Taxation Law - Customs – Refund of Duty – Short Landing or Pilferage – Goods not received by importer – Bill of Entry filed but no Out of Charge order issued – Authorities in dispute over whether goods were short-landed or pilfered – Held: Importer entitled to refund of duty under Section 23 of Customs Act as goods were lost before clearance for home consumption – Duty paid cannot be retained when goods not delivered – Customs directed to refund duty with 9% interest [Paras 3, 4, 42–45, 50–54, 61–64] –

Administrative Law – Inter-Departmental Dispute – Customs and Port Authorities blamed each other for loss of goods – Court held importer cannot suffer due to unresolved bureaucratic dispute – Liability between public authorities kept open for separate proceedings – Importer’s substantive right to refund not to be defeated by procedural technicalities [Paras 5–6, 49, 55, 65] –

Procedural Fairness – Duty Paid without Clearance – Bill of Entry not closed – Customs insisted on closure letter which could not be obtained due to inter-agency delays – Held: Such procedural conditions cannot defeat substantive statutory entitlement to refund – Rejection of refund without adjudication is not appealable – Writ petition maintainable [Paras 14–16, 53, 56] –

Interest on Delayed Refund – Duty paid in anticipation of clearance – No goods received – Refund delayed due to inaction of authorities – Held: Interest at 9% to be paid under Section 27A of Customs Act for delay in refunding amount from date of payment till date of refund [Paras 63–64] –

Statutory Interpretation – Sections 13 & 23 of Customs Act – Pilferage vs. Loss – Whether case of pilferage under Section 13 or loss under Section 23 immaterial – Refund due in both cases where goods not cleared for home consumption – Importer not liable to bear duty [Paras 43–44, 50–52, 61] –

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Rule made absolute – Respondent No.1 directed to refund ₹35,37,358/- along with 9% interest from date of payment within 4 weeks – Compliance report to be filed by 08/01/2026 – Inter se liability between Customs and Port left open [Paras 64–66].

Ceiling Law – Title over plot in ceiling proceedings – Earlier order rejecting objection stood set aside in appeal – Res judicata inapplicable – Appellate authority rightly considered Will Deeds, revenue entries and mutation orders to hold the land belonged to Pradeep Singh, not Bhagwan Singh – No perversity or statutory violation – Delay of three years in filing writ – Writ dismissed [Paras 26–32].

Ceiling Proceedings – Determination of Holding – Effect of Remand – Initial order dated 31.10.1994 holding plot no. 508 as part of Bhagwan Singh’s holding was set aside in appeal on 29.01.1997 and matter remanded. Held: Once the remand order wiped out the earlier order, no finality attached to title determination; plea of res judicata misplaced [Para 26].

Appellate Authority – Evaluation of Title – Consideration of Will Deeds and Mutation Records – Appellate authority considered Will Deeds (including Will dated 07.12.1973), long-standing mutation entries and revenue records showing land standing in name of Pradeep Singh / respondents much prior to ceiling proceedings. Findings based on evidence; no perversity shown [Paras 25, 27, 29].

Will Executed During Proceedings – Applicability of Sections 5(6) & 5(8) – State argued that Will dated 06.12.1990 executed during pendency of ceiling proceedings should be ignored. Held: Appellate authority did not treat the Will as a device to evade ceiling law but considered it only to ascertain existing title with reference to revenue entries. No statutory violation made out [Para 28].

Surplus Land Adjustment – No Prejudice to State – Even after exclusion of plot no. 508/5-350 hectares, any deficiency in surplus area was adjusted from other plots of original tenure-holder Bhagwan Singh; no substantial injury to the State established [Paras 11, 29].

Delay & Laches – Administrative Inaction – Impugned appellate order dated 14.10.1999 was received on 29.10.1999 but writ filed only in 2002 after prolonged administrative inaction. Held: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to cure belated administrative lapses when appellate findings are reasoned and lawful [Paras 13–14, 29–30].

Judicial Review – Limited Scope – Appellate findings supported by evidence; no jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of statutory mandate; High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 [Paras 28–31].

Decision – No illegality found in appellate order dated 14.10.1999 excluding plot no. 508/5-350 hectares from holding of Bhagwan Singh; writ petition dismissed; no costs [Paras 31–33].

Service Law – Recruitment – LT Grade Assistant Teachers – Waiting List – Rule 12(8) of 1998 Rules – Discretion of Board – “Not larger than 25%” is a ceiling and not a mandate – No right to insist that waiting list must be 25% of vacancies – Recruitment cannot be prolonged indefinitely – No arbitrariness shown in criteria adopted by Board – Writ petition dismissed [Paras 14-21].

