Specific Performance – Agreement to Sell – Payment of Instalments – Manipulation Alleged – Agreement to sell dated 22.10.2005 for Rs.1,02,00,000/- with earnest money of Rs.15,00,000/- paid on the date of execution – Plaintiff claimed further payment of Rs.5,00,000/- on 22.04.2006 (Ex.PW-3/A) and Rs.5,00,000/- on 22.08.2006 (Ex.PW-3/B) endorsed on the back of the agreement, the latter occasion also extending the last date for execution of the sale deed to 22.02.2007 – Defendant denied the two subsequent payments and alleged manipulation of endorsements – Held: Thumb impression of defendant on endorsements Ex.PW-3/A and Ex.PW-3/B not disputed in cross-examination of attesting witness PW-3; defendant only alleged that a pre-existing thumb impression was misused without appearing to assert this specifically in his own evidence – Non-controverting of the receipt of Rs.5,00,000/- on each occasion in the reply notice (Ex.PW-1/E) is fatal to the defendant – Documents Ex.PW-1/F and Ex.PW-1/G admitted by the defendant also recorded the payments – Suit decreed [Paras 50–92].

Time – Not Essence of Contract for Immovable Property – Unilateral Notice Cannot Make Time Essence – Settled presumption that in contracts for sale of immovable property, time is not the essence unless the agreement in express, unequivocal terms makes it so – A unilateral legal notice by the vendor cannot alter the mutually agreed terms of the agreement and cannot by itself make time the essence of the contract – Defendant's notices dated 27.05.2006 and 26.08.2006 purporting to make time the essence cannot rescind the agreement where the plaintiff had already demonstrated readiness and willingness by making further payments and the last date for execution had been extended by mutual endorsement to 22.02.2007 [Paras 54–63].

Readiness and Willingness – No Straitjacket Formula – Adverse Inference – Financial Capacity – Plaintiff consistently averred readiness and willingness in the plaint, in notices, and in evidence – Defendant failed to suggest in cross-examination that the plaintiff lacked financial capacity to perform his part – No direction was given by the Court or sought by the defendant for production of bank passbook – Held: Adverse inference cannot be drawn for non-production of bank records when the plaintiff was never called upon to produce them; plaintiff's oral statement that he could produce the passbook if directed is sufficient – No rigid formula governs proof of readiness and willingness; it depends on facts and circumstances of each case [Paras 78–91].

Order 2 Rule 2 CPC – Bar of Relinquishment – Not Applicable – Plaintiff had earlier filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction before the Civil Judge, Nalagarh which was withdrawn on 15.09.2007 without reserving liberty to file fresh suit – Defendant contended subsequent suit for specific performance is barred – Held: The two suits are not based on identical causes of action; the suit for injunction was premature as the last date for performance was 22.02.2007 and specific performance could not have been sought before that date; the suit for specific performance could not have been filed before a court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction – A plaintiff who sues for a relief the Court cannot grant is not debarred from subsequently filing a suit for a relief the Court can grant; Order 2 Rule 2 CPC has no application [Paras 94–105].

Rescission by Notice – Not Valid – Once it is proved that the last date for execution of the sale deed was extended to 22.02.2007 by mutual endorsement, the agreement to sell cannot be said to have been rescinded by notice dated 27.05.2006 [Para 106].

Decision: Suit decreed – Defendants directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within three months from today on receipt of balance sale consideration of Rs.77,00,000/- – In case of failure by the defendants to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff is at liberty to approach the Court for execution through its intervention upon depositing the balance sale consideration along with necessary registration and ancillary expenses within two months.

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Specified Value – Amendment Act 28 of 2018 – Section 2(1)(i) – "Specified Value" and "Pecuniary Value" – Distinction – The terms "Specified Value" as defined in Section 2(1)(i) in Chapter I of the Act and "pecuniary value" as used in Section 3(1A) in Chapter II of the Act are two distinct and separate expressions operating in two different fields – "Specified Value" relates to the value of the subject-matter of a commercial dispute to determine whether it falls within the Commercial Court's jurisdiction; "pecuniary value" relates to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Commercial Court itself at different levels – The Division Bench erred in treating both as one and the same, which was the root cause of the conflict [Per Roy, J.; Paras 7-9, 18].

