Protecting Tribal Agricultural Land from Re-Acquisition by Wealthier Non-Tribals Is Constitutionally Justified: Bombay High Court Upholds Validity of Rule 4(1)(a)(i)

“The object behind the restriction is to prevent exploitation… the legislation intends to safeguard tribal land and protect their way of life”— Bombay High Court, in a constitutionally significant ruling, upheld the validity of Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Transfer of Occupancy by Tribals to Non-Tribals) Rules, 1975, which prohibits the sale of tribal agricultural land to non-tribals unless the land is to be used for non-agricultural purposes. The Division Bench of Justice A.S. Chandurkar and Justice Rajesh S. Patil held that the impugned rule is a reasonable classification in furtherance of constitutional directives under Article 46, designed to protect tribal communities from economic exploitation.

"The restriction placed on the transfer of occupancy by a tribal to a non-tribal for agricultural purposes is reasonable in nature and does not fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India," the Court stated, emphasizing that land reform laws meant to insulate vulnerable tribal populations from predatory transactions were not violative of equality norms but were "constitutionally entrenched protections."

The petitioner, a tribal belonging to the Mahadev Koli Scheduled Tribe, sought to transfer his ancestral agricultural land in Taluka Dahanu, District Palghar, to a non-tribal tenant whose family had cultivated the land since 1940. Despite a settlement between the parties and an application under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, the Collector refused permission, citing Rule 4(1)(a)(i) which permits sale by tribals to non-tribals only if the land is to be used for non-agricultural purposes.

The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of this restriction, claiming that it violated Article 14 of the Constitution by creating an arbitrary classification between agricultural and non-agricultural use of land in the context of transfer to non-tribals. He further argued that the Collector's discretion under Section 36A was unreasonably curtailed by the Rule, and urged the Court to read down the provision to allow exceptions in deserving cases.

The petitioner contended that there was no rational nexus between the object of tribal protection and the prohibition on transfer of land for agricultural use. He argued that a tribal landowner’s right to choose a willing buyer should not be overridden merely because the transferee wished to use the land agriculturally.

Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, appearing for the petitioner, asserted:

“The restriction imposed on the purpose of use of the land by a non-tribal resulted in placing unnecessary fetters on the right of a tribal to transfer his occupancy... The differentiation has no nexus to the object sought to be achieved.”

It was further argued that Section 36A(2) empowers the Collector to grant sanction for transfer subject to prescribed conditions, and that Rule 4(1)(a)(i) illegally narrows this discretion. Relying on judgments such as Deepak Sibal v. Punjab University and Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., counsel urged that the Rule should either be struck down or judicially read down to allow agricultural use in exceptional cases.

The Court undertook a detailed analysis of the legislative history, constitutional directives, and judicial precedent. Referring to the Directive Principles, the Bench noted:

“In view of the provisions of Article 46 of the Constitution of India, it has been held that the said provision [Section 36A] intends to safeguard and protect the interest of tribals with a view to prevent their exploitation.”

Highlighting the policy rationale, the Court explained that the restriction is designed to prevent a backdoor route for re-alienation of tribal lands:

“The object behind the same appears to be to prevent non-tribals from accumulating agricultural lands of tribals which could result in future exploitation of tribals and requiring them to undertake agricultural operations on the very lands of which they were owners.”

The Bench added that with greater financial resources, non-tribals could easily dominate the agricultural economy, leading to economic displacement of tribals despite a formal land sale. The Court clarified:

“The restriction does not prevent a tribal from transferring land to another tribal... The only limitation is when land is intended to be used agriculturally by a non-tribal.”

On the question of excessive delegation and discretion, the Court clarified that the Collector’s powers are intact but bounded by legitimate legislative policy:

“Within the contingencies indicated in Rule 4(1), the Collector has the entire discretion and he can consider the request for grant of sanction under Section 36A of the Code... There is no restriction placed in that regard.”

Rejecting the plea to read down the rule, the Court emphasized the importance of legislative consistency and long-standing implementation:

“Rule 4(1)(a)(i) having successfully operated for all these years, it cannot be invalidated on the grounds urged by the petitioner... Individual hardship cannot be a ground to hold a provision invalid, especially when it is enacted keeping in mind Article 46 for the larger good.”

The Court found no merit in the argument that the rule resulted in unconstitutional classification. Quoting Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, the judgment reiterated:

“Article 14 prohibits class legislation, not reasonable classification... The legislative classification should be founded on an intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.”

In a strong endorsement of tribal land protection laws, the Bombay High Court has reaffirmed that Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the 1975 Rules, which bars sale of tribal land to non-tribals for agricultural use, is constitutionally valid, non-arbitrary, and reasonable. The judgment aligns with a long line of judicial thinking which holds that economic justice and land reform measures, especially in favour of Scheduled Tribes, must be interpreted liberally in favour of the marginalized.

“The challenge to Rule 4(1)(a)(i) of the Rules of 1975 therefore fails. The writ petition is dismissed. Rule discharged with no orders as to costs.”

Date of Decision: 26 May 2025