'Murder Went Unavenged, But Courts Cannot Convict On Mere Assumptions': Supreme Court Acquits Accused In 1988 Murder Case, Quashes High Court's Remit Order

"The murder went unavenged, but it is not for the courts to convict the accused on mere assumptions when the evidence led by the prosecution fails to satisfy the judicial mind, of the guilt of the accused." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated July 28, 2026, unequivocally quashed a Bombay High Court order that had remitted a 1988 murder acquittal for fresh consideration of evidence, thereby upholding the original acquittal.

A bench of Justices K. Vinod Chandran and J. B. Pardiwala emphasized that while the anguish of the victim's family is understandable, courts cannot convict on mere assumptions where evidence fails to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court also elucidated the non-maintainability of a victim's revision petition against acquittal post-2009 CrPC amendments, urging conversion to an appeal where statutory remedies exist.

The case stemmed from the 1988 murder of one Qavi, for which the appellants (Khalil Pasha & Ors.) were acquitted by the Trial Court. The victim's brother subsequently filed a Criminal Revision Application before the Bombay High Court, which initially upset the acquittal without hearing the accused. This led to a Supreme Court remit. On remand, the High Court again remitted the matter for fresh consideration of eyewitness testimonies, Section 27 recoveries, and chemical analysis, while upholding the Trial Court's rejection of dying declarations. The accused then approached the Supreme Court challenging this second remit order.

The primary questions before the court were whether the High Court's remit order, particularly in a case as old as 1988, was sustainable, and whether a criminal revision application by a victim against an acquittal was maintainable following the 2009 amendment to Section 372 of the CrPC. The Court also undertook a re-appreciation of the evidence to determine if the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Victim's Revision Against Acquittal Not Maintainable Post-2009 CrPC Amendment

The Supreme Court noted that the criminal revision application was filed in 1990, prior to the 2009 amendment to Section 372 of the CrPC. However, it clarified the current legal position, stating that post-amendment, a victim has a statutory right to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal, which does not require special leave like State appeals under Section 378(4) CrPC. The Court, citing its earlier decisions in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka and Joseph Stephen v. Santhanasamy, reiterated that where an appeal remedy is available, a revision at the instance of a party who has not availed of the appeal remedy is generally barred under Section 401(4) CrPC.

High Court Can Convert Revision to Appeal in Interest of Justice

Despite the bar on revision, the bench acknowledged that Section 401(5) CrPC empowers the High Court, in the interest of justice, to treat a revision application as a petition of appeal, especially where recourse to revision was taken on an erroneous belief that no appellate remedy existed. The Court also pointed out that Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) is analogous to Section 401 of the CrPC, indicating continuity in this legal principle.

Supreme Court Re-Appreciates Evidence Due to Case Age

Considering the protracted nature of the proceedings since the 1988 incident, the Supreme Court deemed it appropriate to itself re-appreciate the evidence presented before the Trial Court. The prosecution had sought to prove motive, unlawful assembly, assault, dying declarations, the nature of injuries, cause of death, and weapon/clothing recoveries to establish murder.

Motive Not Proved by Prosecution

The prosecution’s theory of motive revolved around an altercation between A4 and the deceased. However, PW4's testimony regarding this altercation was found unreliable, especially since the deceased was engaged in selling apparels, not whitewashing as suggested by PW4. This cast doubt on the very basis of the alleged motive.

Eyewitness Testimonies Plagued by Inconsistencies

The testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses (PW3, PW4, PW8) were critically examined. They were labeled as "chance witnesses" at a public place. Their accounts were inconsistent with each other, with PW4 speaking of an unexamined witness named Ajaz, and PW3's Section 161 CrPC statement being delayed without explanation. Crucially, despite their close acquaintance with the injured and the police station being minutes away, none of them took the injured to the hospital or informed the police. Their testimonies were deemed not to inspire confidence.

Dying Declarations Deemed Unreliable

The High Court itself had refused to credit the dying declarations, a finding upheld by the Supreme Court. The dying declarations, purportedly made to the brother (PW10) and father (PW5), differed on the location and timing. More critically, the doctor (PW1) who first examined and admitted the deceased testified that the injured was unconscious and never regained consciousness. This directly contradicted the later testimony of another doctor (PW11) who stated the injured was conscious, whose statement was found suspicious and inconsistent with PW1. The post-mortem report, indicating grievous internal injuries to the lung and heart, made a conscious and clear statement improbable.

Scene of Occurrence Suspicious, No Seizures

The Court noted a significant lapse concerning the scene of occurrence. Despite the brutal attack and severe injuries, the Investigating Officer had merely prepared a scene mahazar but made no seizures from the spot. The absence of any tell-tale signs of the brutal attack, such as blood spills, at the scene where the deceased was found further fueled suspicion regarding the prosecution's narrative of events.

Section 27 Recovery Alone Insufficient for Conviction

While a weapon was recovered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act with human blood stains, the prosecution failed to establish a clear connection of this weapon to the crime or the deceased. The human blood was not indicated to be that of the deceased or the accused. The Court held that Section 27 recovery alone, without other corroborating circumstances forming a complete chain of guilt, is insufficient to lead to a conviction.

Acquittal Fortifies Presumption of Innocence; Appellate Interference Limited

The Supreme Court strongly reiterated the principles governing appellate review of acquittals. It held that when a Trial Court hands down an acquittal, it fortifies the presumption of innocence. An appellate court should not overturn an acquittal if the view taken by the Trial Court is plausible, even if another view is possible. The benefit of any reasonable doubt must always be conferred on the accused. The Court stressed that acquittals should not be lightly interfered with without strong compelling reasons.

"The murder went unavenged, but it is not for the courts to convict the accused on mere assumptions when the evidence led by the prosecution fails to satisfy the judicial mind, of the guilt of the accused."

Based on its comprehensive re-appreciation of the evidence, the Supreme Court found the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The motive was not proven, eyewitness accounts were untrustworthy, dying declarations were incredible, and the scene of occurrence was suspicious due to lack of seizures. The Section 27 recovery alone could not sustain a conviction. Consequently, the High Court's remit order was deemed unsustainable.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the Trial Court's order of acquittal for the accused in a case spanning over three decades. The judgment underscores the stringent evidentiary standards required for conviction in criminal cases, particularly when an acquittal by the trial court fortifies the presumption of innocence. It also clarifies the procedural aspects of a victim's right to appeal against acquittal post-2009 CrPC amendments, emphasizing the need for an appeal rather than a revision petition.

Date of Decision: 28 July 2026