Criminal Law – Murder – Eyewitness Testimony – Conviction Upheld – Property Dispute – Mediation Meeting – The appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC for stabbing his brother Titu Miah Khadim at a mediation meeting convened to settle a property dispute on 01.10.2021 – PW-2, whose presence at the place of occurrence was not disputed, gave a direct eyewitness account of the stabbing and the appellant's conduct of cleaning the blood-stained knife with a gamcha thereafter – PW-4 corroborated the account and saw the deceased lying with bleeding injuries while the appellant was cleaning the knife – PW-8 also witnessed the attack – Held: The evidence of PW-2 was corroborated by PW-4, PW-8 and to some extent PW-3 – The witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined and the defence failed to shake their credibility – Inconsistencies in testimony of witnesses do not automatically render evidence inadmissible or unreliable – Appeal dismissed and conviction affirmed [Paras 27–55].

FIR – Multiple FIR – Cryptic Telephonic Information in GDE – Not FIR – The defence contended that telephonic information entered in GDE No. 29 dated 01.10.2021 was the first FIR and the subsequent written complaint Exhibit P-1 by PW-1 was a second FIR hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. – Held: A cryptic telephonic information cannot be treated as an FIR – PW-14, the IO, admitted that after receipt of the telephonic information in GDE No. 29, he proceeded to the spot and only after observing commission of cognizable offence did he commence investigation – The written FIR Exhibit P-1 lodged by PW-1 was thus validly the first FIR in the case – Nothing on record shows that more than one FIR was lodged in respect of the same murder – Plea that Exhibit P-1 would be hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. falls flat [Paras 38, 47].

Delay in Examination of Witnesses – Not Fatal Unless Prejudice Caused – Investigation – The defence urged that delay in examination of prosecution witnesses by the IO provided scope for manipulation of evidence – Held: Delay in examination of witnesses by the IO can raise questions about fairness of investigation but does not automatically vitiate the investigation unless it has caused actual prejudice to the accused or the integrity of the investigation is compromised – Non-disclosure of information received by PW-1 to the IO immediately was not fatal to prosecution as PW-1 was under mental shock and agony upon learning of his father's death [Paras 49, 48].

Non-Recovery of Weapon – Not Fatal When Direct Eyewitness Evidence Available – The defence contended that non-recovery of the knife used for the assault was fatal to the prosecution case – Held: Recovery of the weapon of offence is not a sine qua non for conviction – When there is direct evidence of eyewitnesses whose testimony is found reliable and corroborated by medical evidence, absence of recovery of the weapon cannot be a ground to acquit the accused [Paras 43–46].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed — Conviction under Section 302 IPC and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life confirmed — Pending miscellaneous applications closed — Lower court record to be sent down forthwith.

Criminal Law – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence – Conviction under Section 302 IPC upheld – Appellant accused of murdering the deceased after expressing improper intentions towards the deceased's wife – Case rested on circumstantial evidence: motive, last seen together, extra-judicial confession, and recovery of blood-stained axe – Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment – Held: The chain of circumstances is complete, unerring, and excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence – The evidence of prosecution witnesses is cogent and corroborates the medical and forensic evidence – Conduct of accused attempting to flee and his failure to provide a plausible explanation in his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement further strengthens the prosecution case – Appeal dismissed [Paras 24–29, 61].

Evidence – Last Seen Theory – Burden of Proof under Section 106 of Evidence Act – Deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused shortly before the occurrence, having left on the pretext of fishing – Held: When an accused is last seen with the deceased, the burden shifts to the accused to offer a reasonable explanation as to when and how they parted company – Accused merely claimed false implication and failed to offer any plausible explanation – Such failure attracts the principle embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act and provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances [Paras 39–44].

Evidence – Appreciation of Evidence – Minor Contradictions – Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus – Defence highlighted minor discrepancies regarding time of death, delay in FIR, and sequence of events – Held: Minor contradictions or omissions that do not go to the root of the prosecution case cannot be a ground to discard otherwise reliable testimony – The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and is merely a rule of caution – Testimony of a rustic village wife in severe emotional distress cannot be discredited over minor inconsistencies – Substratum of the prosecution case remains intact [Paras 31–38].

Medical Jurisprudence – Time of Death – Post-mortem Findings – Defence challenged time of occurrence based on the presence of semi-digested food in the stomach – Held: The condition of stomach contents is not an infallible or precise guide for determining the exact time of death – It must be appreciated in conjunction with other surrounding circumstances – Digestion rates vary based on physiological factors – Medical evidence regarding the probable time of death is broadly consistent with the positive direct evidence of the prosecution [Paras 51–57].

