Trusteeship Of Public Charitable Trust Not Personal Property Capable Of Testamentary Devolution; Cannot Be Bequeathed By Will: Punjab & Haryana High Court Grants Injunction Under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC

"The trusteeship of a public charitable trust is not personal property that can be bequeathed like an ordinary estate." Holding that the office of a trustee in a public charitable trust is a personal position of confidence that cannot be converted into a hereditary family entitlement through a testamentary instrument, the Punjab and Haryana High Court bench of Justice Deepak Gupta on October 16, 2026, ruled that a co-trustee has no inherent authority to bequeath trusteeship rights via a Will unless the trust deed explicitly confers such a power.

The petitioner, Janhit Sewa Charitable Trust, assailed concurrent orders of the trial court and the appellate court which rejected its temporary injunction application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC. The respondents asserted managerial control and headship over the public charitable trust on the strength of a registered Will executed by a deceased life trustee. The trust instituted a civil suit for declaration to annul the testamentary appointment and prayed for an interim injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in the day-to-day administration and properties of the trust.

Whether the office of a trustee in a public charitable trust constitutes personal property capable of being bequeathed or transferred through a Will.

Whether a concurrent refusal to grant an interim injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC warrants interference under Article 227 of the Constitution where the subordinate courts misread the foundational trust deed.

Addressing the scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court noted that while supervisory jurisdiction does not convert the court into an appellate forum over discretionary interlocutory orders, interference is fully justified if discretion is founded upon a misreading of foundational documents or an erroneous legal premise.

Misconstruction of a governing trust instrument justifies supervisory interference under Article 227

The Court observed that concurrence between two courts below does not insulate an order tainted by a patent error of law. Referring to established precedents, the bench emphasized that when subordinate courts interpret an instrument in isolation and ignore its collective governance scheme, supervisory correction becomes necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The Court held that the powers under Clause 6(b) of the trust deed were vested exclusively in the founder-trustee to provide for succession after his lifetime, requiring subsequent nominees to act collectively as a body governed by quorum rules.

Trusteeship is an office of personal confidence and cannot devolve through testamentary succession

The Court firmly rejected the proposition that individual life trustees could independently bequeath their seats to family members. Such an interpretation, the bench reasoned, would turn the administration of a public charity into a hereditary entitlement, directly contradicting the irrevocable dedication of trust property to the public.

Highlighting equitable principles under trust law, Justice Deepak Gupta observed:

"It is also contrary to the settled principle that a trustee's office is a personal one of confidence, which does not devolve by succession. Section 1 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 excludes public charitable trusts from its operation, but the principles underlying Sections 47, 73 and 75 of that Act embody general equitable principles. Under those principles, a trustee cannot delegate the office, and new trustees are appointed by the person empowered by the instrument, or failing such person, by the continuing trustees or the court. They are not appointed by the will of a deceased co-trustee."

Registration of a Will does not validate the bequest of an office the testatrix lacked authority to convey

The High Court clarified that statutory presumption of genuineness arising from the registration of a Will cannot cure an inherent absence of dispositive competence. The testatrix could only bequeath what she legally possessed, and the management of a public trust cannot form part of a private testamentary estate.

The Court held:

"Even if the Will is genuine and validly executed, it cannot confer a right which the testatrix herself was not competent to pass on. The trusteeship of a public charitable trust is not personal property that can be bequeathed like an ordinary estate."

Restraining an unauthorized claimant from managing public trust funds preserves status quo and does not grant final relief

The bench overturned the lower court's reliance on bar against granting final relief at the interlocutory stage, clarifying that an interim injunction preventing claimants from meddling in the trust on the strength of an invalid testamentary clause merely preserves the status quo.

The Court observed that permitting a claimant with a prima facie untenable title to participate in the trust's administration and handle donation funds would expose the public charity to irreparable harm, tilting the balance of convenience decisively in favor of the trust.

Partly allowing the revision petition, the High Court set aside the impugned orders and granted an interim injunction restraining Respondent No. 1 from acting as a trustee or interfering in the management, accounts, or properties of the trust on the basis of the disputed Will until the disposal of the suit. The Court similarly restrained Respondent No. 2 from asserting any claim under the Will, directed the managing trustees to maintain true accounts and submit half-yearly statements before the trial court, and requested the trial court to decide the main suit within one year.

Date of Decision: October 16, 2026