history of 11 cases spanning from 2013 to 2023 including prior Gangster Act charges – No new grounds urged beyond continued incarceration and parity with co-accused – Held: Mere parity or passage of time not sufficient – No new material to satisfy Section 19(4)(b) – Bail rejected [Paras 2, 4, 8-10].

Criminal Law – Bail – Requirement under Section 19(4)(b) of Gangster Act – Court reiterated that before granting bail under the Act, it must be satisfied that accused is not guilty and not likely to reoffend – Applicant's criminal antecedents and recurrence of charges under the Gangster Act indicate he remains a threat to society – Satisfaction under Section 19(4)(b) not recorded – Bail rightly refused [Paras 6-7, 9].

Successive Bail Applications – No Change in Circumstances – Not Maintainable – Relying on precedent Satya Pal v. State of U.P., 1998 (37) ACC 287 and State of Maharashtra v. Buddhikota Subha Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2292 – Court held that unless substantial change in fact situation is shown, successive bail application not maintainable – Filing repeated applications with same grounds held to be abuse of process [Paras 7-8].

Criminal History – Consideration for Bail – Threat to Society – Applicant had history of repeated offences including under Cow Slaughter Act, Arms Act, IPC and earlier Gangster Act charges – Bail denied citing threat to public order and possibility of further offences – Public interest outweighs individual liberty in such cases [Paras 7, 9].

Decision: Second bail application rejected – No new or substantial ground shown – Long criminal history and repeated invocation of Gangster Act noted – Satisfaction under Section 19(4)(b) not possible – Applicant deemed threat to society if released [Para 10].

Criminal Law – Murder Trial – Conviction Reversed – Appellants convicted under Section 302/34 IPC for alleged murder of deceased by slitting his throat with an axe – FIR lodged by wife of deceased stated that she found husband lying dead in the night and named appellants on suspicion – During trial, witnesses claimed to be eyewitnesses and attributed motive – Held: Their testimonies contradicted the FIR and were inconsistent with cross-examination – Trial court erred in relying upon developed and contradictory versions – Conviction set aside [Paras 45–54, 72]

Eyewitness Credibility – Contradictory Versions – PW-1 (wife of deceased) and PW-2 (brother of deceased) claimed to have seen incident but their presence at the spot was contradicted by their own statements – FIR silent on actual witnessing of assault – Held: Eyewitness accounts developed as afterthought – Testimony not credible – Benefit of doubt extended [Paras 46–49, 52–54, 64]

Motive – Failure to Prove – Prosecution alleged motive of personal enmity involving illicit relationship – PW-2 denied any such incident or knowledge – No corroborative evidence led – Held: Motive entirely unproved – Weakens prosecution case significantly [Paras 49, 56–57]

Recovery – Crime Weapon (Axe) – Recovery of axe allegedly made at instance of accused – PW-3, witness to recovery, retracted and stated recovery was staged by police – No proper disclosure statement proved – Recovery site was accessible to public – Site plan prepared five days after alleged recovery – Held: Recovery legally unreliable and inadmissible under Section 27 Evidence Act – Prosecution failed to prove recovery beyond doubt [Paras 65–71]

Benefit of Doubt – Infirmities in Prosecution – Inconsistent statements, unproven motive, fabricated recovery, and contradictions between FIR and trial evidence – Held: Prosecution failed to prove case beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction unsustainable – Appellants acquitted [Paras 72–73]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302/34 IPC set aside – Appellant Sukh Lal Bunkar already on bail – Bail bonds discharged – Appellant Pappu Sonkar to be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case – Section 437-A CrPC to be complied with.