Criminal Trial – Investigation Lapses – Forensic Evidence – Forensic report confirmed human blood on the recovered axe and clothes but did not establish the exact blood group – Held: Occurrence pertains to 2004 when forensic techniques were comparatively limited – Defective investigation or failure to determine exact blood group cannot be a ground for acquittal when the substantive evidence is trustworthy – Doubts must be reasonable and not based on conjectures or isolated infirmities [Paras 45–50, 58–60].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Judgment and order of conviction under Section 302 IPC affirmed – Appellant directed to serve the remaining part of his sentence.

Property Law - Doctrine of Lis Pendens vs. Bona Fide Purchaser - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 19(b) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 52 - Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of a registered agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 executed by Defendant No. 1 - During the pendency of the suit, Defendant No. 1 executed a sale deed in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 7 on 11.10.1982 - Trial court denied specific performance holding the subsequent purchasers to be bona fide purchasers for value without notice under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act - Held: Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act operates at a stage prior to the institution of a suit - Once a suit is instituted, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act comes into force and prevails over Section 19(b) - The defense of bona fide purchaser without notice is not available to pendente lite transferees, as Section 52 is based on public policy - Subsequent purchasers are bound by the decree irrespective of good faith or lack of notice - Trial court legally erred in granting the benefit of Section 19(b) to pendente lite purchasers [Paras 32-37, 65-70].

Property Law - Transfer by Unauthorized Person - Subsequent Acquisition of Interest - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 43 - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Section 13(a) - At the time of executing the agreement to sell (03.09.1981), Defendant No. 1 had an imperfect title as the property had been previously sold to a third party - Subsequently, on 07.09.1981, Defendant No. 1 acquired perfect title when the prior sale deed was cancelled via a compromise decree - Held: Under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act, if a vendor acquires any interest in the property subsequent to the contract and the agreement subsists, the purchaser can compel the vendor to make good the contract out of such acquired interest - Subsequent purchasers cannot oppose specific performance on the ground of the vendor's initial lack of title [Paras 35-38, 66-68].

Specific Performance - Readiness and Willingness - Proof of Execution - Plaintiff proved payment of substantial earnest money (Rs. 41,000/- out of the total consideration of Rs. 79,500/-) and the execution of the registered agreement - Plaintiff further proved readiness and willingness by remaining present at the Sub-Registrar's office on the stipulated date and serving legal notice - Defendant No. 1 committed default by failing to obtain the requisite income tax clearance and failing to execute the sale deed - Held: Plaintiff successfully established readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract - Plaintiff is entitled to the primary relief of specific performance [Paras 59-61].

Decision: Appeal allowed with costs - Impugned judgment and decree dated 30.09.1986 of the trial court set aside - Suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 03.09.1981 decreed against all defendants - Defendant No. 1 directed to execute the sale deed and hand over vacant possession upon receiving the balance consideration within two months, failing which the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree executed through the court.

Trademark Law - Infringement and Passing Off - Deceptive Similarity - 'TULASI' vs 'TULSI' - Appeals against temporary injunction restraining defendant from using 'TULSI' for incense sticks - Plaintiff using registered word and device mark 'TULASI' since 1950; defendant using 'TULSI' alongside mark 'JALLAN' since 2023 - Held: Plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement and passing off based on long, continuous, and exclusive use of its registered mark. Defendant's use of 'TULSI' in large font masking its trademark 'JALLAN' was prominent and acted as a trademark/source identifier rather than a mere descriptor of fragrance. Phonetic similarity between the marks creates a likelihood of confusion. Temporary injunction correctly granted by Trial Court [Paras 32-45, 62-67].

Trade Marks Act, 1999 - Sections 30(2)(a) and 35 - Defense of Descriptive Use - Defendant claimed 'TULSI' merely described the fragrance/ingredient of incense sticks - Held: Statutory protection under Section 30(2)(a) is available only for bona fide and purely descriptive use. Prominent display of the word 'TULSI' on packaging in a significantly larger font than the house mark 'JALLAN' negated the defense of descriptive use at the interlocutory stage. Trial Court justified in concluding the word functioned as a source identifier, limiting the monopoly exception for descriptive common words [Paras 34-36, 42-45, 63-65].

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLIII Rule 1(r) - Scope of Interference with Discretionary Orders - Held: The Appellate Court's power to interfere with discretionary interlocutory orders granting temporary injunctions is limited. An Appellate Court will not substitute its own view merely because another conclusion is possible, unless the Trial Court's exercise of discretion is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or in disregard of settled legal principles. The Trial Court properly evaluated prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. No grounds for interference [Paras 18, 61, 68].