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Specified Value – No Separate Notification Required for Base Limit of Rs. 3 Lakhs – Amendment Act 28 of 2018 – Section 2(1)(i) – The Amendment Act 28 of 2018 itself substituted the "Specified Value" from "not less than Rs. 1 crore" to "not less than Rs. 3 lakhs" with effect from 03.05.2018 – No separate notification by the Central Government is required to bring this amendment into force – The word "or" used in Section 2(1)(i) between "not less than Rs. 3 lakhs" and "such higher value" is disjunctive; notification by the Central Government is required only when the Central Government intends to fix a higher value than the base limit of Rs. 3 lakhs – The Statute itself has fixed the base value [Per Roy, J.; Paras 9-12; Per Tilhari, J. concurring; Paras 35-65].

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 3(1A) – Notification by State Government – Pecuniary Jurisdiction of Commercial Courts – Section 3(1A) inserted by Amendment Act 28 of 2018 confers power on the State Government to specify pecuniary value of Commercial Courts by notification in consultation with the High Court – Notification under Section 3(1A) is required to confer pecuniary jurisdiction on Commercial Courts, particularly for the part of the specified value from Rs. 3 lakhs to less than Rs. 1 crore – Section 3(1A) starts with non-obstante clause "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act" thereby overriding Section 2(1)(i) to the extent of the reduced specified value; till such notification is issued by the State Government, the two existing Commercial Courts in Andhra Pradesh at Visakhapatnam and Vijayawada, constituted for "specified value" of not less than Rs. 1 crore, cannot automatically exercise pecuniary jurisdiction for disputes of value below Rs. 1 crore [Per Roy, J. Paras 14-24; Per Tilhari, J. partly concurring/supplementing on question 'A', differing on questions 'B' & 'C'; Paras 68-104].

Commercial Courts – Jurisdiction – Civil Courts and Special Courts – When a special court is constituted under a special enactment to deal with commercial disputes of a Specified Value, jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts is impliedly barred – Pecuniary limits of A.P. Civil Courts Act do not apply to Commercial Courts established under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 which is a Central special enactment – Commercial Courts established at District Judge cadre level have ample jurisdiction to try disputes of specified value irrespective of pecuniary limits on ordinary civil courts under the A.P. Civil Courts Act [Per Roy, J.; Paras 21-24].

Reference – Answers – Conflict between Bellam Balakrishna and U.V. Satyanarayana – Per Majority (Roy, J. and Devanand, J.): (A) Amendment Act 28 of 2018 itself amends the "Specified Value" to "not less than Rs. 3 lakhs" operative from 03.05.2018 without any notification; notification required only for higher value by Central Government; (B) Specified Value operative from date of amendment 03.05.2018; no notification by Central or State Government required for base limit; (C) U.V. Satyanarayana lays down the law correctly; Bellam Balakrishna does not – Per Tilhari, J. (concurring on 'A', differing on 'B' & 'C'): Amendment Act operative from 03.05.2018 for Central Government notification; State Government notification under Section 3(1A) is mandatory for the part of specified value from Rs. 3 lakhs to less than Rs. 1 crore to become operative in Andhra Pradesh; Bellam Balakrishna lays down the law correctly with modification; U.V. Satyanarayana does not lay down correct law [Paras 26, 112].

Commercial Courts – Implementation – Directions to State Government and High Court – Court noted that no effect has been given to the amendments to Sections 2(1)(i), 3(1A) and 3(3) of the Act by the High Court or the State Government; two existing Commercial Courts are still receiving only disputes of Specified Value above Rs. 1 crore – Directed the High Court to pursue the matter with the Government and issue fresh proceedings specifying the Specified Value as not less than Rs. 3 lakhs – State Government directed to immediately implement G.O.Rt.No.609 dated 05.06.2023 converting 13 Fast Track Courts as Commercial Courts in the cadre of Senior Civil Judge and issue notification under Section 3(1A) specifying the pecuniary value [Para 27-29].

Decision: Reference answered accordingly – Civil Revision Petitions directed to be listed before respective Benches for disposal according to law – Copy of judgment directed to be sent to the Advocate General, Chief Secretary and Law Secretary, State of Andhra Pradesh for necessary action.

