Property Inherited Under Section 8 Hindu Succession Act Is Absolute Ownership; Grandson Has No Right By Birth During Father's Lifetime: Supreme Court

"A son’s son is not mentioned as an heir under Class I of the Schedule, and, therefore he could not get any right in the property of his grandfather under the provision." Reaffirming the primacy of codified law over traditional Mitakshara coparcenary principles, the Supreme Court held that property devolving upon a son under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 constitutes his absolute individual property, extinguishing any claim of right by birth raised by his own son during his lifetime.

A bench comprising Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sunita Agarwal on November 6, 2026, dismissed an appeal preferred by a minor grandson seeking partition against his father and subsequent purchasers, ruling that ancestral property partitioned among Class I heirs ceases to retain its joint family character.

The suit property originally belonged to late N. Ramakrishnan, whose daughter instituted a partition suit in 1993 that concluded in a compromise decree dated February 3, 1994, allotting an 1,811-square-foot parcel to the appellant’s father. Although the appellant was born on January 6, 1994, prior to the final compromise decree, his father alienated the allotted parcel in April 1997 through registered sale deeds without joining the minor. The appellant filed a suit through his mother seeking partition and separate possession of a half-share, claiming that the property retained coparcenary incidents. While the trial court decreed the suit, the High Court reversed the decree and recognized the father as the exclusive owner.

Whether a grandson acquires an interest by birth in property that devolved upon his living father under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

Whether property allotted to a male heir pursuant to a partition among Class I statutory heirs continues to bear the character of Mitakshara coparcenary property vis-à-vis his own descendants?

Whether the provisions of unamended Section 6 of the 1956 Act or Section 29-A of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 entitle a grandson to demand partition of his father's divided share during the father's lifetime?

Grandson Expressly Excluded From Class I Intestate Succession

The Supreme Court underscored that Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 establishes an exhaustive, self-contained statutory code regulating intestate succession among Hindu males. The Court observed that under the statutory scheme, Class I Schedule heirs succeed simultaneously to the absolute exclusion of all other relatives. While the legislature deliberately included the son of a predeceased son within Class I, it conspicuously omitted the son of a living son.

"In the codified Hindu Law of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the right of a son’s son in his grandfather’s property during the lifetime of his father which existed under the personal Hindu Law as enforced before the Act 1956, was not saved expressly by the legislature while enacting the Hindu Succession Act, 1956," the bench observed.

Devolution Under Section 8 Operates In Individual Capacity Rather Than As Karta

Reaffirming the established jurisprudence laid down in C.W.T. v. Chander Sen and consistently followed in Bhanwar Singh v. Puran and Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan, the bench ruled that property devolving on a son under Section 8 is held in his individual capacity and not as karta of a joint Hindu family consisting of his descendants. The Court emphasized that reading down Section 8 to create a coparcenary right by birth would lead to an impermissible dichotomy between male and female Class I heirs.

"The express words of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 cannot be ignored and must prevail. The Preamble to the Act reiterates that the Act is, inter alia, to 'amend' the law, with that background the express language which excludes son's son but includes son of a predeceased son cannot be ignored," the Court noted while citing Chander Sen.

Partition Destroys Coparcenary Character And Grants Exclusive Power Of Alienation

Examining the impact of the 1994 compromise decree, the apex court noted that the succession to the grandfather's estate opened upon his demise prior to the appellant’s birth. The Court held that when Class I heirs partition an estate, they take their respective divided shares as tenants-in-common per capita under Section 19 of the Act, which completely ruptures any pre-existing coparcenary status.

"With the partition, the property of N. Ramakrishnan the grandfather of the appellant ceased to be joint family property, inasmuch as, all heirs succeeded the same as tenant in common and not as joint tenant, and joint coparcenary did not continue," the judgment held.

The bench stressed that once a divided share reaches the hands of a son under a decree of partition, it becomes his exclusive, separate property. Consequently, the father is clothed with full competence to alienate or dispose of the property at his own volition, without requiring the consent of his son or showing legal necessity.

Inapplicability Of Section 6 And Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, 1989

The Supreme Court decisively rejected the appellant's reliance on Section 29-A of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 and the unamended Section 6. The Court reasoned that since the grandfather's succession had already opened before the appellant's birth, the appellant could never be deemed a surviving coparcener at the time the original owner passed away.

"With the partition decree, the property of N. Ramachandran falling in the share of the father of the appellant became his exclusive property in his individual capacity and cannot be said to be coparcenary. There is no question of devolution of the property once partitioned and became exclusive individual property of the first respondent upon the appellant herein so as to recognise his right on the premise of attaining coparcenary rights with his birth," the bench concluded.

Affirming the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that the minor plaintiff possessed no maintainable cause of action to seek partition of his father's absolute property, and accordingly dismissed the civil appeal.

Date of Decision: November 06, 2026