Criminal Law - Quashing of Proceedings - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent powers to prevent abuse of process - Petitioner challenged cognizance order for offences under Sections 294-A, 420, 120(B) IPC and Section 7(3) of Lotteries Act - Allegations involved illegal betting on 2019 World Cup cricket matches at Haryana Bhawan - Petitioner argued FIR was tampered and ante-timed as GD entry was dated 10.07.2019 while FIR was shown as registered on 09.07.2019 - Court found no independent witnesses from the locality despite it being a bustling market - No evidence of money collection or ticket distribution found in bank statements or WhatsApp chats - Held - Compelling petitioner to face trial on basis of uncorroborated confessions to police would be an exercise in futility - Petition allowed and proceedings quashed - [Paras 1-30].

Criminal Law - Statutory Bar to Cognizance - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 196(2) - Absence of Sanction - Cognizance taken for offence under Section 294-A IPC regarding keeping a lottery office - Offence is not punishable with rigorous imprisonment for two years or more - Section 196(2) mandates written consent of State Government or District Magistrate for such offences - No material on record showed such consent was obtained prior to the cognizance order - Held - Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of Section 294-A IPC in the absence of requisite sanction - [Para 18].

Evidence Law - Admissibility of Confession - Indian Evidence Act 1872 - Section 25 - Confession to police officer - Prosecution case rested primarily on alleged confessions of petitioner and co-accused made to the police during a raid - No recovery of lottery tickets or incriminating material to corroborate the statements - Held - Confessions made to a police officer are inadmissible and cannot form the basis of conviction without corroboration - [Paras 26-27].

Criminal Law - Cheating and Conspiracy - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 420 and 120(B) - Ingredients of offence - Charge of cheating requires inducement and delivery of property while conspiracy requires prior meeting of minds - Investigation failed to identify any person induced or cheated by petitioner - Case diary showed no material suggesting a prior agreement between accused persons - Held - Necessary ingredients to attract Sections 420 and 120(B) IPC were completely absent - [Paras 19-21].

Decision: Petition allowed – Order of cognizance dated 06.04.2022 passed by SDJM (Sadar) Cuttack in G.R. Case No. 1169 of 2019 is quashed so far as it relates to the petitioner.

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – CISF – Removal from Service – Scope of Writ Jurisdiction – Four articles of charge proved against petitioner-constable including making unsubstantiated sexual harassment allegations, misbehaviour with superior officers, involving local police bypassing chain of command, and habitual indiscipline despite prior penalties — all authorities concurrently upheld removal — Held: High Court does not act as appellate authority in disciplinary matters; interference warranted only where proceedings are vitiated by violation of natural justice, findings are perverse or based on no evidence, there is patent procedural illegality, or punishment is shockingly disproportionate — no such ground made out — writ petition dismissed [Paras 12, 31–32].

Natural Justice – Alleged Denial of Fair Opportunity – Ex Parte Inquiry – Petitioner claimed denial of fair opportunity and effective ex parte proceeding — Held: Petitioner was duly served with charge memorandum, filed reply and participated in inquiry; no specific instance of denial of request for leading evidence or cross-examination shown; petitioner did not cooperate with Sexual Harassment Complaint Committee leading to ex parte conclusion — petitioner cannot take advantage of own non-cooperation to allege violation of natural justice [Paras 13–17].

Sexual Harassment Complaint – Treatment as Misconduct – Petitioner contended disciplinary action was a consequence of raising sexual harassment complaints — Held: Complaint was duly enquired into by constituted Committee which found allegations unsubstantiated; disciplinary proceedings not directed at the act of making a complaint but at the findings that allegations were unsubstantiated and conduct amounted to misconduct; no material to demonstrate mala fides or legal unsustainability of the Committee's inquiry [Paras 22–25].

Habitual Misconduct – Past Conduct as Relevant Factor – Petitioner had been penalized on multiple prior occasions for indiscipline including a prior false complaint; continued misconduct despite opportunities to improve — Held: In uniformed forces, past conduct is a relevant factor in determining the nature and extent of penalty; consideration of previous record by disciplinary authority cannot be faulted [Paras 26–27].

