Commercial Law – Contracts – Suit for Recovery of Money – Breach of Contract – Demurrage and Excess Freight Charges – The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 1,18,70,115/- (principal and interest) against the defendant/respondent regarding a contract for transportation services – Defendant contended that plaintiff breached the contract by failing to place trailers at the designated time, forcing the defendant to hire alternate transporters and incur demurrage charges imposed by port authorities – Defendant recovered Rs. 29,61,000/- by encashing bank guarantee, retaining EMD, and from pending bills – Held: Trial Court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove the basis of its claim, having produced no supporting documents like invoices – Defendant produced adequate material, including bills from port authorities, to justify deductions made strictly in accordance with the contract terms – Dismissal of suit upheld [Paras 15, 20, 23, 30–34].

Evidence – Burden of Proof – Claim for outstanding dues – Plaintiff claimed a specific sum but failed to enumerate details or produce any material/invoices to substantiate the claim other than a statement of accounts and a demand letter – PW1 admitted no separate bills were raised – Held: Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving the amount due and payable – Defendant justified its deductions with documentary evidence (Ex. D28) which went unimpeached in cross-examination – Appeal dismissed [Paras 20, 26, 32–34].

Decision: Appeal dismissed as being devoid of merit with costs. All pending applications disposed of.

Stamp Act – Recovery Against Legal Representatives – Liability Limited to Inherited Estate – Section 48, Indian Stamp Act, 1899 read with Section 181, U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 – Petitioners, sons of the deceased purchaser against whom deficiency and penalty were imposed under Section 47-A of the Stamp Act, challenged recovery certificate issued against them after their father's death – Contended that they inherited no property from their father and that since the sale deeds were declared null and void by civil court, no property stood transferred – Held: Under Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act, chargeability of duty is referable to the date of execution and the instrument includes every document which purports to create any right or liability; consequently the civil court's declaration of the sale deed as null and void is wholly irrelevant for determining liability under the Stamp Act – Legal representatives fall within the category of "defaulters" under Section 181 of the Code, 2006 and recovery proceedings may be continued against them as if they themselves are defaulters – However, proviso to Section 181(1) limits their liability strictly to the extent of the property of the deceased which has come to their hands [Paras 12–25].

Stamp Duty – Legal Representatives – Mode of Recovery – Inquiry Before Execution – Section 48 of the Stamp Act permits recovery by any mode prescribed for recovery of arrears of land revenue and the Collector may adopt any one or more modes under Section 170(1) of the Code, 2006 including arrest and detention, attachment of movable or immovable property, attachment of bank account, or appointment of receiver – The explanation to Section 170(1) permits simultaneous enforcement of two or more processes – Held: The respondents are well within their rights to give effect to the recovery certificate but must do so keeping in mind the mandate of the proviso to Section 181(1) which confines liability to the inherited estate – Whether the petitioners have inherited property from their father is a pure question of fact requiring investigation and cannot be accepted at the writ stage on the basis of affidavits – Collector directed to conduct inquiry after receiving petitioners' objections along with Income Tax Returns [Paras 15–27, 33].

Instrument – Definition – Declaration of Null and Void by Civil Court – Irrelevance for Stamp Liability – Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act defines instrument to include every document by which any right or liability is or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded – Held: The expression "purports to be created" ensures that even if a right or liability is not actually created but the document purports to create the same, it falls within the definition of instrument – Subsequent declaration of sale deed as null and void by the civil court has no bearing on the question of chargeability to stamp duty [Paras 12–14].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of — Petitioners directed to file objections before Collector, Agra within one month along with Income Tax Returns — Collector to conduct inquiry into extent of inherited estate and decide objections within four months by reasoned order — Petitioners restrained from creating third party rights over movable and immovable properties and from withdrawing amounts from bank accounts in excess of the impugned levy, until decision on objections — No coercive action, arrest or detention against petitioners till decision on objections or four months whichever is earlier.

