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by Admin
21 April 2026 9:22 AM
"Preference for higher qualification operates only within the zone of candidates who have already fulfilled the essential eligibility criteria; it does not enlarge or modify the field of eligibility itself", Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated April 20, 2026, held that a higher academic degree cannot be used to substitute or bypass the mandatory "essential" work experience prescribed in recruitment rules.
A bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar observed that "preferential" qualifications only come into play once the threshold eligibility is met, and a candidate lacking the required experience cannot be declared eligible merely because they possess a superior degree.
The case arose from a recruitment dispute involving the post of Computer Hardware Engineer with the Himachal Pradesh Board of School Education. The Board’s advertisement prescribed a B.E./B.Tech degree with five years of experience as an essential qualification, while noting that preference would be given to M.Tech holders. The appellant, Himakshi, was selected despite having only one year of experience because she held an M.Tech degree and secured the highest marks.
Primary Legal Issues Before The Court
The primary question before the court was whether a candidate lacking the essential five-year work experience could be selected on the basis of a preferred higher academic qualification. The court was also called upon to determine whether the power of relaxation under recruitment rules can be presumed to have been exercised in the absence of any written record or specific deliberation by the recruiting agency.
Essential Qualifications Act As A Mandatory Threshold
The Court emphasized that the use of the word "minimum" or "essential" in recruitment rules indicates a threshold condition that must be fulfilled by all candidates. It noted that such conditions cannot be diluted or substituted based on comparative merit or superior academic achievements. The bench clarified that essential eligibility criteria form the bedrock of the selection process and cannot be rewritten after the process has commenced.
Court Distinguishes Between Essential And Preferential Qualifications
The bench observed that the stage of extending preference arises only after a candidate satisfies the essential qualifications. The Court held that a preference for a higher qualification operates strictly within the zone of candidates who have already crossed the eligibility bar. It cannot be used to enlarge the field of eligibility or to treat an otherwise ineligible candidate as qualified.
"The stage of applying preference arises only after a candidate is found to fulfil the essential qualifications prescribed for the post. Where a candidate does not meet the threshold requirement of eligibility, the question of extending preference does not arise."
Higher Degrees Do Not Presuppose Lower Experience Requirements
Citing the precedent in Zahoor Ahmad Rather v. Sheikh Imtiyaz Ahmad (2019), the Court reiterated that in the absence of a specific statutory rule, a recruiting agency cannot treat a higher qualification as a replacement for mandatory experience. The bench noted that the State, as an employer, is entitled to prescribe specific qualifications, and judicial review cannot be used to expand the ambit of these prescribed criteria.
Power Of Relaxation Must Be Consciously Exercised In Writing
While Rule 18 of the R&P Rules granted the Board the power to relax provisions for reasons recorded in writing, the Court found no evidence of such exercise. Upon summoning the records, the bench observed that the Selection Committee’s files were silent on the deficiency in the appellant's experience. The Court noted that the mere existence of a power to relax does not mean the power has been exercised.
"The absence of any deliberation or reasoning reinforces that selection was effected without due application of mind and without granting relaxation. The power of relaxation involves a departure from prescribed conditions and requires a conscious, reasoned, and demonstrable exercise of discretion."
Equity Cannot Override Fundamental Illegality In Selection
The appellant argued that she had been in service since 2016 and was regularized in 2019, thus creating equitable grounds for her retention. However, the Court rejected this, stating that equitable considerations cannot be invoked to override essential eligibility requirements. It distinguished this case from others where "marginal" deficiencies were protected, noting that a four-year deficit in experience was a "root" defect.
"Inherent illegality arising from contravention of the R&P Rules cannot be dispensed with by equitable considerations. The experience required was of a specialized nature in computer manufacturing, which could not be substituted by subsequent service on the post itself."
No Right To Appointment For Unsuccessful Candidates
The Court also declined to direct the appointment of the respondent, Rahul Verma, who claimed to possess the requisite experience. The bench observed that his experience was also not strictly in a "company of repute" as defined by the rules. It held that the entire selection process was vitiated by a failure to scrutinize eligibility at the threshold, and directing his appointment would amount to substituting one illegality with another.
Fresh Selection Process Permitted
The Supreme Court upheld the Himachal Pradesh High Court's decision to set aside Himakshi’s appointment. The bench concluded that since the selection process was fundamentally flawed due to the non-adherence to the R&P Rules, the Board is at liberty to issue a fresh advertisement. The Court emphasized that in matters of public employment, transparency and strict adherence to declared criteria are paramount.
The appeals were dismissed, and the Court confirmed that the selected candidate's appointment could not be sustained in law. The Board has been granted the liberty to conduct a fresh selection process strictly in accordance with the prescribed Recruitment and Promotion Rules.
Date of Decision: 20 April 2026