Income Tax – Assessment under Section 153D – Mechanical Approval – Validity – Revenue challenged ITAT order which quashed assessments for AY 2007–08 on ground that approval under Section 153D was granted mechanically by Additional CIT through a single omnibus letter covering 246 assessments – Tribunal held approval lacked application of mind and violated legislative intent requiring due consideration of seized materials – Following Pr. CIT (Central-2) v. M/s MDLR Hotels Pvt. Ltd., ITA No.593/2023 (Del) and Pr. CIT (Central-2) v. M/s King Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., ITA No.754/2024 (Del) – Held: Approval given in bulk without reference to individual records or seized material defeats purpose of Section 153D – Such “rubber-stamp” or blanket approval unsustainable [Paras 3–5].

Administrative Approval – Requirement of Satisfaction – Court reaffirmed that statutory satisfaction under Sections 151 and 153D must reflect due application of mind – Merely appending “Yes” or issuing a common sanction letter to multiple assessments cannot be deemed valid approval – Citing Pr. CIT-7 v. Pioneer Town Planners Pvt. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1685; N.C. Cables Ltd.; and Central India Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. ITO [Paras 4, 15–21].

Judicial Precedent – Binding Effect – Court followed coordinate bench rulings in MDLR Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and King Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., arising from identical ITAT order dated 08.02.2023 and involving same issue of Section 153D approval – Held: No new substantial question of law arises – Appeal covered by settled precedent [Paras 4–6].

Decision – Delay in refiling (812 days) condoned – Appeal dismissed – No substantial question of law arises – Issue concerning interplay of Section 144A and Search & Seizure Manual, 2007 kept open for future consideration [Paras 1, 6–7].

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Vague Allegations and Police Cases – Divorce Denied – Appellants, two brothers, filed separate divorce petitions under Section 13(1)(ia) of HMA alleging cruelty by their wives who are sisters – Alleged incidents included quarrels, assaults, poisoning, FIRs and refusal to attend last rites – All FIRs ended in acquittal or compounding – No medical or independent evidence produced – Held: Allegations were vague, general and unsupported – Mere registration of FIRs without conviction or supporting proof cannot constitute cruelty – Appeals dismissed [Paras 6–9, 18–29].

Cruelty – Evidentiary Threshold – Section 13(1)(ia) HMA – Proof Required – Family Court rightly held that allegations of cruelty must be specific and substantiated – No evidence of poisoning or Kalendra proceedings produced – FIR-based allegations unsupported by medical records or independent testimony – Respondents acquitted, and allegations found to be part of domestic discord – Held: Standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities, but even that not satisfied in present case [Paras 21–25].

Separation – Long Duration Alone Not Cruelty – No Irretrievable Breakdown Proven – Appellants relied on prolonged separation of over 13 years to seek divorce – Held: Long separation, in absence of intent to reconcile or abusive conduct by respondent, cannot per se constitute cruelty – Appellants themselves unwilling to resume cohabitation – Reliance on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh and Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli found misplaced [Paras 27–28].

Burden of Proof – Non-Examination of Key Witness – Adverse Inference – Appellants failed to examine any independent witness or produce credible documentary evidence – Plaintiff Devender Kumar admitted in cross-examination unwillingness to live with respondent – Held: Mere allegations without proof cannot sustain divorce on grounds of cruelty [Paras 21–23, 26].

Decision: Divorce appeals dismissed – Family Court judgment upheld – No credible evidence of cruelty – Long separation without cohabitation not a standalone ground for divorce – Parties left to bear their own costs [Paras 29–30].

NDPS Act – Bail – Sections 8, 21, 29 NDPS Act - Commercial Quantity – Procedural Lapses – Bail Granted – Petitioner arrested on 21.04.2023 for alleged possession of 50 bottles of Myberry (Codeine Phosphate) – Co-accused arrested based on petitioner's disclosure – Final report filed on 17.07.2023 – Trial delayed with less than half of 21 witnesses examined – Held: Petitioner in custody for over 2.5 years with no prior criminal history – Material contradictions in prosecution evidence – Mandatory procedural safeguards under NDPS Act found breached – Bail granted on conditions [Paras 1–9, 20]