Proportionality of Punishment – Members of Disciplined Force – High Standard of Conduct Required – Held: In a disciplined force, making unsubstantiated allegations against colleagues, misbehaving with superior officers, and bypassing chain of command have serious implications for discipline; having regard to the nature of charges proved and past conduct, the penalty of removal from service cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate so as to warrant interference [Paras 28–30].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed — Pending application closed.

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 439(2) - Bail Cancellation - Distinction between cancellation and revocation - Held - Law is well settled that cancellation of bail due to violation of conditions is distinct from revocation of an order found to be perverse or illegal - Bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner or merely because the offence is serious - High Court while dealing with a cancellation application does not sit as an appellate court to judge the bail order passed by a co-ordinate bench - [Paras 8-12].

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 437(1) - Bail - Concession for women - Held - Statute provides that the court may direct the release of a woman on bail even in cases where life imprisonment or death penalty is prescribed - Women are recognized as potentially vulnerable and capable of being made scapegoats by unscrupulous elements - Respondent being a female is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 437(1) - [Paras 13-14].

Criminal Law - Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 - Sections 8/15 27A 29 and 59 - Manipulation of investigation - Official misconduct - Held - State sought cancellation on the ground that the co-ordinate bench ignored the gravity of the charge - Order granting bail was based on the observation that the offence fell under Section 221 IPC - No supervening circumstances or post-bail misconduct reported despite the lapse of four years since the grant of bail - Application for cancellation lacking merit - [Paras 1-7 and 12-15].

Decision: Application dismissed – Order granting bail to the respondent remains undisturbed.

Habeas Corpus — Maintainability — Married Detenue Residing with Husband — Petitioner claiming to be close friend and live-in partner of a married woman filed habeas corpus petition alleging she apprehended threat from her husband — Detenue admittedly married to Respondent No. 5 with a child from the said marriage and residing with him — Held: Court cannot intervene in matrimonial issues inter se spouses — Judicial sanctity cannot be accorded to an adulterous relationship — Petition not maintainable [Paras 1–2].

Habeas Corpus — Reliance on Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala — Distinguished — Petitioner relied upon Supreme Court guidelines in Devu G. Nair for protection of intimate partners and LGBTQ communities — Held: Said judgment arose in a case where the detenue was not married and was not residing with a spouse; guidelines therein were laid down concerning illegal detention of persons in intimate relationships and LGBTQ contexts — Distinguishable on facts; of no avail to petitioner [Para 2].

Decision: Petition dismissed in limine for lack of maintainability — Pending miscellaneous applications disposed of [Para 3].

SC/ST Act – Appeal under Section 14-A(1) – Order of Framing of Charge – Interlocutory Order – Maintainability – Appellants challenged the order of framing of charges under Sections 427, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3(1)(da) and 3(1)(dha) of the SC/ST Act passed by the Special Judge, Deoria – Section 14-A(1) provides that an appeal shall lie from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order – Held: Order framing charge is an interlocutory order as it does not terminate proceedings or finally decide rights of parties; trial continues until culminating in acquittal or conviction – Appeal under Section 14-A(1) against an interlocutory order is not maintainable – Appeal dismissed [Paras 7-28].

Criminal Procedure – Order of Framing of Charge – Nature – Interlocutory Order – An "interlocutory order" is one made during the progress of proceedings which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties – Order which does not terminate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of parties is only an interlocutory order – An order which substantially affects the rights of the accused is not an interlocutory order – Trial of a warrant case starts with framing of charge; prior to it, the proceedings are only an inquiry – After framing of charge, if accused pleads not guilty, the court must proceed to trial to its logical end and can only acquit or convict and cannot discharge – Order framing charge is therefore an interlocutory order as it does not terminate proceedings but trial continues [Paras 9-20].

Criminal Procedure – Framing of Charge – Effect – After Charge Framed, Discharge Not Permissible – Once charges are framed and accused pleads not guilty, the Magistrate or court has no power under the Code to discharge the accused; it can only convict or acquit – Issue of discharge becomes redundant after charges are framed as courts have no jurisdiction to allow discharge at that stage – Any purported "discharge" after framing of charge would be illegal – This settled position further reinforces that order of framing of charge is interlocutory as it does not conclude the trial [Paras 10-17].