Criminal Law – Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 405 and 406 IPC – Provident Fund Deductions – "Employer" and "Occupier" – Ultimate Control – Petitioners were former General Managers and Branch Manager of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals, South Ancheri, a unit of the Kerala State Federation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Development Co-operative Society – Charged with criminal breach of trust for failure to deposit employees' provident fund contributions deducted from salaries during May 2011 to February 2016 – Held: Petitioners do not satisfy the definition of "Employer" or "Occupier" under Section 2(e) and 2(k) of the EPF Act or "Occupier" under Section 2(n) of the Factories Act, as ultimate control over the affairs of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals vested in the Federation, not in the petitioners who were lower-level officers of the Co-operative Department – FIR and all proceedings quashed [Paras 4-18].

Criminal Law – Employer – Occupier – Definition – Sections 2(e) and 2(k) EPF Act, Section 2(n) Factories Act – "Employer" in relation to an establishment which is not a factory means the person or authority having ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, or the manager/managing director/managing agent when affairs are entrusted to them – "Occupier" of a factory is the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory – General Managers and Branch Managers assigned to a unit of a Federation do not have ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment when ultimate control is vested in the Federation and its Managing Director under the bye law – Such officers are not "Employers" or "Occupiers" within the meaning of the EPF Act or Factories Act [Paras 7-11].

Criminal Law – Cooperative Society – Bye Law – Managing Director – Ultimate Control – As per the Bye Law of the Federation, management vests in the Board of Directors with the Managing Director as the Chief Executive responsible for general administration of the Federation and all units functioning under it – Managing Director has authority to sign cheques, receive moneys, supervise staff, sue and be sued on behalf of the Federation – Form No. 5A submitted under the EPF Scheme showed the name of the Managing Director as the owner and occupier of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals, South Ancheri – The persons liable to be prosecuted are the Managing Directors of the Federation during the relevant periods, who were however excluded from the final report without justification [Paras 12-16].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Where on the face of prosecution records and relevant bye law it is apparent that ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment did not vest in the petitioners, the question of ultimate control is not purely factual and requiring evidence – Court can quash proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process of law – Argument that question of ultimate control must await trial is not acceptable where the legal position is apparent from the prosecution records themselves [Para 17].

Decision: All three petitions allowed – FIR registered in Crime No. 1598/2016 of Ollur Police Station and all proceedings before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur in CC No. 1230/2017 quashed [Para 18].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Essential Ingredients – Legally Enforceable Debt – Proof – Complainant alleged he gave a friendly loan of Rs. 3,00,000/- to the respondent and in discharge thereof two cheques of Rs. 1,00,000/- and Rs. 2,00,000/- dated 26.06.2012 were issued – Cheques dishonoured for insufficient funds – Both parties connected to a Ponzi scheme (TVI Express) – Accused denied taking any loan and claimed cheques were issued for business purposes and were blank signed cheques misused by the complainant – Witness who allegedly saw the loan transaction denied witnessing anything in cross-examination – No date of loan disclosed; no agreement between parties; cheque deposited on same date as issue – Held: Complainant failed to prove that cheques were issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability – Essential ingredient of Section 138 not established – Acquittal affirmed [Paras 6-17].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 139 – Presumption – Rebuttal – Standard of Proof – Section 139 raises a rebuttable presumption that the holder received the cheque for discharge of a debt or liability – Standard of proof for rebuttal is preponderance of probabilities; accused need not discharge an unduly high standard – Where the accused is able to raise a probable defence creating doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail – In the present case, the nature of business in which both parties were engaged, the absence of any specific details of the loan, the absence of any agreement, and the accused's denial under Section 313 CrPC collectively establish rebuttal by preponderance of probabilities [Paras 12-15, 17].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Service of Demand Notice – Deliberate Avoidance – Where notice is returned with endorsement of absence, it is open to the complainant to prove that the addressee deliberately avoided service – Mere postal endorsement of "7 days absent" is not sufficient to constitute deemed service – Accused established through evidence that he was absent for 15 days due to his mother's illness and had no opportunity to receive the notice – Complainant adduced no evidence of the postal authority and made no further attempt to serve notice – Notice cannot be treated as served in such circumstances [Paras 8-9].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – Court must be careful while reversing an order of acquittal – Acquittal is affirmed where the Trial Court's findings are supported by a reasonable view of the evidence, particularly when the complainant's own witness resiled from his testimony and the factual matrix raised a credible probability of the cheques being issued for business purposes rather than in discharge of any debt [Paras 5, 17].

