Injured Wife Is Sterling Witness — Her Identification Of Husband As Assailant Needs No Corroboration: Allahabad High Court

"It is highly improbable that she has falsely implicated her husband — the assailant is her real husband, residing in the same house", In a case that lingered in the judicial system for over four decades, the Allahabad High Court on March 19, 2026 dismissed a criminal appeal filed in 1985 and affirmed the conviction of Rameshwar Dayal under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code for firing upon his wife Vimla Devi three times within their matrimonial home at midnight — leaving her permanently disabled in one leg.

Justice Abdul Shahid upheld the seven years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- awarded by the trial court, cancelling the appellant's bail and directing him to surrender within fifteen days.

Rameshwar Dayal himself lodged an FIR on February 23, 1983 at Police Station Bhogaon, Mainpuri, claiming that 3-4 unknown miscreants had entered his house by a ladder, fired upon his wife Vimla Devi, and fled. The Investigating Officer, however, travelled to S.N. Medical College, Agra, where the injured wife was admitted, and recorded her statement — in which she named her own husband as the assailant. The offence was converted from Section 459 IPC to Section 307 IPC, and Rameshwar Dayal was chargesheeted as the sole accused. The VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Mainpuri convicted him on February 20, 1985, and he was released on bail two days later after filing the present appeal.

The Injured Wife as a Sterling Witness: No Room for Misidentification

The Court placed Vimla Devi — PW-3 — at the very centre of its analysis, characterising her as a "sterling witness" whose identification of her husband as the assailant admitted of no doubt. The Court noted that both parties were residing in the same matrimonial home, the incident occurred at midnight within their shared premises, and the accused had a history of maltreatment and illicit relationships. "It is highly improbable that she has falsely implicated her husband in the said offence," the Court observed. The defence argument that she could not have identified the shooter because her face was turned westward when fired upon from the east was rejected outright — the Court found that in a case where the assailant is the woman's own husband, there could simply be no question of misidentification.

"It Is Quality of Witness and Not Quantity That Determines Adequacy of Evidence"

Pressing its analysis further, the Court held that the absence of independent witnesses was no infirmity whatsoever. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, the Court reiterated that under Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the number of witnesses is irrelevant. Conviction can rest on the solitary testimony of a single eye-witness, provided that testimony is credible and inspires confidence. PW-3's deposition, consistent throughout examination and cross-examination, met that standard fully. "It is quality of witness and not quantity which determines adequacy of evidence."

Hostile Witness Does Not Wash Out the Entire Prosecution Case

PW-1, the Jethani of the injured, turned hostile in court and resiled from her earlier statement recorded by the Investigating Officer at Agra Hospital — a statement in which she had acknowledged seeing Rameshwar Dayal standing nearby with a gun and confirmed that Vimla Devi had told her it was her husband who fired. The Court, relying on Meellappa Siddappa Alakanur v. State of Karnataka, held that the deposition of a hostile witness does not by itself wash out the entire evidence. The earlier statement at Agra, verified by the Investigating Officer PW-2, corroborated the prosecution version and remained on record. The Court additionally found PW-1's in-court testimony self-contradictory — she claimed she had been "separated" during the conversation at the hospital, yet proceeded to depose that she saw the injured's father hand money to the Inspector, which the Court found wholly incredible.

Defence Version Collapses Under Its Own Contradictions

The defence examined two witnesses to support the "unknown miscreants" theory. DW-1 (the accused's own brother Lajja Ram) deposed that the miscreants fled over the roof using a ladder. DW-2 (co-villager Babu Ram) deposed that miscreants simply walked out of the house at ground level. The Court found these accounts mutually destructive. More damningly, the Investigating Officer had found the ladder at the spot with two broken steps, making it physically impossible for anyone to have used it to reach the roof. The miscreants, on the defence's own version, also fled without looting a single household article — a circumstance the Court found entirely unbelievable. "It was not possible for the miscreants to use that broken ladder and reach the roof of the house," the Court observed, and the defence produced no cogent evidence to contradict this finding.

Non-Recovery of Firearm and Absence of FSL Report Not Fatal

The appellant's senior counsel pressed hard on the non-recovery of the gun and the absence of any Forensic Science Laboratory report. The Court rejected both arguments. Relying on Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of U.P., the Court held that in offences committed by firearm, absence of a ballistic expert report is not always fatal to the prosecution. Relying on State of U.P. v. Naresh and Others, the Court reiterated that non-recovery of a firearm is no ground to disbelieve the prosecution case. Where ocular evidence is trustworthy, it prevails over medical evidence — and the Court found that any minor discrepancies between the injured's account and the medical findings did not touch the basic prosecution case.

Section 307 IPC Stands — Modification to Section 323/324 Refused

The appellant relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Sivamani v. State to argue that the nature of injuries was insufficient for Section 307 IPC and the conviction deserved modification to Sections 323 and 324. The Court rejected this. Relying on Nanhey v. State of U.P., it held that to constitute an offence under Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the injury inflicted be grievous or dangerous to life. The intent to cause death is the determinative factor — and the Court found that intent fully established from the facts: the midnight attack, three successive gunshots, and the consistent background of maltreatment, dowry demands, and the accused's admitted desire to remarry.

Sentence Affirmed — No Mitigation Despite 41 Years on Bail

The appellant urged the Court to reduce the sentence, citing his approximate age of 70 years and clean criminal record. The Court, after examining the statement of the accused's own father on the sentencing hearing, calculated his age at approximately 60 years. On merits, the Court found no ground for leniency. Vimla Devi's leg remained permanently disabled. She had never returned to her matrimonial home. The accused never visited her in hospital and never came to bring her back. The relationship had never been repaired. "Her one leg is totally ineffective and she takes the support of a Lathi for walking" — the Court noted this as a permanent consequence of the accused's act, underscoring why no reduction in sentence was warranted.

Date of Decision: March 19, 2026