Decision: Appeals dismissed. The common order passed by the Trial Court allowing the temporary injunction applications filed by the plaintiff is upheld.

Civil Law – Territorial Jurisdiction – Waiver of Objection – Section 21 and Order VII Rule 10 CPC – Suit for recovery of Rs. 10 lacs where Trial Court allowed the respondent's application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to return the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction – Appellant contended that the respondent did not object to territorial jurisdiction in the written statement and no issue was framed on this aspect – Held: In terms of Section 21 CPC, an objection to territorial or local jurisdiction must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity, and in any case at or before the settlement of issues – If not taken at the earliest, the objection is deemed to be waived – Territorial jurisdiction can be assumed by the Court upon waiver, as it does not go to the root of the matter unlike inherent lack of subject-matter jurisdiction – Since the respondent raised no objection at the first instance or at the stage of framing issues, the objection stands waived – Impugned order returning the plaint is set aside and the suit is restored [Paras 3–10].

Decision: Appeal succeeds and is disposed of – Impugned order dated 23.07.2022 is set aside – Suit is restored to its original number and directed to be listed before the concerned Trial Court on 30.03.2026.

Civil Law – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC – Bar of Jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 – Plaintiff, a subsequent mortgagee, challenged the DRT proceedings, Recovery Certificate and auction sale by a civil suit on grounds of fraud and collusion — defendants sought rejection on the ground of statutory bar under Section 18 of the Act — plaintiff contended that the bar operates only against Banks and Financial Institutions and not against individual plaintiffs — Held: Section 18 is absolute in its operation — the bar extends to all persons including borrowers, guarantors, purchasers and subsequent mortgagees — once the reliefs sought relate to matters falling within Section 17, the civil court's jurisdiction stands excluded regardless of the identity of the plaintiff — plaint liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) [Paras 20–31].

Civil Procedure – Rejection of Plaint – Limitation – Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 – Suit for Declaration – Ex Facie Bar – Plaintiff admitted knowledge of DRT proceedings and Recovery Certificate as early as 2009 by filing I.A. No.2 of 2009 before the Recovery Officer — auction sale confirmed on 03.03.2010 — suit filed only on 20.07.2016, well beyond the three-year period — plaintiff's claim of continuing cause of action rejected as the acts complained of are completed events — Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies only to continuing breach or tort, not to completed transactions — Held: Suit ex facie barred by limitation, plaint liable to be rejected [Paras 32–45].

Civil Procedure – Res Judicata – Not a Ground for Rejection of Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 – Held: Plea of res judicata cannot be made a ground for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC — issue not decided on this ground [Para 46].

Civil Procedure – Abuse of Process – Vexatious Suit – Same Grounds Previously Decided – Third defendant (guarantor) had filed C.S. No.796 of 2009 seeking identical reliefs; plaint rejected under Order VII Rule 11 and confirmed up to the Supreme Court — plaintiff had also challenged the same proceedings in I.A. No.2 of 2009 before the Recovery Officer and failed up to the DRAT — present suit founded on the same grounds and is wholly derivative of the rights asserted by the third defendant — Held: Suit amounts to clear abuse of process of law and is vexatious; liable to be rejected at threshold [Paras 47–52].

Decision: Both appeals dismissed with costs — Fair and decretal orders passed in I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2019 in O.S. No.3969 of 2019 rejecting the plaint confirmed — connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Review Jurisdiction – Scope and Limitations – Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC – Review Not an Appeal in Disguise – The petitioners, claiming to be in possession of land bearing Khasra No. 277 for 30-40 years under a valid Patta dated 09.09.1998, challenged the order dated 06.05.2025 passed in W.P.(C) No. 2266 of 2025 on the ground that they were neither impleaded nor heard despite being directly affected parties, and that their residential house was now under threat of demolition pursuant to consequential dispossession proceedings under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code – Held: The scope of review jurisdiction under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is extremely limited and is confined to cases of error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new and important evidence not producible earlier despite due diligence, or any other sufficient reason analogous to the specified grounds – Review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be invoked for rehearing or rearguing the matter on merits – An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record [Paras 7–20].

Review – Non-Impleadment of Affected Parties – Order Merely Directing Authorities to Act in Accordance with Law – Not an Adjudication of Rights – The petitioners contended that the impugned order was passed in violation of principles of natural justice as they were not heard – Held: Upon careful perusal of the order dated 06.05.2025, this Court had not adjudicated the inter se rights of the parties but merely directed the competent authority to proceed in accordance with law – Such a direction simpliciter does not determine any substantive rights of the petitioners – Non-impleadment in such proceedings does not, by itself, constitute an error apparent on the face of the record warranting exercise of review jurisdiction – Petitioners always had appropriate remedies available against any consequential action by the authorities [Paras 9, 14, 15].