Decision: CRA dismissed – Order of acquittal dated 19.12.2013 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Tehatta, Nadia affirmed – All connected applications disposed of [Paras 18-20].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138/141 – Vicarious Liability of Director – Quashing – Inherent Jurisdiction – Cheque bearing No.301731 dated 21.05.2025 for Rs.2.05 Crores issued by Kartarz Alloys Private Limited towards part payment during OTS negotiations for a loan account declared NPA by ICICI Bank Ltd. – Cheque dishonoured – Complaint filed by respondent-company as assignee of the debt – Petitioner, a Director of the company, summoned by trial Court vide order dated 12.01.2026 – Petitioner contended he had no role in day-to-day affairs, cheque bore only the Managing Director's signatures, and the cheque was a conditional security cheque presented fraudulently after rejection of OTS proposal – Held: These are disputed questions of fact incapable of conclusive adjudication in inherent jurisdiction proceedings – Complaint contains foundational averments specifically alleging petitioner's responsibility for the affairs of the company and active participation in the transaction – No patent illegality or perversity in the summoning order – Petition dismissed [Paras 6–8].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Scope and Limits – Section 528 BNSS / Section 482 CrPC – Jurisdiction to quash is to be exercised sparingly and only where continuation of proceedings amounts to abuse of process of law or where no offence is disclosed even if allegations in the complaint are taken at face value – Court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or examine the defence raised by the accused – Where basic averments exist in the complaint, proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the threshold merely because the accused raises a probable defence – Defence pleas and disputed questions of fact are matters for adjudication before the trial Court after parties lead evidence [Paras 6–8].

Conditional Security Cheque – OTS Negotiations – Defence of Accused – Whether the cheque was issued as a conditional security cheque and whether it could lawfully be presented after rejection of the OTS proposal are questions of fact requiring evidence – Authenticity and legal consequences of resignation documents relied upon by the petitioner also require trial – This Court cannot at this stage record a definitive finding that the petitioner had no role in the company's affairs [Para 8].

SARFAESI Proceedings – Quashing by DRT – Collusion Alleged – Petitioner contended that SARFAESI proceedings initiated by ICICI Bank were subsequently quashed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal vide order dated 08.08.2025 and that the respondent-company and the Bank acted in collusion to pressurize the petitioner – Held: These contentions require appreciation of evidence and cannot be accepted as grounds for quashing at this stage [Para 4].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Complaint No. NACT-745-2025 and summoning order dated 12.01.2026 not interfered with – Petitioner to face trial before the learned trial Court – Pending miscellaneous applications disposed of.

Civil Law – Gift Deed – Unsound Mind – Mandatory Inquiry – Order 32 Rule 15 CPC – Plaintiff, a hearing and speech-disabled woman approximately 80 years of age, filed suit through next friend challenging the validity of a gift deed dated 28.11.1989 executed in favour of the defendants, claiming she was mentally incapable of executing any document – Trial Court and Appellate Court concurrently held that plaintiff was hearing impaired but mentally sound and upheld validity of gift deed – Held on second appeal: Order 32 Rule 15 CPC mandates that before proceeding in a suit filed by a person claimed to be of unsound mind through a next friend, the Court must either find that the person has been adjudged of unsound mind or must conduct an inquiry to satisfy itself of the person's mental infirmity – No such inquiry was conducted in the present case; plaintiff never appeared before the Court and no expert was examined to prove unsoundness of mind – The very premise of the suit that the plaintiff was of unsound mind is therefore not established [Paras 14–17].

Proof of Unsoundness of Mind – Expert Evidence – Lay Witnesses – PW2 and PW3, non-medical lay witnesses, deposed about the plaintiff's hearing, speech and cognitive disability – Held: Testimony of lay witnesses not being medical experts cannot be relied upon to establish unsoundness of mind – Medical certificate (Ex.DY) issued by a Surgical Specialist stated plaintiff was hearing impaired but could hear on loud speaking with alert mental status – Surgical Specialist, while not a specialist in mental faculties, is more competent than a layperson and the certificate cannot be discarded solely on that ground [Paras 18–19].