SC/ST Act – Section 14-A – Alternate Remedy – Where appeal is not maintainable against an interlocutory order such as order of framing of charge, the aggrieved party may avail the remedy of revisional jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction under the BNSS or other laws if permissible – Even if order of framing of charge were treated as a final order, the appellate court cannot direct the trial court to discharge the accused, as no such power exists after charges are framed [Paras 25-26].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed as not maintainable – Order of framing of charge dated 15.09.2025 of the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Deoria held to be an interlocutory order against which appeal under Section 14-A(1) of the SC/ST Act does not lie [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Contempt — Social Media Campaign — Scandalising the Court — Judicial Independence — Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Respondents, aggrieved by orders passed by this Court in a criminal revision petition, initiated a coordinated and sustained public campaign through social media platforms, press conferences, edited videos and public letters, instead of availing legal remedies before the Supreme Court — The campaign was found to be a calculated attempt to vilify the presiding Judge, undermine judicial independence, and obstruct administration of justice — Recusal applications filed by respondents were rejected by a detailed judgment dated 20.04.2026 — Held: Acts of the proposed contemnors prima facie constitute criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Suo motu proceedings drawn — Matter directed to be placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to an appropriate Bench [Paras 1-18, 116, 120, 139].

Contemptuous Conduct — R-18 Arvind Kejriwal — Declarations on Social Media — R-18 publicly published a letter on platform 'X' on 27.04.2026 attributing political bias to this Court and declaring he would neither appear personally nor through counsel in the matter — He stated that no ordinary citizen could believe that this Court could rule against the Solicitor General or the Union Government, and that the outcome appeared "foretold" — His public declaration framed as "Satyagraha" was found to be, in effect, a deliberate attempt to publicly portray the Court as incapable of independent adjudication — Held: Such statements scandalise the Court and lower its authority in the eyes of the public and appear to fall within the ambit of criminal contempt [Paras 40-56].

Contemptuous Conduct — R-8 Manish Sisodia and R-19 Durgesh Pathak — Both respondents published letters on social media platform 'X' endorsing R-18's position, declaring they had no hope of receiving justice from this Court and would not participate in proceedings either personally or through counsel — Held: Such statements and conduct tend to scandalise and lower the authority of this Court and constitute a serious and deliberate attempt to obstruct administration of justice, falling within Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act [Paras 57-60].

Contemptuous Conduct — Sanjay Singh (@SanjayAzadSln) and Devesh Vishwakarma (@devesh_aap) — Posts published on 'X' falsely alleged that the presiding Judge received promotions on attending RSS/BJP events and that no justice could be expected from her — A video of the Judge's lecture at Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapeeth, Varanasi (delivered on 19.05.2024 at a workshop on new criminal laws) was selectively cropped and circulated in a misleading manner, falsely portraying it as a speech at an RSS/BJP event — Fact-check reports by PTI, Bar & Bench and Alt News confirmed the video was decontextualised — Held: Such statements and edited video publications prima facie amount to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [Paras 61-77].

Contemptuous Conduct — Vinayy Mishra (@vinayymishraap) — Published posts on 'X' attributing political allegiance to this Court; insinuated that if this Court did not recuse, the case would effectively be heard at the "BJP headquarters" — Photographs of the Judge receiving a memento at an academic event were falsely projected as awards received at political party programmes — Held: Statements of such nature have the tendency to scandalise this Court, lower the authority of the judiciary, and interfere with administration of justice, falling within criminal contempt [Paras 78-83].

Contemptuous Conduct — Saurabh Bhardwaj — Press Conference on YouTube — AAP State President, Delhi, held a press conference on 10.03.2026 — one day after the case was first listed — and publicly questioned the relationship of the presiding Judge with the BJP without any factual basis, casting aspersions on her integrity and impartiality — Held: Such statements publicly portraying a sitting Judge as politically connected during the pendency of a criminal case tend to lower the authority of the Court and scandalise the institution, falling within the ambit of criminal contempt [Paras 84-89].

Law of Criminal Contempt — Fair Criticism vs. Scandalising the Court — Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — The Court reiterated the settled distinction between fair and bona fide criticism of judicial orders, which is permissible, and a calculated campaign to scandalize the Court and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, which constitutes criminal contempt — A defamatory statement against a Judge personally constitutes libel; when it is calculated to interfere with due administration of justice, it becomes contempt — Popularity or political influence cannot confer constitutional immunity from the law of contempt — Held: A lie spoken a thousand times does not become the truth; intimidation clothed as legitimate criticism does not become immune from the law of contempt [Paras 25-32].

