POCSO – Gang Rape of Minor – Suspension of Sentence – Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. – Post-Conviction Stage – Presumption of Innocence Not Available – The appellant was convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 376(DA) IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act for gang rape of a minor victim – A previous application for suspension of sentence (I.A. No. 1464 of 2023) had already been rejected by this Court on 17.10.2023 after considering the consistent testimony of the victim (PW-1) and her corroborative statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. – In the second application, the appellant reiterated the same grounds and claimed parity with co-convicts who were subsequently granted bail vide order dated 18.11.2025 – Held: At the post-conviction stage of suspension of sentence, the presumption of innocence does not arise and the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception is not attracted – The Court is required to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal coupled with other factors and there must be strong and compelling reasons for grant of bail which must be recorded in the order as mandated under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. – Detailed reappreciation of evidence is not required and the Court should not try to pick up lacunae in the prosecution case [Paras 42–44].

Suspension of Sentence – Parity with Co-Convicts – Not Available as a Matter of Right – Wrong Order Cannot Be Perpetuated – Article 14 – The co-convicts were initially refused suspension of sentence vide order dated 06.03.2024 and thereafter granted bail vide order dated 18.11.2025 by a co-ordinate Bench which took a different view on different facts including the FSL report not establishing rape and the victim's contradictory stand on relationship with the accused – Held: Parity is focused on the role played by the accused and cannot be utilized solely because another accused person was granted bail in the same offence – Parity cannot be claimed as a matter of right – Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or irregularity and if a benefit has been conferred on an individual without legal justification, others cannot claim the same on that basis – This Court is not sitting in appeal over the co-ordinate Bench's order but the basis on which suspension was granted to co-convicts was different on facts and cannot be imported to the present application [Paras 33–41].

Suspension of Sentence – Long Period of Custody – Not Sole Ground for Suspension of Life Sentence – The appellant contended that he had been in judicial custody for approximately five years and this fact alone justified suspension of sentence – Held: Period of custody cannot be the sole ground for suspending sentence and must be considered coupled with the attributability of the accused as found and substantiated in the trial – In cases of life imprisonment, mere factual incarceration for a period and likelihood of delay in disposal cannot be a reason for invocation of power under Section 389 Cr.P.C. without reference to relevant factors – The nature of the offence, the manner of commission, the gravity of the offence, and desirability of releasing the convict must be considered objectively – In heinous crimes such as gang rape on a minor, the period of custody cannot override the gravity of offence as established at trial [Paras 45–53].

Decision: I.A. No. 1770 of 2026 dismissed — Prayer for suspension of sentence rejected — Observations not to prejudice the parties on merits of the pending appeal.

Service Law — Recruitment — Denial of Appointment — Pending Criminal Case — Truthful Disclosure — Petitioner selected for the post of Junior Assistant through U.P. Subordinate Services Selection Commission and allotted to Department of Cane and Sugar — Appointment denied solely on ground of pendency of a criminal case under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act — Case registered primarily against petitioner's elder brother (main accused) arising out of a matrimonial dispute; petitioner implicated as co-accused with only general and sweeping allegations of dowry demand without specific role attributed — Petitioner had truthfully disclosed the pendency of the case in terms of Clauses 15(9) and 15(14) of the advertisement — No other adverse material found against the petitioner — Held: Pendency of a criminal case based on general allegations arising out of a matrimonial dispute does not constitute a valid ground to deny appointment — Impugned order quashed — Appointment directed subject to outcome of criminal trial [Paras throughout].

Avtar Singh v. Union of India — Guidelines — Pending Criminal Cases at Stage of Recruitment — Where candidate has truthfully disclosed pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, the employer may in its discretion appoint the candidate subject to the decision of such case — Employer's right to consider antecedents does not translate into an automatic bar on appointment in every case of pending criminal proceedings — Youthful indiscretions and minor offences ought not to result in branding a person as a criminal for life — Approach should be reformative rather than punitive — Minor infractions, particularly those arising from personal or family circumstances, deserve to be condoned rather than resulting in lifelong adverse consequences — Offences alleged in the present case, though cognizable, do not in the facts of the case appear to be of such gravity as to render petitioner unsuitable for public employment [Para 38.6 of Avtar Singh guidelines].

