Limitation Not Always A Legal Bar — Mixed Questions Of Fact And Law Must Go To Trial: Allahabad High Court Reiterates Scope Of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC

"Where the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded, the question of limitation cannot be summarily decided under Order VII Rule 11(d)" — Allahabad High Court reiterating the settled legal principle that the power under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to reject a plaint as time-barred must be exercised strictly based on the plaint averments. The Court dismissed an appeal filed under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC against the First Appellate Court’s decision to remand the matter for trial, holding that no substantial question of law arose for interference.

The judgment, authored by Hon’ble Dr. Justice Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, emphasized that the issue of limitation, especially under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, often entails a mixed question of fact and law and cannot be decided without trial where the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded in the plaint.

"Limitation Under Article 59 Begins From Date Of Knowledge — Not From Date Of Document"

Court: Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) unsustainable when plaintiff pleads specific date of knowledge; evidentiary scrutiny required

The suit originated with a prayer for cancellation of a sale deed dated 9.7.1978, registered on 17.11.1978, concerning agricultural land in Village Tarawan, District Sonbhadra. The suit was instituted on 8.10.2003 by the plaintiffs (respondents herein), alleging that they became aware of the sale deed only in April 2003 upon inspection of revenue records after a dispute with the defendants.

The trial court, however, accepted the defendants' application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, holding the suit to be time-barred and concluded that the plaintiffs had resorted to “clever drafting” to create an illusory cause of action to circumvent limitation.

On appeal, the First Appellate Court reversed the order, holding that the question of limitation was a mixed question of fact and law, and remanded the matter for trial on preliminary issues, specifically issues 3, 4 and 7, which related to jurisdiction and statutory bars under the UP Consolidation and Zamindari Abolition laws.

The defendants then filed the present appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC, challenging the remand order.

The core legal question was whether the plaint could be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that the suit, filed 25 years after the sale deed, was barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court noted that Order VII Rule 11(d) can only be invoked when the bar of limitation is evident from the plaint itself, and it is not open to consider the defendant’s contentions or traverse beyond the plaint at this stage.

“The trial Court while rejecting the plaint was at fault in failing to confine itself to the averments in the plaint and had based its conclusion on assertions regarding facts stated in the application filed under Order VII Rule 11,” observed the Court [Para 29].

Crucially, the High Court upheld the First Appellate Court’s reliance on Article 59, which provides that the three-year limitation period for cancellation of a document begins from the date when the facts entitling the plaintiff to seek such relief became known to them. The Court emphasized that in the present case, the plaintiffs had clearly pleaded April 2003 as the date of knowledge.

“In a situation where the date of knowledge has been specifically pleaded in the plaint and forms the basis of accrual of cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided at the threshold,” the Court ruled [Para 34].

The Court further relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy (2020) 17 SCC 260, Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai (2018) 6 SCC 422, and Shakti Bhog Foods Ltd. v. Central Bank of India (2020) 17 SCC 260, to reiterate that only plaint averments are relevant at the stage of Order VII Rule 11.

“The assertion of limitation must be ex-facie apparent from the plaint itself. The defendants’ written statement or contentions are irrelevant,” noted the Court [Para 25].

The Court also clarified that even though decisions like Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association (2025 SCC OnLine SC 48) and R. Nagraj v. Rajmani (2025 SCC OnLine SC 762) allow for limitation to be treated as a question of law in some circumstances, such flexibility does not apply when the plaint itself raises a factual dispute about the date of knowledge.

Rejection of Appeal Under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC

The High Court underlined that an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) must satisfy the standard of substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC. Finding none in the present case, the Court dismissed the appeal.

“No substantial question of law arises for consideration for the purpose of admitting the appeal. Consequently, the appeal does not merit admission and is, accordingly, dismissed,” the Court held [Para 38].

The Court also clarified that its observations would not prejudice the trial Court’s further proceedings on the remanded issues, especially issues regarding jurisdiction under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, which the defendants had raised.

The Allahabad High Court’s judgment affirms and clarifies the doctrinal limits of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, particularly with regard to the question of limitation. It reiterates the principle that unless the bar of limitation is apparent on the face of the plaint, summary rejection is impermissible. When the plaintiff pleads a specific date of knowledge, that plea must be tested through evidence and trial.

The Court has reinforced the well-established legal threshold that questions of limitation, when intertwined with factual assertions, are not mere questions of law, and courts must resist dismissing such suits without a full trial.

Date of Decision: October 6, 2025