Section 69 BNS | Promise To Marry Cannot Be Alleged By A Married Woman To Prove Deceitful Consent For Sexual Intercourse: Kerala High Court

"A married woman who voluntarily accompanies another man to a hotel room and has sexual intercourse with him cannot, merely on the basis of an allegation of a promise of marriage, contend that the sexual relationship was induced solely by such promise, particularly when her subsisting marriage was not in dispute." Kerala High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a married woman with a subsisting marriage cannot invoke the offence of sexual intercourse on a false promise of marriage under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) to claim that her consent was vitiated.

A bench of Justice Jobin Sebastian observed that where the complainant is already married, an allegation of a "promise to marry" lacks the legal foundation required to establish that consent was obtained through deceitful means.

The petitioner, Habibur Rahman, was the sole accused in a criminal case registered at Kovalam Police Station for offences under Section 69 of the BNS and Section 66E of the Information Technology Act. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner had sexual intercourse with the de facto complainant after promising to marry her and subsequently circulated her nude photographs. The petitioner sought to quash the proceedings based on an amicable settlement reached with the complainant.

The primary issue before the court was whether criminal proceedings alleging sexual intercourse on a false promise of marriage could be quashed based on a settlement between the parties. Furthermore, the court was called upon to determine whether the essential ingredients of Section 69 of the BNS were satisfied when the complainant is a married woman with a subsisting marriage.

The court began by addressing the request to quash the FIR on the grounds of settlement. The bench clarified that while parties may resolve personal disputes, offences involving sexual violence and allegations of deceit are matters of societal concern.

Settlement Does Not Automatically Quash Grave Offences

Justice Sebastian noted that the offence alleged is grave in nature and cannot be treated as a purely private dispute between two individuals. Consequently, the court held that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed solely on the ground of a settlement reached between the parties, as the element of public interest remains paramount in such serious allegations.

Court Evaluates Merits of Section 69 BNS

Despite the settlement, the court examined the merits of the allegations under Section 69 of the BNS. This provision punishes sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or a false promise to marry. The court observed that the core of the offence lies in the "deceitful" nature of the promise, which must be the inducing factor for the victim’s consent.

Marriage Status Vitiates the Promise Claim

The court pointed out that the de facto complainant was a married woman with children and her husband was alive at the time of the alleged incident. The bench reasoned that given the woman's existing marital status, the assertion that she consented to intercourse based on a promise of marriage is legally untenable.

"The materials placed on record do not disclose the commission of an offence under Section 69 of the BNS."

No Offence Made Out

The court held that even if the allegations in the First Information Statement were accepted at face value, the essential ingredients for Section 69 of the BNS were missing. Because the complainant’s subsisting marriage was not in dispute, it could not be argued that her consent was induced by a "promise of marriage" that she could legally expect the petitioner to fulfill.

Abuse of Process of Law

Finally, the court concluded that since the fundamental elements of the alleged offence were not present and given that a settlement had been reached, the continuation of the criminal trial would serve no useful purpose. To allow the prosecution to proceed would constitute an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, the FIR and all further proceedings were quashed under Section 528 of the BNSS.

The court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings, reinforcing that the legal concept of "promise to marry" as a basis for vitiating consent is inapplicable when the complainant is already in a subsisting marriage. This ruling provides a significant precedent for advocates dealing with cases under the new criminal codes, particularly regarding the threshold for "deceitful" consent.

Date of Decision: 03 September 2026