Criminal Law – Reasonable Grounds under Section 37 NDPS Act – Interpretation – Court clarified that “reasonable grounds” for believing guilt under Section 37 require more than suspicion but less than proof – Held: No cogent evidence to support prima facie guilt of petitioner – Co-accused already granted bail – Petitioner stands on parity – No apprehension of tampering with evidence or absconding [Paras 9–10]

Bail Jurisprudence – Constitutional Safeguards – Liberty vs. Public Interest – Citing Sanjay Chandra v. CBI and Siddharam Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra – Court reiterated that bail is the rule, jail the exception – Long incarceration without trial amounts to pre-trial punishment – Denial of bail not justified solely by seriousness of charge in absence of risk of misuse of liberty [Paras 14–19]

Discretion in Grant of Bail – Judicial Principles – Court must consider gravity of offence, likelihood of conviction, potential for interference with justice, and balance individual liberty with societal interest – No blanket rule – Each bail decision must be context-specific and factually grounded [Paras 12–13, 18]

Decision:

Bail granted – Petitioner to be released upon furnishing personal bond of ₹1,00,000 and two sureties of ₹50,000 each from relatives – Subject to compliance with conditions: (a) regular appearance at trial, (b) no tampering with evidence or witnesses, (c) no travel outside UT of J&K without court’s permission, (d) no repetition of offence – Trial court empowered to proceed under Sections 491 and 492 BNSS in case of breach of conditions.

Service Law – Compassionate Appointment – Fraud and Misrepresentation – Appointment void ab initio – Petitioner, claiming to be son of deceased employee Sumitra Devi, secured appointment on compassionate grounds – Inquiry revealed petitioner was son of Yashoda Devi, not Sumitra Devi – Legal heir and succession certificates found to be obtained by suppression of facts – Held: Fraud vitiates all solemn acts – Appointment obtained by fraud confers no right or protection under Article 311 – Writ dismissed – Impugned order dated 04.07.2025 upheld [Paras 89–97, 108–110].

Compassionate Appointment – Eligibility & Parentage – Proof of Fraudulent Representation – Petitioner’s father, while serving as Revenue Inspector, submitted false affidavit and legal heir certificate showing petitioner as son of deceased teacher Sumitra Devi – Inquiry and statements of Sumitra Devi’s daughters (Snehlata and Anita) proved petitioner is son of Yashoda Devi – Appointment based on misrepresentation held fraudulent and non est in law [Paras 24–26, 89–90].

Departmental Inquiry – Fresh Inquiry in compliance with Division Bench order dated 24.04.2025 – Petitioner repeatedly sought adjournments; did not produce evidence – Inquiry Officer’s report based on official records and witness statements upheld – Due process satisfied – No violation of natural justice [Paras 21, 23–26, 99].

Fraud – Legal Consequence – Fraud unravels everything – Concealment of material facts amounts to suppressio veri and suggestio falsi – Appointment and benefits obtained through fraud are nullities – Salary and pension benefits drawn under such appointment recoverable – No equity or constitutional protection available [Paras 55–57, 95–97, 108–110].

Interim Orders – No Enduring Right – Interim reliefs merge in final adjudication and confer no substantive rights – Petitioner’s reliance on interim orders untenable once disciplinary order attained finality [Paras 91–94].

Succession/Legal Heir Certificates – Fraudulent Procurement – Competent authority not bound to honour certificates obtained by concealment or false information – Fraudulent certificates can be ignored without formal cancellation – Fraud renders them void ab initio [Paras 76–80].

Article 311 – Scope of Protection – Protection under Article 311 available only to validly appointed employees – Appointment obtained by fraud or forged documents is void ab initio; cancellation thereof does not amount to punitive dismissal – No disciplinary inquiry required where appointment itself is illegal [Paras 102–103].

Equitable Relief – Denied to Fraudulent Litigant – Writ jurisdiction is discretionary – A petitioner approaching court with unclean hands forfeits equitable relief – Fraudulent conduct disentitles writ remedy [Paras 81–83].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Order dated 04.07.2025 declaring petitioner’s appointment void ab initio affirmed – Court holds petitioner guilty of fraud and suppression of material facts – No relief granted – Directions for recovery of benefits implied [Paras 109–110].