Judicial Propriety — Transfer of Main Revision Petition — Not a Recusal — Having drawn suo motu contempt proceedings, this Court directed the main revision petition CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 to be placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to another Bench — Clarified that this is not a recusal nor a yielding to the demands of the contemnors — The order rejecting recusal dated 20.04.2026 remains unchallenged and continues to hold the field — Transfer directed solely on grounds of judicial propriety and fairness to the accused so that the contemnors cannot project themselves as victims of bias [Paras 131-137].

Decision: Suo motu criminal contempt proceedings initiated — Registry directed to assign appropriate case title and number to the contempt proceedings and place them before the Chief Justice on 15.05.2026 for assignment to an appropriate Bench, for issuance of show-cause notices to the proposed contemnors as per Contempt of Courts (Delhi High Court) Rules, 2025 — Main revision petition CRL.REV.P. 134/2026 also placed before the Chief Justice for assignment to another Bench.

Constitutional Law – Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – Disputed Property Title – Writ petition filed under Article 226 challenging alleged forcible dispossession by State authorities from land bearing Survey No. 770, Naugaon, District Dhar, admeasuring 0.493 hectare — petitioners claimed ownership based on revenue entries since 1927-28, municipal tax payments, and earlier SDO orders dated 22.07.2008 and 13.05.2019 terminating dispossession proceedings — Held: disputed questions of ownership and title cannot be adjudicated in summary writ proceedings; petitioners at liberty to file a civil suit before a competent civil court [Paras 19, 27, 28, 39].

Revenue Records – Mutation Entries – No Conferral of Title – Payment of municipal taxes and mutation of name in revenue or municipal records does not confer or extinguish title — SDO order dated 22.07.2008 neither explicitly declared petitioners as rightful owners nor did the precedent order in M.P. No. 180/1981 reflect the petitioners' names or the subject survey number — records instead indicate petitioners' ancestors functioned as hospital superintendents in a caretaker capacity — Held: mutation entries are for fiscal purposes only and confer no right, title or interest [Paras 20–26].

FIR – Quashment – Article 226 – Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B IPC – FIR registered on complaint by Tahsildar alleging fraudulent alienation of Government property through forged documents — petitioner, functioning at best as an administrative superintendent, executed a registered lease deed in 2008 and agreement to sell in 2009 without any verified legal right — prima facie cognizable offences disclosed — Held: case does not fall within any of the parameters for quashing an FIR as laid down in Bhajan Lal; High Court should not stifle a legitimate criminal investigation at the threshold [Paras 29–37].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — petitioners granted liberty to file a properly constituted civil suit before a competent civil court to establish ownership, title, and right to sell or lease the property — no order as to costs [Paras 38–40].

Copyright Law – Interim Injunction – Suppression of Material Facts – Discretionary Relief – Plaintiff, producer of cinematograph film 'Tridev', claimed first ownership of copyright in the song 'Tirchi Topiwale' comprising literary work (lyrics by Anand Bakshi), musical work (composed by Kalyanji-Anandji) and sound recording — by assignment agreement dated 30.06.1988, plaintiff assigned limited rights to defendant No. 3 (Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd.) confined to record-based exploitation, i.e., manufacture and sale of cassettes and gramophone records — defendants used original and remixed version titled 'Rang De Lal (Oye Oye)' in film 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' released on 19.03.2026 — plaintiff sought injunction restraining OTT release of the film to the extent it comprises the said song — Held: plaintiff disentitled from discretionary relief on account of suppression of material facts, prolonged inaction, and failure to satisfactorily explain non-disclosures in plaint, rejoinder and affidavits [Paras 14–30].

Assignment Agreement – Scope of Rights – Interpretation – Agreement dated 30.06.1988 defined "the said work" to include literary, dramatic, musical, record and cinematographic film copyrights in 'Tridev' — paras 2(i) and 2(xi) assigned all rights, titles and interests in literary, dramatic and musical works embodied in the said work, including the right to make or authorize any versions and to perform, broadcast or transmit such versions — para 7 permitted adaptation and combination with any other work — para 12 applied assignment to all songs, dialogues and sequences irrespective of their presence in any version of the film — Held: prima facie, the agreement granted all rights in musical, literary and dramatic works in the said work to defendant No. 3, excluding only the cinematograph film itself — the agreement in present case not entirely pari materia with the agreement considered in Shemaroo Entertainment [Paras 33–33.7].

