Second FIR in Same Offence Is Procedural Irregularity, Not Fatal Unless It Prejudices the Accused: Orissa High Court

“Prosecution Should Have Added Accused to First FIR Instead of Registering a New One — Investigation Must Flow from the Original Crime Report” - In a detailed pronouncement concerning the permissibility of registering a second FIR for the same offence, the Orissa High Court has held that while such a practice is procedurally irregular, it does not ipso facto vitiate the trial unless actual prejudice to the accused is demonstrated.

The ruling came in the judgment in Prasanta Kumar Sahoo v. State of Odisha, where the accused had challenged his conviction for the alleged murder of his adoptive parents, partly on the ground that a second FIR was registered months after he himself had filed the first FIR in the same matter.

The Court found no justification for registration of a fresh FIR, observing that the investigating agency ought to have added the appellant as an accused in the first FIR, rather than initiating a parallel FIR and treating it as a new case altogether.

“Law Does Not Permit Splintering of Investigation by Filing Second FIR in Same Incident”: High Court Follows T.T. Antony Doctrine

The Bench, comprising Justice S.K. Sahoo and Justice Chittaranjan Dash, cited the well-established ratio of the Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, where it was held that:

“There can be no second FIR and consequently no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence.”

The High Court remarked that the registration of the second FIR in the present case was inconsistent with this principle and amounted to a procedural overreach by the police.

However, the Court drew a nuanced distinction by holding that this irregularity did not cause any actual prejudice to the accused and hence did not, by itself, warrant acquittal or annulment of the entire proceedings.

“When Accused Himself Lodges the First FIR, He Can Be Later Named in It — No Need for New FIR”

The appellant, Prasanta Kumar Sahoo, had initially lodged an FIR at Jatni Police Station on 13 August 1996, claiming that his adoptive mother had murdered his adoptive father and then attempted suicide. Based on this report, PS Case No. 108 of 1996 was registered under Sections 302/309 IPC.

Months later, the Investigating Officer registered another FIR, this time treating Prasanta and his wife as the accused, and started a new case, leading to his prosecution and eventual conviction.

The High Court strongly disapproved this action, stating:

“The second FIR is not permissible in law… The I.O. should have forwarded the name of the appellant as an accused in the first FIR and submitted chargesheet accordingly.”

Yet, the Court observed that this procedural deviation did not render the entire trial illegal, particularly when the appellant was made aware of the charges and participated fully in the trial process.

“Violation of FIR Procedure Is Irregularity — Not Every Violation Makes the Trial Void”

Referring to the principle laid down in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254, and Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148, the High Court reiterated that:

“A second FIR may amount to abuse of process of law, but its existence alone will not vitiate the trial unless it prejudices the right of fair trial or leads to miscarriage of justice.”

Applying this principle, the Court refused to invalidate the proceedings merely because a second FIR was filed, noting that:

“The trial court based its findings on evidence recorded in court, not merely on the FIR registration. No procedural prejudice was demonstrated.”

“Investigation Must Be Continuous and Comprehensive — Not Fragmented by Multiple FIRs”

The High Court warned investigating agencies against the practice of fragmenting investigations through multiple FIRs for the same occurrence, stating:

“The correct course of action would have been to continue the investigation in the original FIR by adding the new information or names under Section 173(8) CrPC… What was done here was procedurally flawed.”

Nevertheless, the Court ultimately acquitted the appellant, not because of the second FIR, but due to the lack of substantive evidence, as the chain of circumstantial evidence was incomplete.