Permitting Vehicle For Drug Transport And Conspiracy Are Independent Offences Attracting Separate Punishments: Supreme Court

"When the offence under Section 25 is entirely possible to be committed separately as an independent offence... and when the offences of abetment and criminal conspiracy mentioned in Section 29 are in themselves independent offences, it is entirely logical to deduce and conclude that commission of these offences once established, would attract separate punishment and sentence," Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated April 8, 2026, held that permitting a conveyance to be used for drug offences and entering into a criminal conspiracy under Sections 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) constitute distinct and independent offences that attract separate punishments. A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed that these sections are not mere extensions of the principal offence but are substantive crimes that rely on the doctrine of "legislation by reference" to prescribe penalties.

The appellant and a co-accused were intercepted by the police while travelling in a car, leading to the recovery of 4.1 kilograms of charas from beneath the appellant's front seat. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) as well as under Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act, awarding separate rigorous imprisonment of 12 years and fines for each set of offences. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh subsequently reduced the substantive sentences to 10 years but maintained the separate convictions and punishments, prompting the present appeal.

The primary question before the court was whether independent and separate punishments can be awarded for offences under Sections 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act in addition to the principal offence under Section 20. The court was also called upon to determine whether a convict must pay double the fine amount when separate sentences are directed to run concurrently.

Sections 25 And 29 Are Independent Offences

Discussing the scheme of Chapter IV of the NDPS Act, the court rejected the appellant's argument that Sections 25 and 29 do not prescribe independent sentences. The bench explained that the legislative intent was to treat allowing premises or conveyances to be used for a crime, as well as criminal conspiracy, as distinct criminal acts. The court noted that a person facilitating the crime by permitting the use of their property commits a squarely independent offence. "Allowing premises etc. to be used for commission of an offence is conceived by the legislature to be a separate offence and engrafted in the Act accordingly as an independent offence under Section 25," the bench observed.

Legislation By Reference And Incorporation

The court addressed the statutory language of Sections 25 and 29, which state that an offender shall be punishable with the punishment "provided for that offence" rather than expressly quantifying the prison term. The bench clarified that this is a classic instance of "legislation by reference" and "legislation by incorporation." The punishment provided for the principal offence under Section 20 is bodily lifted and read into Sections 25 and 29.

"The legislature has referred to the punishment mentioned in the particular section to be referred to and applied for the purpose of punishment and sentence to be imposed under another section."

"Occupier" Liability And Fetter On Conspiracy Punishment Lifted

Addressing the appellant's contention that he was merely a passenger and not the registered owner of the vehicle, the court held that Section 25 expressly covers an "occupier" having use of the conveyance. Regarding conspiracy, the court highlighted that Section 29 expressly overrides Section 116 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Consequently, the limitation on imprisonment terms for abetment found in the IPC is entirely done away with under the NDPS framework, allowing for the full punishment to be meted out.

"One of the objects of concurrent running of the sentence is to avoid double punishment. This principle would readily apply when two separate punishments are awarded, and sentences are imposed for two offences relatable to one set of facts."

Sentences Should Run Concurrently To Avoid Double Jeopardy

While affirming the legality of separate punishments, the court issued a crucial caveat regarding cases where offences under Sections 25 and 29 arise from the exact same transaction as the principal offence. The bench termed these parasitic or derivative offences, advising that courts should direct the sentences to run concurrently. The judges emphasized that imposing cumulative punishments for interconnected offences arising from a single set of facts would violate the principle against double jeopardy.

Fine Is A Punishment; Double Fine Impermissible

Delving into the jurisprudence of sentencing under Section 53 of the IPC, the court addressed the imposition of dual fines of Rs. 1,20,000 for each set of offences. Relying on the precedent set in Shahejadkhan Mahebubkhan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, the court distinguished between a substantive sentence of fine and default imprisonment, which is merely a penalty. The bench definitively ruled that when substantive sentences of imprisonment are ordered to run concurrently, the monetary fines must also operate concurrently to prevent the convict from paying twice.

Partially allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the substantive sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment but struck down the liability to pay the double fine. Noting that the appellant had already undergone 11 years of incarceration, inclusive of the default imprisonment period, the court directed his immediate release from custody.

Date of Decision: 08 April 2026