Criminal Law – Murder – Eyewitness Testimony – Conviction Upheld – Property Dispute – Mediation Meeting – The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC for stabbing his brother Titu Miah Khadim at a mediation meeting convened to settle a property dispute on 01.10.2021 – PW-2, whose presence at the place of occurrence was not disputed, gave a direct eyewitness account of the stabbing and the appellant's conduct of cleaning the blood-stained knife with a gamcha thereafter – PW-4 corroborated the account and saw the deceased lying with bleeding injuries while the appellant was cleaning the knife – PW-8 also witnessed the attack – Held: The evidence of PW-2 was corroborated by PW-4, PW-8 and to some extent PW-3 – The witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined and the defence failed to shake their credibility – Inconsistencies in testimony of witnesses do not automatically render evidence inadmissible or unreliable – Appeal dismissed and conviction affirmed [Paras 27–55].

FIR – Multiple FIR – Cryptic Telephonic Information in GDE – Not FIR – The defence contended that telephonic information entered in GDE No. 29 dated 01.10.2021 was the first FIR and the subsequent written complaint Exhibit P-1 by PW-1 was a second FIR hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. – Held: A cryptic telephonic information cannot be treated as an FIR – PW-14, the IO, admitted that after receipt of the telephonic information in GDE No. 29, he proceeded to the spot and only after observing commission of cognizable offence did he commence investigation – The written FIR Exhibit P-1 lodged by PW-1 was thus validly the first FIR in the case – Nothing on record shows that more than one FIR was lodged in respect of the same murder – Plea that Exhibit P-1 would be hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. falls flat [Paras 38, 47].

Delay in Examination of Witnesses – Not Fatal Unless Prejudice Caused – Investigation – The defence urged that delay in examination of prosecution witnesses by the IO provided scope for manipulation of evidence – Held: Delay in examination of witnesses by the IO can raise questions about fairness of investigation but does not automatically vitiate the investigation unless it has caused actual prejudice to the accused or the integrity of the investigation is compromised – Non-disclosure of information received by PW-1 to the IO immediately was not fatal to prosecution as PW-1 was under mental shock and agony upon learning of his father's death [Paras 49, 48].

Non-Recovery of Weapon – Not Fatal When Direct Eyewitness Evidence Available – The defence contended that non-recovery of the knife used for the assault was fatal to the prosecution case – Held: Recovery of the weapon of offence is not a sine qua non for conviction – When there is direct evidence of eyewitnesses whose testimony is found reliable and corroborated by medical evidence, absence of recovery of the weapon cannot be a ground to acquit the accused [Paras 43–46].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed — Conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life confirmed — Pending miscellaneous applications closed — Lower court record to be sent down forthwith.

Trademark Law - Infringement and Passing Off - Deceptive Similarity - 'TULASI' vs 'TULSI' - Appeals against temporary injunction restraining defendant from using 'TULSI' for incense sticks - Plaintiff using registered word and device mark 'TULASI' since 1950; defendant using 'TULSI' alongside mark 'JALLAN' since 2023 - Held: Plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement and passing off based on long, continuous, and exclusive use of its registered mark. Defendant's use of 'TULSI' in large font masking its trademark 'JALLAN' was prominent and acted as a trademark/source identifier rather than a mere descriptor of fragrance. Phonetic similarity between the marks creates a likelihood of confusion. Temporary injunction correctly granted by Trial Court [Paras 32-45, 62-67].

Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Sections 30(2)(a) and 35 - Defense of Descriptive Use - Defendant claimed 'TULSI' merely described the fragrance/ingredient of incense sticks - Held: Statutory protection under Section 30(2)(a) is available only for bona fide and purely descriptive use. Prominent display of the word 'TULSI' on packaging in a significantly larger font than the house mark 'JALLAN' negated the defense of descriptive use at the interlocutory stage. Trial Court justified in concluding the word functioned as a source identifier, limiting the monopoly exception for descriptive common words [Paras 34-36, 42-45, 63-65].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - Scope of Interference with Discretionary Orders - Held: The Appellate Court's power to interfere with discretionary interlocutory orders granting temporary injunctions is limited. An Appellate Court will not substitute its own view merely because another conclusion is possible, unless the Trial Court's exercise of discretion is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or in disregard of settled legal principles. The Trial Court properly evaluated prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. No grounds for interference [Paras 18, 61, 68].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The common order passed by the Trial Court allowing the temporary injunction applications filed by the plaintiff is upheld.