Decision: Writ petition allowed — Impugned order dated 06.07.2020 quashed — Respondent No. 2 directed to issue appointment letter to petitioner forthwith — Appointment subject to outcome of the criminal trial/appeal, if any.

Maintenance – Divorced Wife – Section 125 CrPC – Revision – Petitioner-husband, employed as Assistant Manager in State Bank of India drawing a monthly salary of Rs.60,000/-, challenged the Family Court's order granting maintenance of Rs.10,000/- per month to the opposite party-wife from 22.12.2017 along with Rs.3,000/- as litigation expenses – The marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce passed by Family Court, Nellore vide judgment dated 21.12.2010 – The divorced wife claimed maintenance as a divorcee under the Explanation to Section 125 CrPC, which expressly includes a divorced woman who has not remarried within the definition of "wife" – Held: The contentions raised stand authoritatively covered by the Supreme Court's decision in Rajnesh v. Neha; petitioner directed to file affidavit regarding securing the maintenance amount [Paras 5, 7, 8, 10].

Section 125 CrPC – Wife Earning Income – Not a Bar to Maintenance – It is well settled that merely because the wife is capable of earning or is actually earning does not operate as a bar to her claim for maintenance – The court must determine whether the wife's income is sufficient to enable her to maintain the same standard of living as she was accustomed to in the matrimonial home – No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the husband before the Family Court to prove the wife's alleged income of Rs.6,00,000/- per annum – Reliance placed on Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324 [Paras 7, 8].

Maintenance – Date of Award – From Date of Application – As authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajnesh v. Neha, maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is to be awarded from the date of filing of the application in all cases – The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing as the period of pendency is not within the control of the applicant – Family Court's direction to pay maintenance from 22.12.2017 (date of application) is consistent with this settled position [Para 8, Para 109 of Rajnesh v. Neha].

Procedural Direction – Security for Maintenance Amount – In light of the observations in Rajnesh v. Neha that the amount directed under Section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a money decree, the petitioner-husband is directed to file an affidavit indicating whether and how he proposes to secure the maintenance amount directed by the Family Court – Matter listed for fresh admission in the week commencing 20.04.2026 [Paras 10, 11].

Decision: Matter adjourned — Petitioner directed to file affidavit regarding securing the maintenance amount — Listed for fresh admission in the week commencing 20.04.2026.

Family Law – Alienation of minor's undivided interest in joint family property – Requirement of Court's permission – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Sections 6, 8 and 12 – Appellant-mother sought permission to sell minor daughter's 1/4th share in undivided joint family property for her higher education – Lower court appointed her guardian but refused permission to sell – Held: Under Section 12, no guardian can be appointed for a minor's undivided interest in joint family property if it is under the management of an adult member – Father having died, the mother is the adult member managing the joint family property and the natural guardian under Section 6 – Restrictions under Section 8(2) do not apply to the fluctuating undivided interest of a minor in joint family property managed by an adult member – Mother is competent to sell the minor's share for legal necessity and welfare – Refusal of permission by the lower court is unsustainable [Paras 26–29, 34–36].

Family Law – Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 12 – Interpretation of "adult member" – Held: The adult member of the family managing the joint Hindu family property may be either male or female, not necessarily the Karta – Mother, being an adult female member in management of the joint family property after the death of the father, is fully competent to manage and deal with the undivided interest of the minor – Minor being a Hindu and having an interest in undivided joint family property is protected by the management of the mother – Lower court's order set aside and permission granted for the welfare of the minor [Paras 27, 31–36].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment and order dated 17.07.2025 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge is set aside – Prayer of the appellant to sell the minor's undivided share for her higher education is granted.

Civil Law – Preliminary Issues – Order XIV Rule 2 CPC – Discretionary Nature – Post-1976 Amendment – Suit for cancellation of Will instituted in 2006 – Issues framed in December 2008 – Plaintiff's evidence substantially recorded – Application by defendant filed in July 2025 to decide issues of limitation and bar under Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act as preliminary issues – Held: After the 1976 Amendment, Rule 2 of Order XIV is no longer mandatory – The word "shall" of the unamended rule has been replaced by "may," making it discretionary for the court to decide issues of jurisdiction or bar to suit as preliminary issues – Only issues of law which do not require inquiry into facts can be tried as preliminary issues – Plea of limitation being a mixed question of fact and law cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts – Application filed after 18 years is not bona fide – Direction to decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision issued [Paras 4–23].