Recruitment Process – LT Grade Assistant Teachers – Advertisement No. 01/2016 – Completion of Selection – Petitioners, who were unsuccessful candidates not included in merit list or initial waiting list, sought preparation of a fresh enlarged waiting list claiming vacancies still existed and process for Supplementary Panels should continue – Prior directions in Writ A No. 14121/2022 and Special Appeal No. 679/2022 were relied upon – Held: Process for counselling and preparation of waiting list concluded; recruitment cannot be kept alive indefinitely [Paras 1-8, 12, 18].

Waiting List – Interpretation of Rule 12(8), 1998 Rules – Rule provides list “not larger than twenty-five percent” of vacancies – Held: Phrase imposes only a maximum ceiling; no mandate that waiting list must necessarily be 25% of vacancies – Discretion lies with Board/Commission to decide appropriate percentage depending upon circumstances – Petitioners’ argument that full 25% is mandatory rejected [Paras 14-17].

Administrative Discretion – Criteria for Waiting List – Challenge raised against non-uniform application of percentage criteria for different subjects; petitioners contended arbitrariness – Held: While uniform criteria may be ideal, mere lack of uniformity does not ipso facto render decision arbitrary absent violation of statutory rules – No mala fides or illegality established [Paras 17, 19-20].

Right of Candidates in Waiting List – No Indefeasible Right – Court reiterated settled law that candidates in waiting list (or even select list) have no absolute right to appointment; waiting lists cannot survive indefinitely – Recruitment begun in 2016 cannot be prolonged further – Reliance placed on Supreme Court judgment Sudesh Kumar Goyal v. State of Haryana (2023) 10 SCC 54; applied by this Court in earlier cases – Held: No right is created in favour of petitioners merely because some vacancies may have subsequently arisen [Paras 15-18].

Precedents – Gaurav Kumar (2025) and Ambrish Kumar (2021) – Both judgments categorically hold that Rule 12(8) only prescribes a maximum limit, not a mandatory minimum; Board is not required to draw waiting list equal to 25% of vacancies – These precedents directly apply and operate against petitioners’ claim – Writ petition must fail [Paras 15-17, 20].

Decision – Impugned order dated 16.05.2025 upholding earlier waiting list found lawful – No statutory violation demonstrated – Recruitment process concluded – Writ petitions dismissed [Paras 20-21].

Civil Law - Specific Performance – Agreement of Sale – Proof of Execution – Plaintiff relied on agreement dated 26.09.2006 for sale consideration of Rs.6,00,000/- – Defendants contended agreement was concocted and created as security for hand loan of Rs.2,50,000/- – Property situated within Bengaluru city limits with guideline value exceeding Rs.23 lakhs in 2005 – Held: On preponderance of probabilities, execution of agreement of sale for meagre consideration doubtful – Trial Court erred in holding execution proved merely on basis of agreement and reply notice [Paras 14–17].

Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Section 16(c) of Specific Relief Act – Burden on plaintiff to prove continuous readiness and willingness – Mere issuance of legal notice insufficient – No evidence of financial capacity or availability of funds to pay balance consideration – Held: Plaintiff failed to discharge mandatory statutory requirement – Suit for specific performance not maintainable [Paras 18, 24].

Specific Performance – Discretion of Court – Section 20 of Specific Relief Act (Pre-amendment) – Even if agreement assumed to be proved, grant of decree not automatic – Court required to consider unfair advantage, hardship, surrounding circumstances and conduct of parties – Agreement giving unfair advantage to plaintiff in light of gross undervaluation – Held: Discretion wrongly exercised by Trial Court [Paras 25–34].

Evidence – Additional Evidence in Appeal – Order XLI Rule 27 CPC – Certified copy of Sub-Registrar guideline value and Gazette Notification produced – Public documents relevant for just decision – Held: Additional evidence rightly admitted and considered [Para 15].

Relief – Alternative Relief – Refund of Advance – Where specific performance refused, plaintiff entitled to refund of earnest money – Defendants directed to refund Rs.2,50,000/- with interest at 6% per annum from date of agreement – Equitable relief granted [Para 35].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated 28.08.2018 in O.S. No. 974/2008 set aside – Suit for specific performance dismissed – Decreed for alternative relief of refund of Rs.2,50,000/- with 6% interest per annum from 26.09.2006 – Amount to be refunded within five months.