Criminal Law – Interim Custody of Property – Freezing and Defreezing of Bank Accounts – Sections 451, 457 and 102 Cr.P.C. – The complainant transferred Rs. 1.17 crores, including amounts to the petitioner's account, for the procurement of a fluid which was never supplied – The Investigating Officer froze the petitioner's bank account containing Rs. 1,12,15,884/- – The Magistrate allowed the complainant's application for interim custody upon execution of an indemnity bond and rejected the petitioner's application to defreeze the account – The Revisional Court affirmed both orders – Held: The email communications placed on record indicate that the amount was transferred to the petitioner's account at the behest of the main accused – The petitioner being an associate of the main accused, the possibility of the deposited amount being proceeds of crime cannot be ruled out prior to a full-fledged trial – The Magistrate rightly released the amount in favour of the complainant who actually lost the money due to the alleged fraudulent act – Petitions rejected [Paras 4–10].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Scope of Interference with Concurrent Findings – The High Court was approached to undo the concurrent orders passed by the Magistrate and the Revisional Court – Held: In the exercise of inherent or revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court does not upset concurrent factual findings in the absence of perversity, nor does it re-analyse or re-interpret evidence on record – The lower courts validly safeguarded the funds by imposing a condition that the complainant shall re-deposit the entire amount if he loses the case – The complainant having prima facie shown entitlement to the amount, the impugned orders are based on cogent reasons and do not warrant interference – Petitions rejected [Paras 11–12].

Decision: Petitions rejected – The orders of the Magistrate and the Revisional Court allowing the complainant's application for interim custody and rejecting the petitioner's application for defreezing the bank account are affirmed.

Civil Law – Territorial Jurisdiction – Waiver of Objection – Section 21 and Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Suit for recovery of Rs. 10 lacs where Trial Court allowed the respondent's application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to return the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction – Appellant contended that the respondent did not object to territorial jurisdiction in the written statement and no issue was framed on this aspect – Held: In terms of Section 21 CPC, an objection to territorial or local jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity, and in any case at or before the settlement of issues – If not taken at the earliest, the objection is deemed to be waived – Territorial jurisdiction can be assumed by the Court upon waiver, as it does not go to the root of the matter unlike inherent lack of subject-matter jurisdiction – Since the respondent raised no objection at the first instance or at the stage of framing issues, the objection stands waived – Impugned order returning the plaint is set aside and the suit is restored [Paras 3–10].

Decision: Appeal succeeds and is disposed of – Impugned order dated 23.07.2022 is set aside – Suit is restored to its original number and directed to be listed before the concerned Trial Court on 30.03.2026.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Limitation – Illusory Cause of Action – Plaintiff claimed 1/5th share as daughter of Late Bapusingh in suit lands at Village Nipania, Dist. Indore bearing Survey Nos. 77/1, 78/2, 79/2, 57/1 and 67/1 – Mutations in favour of brothers effected in 1984-85, sale deed executed in 1987 in favour of applicant and another sale deed in 2003 — suit filed in 2020 i.e. more than 40 years after mutation and 17 years after sale deed — cause of action projected as arising on 01.01.2020 on perusal of Civil Suit No. 884/2017 found to be illusory — plaintiff aware of mutation proceedings since their inception as revenue records are in public domain — clever drafting used to suppress date of death of Bapusingh and create cloud over limitation — Held: Plaint does not disclose any real cause of action and is manifestly barred under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act; trial court erred in dismissing application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Paras 8–32].