Preliminary Issue – Limitation – Mixed Question of Law and Fact – A plea of limitation cannot be decided as a preliminary issue as the starting point of limitation is entirely a question of fact requiring evidence – Where the decision on an issue of law depends upon decision of facts, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue – Court has no jurisdiction to try a suit on mixed issues of law and fact as preliminary issues [Paras 17–18].

Bona Fides – Belated Application – Where defendant chose not to press for decision of issues as preliminary issues for 18 years from the date of framing of issues, and the application was filed only after substantial recording of plaintiff's evidence, such application cannot be regarded as bona fide – It would be appropriate for the court below to consider and decide all issues simultaneously at the time of final decision [Paras 21–23].

Decision: Petition disposed of – Trial court directed to decide all issues framed in Original Suit No. 859 of 2006 simultaneously – Trial court to endeavour to decide the suit expeditiously, preferably within one year from production of certified copy of this order.

Service Law – Departmental Proceedings – Acquittal in Criminal Case – Effect on Disciplinary Action – Constable dismissed from service on charges of misconduct arising out of alleged involvement in narcotic trafficking under Sections 20(b)(ii)(C) and 29 of the NDPS Act – Criminal court acquitted the respondent recording categorical finding that prosecution failed to establish his involvement and that plea of alibi stood proved by cogent documentary and oral evidence – Disciplinary authority proceeded to dismiss despite acquittal, relying on same set of witnesses whose testimony was discarded by the criminal court – Single Judge set aside dismissal and directed reinstatement – Held: Where the foundation of the departmental proceedings rests on the same factual matrix as the criminal case and the same witnesses whose evidence was rejected by the criminal court form the basis of the inquiry, the departmental proceedings are based on "no evidence" and are unsustainable – Writ Appeal dismissed [Paras 3–21].

Plea of Alibi – Established by Cogent Evidence – Effect on Departmental Proceedings – Respondent established during criminal trial that on the date of alleged offence he was undergoing official training at Phulbani from 25.05.2015 to 30.05.2015 – Training records and testimony of D.W.1 accepted by the trial court – Criminal court recorded that respondent was not even present at the spot – Inquiry officer relied on the very same witnesses whose statements before the criminal court were rejected – Held: Once the plea of alibi is judicially accepted and attains finality, the entire genesis of the departmental charge stands washed away on facts – Departmental findings based on no evidence [Paras 17–20].

Judicial Review – Scope in Disciplinary Matters – Perversity of Findings – Appellants contended that the Single Judge exceeded permissible limits of judicial review by re-appreciating evidence – Held: High Court's interference was not by way of appellate re-appreciation but on the ground that the findings of the disciplinary authority were based on no evidence, being premised entirely on witnesses whose version stood judicially discredited – Interference was warranted and cannot be faulted on law or facts [Paras 13–14, 20].

Decision: Writ Appeal dismissed – Order of Single Judge setting aside dismissal and directing reinstatement with all consequential service and financial benefits upheld.

Rape – Consensual Relationship – Section 375 IPC – FIR Quashed – Petitioner, a skating coach, allegedly developed physical relations with the prosecutrix, wife of the complainant, over a prolonged period – FIR lodged by the husband on the ground that the petitioner had forcibly committed rape and blackmailed the prosecutrix – Prosecutrix, a qualified dentist aged about 34 years with two children, did not disclose the alleged relationship until confronted by her husband with the threat of divorce – Hotel room was booked jointly and entry was in the prosecutrix's own handwriting – No audio, video, or digital evidence of blackmailing found during investigation – Prosecutrix refused internal medical examination – Held: Where a fully grown, educated woman engages in a prolonged physical relationship, it constitutes an act of promiscuity and not an act induced by misconception of fact – Ingredients of Section 375 IPC not established – FIR and all consequential proceedings quashed [Paras 7–11].

Consent – Misconception of Fact – Section 90 IPC – Section 375 IPC – Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise – Court reiterated that consent under Section 375 IPC requires active and reasoned deliberation – A consent vitiated by misconception of fact must be traceable directly to a false promise made with no intention of fulfilment from the very beginning – Where physical relationship is maintained over a prolonged period by a consenting adult woman, it cannot be said that the relationship was purely the result of deception or false promise – No nexus between any alleged promise and the sustained physical relationship established – Held: Consent not vitiated under Section 90 IPC [Paras 8–10].