Criminal Law - Money Laundering – Freezing of Property – Requirement of "Reason to Believe" – Section 17(1A), PMLA – Freezing orders dated 05.09.2018 passed by ED under Section 17(1A) were held invalid as they were based solely on "suspicion" without material or reasons recorded in writing – Court held "suspicion" is not equivalent to "reason to believe" and cannot justify action under PMLA – Procedural non-compliance with Rules 3 and 4 of the 2005 Freezing Rules also found – Held: Orders unsustainable in law [Paras 59–67]

Attachment Proceedings – Section 8(3), PMLA – Misreading of 90-day Clause by Tribunal – Tribunal’s interpretation that investigation must be completed within 90 days under Section 8(3)(a) was held erroneous – Court clarified: 90-day limit pertains to duration of attachment/retention during investigation, not to the investigation itself – Held: No statutory time limit prescribed for completion of investigation under PMLA [Paras 37–42]

Property Freezing – Whether Person Must Be Accused – Respondent not named as an accused, but husband was – Court followed Union of India v. J.P. Singh and held that continuation of freezing under Section 8(3) does not require the person holding property to be an accused, as long as property is linked to alleged money laundering and prosecution complaint is pending [Paras 45–48]

Procedural Safeguards – Violation of Section 17 and Related Rules – Freezing orders failed to show compliance with mandatory procedure under Section 17(1), (1A), and (4) – No proper “reason to believe”, no material disclosed to Adjudicating Authority as required – Court reiterated that freezing impacts right to property under Article 300A and strict adherence to procedure is essential [Paras 52–68]

Function of Adjudicating Authority – Misapplication of Terminology – Confusion Between Retention, Continuation, Confirmation – Court found the adjudicating authority’s orders mechanically reproduced pleadings and failed to apply mind – Incorrect terminology used (retention granted when continuation was sought) – Held: Process vitiated due to non-application of mind and procedural errors [Paras 71–79]

Statutory Interpretation – Specific Terms Not Interchangeable – Court clarified that terms such as "freezing", "retention", "continuation", and "confirmation" are distinct and refer to different statutory processes – Lumping them together renders the orders legally defective [Paras 74–75]

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Freezing orders held illegal and procedurally defective – Tribunal’s decision to unfreeze accounts upheld – Procedural safeguards under PMLA not followed – ED’s reliance on suspicion without material held unsustainable – Pending applications disposed of – No costs awarded.

Income-tax – Search and Seizure – Section 153C – Jurisdiction – Search conducted at petitioner’s residential premises pursuant to warrant under Section 132 – Statement recorded and panchanama drawn – Satisfaction note prepared treating petitioner as an “other person” – Held: Person whose premises are searched and from whom documents are seized is a “searched person” – Proceedings under Section 153C against such person are illegal and without jurisdiction.

Income-tax – Section 153C vis-à-vis Section 153A – Distinction between “searched person” and “other person” – Mere issuance of warrant in the name of another does not alter the status of the person whose premises are actually searched – Substance of search decisive – Petitioner could only be proceeded against, if at all, under Section 153A and not under Section 153C.

Income-tax – Preconditions for invoking Section 153C – Requirement of incriminating material belonging to a person other than the searched person – Absence of such condition in the present case – Initiation of proceedings held to be bad in law.

Judicial Precedent – Binding nature – Issue squarely covered by judgment of the coordinate Bench in C.R. Ram Mohan Raju v. DCIT, affirmed by the Division Bench and the Supreme Court – Consistency in interpretation of Section 153C maintained.

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Impugned notice dated 16.09.2020 issued under Section 153C for Assessment Year 2018-19 quashed – All consequential assessment orders, penalty proceedings and demand notices set aside.

Intellectual Property – Trademark Infringement – Permitted User – Consent Decree Enforcement – Plaintiff “The Indian Express” sought injunction against Defendant for using “New Indian Express” in Mumbai for event promotion, violating Clause 18(iv) of MoS dated 05/02/1995 and Supplemental MoS dated 12/08/2005 – Defendant granted only limited user rights for publishing English daily in five southern states and specified UTs – Held: Defendant’s conduct in Mumbai beyond scope of permitted user – Prima facie case made out for infringement and passing off [Paras 1, 75–78, 93].

Contract – Interpretation of Consent Decree – Negative Covenant – Clauses 17, 18(iv), and 19(iv) of MoS impose absolute restriction on Defendant’s use of title “New Indian Express” outside permitted territory and only for publication – Event organization, even promotional, falls outside permitted scope – Held: Limited permissive use strictly confined to agreed terms – No rights conferred for standalone events or revenue-generating activities outside agreed states/UTs [Paras 73–77, 91–93].

Acquiescence and Waiver – Consent Decree – Defendant argued Plaintiff waived rights by non-objection and joint advertising history – Held: No waiver/acquiescence can override a binding consent decree – Plaintiff’s silence, if any, does not imply consent – IPAB order of 2015 restricting use to southern states & UTs remains unchallenged and binding – No positive act amounting to waiver established [Paras 85–90].

