Hostile Witness Cannot Erase a Bribe Demand Already Made on Record: Supreme Court Restores Conviction of Ration Officer

"The evidence of a hostile witness cannot, as a matter of law, be washed off the record altogether — the court must find the creditworthy portion and act upon it", In a significant ruling on the law of hostile witnesses in corruption cases, the Supreme Court has restored the conviction of a Taluk Supply Officer who demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs. 500 to countersign a ration card register — holding that a complainant turning hostile at trial cannot erase a demand already made, recorded, read over and confirmed before independent witnesses prior to the trap.

A bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran set aside the High Court's order of acquittal and restored the trial court's conviction and sentence of two years imprisonment under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The respondent-accused was the Taluk Supply Officer responsible for supervising Authorised Ration Dealers in his jurisdiction. The complainant, an Authorised Ration Dealer, was required to maintain an 'Abstract' — a register recording changes in ration cards — which had to be verified by the Revenue Inspector and then countersigned by the TSO every three months. The accused repeatedly refused to countersign the Abstract. Other ration dealers informed the complainant that the TSO would only countersign if paid a bribe of Rs. 500.

Unwilling to pay, the complainant approached the Vigilance Department. His oral complaint was taken down in writing by the Deputy Superintendent of Police (PW17), read over to him, and confirmed as correct in the presence of two independent witnesses — a Special Tahsildar and an Assistant Engineer of the PWD. A trap was laid; a marked Rs. 500 note was handed over by the complainant to the accused inside his cabin. Upon the pre-arranged signal, the trap team rushed in. The marked note was recovered from the accused's shirt pocket. His left hand tested positive for the chemical powder. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to two years imprisonment concurrent under both provisions with a fine of Rs. 10,000. The High Court acquitted him, finding that since the complainant had turned hostile, the demand was not established. The State of Kerala appealed.

The Court was required to decide: whether the hostile deposition of the complainant (PW1) entirely destroyed proof of demand under Section 7 of the PC Act; whether the creditworthy portions of a hostile witness's evidence — corroborated by independent witnesses — could establish demand; what the correct legal position under Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) was regarding proof of demand and offer; and whether the accused's false and contradictory explanation for accepting the marked note was an additional circumstance of guilt.

What the Complainant Actually Said — Before He Prevaricated

The Court undertook a careful reading of PW1's entire deposition — including in the original vernacular — and found that the High Court had selectively focused on the prevarication in cross-examination while ignoring the creditworthy admissions made during examination-in-chief and under cross-examination by the prosecution.

PW1 had deposed that the TSO had twice refused to countersign the Abstract. He was specifically confronted with the statement from his complaint that on 13.07.2009 and 20.07.2009, the accused had demanded Rs. 500 — which he affirmed. He confirmed that he had approached the vigilance office only because he was unwilling to pay the bribe. He confirmed that the oral complaint was taken down by PW17, read over to him in the presence of two independent witnesses, and that he confirmed all the statements as truthful before those witnesses.

"A specific question was put to the witness as to whether the statements made, taken down and read over to him were confirmed as truthful before the witnesses, which was affirmed by him before Court."

It was only when defence counsel put suggestions to him in cross-examination that PW1 proceeded to affirm each one — including denying the demand — in what the Court characterised as a transparent attempt to help the accused. These inconsistent answers in cross-examination did not, however, erase what he had already admitted in examination-in-chief and in answers to the prosecution's own cross-examination questions.

The Law on Hostile Witnesses — Credit Cannot Be Entirely Washed Away

The Court applied the governing principle as laid down in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration and approved by the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi):

"Even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony."

The Court held that this is the mandatory judicial exercise every court must undertake with a hostile witness — not a wholesale rejection of the entire deposition, but a careful identification of the creditworthy portions. PW1's admissions regarding the complaint, the pre-trap proceedings, and his confirmation of the statements before independent witnesses constituted precisely such creditworthy evidence — untouched by any effective cross-examination by the defence.

"PW1 prevaricated, but so much of the facts brought out by the prosecution on his examination brings forth a demand having been made by the accused. His evasive and inconsistent answers do not efface the creditworthy admissions already made."

PW2 and PW17 Fully Corroborated the Demand

The independent witness PW2 — the Assistant Engineer of PWD — corroborated every aspect of the pre-trap proceedings. He was present when PW1 made the oral complaint before PW17, confirmed it as correct, and participated in the trap proceedings. His evidence was, as the High Court itself acknowledged, not impeached by a single question in cross-examination by the defence.

PW17, the Deputy Superintendent of Police who led the trap, corroborated the oral complaint having been made by PW1, taken down in writing, read over to the complainant and confirmed by him in the presence of independent witnesses. Ext. P1 — the First Information Statement — was proved through PW17 as a document recording PW1's oral narration of the demand.

The Court found that this triple corroboration — PW1's own admissions, PW2's independent testimony, and PW17's evidence — fully established the demand, making the non-examination of the Special Tahsildar (who had accompanied PW1 into the cabin) an irrelevant gap.

Demand Established — The Neeraj Dutta Framework Applied

The Court referred to the Constitution Bench ruling in Neeraj Dutta which had held that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification as a fact in issue is the sine qua non for guilt under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. An offence under Section 7 can also be made out without a prior demand if there is a proved offer by the bribe-giver and acceptance by the public servant — which enables the presumption under Section 20. However, since demand was independently established in this case, the question of offer did not arise.

The Court distinguished the present case from Jayaraj B. v. State of Andhra Pradesh — which the defence had relied upon — by pointing out a critical factual difference: in Jayaraj B., the complainant had completely disowned the very complaint, stating the money was handed over as a fee for licence renewal deposited with a bank. Here, PW1 never disowned the complaint — he admitted making it, admitted confirming it before independent witnesses, and admitted the demand on being specifically confronted with the statements.

"The facts here are quite distinct since the complaint is admitted, the pre and post trap proceedings are spoken to by the complainant and corroborated by one of the independent witnesses."

False Explanation — Another Nail in the Coffin

The accused admitted receiving the marked Rs. 500 note but offered shifting explanations. In the cross-examination of PW1, the defence suggested the money was a loan repayment from PW1 to the accused through one Swayam Prakash. Under Section 313 CrPC examination, however, the accused stated the reverse — that PW1 had entrusted the money to him to hand over to Swayam Prakash. Swayam Prakash himself, examined as PW8, turned hostile but deposed that he had borrowed money from PW1 — not the other way around. The subject of the alleged loan thus stood contradicted by the very witness the accused sought to rely upon.

"Though the accused is entitled to take inconsistent stances in defence, where the suggestion made and explanation offered are contrary and the subject of the alleged loan is spoken yet otherwise, the false explanation is a compelling circumstance pointing to the guilt of the accused."

High Court's Error Identified

The Court noted a telling contradiction in the High Court's own reasoning: it had itself observed that PW2's evidence was not impeached by a shred in cross-examination, that PW1's demeanour in the witness box showed hesitation before answering, and that certain portions of Ext. P1 were admitted by PW1. Yet despite these observations, the High Court concluded that the demand was not established. The Supreme Court found this conclusion plainly erroneous — the High Court had the correct observations but drew the wrong conclusion from them.

The trial court had correctly discharged its judicial duty by scrutinising the deposition of the hostile witness, identifying the creditworthy portion, and acting upon it in light of the corroborating evidence.

The appeal was allowed. The High Court's order of acquittal was set aside and the trial court's conviction and sentence were restored. Since the sentences of two years concurrent under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) with fine of Rs. 10,000 represented the statutory minimum, the Court found no reason to interfere with the quantum.

Date of Decision: April 15, 2026