Decision: Petition allowed – FIR No. 48 dated 02.03.2020 under Section 376(2) IPC registered at Police Station Sector 36, Chandigarh and all consequential proceedings quashed qua the petitioner.

Recruitment – DSSSB – Rejection of candidature – Non-submission of e-dossier – Effective communication – Requirement of SMS/email along with website notice – Mere uploading on website not sufficient where scheme mandates dual communication – burden on authority to prove intimation – failure vitiates rejection [Paras 21–29, 33–37]

Legitimate Expectation – Recruitment process – Assurance of communication through SMS/email – Candidates entitled to rely on such representation – authority cannot rely solely on website notice – violation renders action arbitrary [Paras 31–34]

Public Employment – Procedural timelines – Balance with fairness – Strict adherence to cut-off dates subject to effective communication – rejection at final stage must satisfy fairness test – Courts to balance administrative efficiency with equity [Paras 38–41]

Proof of Communication – Electronic records – OARS portal showing dispatch of SMS/email – where contact details undisputed, presumption of due service arises – rejection upheld in such cases [Paras 43–46]

Delayed Intimation – Truncated opportunity – Late communication reducing available time – unequal treatment vis-à-vis other candidates – rejection unsustainable [Paras 47–48, 68–70]

Defective Communication – Erroneous result notice / lack of clarity on timing – benefit of doubt to candidate – candidature cannot be cancelled where confusion attributable to authority [Paras 49–51, 55–56]

No Proof of Intimation – Absence of documentary evidence of SMS/email – adverse inference against recruiting authority – rejection invalid [Paras 57–62, 64–66, 71–74]

Equitable Considerations – Special circumstances such as disability, pregnancy, higher merit – leniency justified where communication deficient – procedural lapses not to defeat substantive rights [Paras 6, 8, 73]

Change in Procedure – Shift from offline submission to e-dossier – obligation to clearly notify candidates – failure to communicate procedural change invalidates strict enforcement [Paras 23–26]

Decision: W.P.(C) 938/2026, W.P.(C) 14309/2025, W.P.(C) 506/2023 and W.P.(C) 12996/2024 allowed – remaining connected petitions dismissed – Tribunal orders partly upheld and partly set aside depending on proof of effective communication – pending applications disposed of.

Service Law – Pension – Counting of Past Service – Rule 26, M.P. Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 – Petitioner initially appointed with MPEB in 1981, subsequently appointed as Sub-Inspector in Police Department in 1988 after obtaining NOC from MPEB – Retired as Inspector in 2017 – Claim for counting past service with MPEB towards pension declined by District Pension Officer on the ground that Rule 26 does not cover service rendered with MPEB as it is not State Government service – Held: Service conditions of MPEB employees were determined by the State Government since the Board was constituted and its members appointed by the State Government under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and MPEB had power to frame service regulations – Objection of District Pension Officer overruled – Petitioner entitled to count service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 towards qualifying service – Petition allowed [Paras 9-19, 24].

Qualifying Service – Rule 3(p) – Scope and Construction – Rule 3(p) defines qualifying service as service under the State Government but its latter part extends it to service qualifying under any other order or rule in force – Cumulative reading makes clear that service rendered under any pensionable arrangement, including one governed by rules other than the 1976 Rules, qualifies – When pension rules are capable of more than one interpretation, courts must lean in favour of the employee [Paras 11-13, 17].

Prior Permission – NOC from Earlier Employer – Objection that petitioner did not take up subsequent appointment with prior permission of earlier employer – Rejected – NOC granted by MPEB on 13/11/1987 specifically stated no objection to petitioner's selection as Sub-Inspector – Application also forwarded through Board's authority – Petitioner served for about 30 years before retirement – Raising objection of absence of prior permission at this stage not permissible – Prior permission to be presumed unless State establishes contrary [Paras 20-23].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Objection raised by District Pension Officer overruled – Respondents including District Pension Officer, Shivpuri, directed to process petitioner's claim for counting service from 21/06/1981 to 15/01/1988 in pursuance of order dated 15/05/2018 [Para 24].