Trademark Law – Derivative Marks – Use of “New Indian Express” – Held: Merely adding “New” to “Indian Express” does not create a new distinctive mark – Defendant’s trademark rights exist only under MoS – Registration alone does not confer independent proprietary rights – Plaintiff’s ownership over “Indian Express” remains absolute and enforceable [Paras 92–93].

Delhi High Court Orders – Not Binding – Defendant relied on interim orders of Delhi High Court (2011) – Held: Findings are not binding or conclusive – Delhi Suit dismissed for non-prosecution – No estoppel arises – IPAB’s order and MoS prevail [Paras 83–84].

Decision: Interim Application allowed – Injunction granted restraining Defendant from using “New Indian Express” for events, promotion or business outside permitted states/UTs – Application allowed in terms of prayer clauses (a) to (d) – No costs awarded [Para 95].

Civil Law – Forensic Examination – Alleged Tampering of Sealed Documents – Mere Apprehension – No Foundational Basis – Administrative Enquiry Found No Tampering – Photocopies Identical to Originals – Article 227 Petition Dismissed with Costs [Paras 2, 5–8].

Evidence Act – Section 45 – Forensic Examination – Mere Apprehension Insufficient – Petitioner claimed that breaking of lac seal on envelope containing original documents indicated tampering; no concrete allegation or proof of actual manipulation inside the envelope – Held, mere apprehension cannot justify sending documents to a forensic expert; such a direction would unnecessarily delay trial [Paras 2, 5].

Court Records – Administrative Enquiry – Condition of Seal – Storage-Related Damage Not Indicative of Tampering – Trial court’s administrative enquiry found plastic tape intact and cracks in lac seal attributable to bulk storage of envelopes in Ahlmad rooms – Documents remained secure; no material supporting allegation of tampering [Paras 2–3, 6].

Forensic Request Limited to Envelope – Not Maintainable – Prayer to send only the envelope for forensic examination held irrelevant to the lis and outside scope of dispute – No forensic purpose demonstrated [Para 6].

Comparison With Photocopies – No Discrepancy Found – Photocopies earlier filed by petitioner matched originals retrieved from sealed cover, negating suspicion of manipulation [Para 7].

Reliance on Precedent Misplaced – Thiruvengadam Pillai Distinguished – Precedent encouraging expert comparison of handwriting irrelevant since present case did not concern disputed handwriting but alleged tampering of sealed documents [Para 4].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Article 227 – No Perverse Error – Petition Frivolous – Trial court order found reasoned and justified; no illegality or perversity warranting interference – Petition dismissed as frivolous with cost of Rs.10,000 to be deposited with DHCLSC within one week [Paras 8–9].

Direction to Trial Court – Trial court to ensure compliance regarding deposit of costs [Para 10].

Service Law – BSF – Disciplinary Proceedings – Extra-marital Conduct – Officer engaged in intimate relationship with a female constable while being married – Compromising photographs leaked and circulated on social media – SCOI and ROE conducted – Disciplinary authority found conduct to be unbecoming of an officer in a disciplined force – Held: Relationship, though consensual, constituted grave misconduct warranting action under Rule 20(2) and 20(4)(c) of BSF Rules – Compulsory retirement upheld [Paras 2–6, 18–19, 38–39].

Judicial Review – Scope under Article 226 – Disciplinary Action – High Court reiterates that Court cannot substitute its views unless the decision is illegal, arbitrary, or perverse – Decision to treat holding of GSFC as "inexpedient" is valid if based on material facts and nature of misconduct – Held: No violation of principles of natural justice as officer was heard at multiple stages – No interference warranted under Article 226 [Paras 21–22, 30–31, 34–40].

Interpretation – Rule 20(2) of BSF Rules – Meaning of "Inexpedient" – Court held term "inexpedient" has wider ambit than "not reasonably practicable" – Covers situations where holding GSFC may not be suitable or appropriate to achieve disciplinary objectives – Rule 20(2) intended to give discretion to competent authority in fit cases without mandatory GSFC – Held: Invocation of Rule 20(2) justified in facts of case [Paras 30–37].

Constitutional Law – Distinction from Article 311(2)(c) – Rule 20(2) BSF Rules operates independently and does not require satisfaction on grounds of “security of the State” unlike Article 311(2)(c) – Full Bench decision in Laishram Sushil Singh not applicable to BSF Rule 20(2) – Held: Provisions not pari materia and operate under different legal tests [Paras 28–29].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Court upheld the disciplinary authority’s decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner under Rule 20(4)(c) of the BSF Rules – Held: Decision to invoke Rule 20(2) based on seriousness of misconduct and nature of evidence was lawful – No ground for judicial interference under Article 226 of Constitution of India [Para 41].