Domestic Violence – Shared Household – Right of Residence – Section 2(s) read with Section 17, PWDV Act – Wife began residing at property owned by her in-laws immediately after marriage – Held: Property qualifies as “shared household” irrespective of ownership – Right of residence under Section 17 not dependent on title – Once aggrieved person has lived there in a domestic relationship, protection from dispossession can be granted – Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, followed; S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, overruled [Paras 11–14, 28].

Ownership of In-laws – Effect on Residence Right – Property purchased and registered in name of father-in-law held to be self-acquired – Still constitutes shared household for purpose of protection under DV Act – Ownership is immaterial for Section 17 protection so long as relationship and cohabitation exist – Civil decree on title (even if stayed) has no bearing on right of residence [Paras 13–14].

Domestic Relationship – Termination of Cohabitation – Whether destroys right to reside – Held: No – Section 2(f) includes relationships where parties “have at any point of time lived together” – Right of residence continues to protect woman even after separation, till eviction through due process of law [Para 14].

Residence Orders – Power of Magistrate – Sections 17 & 19 PWDV Act – Magistrate empowered to restrain dispossession and alienation – Directions do not confer ownership but preserve possession until due process is followed – Restraint on alienation falls within Section 19(1)(d) – Challenge to such restraint unsustainable [Paras 15, 28].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Limited Scope – Sections 397/401 CrPC – High Court cannot reappreciate evidence or admit fresh evidence – Findings of Mahila Court and Appellate Court upheld as reasoned and based on record – Electricity bills produced for first time in revision rejected as extraneous [Paras 8, 19–20].

Physical Residence – Electricity Consumption as Proof – Low electricity usage not conclusive proof of non-occupation – Findings of actual residence by lower courts based on evidence cannot be disturbed – Weak inference cannot rebut statutory protection [Paras 17–20].

Balance of Interests – Coexistence – Both parties occupying separate floors (Respondent on ground floor, Petitioner on first floor) – Arrangement ensures protection to daughter-in-law and peaceful residence to senior citizen – Equilibrium achieved consistent with Section 19 PWDV Act and proportionality principle [Paras 23–25].

Alternate Relief – Section 19(1)(f) – Though Court could have directed alternate accommodation, choice to preserve possession till due process not perverse – Judicial discretion properly exercised; no interference warranted [Paras 26–27].

Civil Proceedings – Pendency before Civil Court and Supreme Court – Does not oust jurisdiction under DV Act – Sections 17, 19, and 26 allow parallel protective remedies – Residence order independent of proprietary adjudication [Para 27].

Decision: Revision petitions dismissed – Concurrent findings of Trial and Appellate Courts upheld – Property qualifies as shared household under Section 2(s) – Respondent’s right of residence under Sections 17 and 19 sustained – Restraint against dispossession and alienation confirmed – Observations confined to protection under DV Act; title and mesne profits left to be decided in civil proceedings – No order as to costs [Paras 28–30].

Trademark Infringement – “WOW BURGER” held deceptively similar to “WOW MOMO” – Initial Interest Confusion – Word mark comparison – Despite visual and stylistic differences in device marks, the dominant component “WOW” in both appellant’s and respondent’s marks created a likelihood of association – Appellate Court held that use of “WOW BURGER” by respondent likely to confuse an average consumer into believing an association with “WOW MOMO” family of marks – Infringement under Section 29(2)(b) of Trade Marks Act established [Paras 20-23, 33-34, 51, 55, 57]

Passing Off vs Infringement – Distinct Legal Tests – Trial Court erred in conflating standards – Held: Device mark differences (colour, style) and other contextual factors irrelevant for statutory infringement – Infringement assessed by direct comparison of marks irrespective of trade dress – Court emphasized statutory rights of registered proprietor under Section 28 over common law passing off principles [Paras 24-25, 55, 57]