Gift Deed – Execution – Sound Disposing Mind – Attestation – Scribe (DW2) and attesting witnesses (DW3 and DW4) consistently deposed that the gift deed was read over and explained to the plaintiff Rumal Dei, who acknowledged its correctness and put her thumbprint – Tehsildar (DW5) made independent inquiries from the plaintiff and she answered them before putting her thumbprint – Concurrent findings of Trial Court and Appellate Court that witnesses of defence corroborated each other on execution in sound disposing mind is a pure finding of fact, not perverse, and warrants no interference [Paras 20–26].

Mutation – Registration – Not to be Disturbed – Sub-Registrar duly registered the gift deed after satisfying himself of the plaintiff's soundness of mind; mutation attested after production of medical certificate – Authorities rightly registered the gift deed and the mutations [Para 26].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed – Concurrent judgments and decrees of the Trial Court dated 26.08.1997 and the Appellate Court dated 31.12.2004 affirmed – Substantial questions of law answered against the appellants.

Trade Marks – Passing Off – House Mark "REDDY" in Pharmaceutical Trade – Prior Use – Goodwill – Respondent/DRL established since 1984 under the trading style "Dr. Reddy's Laboratories" claimed the mark "REDDY" had, through long and continuous use, acquired distinctiveness exclusively associated with it – Appellant/RPL, incorporated in 1996 with Managing Director bearing the surname "Reddy", used "REDDY" as a house mark on pharmaceutical formulations launched in 2003 – Single Judge granted permanent injunction – Division Bench upheld – Held: The dominant and essential feature of both marks is "REDDY"; the marks are phonetically identical and structurally the defendant's mark is wholly subsumed within the plaintiff's mark; applying the test of imperfect recollection, the similarity is deceptively likely to lead to confusion; in pharmaceutical matters, even a remote possibility of confusion must be avoided – Passing off established [Paras 86–132].

Trade Marks – Passing Off – Goodwill – Admission of Defendant's Witness Decisive – Plaintiff produced newspaper publications, sales invoices from 1997, and advertisement invoices to establish goodwill – Defendant challenged absence of CA certificates – Held: The proof of goodwill in passing off does not require CA-certified records alone; what is required is a mosaic of evidence showing actual trade, promotion, and public recognition; crucially, DW-1 (defendant's own witness) categorically admitted under cross-examination that "the plaintiff company enjoys a reputation in the market" – Such an admission, being the best evidence against the party making it and unchallenged, binds the defendant and places goodwill beyond doubt [Paras 103–116].

Trade Marks – Acquiescence – Doctrine Applied with Reference to Point of Actionable Misrepresentation – Appellant urged seven years' delay; plaintiff was aware of defendant's use since 1997 and had recognized the corporate name in the Agency Agreement of 2003 – Held: Acquiescence involves a positive act of encouragement or assent and is distinct from mere delay; tolerance of a trade name in a non-competing segment (bulk drug distribution) cannot constitute acquiescence to its subsequent use in a directly competing line (finished pharmaceutical formulations); the cause of action in passing off arises not from mere adoption or use of a mark, but from misrepresentation causing likelihood of deception; cause of action arose only in August-September 2003 when defendant entered the formulations market, upon which plaintiff acted promptly – Acquiescence rejected [Paras 62–84].

Trade Marks – Section 35 – Bona Fide Use of Personal Name – Defence Not Available – Dishonest Adoption – Defendant claimed protection under Section 35 as "REDDY" was the Managing Director's surname – Held: The defence under Section 35 is contingent on bona fide use; honesty of adoption must be assessed at inception; defendant was fully aware of plaintiff's goodwill through prior commercial dealings and the Agency Agreement; defendant filed trademark application (TM No. 1192732) within 16 days of the Agency Agreement on a "proposed to be used" basis, wholly inconsistent with any claim of long or natural use; use of Ameerpet, Hyderabad address on packaging despite no facility there points to mala fide intent; a party cannot simultaneously claim exclusivity over a mark and deny its distinctiveness – defence of bona fide use under Section 35 not available [Paras 134–156].