Review – Grounds Raised Going to Merits – Not Examinable in Review – Illegality of Demarcation, Applicability of Section 250, Validity of Revenue Authority Orders – All questions requiring detailed examination on merits – Held: The grounds urged by the petitioners including alleged illegality of demarcation conducted without notice, bar on applicability of Section 250 where a residential house has already been constructed, and validity of concurrent orders of revenue authorities including the Board of Revenue, are all issues requiring detailed examination on merits and cannot be adjudicated in review jurisdiction – The petitioners had already exhausted remedies up to the level of the Board of Revenue and the attempt in review is to reopen the entire controversy indirectly, which is impermissible [Paras 12, 14, 15].

Decision: Review petition dismissed — No order as to costs — Liberty to petitioners to avail such remedies as may be available in accordance with law against specific consequential actions of the authorities.

Property Law – Forcible Dispossession by State – Road Construction on Private Land Without Acquisition – Compensation – Article 300-A – The respondents' land comprised in Khasra Nos. 240, 241 and 1051/438 measuring 0313-03 bighas situated in Tehsil Karsog, District Mandi was utilized by the State for construction of Karsog-Kunnu Road between 1993 and 1998 without resorting to any process of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act and without payment of compensation – The trial court dismissed the suit but the First Appellate Court reversed and directed the State to initiate acquisition proceedings and pay appropriate compensation – Held: The State being a welfare State cannot forcibly dispossess a citizen of property without due process of law – Article 300-A guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law and the obligation to pay compensation is implicit in this provision – Defendants produced no document showing consent of plaintiffs for construction of road through their land – Concurrent findings of courts below affirmed [Paras 12–22].

Adverse Possession – State Cannot Plead Against Own Citizens – Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – The State contended that the suit was time-barred as it was filed approximately 35 years after construction of road, and pleaded principles of acquiescence and estoppel – Held: A welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its own citizens so as to defeat the title of the owner – The cause of action arising from deprivation of property without legal sanction is a continuing one and delay and laches cannot defeat the claim of the landowner in such circumstances – No period of limitation can be prescribed to bar courts from doing substantial justice where the demand for justice is compelling – State's plea of limitation and laches rejected [Paras 13–16].

Second Appeal – Scope of Interference Under Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – Concurrent Findings of Fact – Held: The first appellate court is the final court of fact and the High Court exercising power under Section 100 CPC can interfere with findings of fact only where the finding is based on inadmissible evidence, is in ignorance of relevant admissible evidence, is based on misreading of evidence, or is perverse – None of these contingencies present in the instant case – Concurrent findings of both courts below based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence – No substantial question of law arises – Appeal dismissed [Paras 23–27].

Decision: Regular Second Appeal dismissed — Judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court affirmed — State directed to initiate acquisition proceedings and pay appropriate compensation as per law — Pending applications disposed of.

Criminal Law – Quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Scope – Appreciation of Evidence Not Permissible – Petitioner (builder/developer) entered into construction agreements for two flats with the complainant in 2006 and received total payments of Rs. 12,90,000/- but failed to hand over the flats — FIR registered under Sections 406 and 420 IPC — charge sheet filed and case pending trial in CC No. 42 of 2017 — petitioner sought quashing — Held: High Court has no jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to appreciate statements of witnesses, record findings on inconsistencies therein, or conclude that no prima facie case is made out — that exercise is for the trial court and the appellate court — petition dismissed [Paras 7–10].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing – Disputed Facts – Defence of Accused to Be Tested at Trial – High Court cannot record findings on disputed facts in quashing proceedings — defence of the accused is to be tested after appreciation of evidence by the trial court during the trial — whether criminal proceedings are malicious is also not to be considered at the stage of quashing but at the conclusion of the trial — Held: Grounds raised for quashing cannot be entertained [Paras 8–10].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing – Test of Prima Facie Case – The Court at the stage of quashing must only see whether the allegations in the complaint form the basis for the ingredients constituting the offences complained of, and whether the preconditions for taking cognizance have been complied with — whether the accused can prove the allegations is a matter to be determined at trial — Held: Allegations in the complaint, if accepted in entirety, constitute the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust — no ground to quash [Para 9].

Decision: Criminal original petition dismissed — Petitioner at liberty to raise all grounds before the trial court — Trial court directed to complete the trial within three months from date of receipt of the order — Connected miscellaneous petitions closed.