Distinctiveness – Use of “WOW” with food items deemed inventive – Word “WOW” alone not distinctive, but in combination like “WOW MOMO” or “WOW BURGER” forms a distinctive composite mark – The inventive idea of pairing an exclamation with a food item was original to appellant – Use of same formula by respondent amounts to conceptual or idea infringement [Paras 35-41]

Dominant Feature – Anti-Dissection Rule – Composite marks must be viewed holistically – Court held “WOW” is the dominant and memorable prefix in both “WOW MOMO” and “WOW BURGER” – Despite differences in suffix (MOMO vs BURGER), dominant feature test supports finding of deceptive similarity – Anti-dissection rule does not prevent consideration of dominant feature where it governs consumer perception [Paras 44-47]

Family of Marks – “WOW” Prefix Across Multiple Registered Trademarks – Appellant’s long-standing use and registration of marks beginning with “WOW” (WOW MOMO, WOW DIMSUMS, WOW MOMO INSTANT) recognized as constituting a family of marks – Court applied “family of marks” doctrine to hold that use of WOW BURGER by a third party results in confusion and association – Injunction justified [Paras 48-50]

Device Mark vs Word Mark – Device stylisation differences immaterial – Since appellant owned word mark registrations, comparison confined to word elements – Even in absence of WOW as a registered standalone mark, WOW MOMO and WOW DIMSUMS registrations sufficient for asserting infringement rights against WOW BURGER [Paras 43, 52-55]

Disclaimer Clauses – Limited Effect – Trial court wrongly relied on disclaimers in select registrations – Appellant had other valid registrations unaffected by such disclaimers – Disclaimers cannot dilute protection of marks where dominant features are copied [Paras 52-53]

Judicial Error – Trial court misapplied principles of trademark law – Focused wrongly on “WOW” as a common English word and ignored composite distinctiveness – Failed to consider the likelihood of confusion under the correct statutory framework – Appellate court intervened to uphold trademark rights [Paras 54-58]

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order of Single Judge dated 12 September 2025 set aside – Respondents restrained from using the marks “WOW BURGER” or any mark deceptively similar to appellant’s registered “WOW MOMO” and associated trademarks – Interim injunction granted pending final adjudication of suit [Paras 59-62].

Land Acquisition – Compensation – Irrigated Land – Comparable Sale Instance – Reference Court accepted sale-deed for jirayat land dated 20.04.2000 at Rs. 2,500/- per R – Held: As acquired land was irrigated, rate must be doubled to Rs. 5,000/- per R – Additional 12% increase warranted due to time gap – Final rate fixed at Rs. 6,346.66/- per R – Principles laid down in State of Maharashtra v. Baliram Patil and SLAO v. Bhagwat Sonawane followed [Paras 10–11]

Land Acquisition – Valuation of Trees and Superstructure – Reference Court erred in rejecting expert report on ground of lack of notice and expertise – Held: Valuer’s credentials not challenged in cross-examination – Mere absence of prior notice irrelevant – Rejection of valuation without contrary evidence is unsustainable – Valuer's report accepted – Compensation granted accordingly [Paras 12–13]

Compulsory Acquisition – Right to Fair Compensation – Reference Court's award enhanced based on judicially accepted principles – Held: Claimants are entitled to receive solatium, interest, and compensation for land, trees, and superstructure – No challenge raised by State to acceptance of comparable sale instance [Paras 9–14]

Decision: Appeals partly allowed – Compensation for acquired irrigated land fixed at Rs. 6,346.66/- per R – Appellants awarded:

30% solatium under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act

Rs. 3,84,000/- and Rs. 63,900/- towards tree compensation in FA 3760/2008 and FA 4300/2008 respectively

Rs. 1,29,803/- and Rs. 24,450/- respectively for superstructure

Interest at 9% p.a. for the first year, and 15% p.a. thereafter until full realisation