Trade Marks – Rectification – Section 57 – IPAB's Order Upheld – Writ Jurisdiction – Limited Scope of Interference – IPAB directed removal of defendant's registered mark "REDDY" (Reg. No. 1192732, Class 5) from the Register – Held: Rectification under Section 57(2) is a broad remedy available to any aggrieved person; if a mark ought not to have been registered in the first place as it breached Sections 9 or 11, it ought not to remain on the Register; IPAB's finding that the mark was "bound to cause material confusion and deception" and was dishonestly adopted falls squarely within Section 9(2)(a) and Section 11 principles; even if IPAB incorrectly cited Section 158 of the Companies Act, the substantive findings independently justify removal; writ jurisdiction is limited to manifest illegality, perversity, or non-application of mind — writ petition dismissed [Paras 32–55].

Trade Marks – Priority of Use versus Registration – Prior Use Prevails – Held: Priority in adoption and use of a trademark takes precedence over priority in registration; DRL's use since 1984 and its common law rights arising from long and continuous use are superior to RPL's later registration; a surname through long, continuous and extensive use may acquire distinctiveness and secondary meaning [Paras 18.6–18.11, 125].

Copyright – Packaging Artwork – OMEZ Strip – Infringement by OMRE – Visual Comparison – Plaintiff owned copyright in OMEZ strip packaging through an Assignment Deed dated 28.08.2002 – Defendant's OMRE strip adopted the same silver foil base, pink/magenta lettering, black descriptive text placement, left-right distribution of dosage/warning and trading particulars, and similar stomach logo device – Held: Originality in artistic works lies in the author's selection, arrangement, layout, colour combination and visual presentation; once the assignment chain of title is proved and unchallenged, ownership is established; overall visual comparison discloses substantial similarity – copyright infringement in OMEZ strip packaging established [Paras 171–186].

Domain Names – Passing Off – "REDDY" in Domain Name – Held: A domain name is not merely an internet address but serves the same function as a trademark — identifying and distinguishing the source of goods or services; misuse of a domain name is capable of resulting in diversion of business and deception of consumers; in an action for passing off, the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate ownership of an identical domain name; once goodwill and likelihood of misrepresentation are established, protection follows – domain name passing off upheld [Paras 157–170].

Damages and Rendition of Accounts – Section 135, Trade Marks Act – Damages and Rendition of Accounts are Alternative Remedies – Held: Under Section 135(1), a plaintiff may seek either damages or an account of profits; absence of quantified evidence of loss may disentitle the plaintiff to compensatory damages but does not defeat the grant of an order for rendition of accounts and delivery up once infringement, passing off, and copyright violation are established [Paras 187–197].

Decision: W.P.(C) 654/2014 dismissed – IPAB's order removing "REDDY" mark from Register of Trade Marks upheld – RFA(OS) 138/2013 dismissed – Permanent injunction against Appellant from using the mark "REDDY" in relation to pharmaceutical products and from operating the domain name www.reddylimited.com confirmed – Order for rendition of accounts of profits and delivery up of infringing products and labels confirmed.

Public Premises Act – Eviction – Unauthorised Occupation – Lease Determined – Section 4 PP Act – Respondent held lease of 84.484 acres of public land granted on 08.03.1926 for use as Race Course, extended from time to time and finally determined on 31.12.1994 by efflux of time – Request for extension/renewal not acceded to in view of government and defence requirements – Show cause notice issued on 17.04.2026 under Sections 4(1) and 4(2)(b)(ii) of the PP Act – Held: On expiry of the term of lease, the respondent's occupation ceased to be authorised within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the PP Act – Section 4 vests a statutory right in the government to seek eviction of unauthorised occupants – Invocation of this right does not amount to abuse of process or pre-meditated action [Paras 44–50].

Letters Patent Appeal – Maintainability – "Judgment" – Interlocutory Order Impacting Statutory Rights – Impugned order staying proceedings before Estate Officer challenged as not being a "judgment" amenable to intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent – Held: The expression "judgment" under Letters Patent is to be given a wider meaning than under CPC – An interlocutory order which adversely impacts a valuable statutory right of a party directly and immediately, and not merely indirectly or remotely, qualifies as a "judgment" – Impugned order restraining the Estate Officer from proceeding with show cause notice directly impacts the statutory right under Section 4 of the PP Act and constitutes a "judgment" – Intra-court appeal maintainable [Paras 23–51].

