Rehabilitation Under the 2015 Policy is Not a Fundamental Right, but a Conditional Benefit: Delhi High Court Dismisses Pleas by Jhuggi Dwellers for Failing Eligibility Criteria

“Minors on the Cut-Off Date and Sole Commercial Use Cannot Be Rehabilitated” – In a significant pronouncement Delhi High Court, through Justice Dharmesh Sharma, dismissed a batch of writ petitions filed by slum dwellers of Bhoomiheen Camp, Kalkaji, challenging their exclusion from rehabilitation and relocation benefits under the Delhi Slum and Jhuggi Jhopri Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015. The Court firmly held that rehabilitation benefits under the 2015 Policy are "policy-based entitlements, not enforceable fundamental rights", and petitioners who failed to fulfill basic eligibility criteria—either for being minors as of January 1, 2015, or for exclusively using their jhuggis for commercial purposes—had no legal claim to relief.

The petitions were disposed of in W.P.(C) No. 2785/2023 and connected matters, with the Court endorsing the DDA's actions under the framework of the 2015 Policy and rejecting the contention that such determinations lacked procedural fairness or constitutional validity.

The petitioners—daily-wage workers and residents of Bhoomiheen Camp, who migrated to Delhi decades ago from various states—sought intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution, claiming that they had been wrongly declared ineligible for rehabilitation by the DDA. The Court noted that the controversy spanned two categories: one, where petitioners were admittedly minors on the critical date of January 1, 2015, and second, where the jhuggis were used solely for commercial activity at the time of survey.

All petitioners claimed long-standing residence and raised challenges to the survey process, the denial of consideration of relevant documents, and the alleged sidelining of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB)—which, under the DUSIB Act, 2010, is the nodal agency for slum rehabilitation in Delhi.

Justice Sharma addressed three main legal issues: eligibility conditions under the 2015 Policy, the legality of survey and documentation process, and the purported exclusion of DUSIB.

The first legal hurdle concerned the mandatory requirement under Clause 1(ii) of Part B of the 2015 Policy, which states:

“The applicant must be at least 18 years of age on the cut-off date of 01.01.2015.”

The Court observed: “It is undisputed that each of the petitioners in this group was a minor as on the cut-off date... Accordingly, their claims to independent rehabilitation fail at the threshold.” [Para 58]

The second category of petitioners—whose jhuggis were rejected due to sole commercial use—also found no favour with the Court. The relevant policy clause, Clause 8 of Part B, was held to be unambiguous:

“No dwelling unit shall be allotted if the jhuggi is used solely for commercial purposes.”

Emphasizing that rehabilitation is not an automatic entitlement, the Court reiterated:

“Findings of fact, duly arrived at by the designated authorities in accordance with the policy framework, cannot be reappreciated or interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.” [Para 66]

Key Findings on Minors and Document Deficiencies

Each minor petitioner admitted their date of birth and lack of requisite voter ID prior to the cut-off date. For instance, Arun Das, whose petition (W.P.(C) 2785/2023) led this category, was born on 15.07.1998.

The Court cited the Appellate Authority’s order which stated: “The admission of the appellant is a clincher piece of evidence... He was less than 18 years of age on the cut-off date of 01.01.2015 and accordingly does not fulfill the eligibility criteria as per the guidelines issued by DDA.” [Order dated 15.12.2022]

Similarly, Mangal Karan and Rahul, born in 1997 and 1999 respectively, failed to produce voter IDs or documents issued prior to 2015 to prove their independent claim.

The petitioners urged the Court to adopt a “holistic” reading of the policy, citing Udal & Ors. v. DDA, but the Court held that:

“While Udal emphasized a combined reading of documentation clauses, it did not dilute the age requirement. The 2015 Policy makes the attainment of majority by the cut-off date an express condition.”

Sole Commercial Use: A Disqualification

In the lead matter for this category, W.P.(C) 6291/2023, petitioner Kashmir Lal admitted before the Appellate Authority:

“I have been using Jhuggi No. B-300 exclusively for commercial purposes since 2010–11... I live elsewhere on rent.” [Appellate Order dated 31.03.2023]

The Court remarked: “This admission, corroborated by video evidence, leaves no doubt that the jhuggi was not being used as a residence, and accordingly, the petitioner falls outside the ambit of eligibility.”

In the case of Mithlesh (W.P.(C) 11015/2023), whose family was already allotted a dwelling unit, the Court held:

“Two allotments against the same dwelling unit are not permissible... The family’s use of the jhuggi was already acknowledged through the allotment to her daughter-in-law.” [Para 65]

On the Role of DUSIB and Survey Protocol

Petitioners argued that DUSIB was improperly excluded from the survey process and that the survey by a private agency was contrary to Section 10(3) of the DUSIB Act, 2010. However, the Court rejected this argument citing its prior ruling in Sanjeev Bhadra v. GNCTD (2025):

“This Court has already found the DDA’s role as land-owning agency to be valid and legally sufficient... The challenge to DUSIB’s exclusion has been conclusively repelled.” [Para 57]

“The Right to Shelter Does Not Equate to the Right to Rehabilitation Under Policy”

The Court also rejected arguments based on Article 21 of the Constitution:

“While the right to shelter is a part of the right to life, it does not automatically translate into a right to rehabilitation in every case. That right must flow from a valid, applicable policy—which in this case, was not satisfied.” [Para 47]

The Court emphasized that policy-driven schemes are governed by their own terms: “No obligation lies on any land-owning agency to provide rehabilitation to persons who fail to meet the minimum conditions of eligibility.” [Para 35]

The Delhi High Court decisively dismissed all petitions: “The petitioners, being minors on the cut-off date or having used their jhuggis exclusively for commercial purposes, were rightly declared ineligible. These writ petitions, being devoid of merit, are hereby dismissed.” [Paras 62, 67]

Further, the Court noted that “policy implementation cannot be stalled by persons who, by their own admissions, do not meet the criteria”, and that “the sanctity of cut-off dates must be preserved to ensure fairness and prevent abuse”.

Date of Decision: May 30, 2025