Limitation Act – Section 17 – Fraud – Specific Particulars Required – Plaintiff pleaded fraud in mutation proceedings but did not set out specific particulars of who committed fraud, when and by what means — bare and unparticularised allegation of fraud insufficient to attract benefit of Section 17 of the Limitation Act — plaintiff not entitled to postponement of limitation on ground of fraud — registered documents in public domain constitute constructive notice — Held: Plea of Section 17 not sustainable [Paras 22–25].

Partition Suit – Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – All Properties Not Included – Suit for partition maintainable only when all co-sharers and all properties are included — in the instant case neither all properties of Late Bapusingh included nor all interested parties impleaded — suit also barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act as relief of cancellation of sale deeds not specifically claimed — mandatory notice under Section 94 of the MP Co-operative Societies Act not given before suing the cooperative housing society (defendant No. 8) — Held: Suit not maintainable on these counts also [Paras 25–31].

Decision: Civil Revision allowed — impugned order dated 31.07.2025 set aside — application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC allowed — plaint in RCSA No. 623/2020 rejected — suit dismissed — no order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Quashing of Proceedings – Matrimonial Dispute – Implication of Relatives – Petitioners (mother-in-law, father-in-law, and sister-in-law) challenged proceedings arising from a complaint filed by the 2nd respondent alleging cruelty and demand of dowry – Held: A close reading of the complaint indicates that commonplace domestic discord and minor skirmishes have been elevated to the pedestal of criminality – The allegations are largely general and omnibus in nature, devoid of specific particulars as to time, date, or overt acts – Even in respect of dowry demands, the narration predominantly pertains to pre-marital discussions regarding marriage expenses – The complaint does not delineate any concrete demand of dowry attributable to the petitioners, nor does it articulate conduct meeting the statutory threshold of cruelty under Section 498A of the IPC [Paras 10, 12].

Criminal Law – Section 498A IPC and Dowry Prohibition Act – Misuse of Provisions – Implication of Family Members – Relying on a catena of Supreme Court judgments, the Court observed a growing tendency to maliciously rope in aged parents, distant relatives, and married sisters living separately in matrimonial matters – Generalized and sweeping accusations, unsupported by concrete evidence or particularized allegations, cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution – Mere existence of quarrels or strained relations does not ipso facto constitute cruelty – Permitting proceedings to continue against the petitioners without a foundational basis would subject them to the ordeal of a protracted trial and result in a miscarriage of justice [Paras 13-14].

Decision: Criminal Petition is allowed – Entire proceedings in C.C.No.23089 of 2021 pending before the XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stand quashed insofar as petitioners 1 to 3 (accused 2 to 4) are concerned – Consequently, I.A.No.1 of 2024 stands disposed.

Criminal Law - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138 and 141 - Vicarious Liability of Directors - Quashing of Summoning Orders - Petitioner sought quashing of summoning orders and criminal proceedings arising from dishonoured cheques issued by the company - Petitioner contended that he was an Independent Director (Non-Executive), not a signatory to the cheques, and not involved in the day-to-day affairs of the company - Complaints alleged generally that the petitioner was personally responsible for the day-to-day management - Held: Vicarious liability under Section 141 of the NI Act must be strictly construed. Mere designation as a director is not sufficient to establish liability. The complaint must contain specific averments demonstrating the director's direct involvement in the affairs of the company at the relevant time. A non-executive or independent director who has not signed the cheques cannot be held liable based on bald, cursory statements. The petitioner was an Independent Director and had resigned before the summoning orders were issued. In the absence of foundational averments establishing a direct nexus to the financial transactions, the petitioner cannot be held vicariously liable. Summoning orders set aside and criminal proceedings quashed [Paras 7-15].

Decision: Petitions disposed of - Summoning orders dated 22.05.2017 and 01.07.2017 set aside qua the petitioner, and all criminal proceedings arising therefrom are quashed.