Mere Presence or Familial Instigation Does Not Attract Section 34 IPC: Jharkhand High Court Sets Aside Life Sentence for Lack of Common Intention

“Conviction Cannot Be Based on Presumption of Common Intention” – In a significant reaffirmation of the legal standard for invoking Section 34 IPC, the Jharkhand High Court acquitted Anjulas Lakra and Isdor Lakra—co-accused in a 1992 murder case—observing that the prosecution failed to prove their common intention in committing the crime. While upholding the individual culpability of Kuwar Lakra (now deceased), the Division Bench of Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Sanjay Prasad found that the co-accused had no direct participation or clear meeting of minds to attract the joint liability provision under Section 34.

“The facts and circumstances, in our view, do not give rise to an inference of preconcert,” the Court held, stating that “convicting the appellants with the aid of Section 34 IPC cannot be sustained.”

The Allegation: Dispute Over Goat-Kid Escalates into Fatal Axe Attack

The case had its origins in a seemingly minor dispute over a goat-kid that went missing and was later recovered from the house of the primary accused, Kuwar Lakra. According to the informant and sole eyewitness, Margret Kerketta (wife of the deceased), on December 26, 1992, all four accused came to her house demanding return of the goat-kid. When her husband Victor refused, they dragged him out and Kuwar Lakra allegedly attacked him with an axe on the head multiple times, killing him on the spot. Margret too was injured while trying to intervene.

She testified, “Kuwar Lakra went to his house, returned with a Tangi (axe) and gave 7–8 blows on the head of my husband… I tried to save him but was assaulted.”

Discrepancies in Eyewitness Testimony and Absence of Corroboration

While Margret’s testimony remained the linchpin of the prosecution case, the High Court found inconsistencies between her initial fardbeyan and trial deposition, particularly on the involvement and role of the co-accused.

At one stage, she claimed that the others asked Kuwar to bring the axe. Later, in cross-examination, she stated that they were already armed when they came. Further, while she asserted that her husband was dragged to another house, the medical evidence did not support signs of dragging such as bruises or abrasions.

“There is major contradiction in the testimony of the sole eyewitness,” the Court observed. “While she attributed instigation to the co-accused, she admitted in cross-examination that they were already armed and that no specific overt act was done by them.”

The Court also noted that the Investigating Officer contradicted her by confirming that she never stated anything about the accused asking Kuwar to bring an axe.

On Section 34: No Common Intention, No Vicarious Liability

The Court delved deep into the jurisprudence of Section 34 IPC, reiterating that: “To attract Section 34, there must be evidence of a pre-arranged plan and participation of the accused in furtherance of the common intention.”

Citing Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, and State of Rajasthan v. Shobha Ram, the Bench emphasized that common intention must be inferred from conduct and circumstances. The Court concluded: “There were individual acts done without meeting of minds… The appellants can be held liable only for their individual acts. No such pre-arranged plan has been proved.”

The Bench underscored that criminal conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the Court found the prosecution evidence riddled with contradictions and lacking corroboration. The Chaukidar—who was allegedly the first person to hear about the incident—was not examined. The alleged murder weapon, though seized, was not sent for FSL analysis.

“If there is any doubt, then the benefit of such doubt is to be given to the accused,” the Court stressed, citing Rang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. and Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat.

“The learned trial court has not properly appreciated the testimony of the sole eyewitness, particularly in regard to major contradictions regarding the applicability of Section 34 IPC… The impugned order requires interference.”

Accordingly, the High Court quashed the conviction and life sentence imposed by the Sessions Judge, Simdega, in 2003 and acquitted the appellants Anjulas Lakra and Isdor Lakra of all charges under Section 302/34 IPC.

Date of Decision: April 4, 2025