Interim Relief – Writ Jurisdiction – Obligation to Record Prima Facie Case, Balance of Convenience and Irreparable Loss – Learned Single Judge deferred proceedings before Estate Officer merely observing that "matter requires consideration" in view of "chequered history of litigation" without any discussion of prima facie case, irreparable loss or balance of convenience – Held: Even while exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court is obligated to consider and record findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss before granting interim relief – Where interim relief amounts to granting final relief, availability of a very strong prima facie case of a standard higher than mere prima facie case is required – Impugned order not sustainable for absence of such reasoning [Paras 52–59].

Show Cause Notice – Writ Challenge – Interference Permissible in Limited Circumstances – Ordinarily, challenge to a show cause notice is not available in writ jurisdiction – However, interference is permissible where notice suffers from patent lack of jurisdiction, reflects non-application of mind, shows pre-determined approach, or amounts to abuse of process or violation of natural justice – Show cause notice under Section 4 of PP Act preceded by determination of lease, vacation notice, disposal of civil suit and satisfaction of outstanding dues – No pre-meditation or abuse of process established [Paras 17, 46].

Earlier Show Cause Notice Quashed – Not a Bar to Fresh Notice – Earlier show cause notice dated 25.10.1999 was quashed by this Court in W.P.(C) 7822/1999 on 09.07.2012 with liberty to decide representation for renewal/extension – Representation processed and rejected – Fresh notice dated 17.04.2026 thereafter issued – Held: Fresh notice issued pursuant to and consistent with the directions in the order dated 09.07.2012 – Respondent has ample opportunity to raise all pleas, including legality of notice, before the Estate Officer [Paras 47–48].

Decision: Intra-court appeal allowed – Order dated 24.04.2026 passed by learned Single Judge directing Estate Officer not to proceed with show cause notice dated 17.04.2026 set aside – No order as to costs [Paras 60–63].

Matrimonial Law - Maintenance – Execution – Imprisonment – Coercive vs. Punitive Detention – Article 21 – Applicant incarcerated since 30.10.2025 pursuant to execution proceedings for recovery of maintenance arrears of approximately Rs. 1,38,000/- under Section 144(3) BNSS – Both courts below declined release on the ground that substantial arrears remained outstanding – Held: Detention in maintenance execution proceedings is merely a coercive device intended to compel compliance and not a punitive sentence akin to criminal incarceration – Once detention ceases to operate as an effective coercive mechanism and assumes the nature of indefinite punitive confinement, the same travels beyond the permissible statutory framework – Continued detention of an indigent person who claims inability arising from prolonged incarceration itself frustrates the very purpose sought to be achieved by maintenance law – Impugned orders set aside and applicant directed to be released [Paras 18–19, 24–25].

Prolonged Incarceration – Indigent Person – Earning Capacity – Proportionality – Applicant is a labourer whose earning capacity is inevitably and totally destroyed by prolonged incarceration – Continued detention of such a person becomes self-defeating as the detenu becomes economically incapacitated from discharging future maintenance liabilities – Courts below failed to examine the larger legal issue of permissibility and proportionality of prolonged incarceration in a singular execution proceeding – Part payment of Rs. 20,000/- by applicant indicates some degree of willingness to comply with maintenance order [Paras 19–20].

Medical Condition – Article 21 – Humanitarian Considerations – Medical documents filed by applicant indicate serious health complications necessitating referral for higher medical treatment from Sub Jail, Rahli – Courts below, while considering application under Section 480 BNSS, were required to balance the coercive purpose of detention against humanitarian and constitutional considerations flowing from Article 21 – Impugned orders do not reflect any meaningful consideration of applicant's deteriorating medical condition [Para 21].

Rights of Maintenance Beneficiaries – Release Not to Extinguish Liability – Maintenance is not a matter of charity but a legal entitlement flowing from statutory obligation – Release of applicant cannot result in extinguishment or dilution of maintenance liability – Applicant directed to deposit Rs. 25,000/- within thirty days of release and to continue paying future maintenance regularly – Executing Court at liberty to proceed in accordance with law in case of future default [Paras 22, 25].

Decision: Petition partly allowed – Orders dated 02.04.2026 and 17.02.2026 passed by Additional Sessions Judge and JMFC respectively quashed and set aside – Applicant directed to be released forthwith from judicial custody in connection with MJC No.257/2024 subject to furnishing personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety – Applicant directed to deposit Rs. 25,000/- before executing court within thirty days of release and to continue paying future maintenance – Executing court to disburse deposited amount to respondents – All remedies of parties in original maintenance proceedings kept open [Para 25].