Section 106 Evidence Act Cannot Relieve Prosecution Of Initial Burden; Absence Of Explanation In Domestic Setting Not Substitute For Prima Facie Guilt: Supreme Court

"Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence," Supreme Court of India.

NEW DELHI: Clarifying the strict statutory boundaries governing the burden of proof, the Supreme Court on November 5, 2026 held that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be invoked to compensate for the prosecution's failure to establish a foundational case against an accused. A Bench comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar ruled that an accused person's failure to offer an explanation regarding matters allegedly within their exclusive knowledge cannot form the basis of a conviction under Section 302 IPC unless the prosecution independently proves every essential ingredient of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant, an elderly mother-in-law, was charged alongside her husband and two sons under Sections 498A, 342, 406, and 302 read with Section 34 IPC for allegedly setting her daughter-in-law on fire. The Sessions Court acquitted all four accused after noticing irreconcilable contradictions across three successive dying declarations and the non-examination of the primary rescue witness. On appeal by the State, the Bombay High Court upheld the acquittal of the other three co-accused but reversed the appellant’s acquittal and convicted her substantively under Section 302 IPC, holding that since she was alone at home with the victim, Section 106 of the Evidence Act mandated her to explain how the burns occurred.

Whether Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can be triggered to draw an adverse inference against an accused in the absence of the prosecution discharging its foundational burden of establishing a prima facie case?

Whether an accused charged exclusively with constructive liability under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC can be convicted substantively under Section 302 IPC upon the acquittal of all co-accused, solely relying on an uncorroborated and inconsistent dying declaration?

Section 106 operates only after the prosecution discharges its primary burden

Addressing the High Court’s reliance on the accused's lack of explanation, the Supreme Court observed that the evidentiary mechanism embedded in Section 106 of the Evidence Act is strictly conditional. The Bench reiterated that the ordinary rule governing criminal trials—placing the entire burden of proving guilt upon the prosecution—is never diluted or modified by Section 106.

The Court emphasized that an accused cannot be forced to prove their innocence merely because an incident occurred within the privacy of a household. Quoting its three-judge bench precedent in Anees v. State Govt. of NCT, the Court reiterated that Section 106 cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution first produces convincing evidence establishing guilt.

Failure to offer an explanation cannot supply missing links in prosecution evidence

The Bench underscored that drawing an adverse inference against a defendant for remaining silent or failing to account for events within their knowledge impermissibly relieves the state of its constitutional and statutory duty. The Court held that the prosecution must first lead credible evidence which, if believed, would independently sustain a conviction.

"It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden on the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden," the Bench noted.

Substantive conviction under Section 302 IPC unsustainable without a separate charge when co-accused are acquitted

Examining the procedural framework of the charges, the Court found that all four accused had been charged exclusively under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC on the premise of joint criminal liability. No separate or independent charge under Section 302 IPC simpliciter was ever framed against the appellant.

Relying on the four-judge bench ruling in Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, the Court noted that once the High Court maintained the acquittal of the other three accused, it legally extinguished the allegation of pre-arranged common intention. Convicting the appellant alone for the substantive murder without an independent charge amounted to framing an entirely new accusation causing grave prejudice.

Uncorroborated and inconsistent dying declarations cannot sustain a reversal of acquittal

The Court criticized the High Court for selectively accepting one dying declaration recorded in the medico-legal case sheet while discarding two subsequent declarations that named the father-in-law as the assailant who ignited the fire. Reaffirming the principles laid down in Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), the Bench noted that when multiple dying declarations contain material contradictions, uncorroborated statements cannot form the sole bedrock of a conviction.

The Court observed that the prosecution deliberately withheld the most crucial independent witness, the Police Patil who first reached the scene, extinguished the flames, and transported the victim to the hospital. The non-examination of this vital witness, coupled with the glaring physical disparity between the sixty-year-old appellant and the victim, rendered the prosecution version fundamentally unreliable.

Setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's acquittal had reinforced the appellant's presumption of innocence, which could not have been disturbed on flimsy grounds. The Court fully restored the Sessions Court's judgment of acquittal and directed that the appellant be released forthwith.

Date of Decision: November 5, 2026