In Absence of Class I, Class II Heirs and Agnates, Cognate Shall Inherit : Punjab & Haryana High Court Revives Uterine Brother’s Right

“Even If He Was Not the Son, He Was Still the Heir”, Punjab and Haryana High Court delivered a reportable judgment clarifying the scope of succession by cognates under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Justice Vikas Bahl restored the trial court decree and held that where an intestate Hindu male dies without Class I or Class II heirs and where alleged agnates fail to prove their lineage, a uterine brother qualifies as a “cognate” and is entitled to inherit.

The Court ruled that the First Appellate Court had erred in refusing to grant relief flowing from admitted facts and in misreading settled principles relating to legitimacy and evidentiary appreciation.

A Battle Over 35 Kanals After an Issueless Death

The plaintiff Lal Chand sought declaration of ownership over 35 kanals 15 marlas of agricultural land in Village Dulheri, District Bhiwani. His claim rested on the assertion that he and Girdhari were sons of Chunia and Mohra, and that Girdhari died issueless and intestate in 1980.

The defendants, however, contended that Lal Chand was not the son of Chunia but was born from an alleged “kareva” marriage between Mohra and Kirpa. They further claimed to be agnates of Girdhari and thus entitled to succeed under Section 8(c) of the Hindu Succession Act.

The Trial Court decreed the suit in 1988, holding Lal Chand entitled to inherit. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree in 1991, dismissing the suit. The High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, examined whether that reversal was contrary to law.

“Court Is Bound to Grant Relief on Admitted Facts” – Appellate Court’s Approach Held Illegal

A striking aspect of the judgment is the Court’s firm stance on pleadings and relief.

The First Appellate Court had rejected the alternative plea that even if Lal Chand was not the son of Chunia, he was at least a uterine brother and therefore a cognate. It dismissed this reasoning on the ground that it was “not pleaded.”

Justice Bahl rejected this approach as legally untenable, observing:

“It is a matter of settled law that in the pleadings, the facts are required to be stated and not arguments and once the said facts are proved/admitted, then, it is incumbent upon the Court to grant relief, which the party is entitled to on the basis of the said admitted/proved facts.”

Since it was undisputed that both Lal Chand and Girdhari were born from Mohra, their uterine relationship stood admitted. The High Court held that the Appellate Court committed a grave error in ignoring the legal consequences flowing from that admitted fact.

“Cognate” Defined – Uterine Brother Entitled in Absence of Agnates

The Court carefully examined Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which provides the hierarchy of succession. It reproduced the statutory scheme that in the absence of Class I and Class II heirs, the estate devolves upon “agnates,” and only thereafter upon “cognates.”

Section 3(1)(c) defines a cognate as:

“one person is said to be a ‘cognate’ of another if the two are related by blood or adoption but not wholly through males.”

The Court held that a uterine brother is unquestionably a cognate. Since the defendants failed to prove that they were agnates — the pedigree table lacked foundational proof and the “main link” was missing — the statutory preference in favour of agnates could not operate.

In such a scenario, Section 8(d) squarely applied, and the plaintiff was entitled to inherit.

“Presumption of Legitimacy Operates in Favour of the Child” – Kareva Marriage Not Proved

On the core dispute regarding paternity, the High Court invoked the presumption of legitimacy.

It was admitted that Mohra was married to Chunia and that Lal Chand was born from Mohra. The burden was on the defendants to prove that Mohra had performed a valid kareva marriage with Kirpa and that Lal Chand was born from that union.

The Court noted that no custom permitting such kareva was pleaded or proved. No substantial evidence established that such a marriage ever occurred. The mutation of Kirpa’s estate in 1965 (Ex.P11) showed inheritance only by his widow Narayani and children — excluding both Mohra and Lal Chand.

The High Court emphasized:

“It is a matter of settled law that there is presumption in favour of legitimacy and there is also a presumption that the husband of the wife to whom the child is born is the father unless the same is rebutted…”

There was no proof of non-access or any circumstance to rebut this presumption. The defendants’ plea collapsed under the weight of statutory presumption and absence of evidence.

“Voter List Is Not Conclusive Proof of Parentage” – Documentary Evidence Misread

The First Appellate Court had relied heavily on certain voter lists showing Lal Chand as son of Kirpa. The High Court disapproved of this approach.

“It is a matter of settled law that voter list cannot be made the sole basis of determining the relationship and, at best, can only be used as corroborative evidence.”

In contrast, the ration card (Ex.PW5/A) and mutation records were duly proved and supported the plaintiff’s case. The High Court found that the Appellate Court had rejected these documents “on surmises and conjectures,” without evidentiary basis.

The testimonies of aged witnesses with special knowledge of the family were also wrongly discarded. The High Court found the Appellate Court’s appreciation of evidence to be perverse.

“Decision Contrary to Law” – Scope of Section 41 Punjab Courts Act Invoked

The Regular Second Appeal was filed under Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. Relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in Pankajakshi v. Chandrika, the Court reiterated that an appeal lies where the decision is “contrary to law.”

Justice Bahl concluded that the First Appellate Court’s findings were contrary to settled principles of succession, legitimacy, and evidence. Interference was therefore justified.

Trial Court Decree Restored, Sale Deed Hit by Lis Pendens

Allowing the appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment dated 21.08.1991 and restored the trial court decree dated 14.06.1988. Lal Chand was declared absolute owner in possession of the suit land. The impugned mutation, mortgage and sale deed executed during pendency of the suit were also set aside as being hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.

The ruling stands as a strong affirmation that succession cannot be defeated by speculative pedigree claims and that courts must give full effect to admitted relationships and statutory presumptions.

Date of Decision: 12/02/2026