Mother Cannot Claim Maintenance From Stepson If Court Has Already Directed Real Son To Maintain Her: Allahabad High Court

"The inability of person claiming maintenance to maintain himself/herself become to an end after order of Court to pay maintenance... the person in whose favour the maintenance order is passed cannot claim another maintenance to another person." Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a mother cannot seek maintenance from her stepson under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) if she is already receiving sufficient maintenance from her biological son pursuant to a court order.

A bench of Justice Lakshmi Kant Shukla observed that once a competent court fastens the liability of maintenance on one capable relative, the claimant's inability to maintain herself comes to an end, precluding her from demanding additional maintenance from another relative.

The revisionist, Smt. Kusum, had originally filed an application under Section 125 CrPC before the Family Court in Muzaffarnagar against her biological son (Opposite Party No. 3) and her stepson (Opposite Party No. 2). The trial court allowed the application and directed the biological son to pay Rs. 8,000 per month for her maintenance, while discharging the stepson from any liability. Aggrieved by the discharge of her stepson, the revisionist approached the High Court seeking to modify the order and fasten equal liability upon the stepson.

The primary question before the court was whether a mother, whose biological son has already been directed to pay maintenance by a trial court, can concurrently press a claim for maintenance against her stepson under Section 125 CrPC. The court was also called upon to determine whether a claimant has the right to dictate from whom and in what ratio multiple obligated persons must pay maintenance.

Maintenance Depends On The Inability To Maintain Oneself

The court first examined the fundamental objective of Section 125 CrPC, noting that maintenance is granted upon proving the inability of the claimant to maintain themselves. The bench observed that while the revisionist may have been unable to maintain herself at the time of filing the initial application, the trial court's order directing her biological son to pay Rs. 8,000 per month materially altered this factual position.

"Status Of Incapability" Ends Upon Favourable Court Order

The bench emphasised that since the biological son did not challenge the trial court's order and accepted the financial liability, the mother's destitution no longer existed in the eyes of the law. The court noted that "in aforesaid circumstance now the revisionist is capable to maintain herself getting the maintenance amount from her real son so now she is lost her status of incapability to maintain herself."

No Right To Claim Multiple Maintenance Allowances

Addressing the claimant's insistence on fastening concurrent liability upon the stepson, the High Court clarified the legal position regarding multiple persons under a statutory obligation to maintain. The court unequivocally held that the primary inability of a person claiming maintenance comes to a complete end after a judicial order ensures their financial upkeep.

Court, Not Claimant, Decides Apportionment Of Liability

The bench firmly rejected the notion that a claimant can demand maintenance from a secondary relative when a primary relative with sufficient means is already fulfilling the obligation. Clarifying the discretionary power of the judiciary in such matters, the court observed that where two or more persons are under an obligation, the claimant cannot dictate the terms or apportionment of payment.

"It is Court to decide that from whom and to what extent maintenance be made payable."

Revision Filed With Malafide Intention To Harass

Finally, the court agreed with the submissions of the State and the stepson that the presence of a real son with sufficient means negated the liability of the stepson. The bench remarked that the criminal revision appeared to have been filed solely with the "intention to harass the opposite party no. 2 without any substantive legal basis."

Finding that the revisionist’s claim against the stepson was wholly devoid of merit, the High Court dismissed the criminal revision. The ruling reinforces the settled legal principle that the primary objective of Section 125 CrPC is to prevent vagrancy and destitution, not to serve as a tool for unjust enrichment or harassment by multiplying claims against multiple relatives.

Date of Decision: 14 July 2026