Police Officer Empowered As 'Excise Officer' Can File Final Report Under Section 173 CrPC For Offences Under Section 61 Punjab Excise Act: Delhi High Court

A report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by an empowered police officer satisfies the statutory mandate under Section 75 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 for taking cognizance of offences, the Delhi High Court held on November 2, 2026. Justice Ravinder Dudeja ruled that the definition of an Excise Officer under the enactment is not confined strictly to officers belonging to the Excise Department, but encompasses police officers who have been duly invested with the requisite statutory powers.

The prosecution case stemmed from the recovery of 100 pouches of illicit liquor from the respondent's premises in Sultan Puri without any valid licence or permit in 1996. Following the investigation, the Station House Officer filed a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondent for an offence punishable under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act. The Trial Court acquitted the accused on the technical threshold that a police report under Section 173 CrPC cannot substitute a complaint or report submitted by an Excise Officer under Section 75 of the Act, prompting the State to appeal.

Whether an empowered police official qualifies as an Excise Officer under Section 3(8) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914, thereby rendering a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure legally valid for taking cognizance under Section 75 of the Act?

Whether the Trial Court erred in acquitting the respondent without examining statutory notifications empowering police officers to act as Excise Officers?

Addressing the jurisdictional competence of the police to present charges under the enactment, the High Court scrutinized Section 75(1)(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, which bars a Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 61 except upon personal knowledge, suspicion, or a complaint or report of an Excise Officer.

Empowered police officials fall within the statutory ambit of Excise Officers

The Court observed that Section 3(8) of the Act defines an Excise Officer expansively as any officer or person appointed or invested with powers under the statute. Consequently, this definition extends beyond personnel belonging to the Excise Department and includes police personnel who have been statutorily clothed with such authority.

Reflecting on prior precedent, the Bench relied on the ruling in Chattar Singh v. State and statutory notifications issued under the Punjab Excise Act applicable to Delhi, specifically Rule 3 of Volume II of the Delhi Administration's Excise Department Manual.

Statutory notifications confer excise powers on specified ranks of police officers

Under these notifications, various ranks of Delhi Police, including Superintendents, Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, and Station House Officers, have been designated and invested with the powers of Excise Officers. The Court emphasized that an empowered officer's final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is fully competent to trigger cognizance.

The High Court observed that the mere fact that a report has been submitted by a police officer, as opposed to an officer belonging to the Excise Department, does not by itself render the prosecution incompetent or defective in law.

Trial Court erred by overlooking enabling notifications and acquitting on technicalities

The Court noted that the Trial Court had erroneously proceeded on an assumption without evaluating the Notification dated September 7, 1966, or determining whether the SHO was duly empowered under the statutory framework. Because the SHO possessed the requisite competence to file the final report, the respondent could not have been acquitted on the purported technical defect.

Finding that the Trial Court had dismissed the case strictly on a flawed technical premise without adjudicating the merits, the High Court held that the prosecution could not be discarded as legally untenable.

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal dated May 23, 2003, and remanded the matter back to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, North-West District, Rohini, to decide the case afresh on its merits in accordance with law after affording both sides a hearing.

Date of Decision: November 2, 2026