Interim Injunction – Triple Test – Clean Hands – A party seeking discretionary relief under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC must come to court with clean hands and disclose all material facts — plaintiff issued legal notice dated 26.04.2016 alleging infringement in film 'Azhar' but took no follow-up action after defendant No. 3's reply dated 02.05.2016 — songs from 'Tridev' were also used in 'K.G.F: Chapter 1' (2019) without any protest — plaintiff suppressed multiple suits filed between 2016 and 2020 and falsely claimed promoter had no connection with industry during that period — affidavits of promoter Mr. Rajiv Rai and Mr. Umesh Mehta contradicted the plaint — Held: failure to provide satisfactory explanation of non-disclosures tantamounts to suppression; suppressio veri suggestio falsi disentitles a party from discretionary relief [Paras 15–27].

OTT Injunction – Incongruity – Balance of Convenience – Plaintiff's inaction for seven to nine years since prior alleged infringements assured defendant No. 3 to exercise its rights and induced defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to invest hugely in producing 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' — restraining OTT release while theatrical exhibition continues would create an incongruous situation — any loss occasioned to plaintiff adequately compensable in monetary damages — Held: application for interim injunction not maintainable — defendant No. 3 directed to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs in court to be invested in interest-bearing FDR for the benefit of the successful party at trial [Paras 28–29, 42–46].

Decision: Application for interim injunction disposed of — defendant No. 3 directed to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs within four weeks with Registrar General of the Court — said deposit to be invested in interest-bearing FDR with auto-renewable clause — observations confined to adjudication of interim application only and not an expression on merits of the suit — suit listed before Joint Registrar on 13.07.2026 and before Court on 21.08.2026 [Paras 46–50].

Delhi Rent Control Act – Applicability – Bar under Section 50 – Suit for Possession – Second Appeal – Appellant/landlord filed Civil Suit for possession of a shop against the Respondent/tenant on the ground that the Suit Property fell in an area not covered by the DRC Act – Both Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the Suit as barred under Section 50 DRC Act – Held: Second Appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 13, 18, 41].

Territorial Applicability – Schedule 1 to Section 1(2) DRC Act – Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara – The Suit Property was urbanised vide Notification dated 08.12.1954 under Section 5(3) Punjab Municipal Act, making it part of the Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara – The DRC Act came into force on 09.02.1959, and its Schedule 1(2) expressly included all areas within the Municipal Committee, Delhi-Shahdara as on 7th April, 1958 – Since the area was already notified and urbanised prior to enactment of the DRC Act, no subsequent separate Notification was required to extend the Act to the Suit Property – Held: DRC Act was applicable to the Suit Property from the date of its enactment itself [Paras 30, 31, 35, 40].

Proviso to Section 1(2) DRC Act – Interpretation – The proviso requiring a further Notification to extend the DRC Act operates only in respect of areas notified or included within MCD limits after the date of Notification of the Act, i.e., after 09.02.1959 – Where urbanisation predates the Act, the proviso has no application – Contention of the Appellant that a second Notification was required even for pre-Act urbanised areas held to be not tenable [Paras 32, 34, 35].

Conduct of Plaintiff – Approbation and Reprobation – The Appellant had earlier filed a Civil Suit (C.S. No. 389/2012) which was withdrawn when the plea of bar of Section 50 DRC Act was raised – Thereafter he filed an Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act (No. E-72/2016), which got dismissed in default and the Restoration Application was also dismissed – The filing of a fresh Civil Suit after abandoning the DRC Act proceedings, without any change in circumstances, amounts to approbation and reprobation and further establishes the applicability of the DRC Act to the Suit Property – Held: Civil Suit not maintainable [Paras 36, 37, 38, 39].

Decision: Second Appeal dismissed – Judgments of learned Civil Judge dated 06.06.2023 and learned ADJ dated 28.03.2024 upheld – Pending applications disposed of.